BARRIERS TO NEW ZEALAND-CHINA ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: A CASE OF THE DAIRY INDUSTRY AND BEYOND

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Introduction

The intensified trend of globalisation in the last two decades has provided opportunities for the emerging economies to catch up with developed world. Hand in hand with the general trend towards globalisation, there has been a dramatic shift in the distribution of wealth and economic power in the world economy from developed economies to developing and emerging economies (Hill, 2009; Mahbubani, 2008; Prestowitz, 2005). Within this context, the world has witnessed the rise and integration of China into the world economy. The transformation of the Chinese economy into a major power on the world stage presents enormous opportunities and also imposes challenges of competition and adaptation for many existing economies, and the societies which they serve. Globalisation has also been complemented by a surge of regional integration which has brought about significant change in the international business environment (Altomonte, 2007).

New Zealand had, despite distance, traditionally been integrated with the British economy. This triumph of politics and history over geography quickly dissipated in the 1960s and 1970s. Britain, a declining economy, turned to what was then the European Common Market. During the same period there was remarkable growth in East and Southeast Asia, led initially by Japan, but followed in a cascade by the “four little dragons/tigers” – South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore – the ASEAN economies and then, by China (Beal, 1999). Due to its geographical location in the Asia-Pacific region and economic complementarity, the New Zealand economy has been increasingly integrated with the Asian-Pacific economies in general and most recently the Chinese economy in particular (Beal and Zhang, 1997).

This paper is concerned with barriers to New Zealand-China economic integration. It begins by presenting a picture of fast economic integration between the New Zealand and Chinese economies in terms of trading relations. It then discusses the low level of investment relative to the trade volume, and the imbalance of investment flows between the two countries. Afterwards, it analyses the case of the Chinese bidding for the Crafar dairy farms and examines what this case revealed about barriers to mutually beneficial and sustainable economic integration. Finally it concludes with the lessons to be learnt.
The trading relationship: A fast economic integration

Regional economic integration refers to preferential trading arrangements defined by geographical region of participating countries and usually also includes removal of restriction of capital flows between members and consensus on rules and regulations governing economic activity (Balasubramanyam, Sapsfrod and Griffiths, 2002).

Benefitted from long lasting friendships at people to people level that had been built up by a generation of pioneers such as Rewi Alley, and from the more independent foreign policy, such as the nuclear-free policy, by successive New Zealand governments New Zealand has enjoyed a better bilateral political relationship with China than most other developed countries. The disparity in size, and the huge potential of the Chinese economy, concentrated the mind of New Zealand governments. Economic complementarities and a relative lack of competitive overlap eased the process. For example, at this stage few Chinese agricultural products compete in the New Zealand market; garlic being an exception. Although at one time New Zealand attempted to build a competitive manufacturing sector, that effort has been unsuccessful to a large extent, so imports of manufactured products have long been accepted and meet with little resistance. The contrast with major manufacturing economies such as the United States, Japan, and South Korea is marked (Dalal and Prestowitz, 2011, Whoriskey, 2012). However, although the economic impact is small, there is still considerable public antagonism over the transfer of the manufacture of iconic products to China. Examples include the clothing brand Swannndri, manufactured in China since 2005 (Donald, 2005). Nevertheless, with the rapid rise of the Chinese economy, New Zealand-China economic relations have deepened significantly since the 1990s. The warm political relations and intensified economic integration resulted in the establishment of Sino-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in 2008, China’s first FTA signed with a developed country.

The signing of FTA has enabled New Zealand to enjoy the first mover advantages, resulting in a dramatic increase of bilateral trade. In 2010, China overtook the U.S. and Japan to become New Zealand’s second largest trading partner, next only to its large neighbour Australia. New Zealand’s merchandise exports to China are dominated by its agricultural products, such as dairy products, reflecting the huge increase in demand for high quality food as the income level of Chinese consumers has surged and there has been a dynamic shift of diet towards the western style.

A brief examination of long-run statistics of merchandise trade between New Zealand and China – in this context defined as the combination of China Mainland and the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong – reveals an important difference between the dynamics of New Zealand imports from and exports to China.

The absolute value of New Zealand imports from China grew from NZ$159 million in 1983 to NZ$7.3 billion in 2011, a 45-fold increase. These figures are, of course, affected by inflation and by the growing integration of the New Zealand economy into the world market. In the context of changes in trade relations, the share of imports provides a more accurate and useful picture. Fig 1 plots China’s share in total merchandise imports of New Zealand over virtually the last three decades. From
this figure we can see China’s share in New Zealand’s total imports rising from 2.1% in 1983 to 16.2% in 2011. This figure also demonstrates that the increase is fairly smooth and has been accelerating over the last decade.

As shown in Fig 2, China’s share in the total exports of New Zealand also demonstrates a dramatic increase over the whole period. However, data in Fig 2 reveals a picture different from smooth growth in share of imports from China. First, here we see a considerable fluctuation, with a significant slump during the period of 1989-1995 and a dramatic increase after 2008. Second, there was an overall increase in share up until 2008, but it is not large. China’s share of New Zealand’s exports in 1983 was 3.1% and it was slightly over double that at 6.8% after 25 years in 2008. However, it took only three years to double the share again, reaching 13.9% in 2011. Both the significant drop at the end of 1980s and the dramatic rise after 2008 in China’s share may reflect the influence of some political factors on New Zealand exports to the Chinese market. The Tiananmen demonstrations, and their repression on 4 June 1989 (the June 4th Incident), was condemned in New Zealand and internationally, and this presumably impacted on New Zealand exports to China, although how this happened is unclear. One possibility is that demand for New Zealand imports for the tourism industry fell with the slump in foreign visitors. Later, the dramatic rise of China’s share in New Zealand exports after 2008 can be explained by another political factor – the signing of New Zealand-China

Note: 1) The figure is based on data from Statistics New Zealand.
2) The data are for June years. Imports are cif, exports are fob, and the currency is NZ$. 
FTA in that year, although not all of the rise can be attributed to this single factor. For example, there was, in particular, a surge in direct exports of milk powder following the Sanlu melamine scandal of 2008 (Christian, 2011). There was a certain irony in this surge given that Fonterra, New Zealand’s major dairy company, had a 43% share in the Sino-New Zealand joint venture of Sanlu.

A comparison of these two sets of data suggests different trends for New Zealand’s imports from and exports to China. While the imports of New Zealand from China are driven mainly by economic factors – the great surge in need for China’s competitive, low-price and increasingly sophisticated manufacturing goods, exports to China are more likely to be vulnerable to the changes in political factors. The risk for New Zealand in this trend of dynamics is two-fold. One is that the increase in exports following the signing of FTA may be temporary and not sustainable. FTAs with large countries are more important for small countries partly because they raise profile, at least temporarily. This was exemplified by Chile’s experience in its FTA with Korea (Beal, 2010). The other is that if there is a growth in antagonism in China towards New Zealand, either in government or amongst consumers, its exports to China might suffer. In particular, if there is a development of a perception that New Zealanders are anti-Chinese, then there may be a reluctance to accept New Zealand products. It should be noted that service exports such as tourism and education are even more vulnerable to bad publicity.

Despite the different pictures shown in New Zealand’s imports from and exports to China, the long-run statistical data indicates that the New Zealand economy has been rapidly integrated with the Chinese economy in terms of its trading relations. Moreover, the significance of the Chinese market for the New Zealand economy is

![Figure 2. China’s share of New Zealand’s merchandise exports, 1983-2011. Source: Statistics New Zealand infoshare, downloaded 19 June 2012.](image-url)
not only shown in its dramatic increase in trade values and its ascending position, but also demonstrated by the dynamic nature in the international trading relations of New Zealand. After being double-hit by a domestic economic recession and the world financial crisis in 2007-2008, the New Zealand economy climbed out of the recession at the end of 2009 although with a slow pace and a weak momentum, thanks to an export-led recovery. However, the difference between this export-led recovery and previous rounds is that it is the Chinese and other Asian markets, instead of its traditional major trading partners of Australia, the United States and Japan, that provided the New Zealand economy with a growing export market. Combined New Zealand exports to its traditional largest markets of Australia, the US and Japan declined by 8.6% in 2009 (Asia New Zealand Foundation, 2010), as high debt levels, continuing difficulty with accessing credit and concerns about rising unemployment in the US, and prolonged recession in Japan constrained consumer spending and imports from New Zealand. As a result, in this year Japan lost its ranking as one of New Zealand’s top three trading partners, a position it had held for around half a century since the 1960s. On the other hand, the merchandise exports from New Zealand to China surged by 43% in the same year of 2009, replacing Japan as the third largest market for New Zealand. Moreover, New Zealand exports to several other emerging Asian economies in 2009, such as Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan, which have benefitted from a closer integration with the Chinese economy, also experienced remarkable growth (27% for Singapore, 17% for Hong Kong and 13% for Taiwan) (Asia New Zealand Foundation, 2010). Moreover, since Australia’s resource-boom is to a large extent due to demand from China, New Zealand’s exports to its larger neighbour can be also seen as linked to China (Alexander, 2012).

The opposite trends of New Zealand’s trade relations with two groups of its major trading partners indicate a diversion of New Zealand trade towards the Chinese and emerging Asian markets, representing the process of economic integration between the New Zealand and Chinese economies. This process is still on-going and even intensifying, demonstrated by China’s continuing rapid ascent in the position among the leading trading partners of New Zealand. According to Statistics New Zealand, China became the second largest trade partner and also second largest exporting market for New Zealand in 2010, overtaking the U. S.; Furthermore, New Zealand imports from China reached a historic high in 2011, and China became the largest import source for New Zealand, pushing Australia to the second place. In the March quarter of 2013 exports to China for the first time surpassed those to Australia and China became New Zealand’s leading trade partner. Based on the current trend of bilateral trade between New Zealand and China, the New Zealand Government developed its “NZ Inc China Strategy” in February 2012, aiming to double its bilateral merchandise trade with China in the next three years by 2015, although it is not yet clear that there is how much difference in practice between the 2012 approach and what preceded it. Given the dynamic change in New Zealand’s trade relations with its major trading partners and its fast integration with the Chinese and Asian emerging economies, it is expected that the New Zealand economy will be increasingly influenced by the performance of the Chinese economy, although not dominated by it, in the future.
Bilateral investment flows: A lacklustre picture

The rapid development of New Zealand’s trade relations with China presents a picture of fast economic integration between the two countries, although there are still some concerns for New Zealand exports to China as discussed above. However, the picture in the other aspect of economic integration, namely, investment flows, has been remarkably different. Theoretically, the relationship between regional economic integration and foreign direct investment (FDI) is rather more complex and controversial than the one between economic integration and international trade (Altomonte, 2007). It is suggested that if FDI is driven by comparative advantages, then regional economic integration would positively affect FDI flows, as FDI flows will tend to increase once the trade barriers are removed (Balasubramanyam, Sapsford and Griffiths, 2002; Altomonte, 2007). As the two economies of New Zealand and China are highly complementary to each other, it would be expected that the growth in trade and decline in trade barriers within the framework of New Zealand-China FTA would be accompanied by a growth in investment flows between the two countries. Against this expectation, the bilateral investment flows between New Zealand and China have lagged well behind the booming trade relations. Up to the year of 2011, the FDI stock invested by New Zealand firms in China is NZ$541 million and that invested by Chinese firms in New Zealand is NZ$1.87 billion (Smellie, 2012). To put these figures in context, the FDI stock from Australia in China is NZ$36 billion, and that from China in Australia is around NZ$100 billion (Smellie, 2012). Although the New Zealand economy is much smaller than the Australian and New Zealand does not have the huge mineral resources of Australia, the stock and flows of bilateral FDI between New Zealand and China is still considerably smaller than might be expected.

The rather subdued relationship in bilateral investment between New Zealand and China contrasts sharply with the boom in trade and suggests an unbalanced economic integration between the two countries.

Bilateral investment: Motivation and barriers

International business theory suggests that growth in trade between trading partners will be accompanied by growth in investment flows. With the increase of economic integration between two or more economies, investment flows between member countries tend to increase (Feils and Rahman, 2011; Rugman and Verbeke, 2007), as firms would like to get access to a larger market and/or to gain economic efficiency.

Some New Zealand companies, such as Fonterra, GlobalHort and Ground Loading Trailers Ltd, successfully invested in China, although there were also some failures, such as Lion Nathan Brewery. The presence of these companies in China has facilitated their penetration of the Chinese market and helped the business growth in the home country. However, the total FDI stock from New Zealand in China is still very small. There are several possible explanations for this. First, traditionally, New Zealand has been mainly a country with capital inflows, rather than outflows. As Table 1 indicates, New Zealand has a particularly high proportion of stock of inward to outward FDI in comparison with other comparable economies. It can be suggested that the small size of the economy, accompanied by a low savings rate, has led to the problem of long-term shortage of capital and limited the ability of New Zealand firms to become involved in outward FDI.
Table 1. Inward and outward stocks of FDI (Millions of US$), 2010, selected countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economy</th>
<th>Inward</th>
<th>Outward</th>
<th>I/O ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>508,123</td>
<td>402,249</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>214,880</td>
<td>831,074</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>70,129</td>
<td>17,642</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>578,818</td>
<td>297,600</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea, Republic of</td>
<td>127,047</td>
<td>138,984</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Second, the small amount of New Zealand FDI in the Chinese market is also a reflection of the relative inexperience of New Zealand firms in FDI activity in general and in investment to China in particular. Mainly due to its lack of a strong and internationally competitive manufacturing sector, New Zealand firms have a track record of exporting commodities from its agricultural sector for firms of other countries to process, rather than investing in its own high-value production, or more sensibly, setting up overseas subsidiaries to do that. Some unsuccessful previous experiences of New Zealand firms in the manufacturing industry in China during the late 1990s, such as Lion Nathan (breweries) and Fletcher Challenge Steel (Kang, 2010), have also contributed to New Zealand firms’ reluctance to invest in the Chinese market, outside of their comfort zone of the agricultural sector. It is no surprise that the highest-profile New Zealand investor in China is the country’s major dairy enterprise, Fonterra. Third, the issue of long-term economic strategy of the government may also need to be examined as one of the factors. For instance, government documents (e.g. NZ Treasury, 2012) paid only scant attention to outward FDI, in contrast to an eagerness to attract inward FDI.

Therefore, it can be concluded that the rather poor record of FDI flows for New Zealand firms in the Chinese market is mainly due to a lack of capacity and/or lack of experience from the New Zealand side.

However, the small value of FDI stock from Chinese firms in New Zealand is due to quite different reasons. With the largest stock of foreign exchange reserve in the world (over US$3 trillion at the end of 2011) and encouraged by the “Go global” strategy formulated by the Chinese government in the late 1990s, Chinese firms have been intensively involved in overseas direct investment, and this trend has intensified since the beginning of the new century. With the explosive growth in the trade relations between New Zealand and China and the signing of FTA, Chinese firms have expressed a strong interest in investing in New Zealand. In 2011 it was reported that China planned to spend $6 billion of its Sovereign Wealth Fund on New Zealand bonds and assets (Lanteigne and Young, 2012). In recent years, several shareholding acquisitions of New Zealand manufacturing and/or agricultural processing firms, such as Synlait,
Fisher & Paykel, and PGG Wrightson, by Chinese companies gained extensive media exposure as successful “win-win” cases for the both sides. However, the relatively small and less advanced manufacturing industries in New Zealand can provide only limited opportunities for Chinese firms to invest in that sector. Chinese firms are much more interested in investing in the New Zealand resources sector than in other sectors. It has been suggested that the classic FDI motivations, including market-seeking, resources-seeking, and strategic assets-seeking, have played a key role in motivating Chinese outward FDI (Buckley et al., 2007; Buckley et al., 2008; Deng, 2009; Rui and Yip, 2008; Kang and Jiang, 2012). A strong need to secure access to overseas natural resources and raw materials in order to sustain China’s long term economic growth has been and will continue to be a key driving force for Chinese overseas investment (Deng, 2004; Hong and Sun, 2006; Ramasamy, Yeung and Laforet, 2012).

It is evident that the most dominant factors in motivating Chinese firms to invest in New Zealand would be resources-seeking and strategic assets-seeking in the agricultural sector. The rapid economic growth in China and dramatic increase of income levels of Chinese consumers has propelled strong demand for high quality agricultural products, including dairy products. It is reported that consumption of dairy products in China had grown at over 15% annually during the period of eight years from 2002 to 2009, but the consumption per capita of dairy products in China up to the year 2009 was still just over 10% of the consumption level in the United States (Asia New Zealand Foundation, 2010). Moreover, the imported dairy products currently represent only around 10% of the total demand and consumption in the market. Thus, there remains huge potential to further growth in the Chinese market for dairy products both of domestic production and foreign imports. Attracted by the excellent country image of “clean and green” and reputation in agricultural products, especially dairy products, of safety and purity, many Chinese firms are very interested in investing in the New Zealand resources sector.

However, the overseas investment by Chinese firms in the New Zealand agricultural sector, especially acquiring farmland, has been and remains a subject of much public opposition. Chinese bids for farms have often been portrayed negatively in the media and been seen as part of China’s race to acquire global resources and strategic assets, enabling its rise as strategic global superpower. The consecutive bids by different Chinese companies for the Crafar farms, and the reaction to them, constitute an important case study of barriers to integration between New Zealand and the global economy. The focus here is on relations with China, but the case has much wider implications. On the one hand, there is a seasoned public objection to selling assets to foreigners. This is exemplified by the lobby group Campaign Against Foreign Control of Aotearoa (CAFCA) (Horton, 2012). The relationship of Maori to the land and to the New Zealand government through the Treaty of Waitangi adds another dimension of complexity (Taonui, 2012). Sales of government owned assets, currently power-generating companies, are an issue of fierce debate (Bennett, 2012). This is partly a matter of objecting to privatisation but the concern over privatisation is magnified by the assumption that, despite government assurances, the assets will be eventually passed to foreign ownership (Cosgrove, 2012). On the other hand, it is clear that the issue related to ethnicity of the foreign investors underlays much of the hostility to foreign ownership. The current focus is on the Chinese, but it goes wider
than that and is essentially a concern about Asians in general. This is primarily a matter of geography and history. Africa is far away from New Zealand and the interaction is very limited and as a consequence anti-African sentiment is subdued. The same is true of Hispanics, Arabs, Iranians, and Europeans other than those from the British Isles and Northwest Europe. Asia is another matter, as the interaction, through trade and investment, migration, tourism, and international students, is intensive and growing. “Asia”, it should be noted, principally means East Asia – trade, migration and tourism, from South Asia is quite small though growing fast; although New Zealand’s relations with Southeast Asia are well developed, the impact of the relations is quite small. It is unlikely that many New Zealanders who are not from East Asia themselves can distinguish between a Japanese, a Korean, and a Chinese and antipathy over ethnicity tends to be influenced by fad and fashion, and impact. Forty years ago anti-Asian feeling was directed at the Japanese, now it is mainly at the Chinese. Occasionally, as in recent incidents involving bad labour conditions on Korean fishing boats in New Zealand waters, there is a certain upsurge of aversion to Koreans (Field, 2011; Noh, 2012). It is important not to exaggerate the antipathy over Asian ethnicity in New Zealand; there is plenty of evidence of widespread positive feelings, friendship, and admiration (Colmar Brunton, 2012). Nevertheless it is necessary to recognise its existence and to examine the ways in which it impedes good decision making on economic integration.

The tortuous bidding for Crafar farms

Crafar farms were first founded in the 1970s by the Crafar family, and had become the largest family-owned dairy business in New Zealand by the beginning of this century (Hickey, 2009). Crafar farms rapidly expanded its farm scale by buying neighbouring farms initially and then purchasing more farms throughout the whole North Island of New Zealand during the last two decades, acquisitions which were financed through bank loans by using their existing farms as leverage. However, the financial difficulties suffered by the Crafar farms, which were caused by the price drop for dairy products because of the economic recession in the 2009, coupled with poor management of the farms, led to a number of defaults in servicing their bank loans of about NZ$200 million. As a result, 16 Crafar farms were put into receivership in October 2009.

In early 2010, Natural Dairy, a China-based company, made its bidding offer on these farms in receivership. This bidding offer triggered strident public disquiet and anxiety. In responding to the strong public opposition, John Key, the New Zealand Prime Minister, raised his concerns about the sale of farmland to overseas interests. Following this, the New Zealand government rejected Natural Dairy’s application to buy the 16 Crafar farms in December 2010. After this failed bidding, another Chinese company, the Shanghai-based Pengxin International made an offer in January 2011 to purchase the 16 Crafar farms in the North Island and applied to the Overseas Investment Office, the New Zealand Government regulatory agency, for consent. Based on recommendation made by Overseas Investment Office, New Zealand government granted an approval to this bidding offer in January 2012, although some strict conditions were attached. Nevertheless, there was still another turnaround regarding this bidding offer. In responding to the request by the local bidding rival of Shanghai Pengxin, a judicial review conducted by a New Zealand High Court overturned the government’s
approval of Shanghai Pengxin’s application for purchasing Crafar farms in February 2012 and the High Court ordered the government to reconsider this application. A final ministerial approval was given on 20 April 2012 (Overseas Investment Office, 2012).

**Concerns about Chinese investment in New Zealand resources sector**

As demonstrated in the case of the attempts to acquire the Crafar farms, Chinese firms’ investment in New Zealand resources sector has sparked concerns and they find themselves stonewalled when they seek to get involved in investment of resources sector, particularly farmland. Evidently, this resistance to Chinese investment has become a major barrier for a further economic integration between the two countries, and thus deserves a close analysis.

As discussed earlier, there is a fear in New Zealand about losing control over its major natural resource, especially its farmland, to foreign interests. Moreover, this fear is compounded and magnified by the concern over the ethnicity of Chinese as the foreign investor.

Prime Minister John Key’s statement that it would not be in New Zealand’s interest if “New Zealanders become tenants in their own country” has reflected the public’s concerns over sales of New Zealand farms (NZPA, 2010). This concern seems valid at first sight as the agricultural sector is the major driving force of the New Zealand economy and farmland is regarded as the most significant strategic assets for the country. However, a more detailed analysis on the ownership over farmland indicates that the issue of “foreign control over New Zealand farmland” is far from as serious an issue as presented. As stated by Mr Key in early 2012, among the total of around 45,000 farm sales during the past 18 months, only 72 sales for farms went to foreign ownership. Mr Key further argued that New Zealand was actually “quite a difficult place to buy land if you are a foreigner” (Rudman, 2012). As for the concern of “Chinese control over New Zealand farmland”, it seems that this issue has been highly exaggerated. It is only during more recent years that Chinese firms started to develop an interest in acquiring farms in New Zealand. Nevertheless, during the six years from 2006 to 2011 New Zealand government approved farmland sales of 1.1 million hectares to foreign interests, of which mainland China accounted for only a tiny 117 hectares and Hong Kong for 939 hectares, less than 0.1% of land sold to foreign investors during the period (Alexander, 2012). Evidently, the popular anxiety about Chinese control over New Zealand farmland is out of proportion with the reality of the overall ownership structure of farmland, and China’s role in that.

Another major concern about Chinese investment in the New Zealand resource sector is the state ownership of investing firms or their strong links with the Chinese government. It has been suggested that Chinese multinational companies (MNCs) have been increasingly active in engaging in overseas investment since the late 1990s and that a significant proportion of these Chinese MNCs are state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (Liu, Buck and Shu, 2005; Buckley et al., 2008; Globeman and Shapiro, 2009). Given SOEs’ affiliation with political institutions in the home country they can be perceived in the host country not simply as business entities, but also as political actors (He and Lyles, 2009; Cui and Jiang, 2012). SOEs are widely perceived as pursuing political
rather than commercial goals which might jeopardise the national interest of the host country (Young et al., 2008). This concern has been widespread in Western countries that have received Chinese overseas investment, such as the United States and Australia (Globeman and Shapiro, 2009; He and Lyles, 2009), as well as in the developing world (Hurst and Wang, 2012). It echoes fears of a generation ago that the strong links between government and business in Japan made investments from Japanese corporations somehow, in often unspecified ways, more problematic than similar FDI from, say, the United States (Cai, 2012). However, the validity of this concern for the case of Chinese firm’s bids for Crafar farms may need a further investigation. First, the negative effect of SOEs’ behaviour pattern in pursuing non-commercial objectives might be more relevant for the situation when the SOEs are operating in the domestic economy (Globeman and Shapiro, 2009). It is unlikely, for instance, that Chinese firms, no matter whether SOEs or privately-owned companies, would make employment preservation an objective for their overseas subsidiaries at the expense of commercial interests. Second, in the case of the Chinese firms’ bids of Crafar farms, both the successive Chinese bidding firms are privately-owned, not SOEs. Even if their acquisition biddings might be encouraged or backed by the Chinese government, their acquisitions were motivated by commercial rather than political considerations. Ironically, the offering package made by Shanghai Pengxin for the purchase of the Crafar farms included post-purchase administration by Landcorp Farming Limited, itself a New Zealand SOE (http://www.landcorp.co.nz/). Indeed, some opponents of the Chinese bid wanted Landcorp to buy the farms, as it is suggested that “Landcorp is owned by us, and it is set up precisely to buy farmland and manage it for us” (Pagani, 2012). One problem with that argument is that the New Zealand dairy industry is primarily an export platform and Landcorp has not played a role as an exporter.

A third concern is related to the enormous differences in political, ideological and cultural systems between the host and home countries of New Zealand and China. Generally speaking, the public and politicians in New Zealand have been reluctant to see foreign ownership over farmland, but as mentioned earlier, there have been numerous cases of farm sales to foreign investors in recent years and none of these sales had led to public uproars and media attention as was the case in bidding offers by Chinese firms. It seems that Chinese firms have been singled out from investing firms of other countries in terms of investing in New Zealand resources sector because of their background in political, ideological and cultural systems in which they are embedded while operating in their home country. As noted by a New Zealand commentator, the public protest over Crafar farm sale was a targeted opposition to the idea of Chinese ownership, as it centred on the sale of 16 Crafar farms to the Chinese, but not on the sale of 72 farms to investors from other countries during the previous 18 months (Rudman, 2012). Politically and ideologically, China is regarded as an authoritarian country ruled by a single political party, which is different from the political system in New Zealand. Coming from their own historical background, there are some fundamental differences between the two countries in their cultural heritage and traditions. Influenced by these differences in terms of broad business environment between New Zealand and China, there is a lack of in-depth knowledge of the New Zealand market and its business culture. It is suggested that when doing business in a foreign land, a firm will suffer
the liability of foreignness that is derived from the differences in business environment between home and host countries (Zaheer, 1995). But of course this works both ways. The huge differences between New Zealand and China and the lack of knowledge about the other make business interaction difficult. However, given that this business interaction is necessary, and much more necessary for New Zealand than for China, then forms of economic integration that enhance knowledge and familiarity with the other country, are particularly desirable.

Lessons from the Crafar affair

The Crafar sale has been given final governmental approval, but the Crafar affair is probably by no means over. It has manifested deep-seated obstacles to New Zealand’s fruitful economic integration with China. The widespread anti-China sentiment in the general public – which can coexist, it should be noted, with cordial relations with Chinese as individuals and often enthusiastic appreciation of Chinese culture, and particularly food – comes as no surprise. Anti-Chinese policies, and the discrimination which they expressed, and nurtured, have a long history in New Zealand. In 1881 a poll tax of ten New Zealand pounds was imposed on Chinese migrants, most of whom had come during the gold rush, and this was raised to one hundred pounds in 1896 – a considerable amount of money at the time. It was not until 1951 that Chinese were allowed to become New Zealand citizens. No other ethnic group suffered such discrimination. Attempts to acknowledge and rectify this unfortunate historical legacy, most notably by then Prime Minister Helen Clark’s apology to the New Zealand Chinese community on the occasion of Chinese New Year in 2002 (Clark, 2002), may have made overt discrimination unacceptable, but clearly have not succeeded in eradicating it. This has been exacerbated by the media, which seldom misses the opportunity to publish or broadcast anything critical of China. There is a partial exception here in the business press (or business section of daily newspapers) where the allure of the Chinese market is an important factor. But even here the coverage tends to be superficial and self-centred with a focus on the problems caused by China’s difference from New Zealand rather than New Zealand’s difference from, and ignorance of, China.

Politicians follow the same route, with political parties in opposition vying with each other on ‘standing up to China’. Parties currently in government have to be more circumspect.

The Crafar affair brought out these background characteristics of New Zealand’s attitude towards China, and the Chinese, but it also highlighted another problem which was rather separate from the China dimension. The elite – political, official, media – revealed a lack of strategic insight and vision, and arguably a failure of courage. It pandered to popular prejudice rather than leading the debate into an analysis of what Chinese investment means for New Zealand’s present and future prosperity.

There is a danger, manifested in the discussions over Crafars as well as elsewhere, of New Zealand mistaking temporary advantage for permanent entitlement. For historical reasons New Zealand currently enjoys certain competitive advantages in comparison with China and with many other countries. Dairy products, of which Crafar
is a part, are a leading example. New Zealand has an enviable reputation for quality and food-safety. China’s reputation, in New Zealand, in other parts of the world such as Korea, and in China itself, is generally agreed to be appalling (McDonald, 2012). The reputation may be unfair, and it is in the nature of these things that failures in food safety, rather that success, attract attention. However, much more important is the fact that food safety is part of a dynamic and historical process. As one American historian put it, ‘A century and a half ago, another fast-growing nation had a reputation for sacrificing standards to its pursuit of profit, and it was the United States….American factories turned out adulterated foods and wilfully mislabelled products. Indeed, to see China today is to glimpse, in a distant mirror, the 19th-century American economy in all its corner-cutting, fraudulent glory’ (Mihm, 2007). Food safety is but one aspect of quality control of production, and regulatory governance. The process can go backwards, and there are many examples in the developed world of deregulation leading to a resurgence of quality issues (Fackler, 2006). However, in general, it can be expected that there will be an overall improvement as companies and governments wrestle with the issue (Enderwick, 2009). Japan is an oft-cited case of a country which went from a low-quality, imitative manufacturer to a high-quality, innovative producer in a short period of time driven by determined government and industry efforts. The Chinese government could scarcely be unaware of the problems caused by bad quality and low safety standards, both domestically and internationally, and the body charged with improving the quality and safety of Chinese products, the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine, is a ministerial-level unit directly under the State Council and there is a Quality Development Outline(2011-2020) which is an important component of the state planning process (General Administration of Quality Supervision, 2011). As with quality and safety, so with general standards of technology. Achievements in aerospace are one manifestation of rapid advance and there are frequent reports of China poised to take world leadership in particular technologies (China Realtime Report, 2012).

It would be prudent for New Zealand to assume that China’s levels of quality production and assurance, technology, expertise, and governance will improve and approach, perhaps equal then overtake that of New Zealand. In that case, New Zealand products, whether milk powder or wine, will attract no special premium in the Chinese market and will have to compete with domestic products of comparable quality as well as, of course, those from around the globe. If New Zealand remains just a ‘farm for China’ as it was a ‘farm for Britain’ a century ago, then prospects for economic prosperity are limited. Moreover, there is a danger that Chinese products, benefiting from economies of scale, might outperform domestic ones in the New Zealand market.

There is a need therefore for New Zealand to have a more ambitious strategic vision than this. New Zealand must seek ways in which to link its economy with Chinese, and Asian, growth. A growth, moreover, not merely in quantity but also in quality. Straightforward exports of products from New Zealand dairy farms and wineries are not likely to achieve that. New Zealand needs to develop strategies which leverage present advantages into sustainable relationships of mutual, evolving benefit. That suggests a policy of promoting intelligent, well-considered economic integration. Economic integration does not, in itself, automatically lead to social benefit and
development as the experience of Africa over the past couple of centuries demonstrates. International joint ventures, certainly but not exclusively, in China can go wrong, as the case of Fonterra’s ill-fated involvement with Sanlu illustrates (Crewdson, 2009). There is always an element of risk. There is always the danger of Intellectual Property Rights being appropriated or otherwise lost. There are no guarantees and no certainties. Nevertheless, now is the time for New Zealand companies to embed themselves into the Chinese economy, so that as it grows and becomes more sophisticated they are part of that development. This is true not merely of the dairy industry but a whole range of industries where New Zealand currently has strengths which could be turned to sustainable advantage in fast-expanding markets. Wine is a case in point, where China has just having overtaken the UK to become the fifth largest market in the world (Wei, 2012). With limited area, New Zealand will never become a large producer of wine, but it might be possible for a New Zealand winery in China to become much bigger, and more successful, than it could at home. Nor should the vision be limited to agricultural products; some New Zealand companies occupy leading positions in niches in manufacturing and services (Lindsay et al., 2011).

None of this is easy or without hazard. It is, however, necessary if New Zealand is not to become a low-value-added appendage to the Chinese economy. The Crafars affair was a case of China investing in New Zealand. Instead of resisting it, often on racist grounds, it should have been welcomed as an opportunity and incentive to increase New Zealand participation in the Chinese economy, and to raise public awareness of the necessity and benefit of that.

References


Biographical notes

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IS THE FACE OF CHINESE ETHNIC MINORITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN NEW ZEALAND CHANGING?

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1. Introduction

New Zealand is an immigrant nation on the Pacific Rim, similar to Australia, Canada and the United States (Selvarajah, 2004a). Its migrant receiving traditions have provided significant benefit to New Zealand’s economic development. It is argued that the temporary and permanent entry of people from other countries helps to attract global talent to address skill shortages (Fernandez & Kim, 1998) and bring capital, expertise, and international connections to build New Zealand’s workforce (Department of Labour, 2009). Nearly a quarter of New Zealand’s population is foreign-born and forty per cent of these immigrants arrived in the past ten years (Mare, Morten, & Stillman, 2007).

The history of migrants from China making their home in New Zealand extends over 150 years. The Chinese community in New Zealand is currently the largest single ethnic minority group with a population of 147,570 residents as at the 2006 census, and is comparable in size to the Samoan community (131,103 residents). This is in the context of a New Zealand society of 4 million people of which European (2,609,589 residents) and Maori (565,326 residents) are the dominating cultures (Statistics New Zealand, 2006). The level of connection the New Zealand Chinese community has with this country’s business sector is significant, and will impact on New Zealand’s ability to participate in Asia’s expanding ascendency.

One of the unique characteristics within the New Zealand migrant receiving history has been the establishment of two distinct Chinese resident populations, with the new Chinese immigrants showing several salient differences to the established New Zealand-Chinese. The first wave of Chinese between 1865 and 1900 came to New Zealand during the gold-rush and suffered significant hardship and discrimination (Ng, 2001). The descendants of this group are English and Cantonese-speaking, locally educated, and have a mixed of New Zealand and Chinese cultural traditions. A second wave of Chinese migration occurred when there was a shift in New Zealand immigrant policy in the mid-1980s (Meares, Ho, Peace, & Spoonley, 2010). In contrast, this group is mandarin-speaking, highly educated, and have strong cultural and economic links to China.

The descendants of early Chinese immigrants live and work alongside those who have arrived in the last two decades. Within this broad community classification there are differences in terms of their place of origin, political inclinations, religion and language or dialect (Meares et al., 2010). Hence, within the dominant host society, it
is important not to become confused between birthplace and ethnicity (Bedford & Ho, 2008) although traditionally in New Zealand, researchers have for comparative purposes labelled immigrants from regions such as China or the Pacific as homogeneous groups (Duncan, Bollard, & Yeabsley, 1997; Dunstan, Boyd, & Crichton, 2004; Elliott & Gray, 2000; Fletcher, 1999; Nana, Sanderson, & Goodchild, 2003).

As part of the knowledge development and greater understanding of receiving countries and their ethnic minority communities, this paper attempts to understand the entrepreneurial behaviours of the Chinese in New Zealand. This paper supports the argument that entrepreneurial behavioural patterns have intragroup differences. Therefore, this paper offers insights into the unique characteristics of the Chinese people of New Zealand, from both migration eras, through the voices of the entrepreneurs themselves.

2. Two waves of Chinese migration to New Zealand

The first wave of Chinese immigrants arrived from 1865-1900. They came to New Zealand as gold seekers (Ng, 2001) and faced significant hardship, discrimination and separation from their families in China (Wong, 2002). These newcomers came to a new world in which a poll tax was imposed on them from 1881 (Friesen, 2009). They also faced restrictive legislation, and were excluded from mainstream society (Ng, 2001). For example, the Chinese Immigration Act 1881, the Aliens Act of 1891 and the Asiatic Immigration Restriction Act of 1899 are all testimony to institutionalised race discrimination of that time (Selvarajah, 2004b). This first wave of Chinese immigrants were predominantly male and almost exclusively came from the Cantonese-speaking Guangdong province of Southern China – a poverty-stricken region at that time (Meares et al., 2010). They stuck together and retained their traditional ways as a means of overcoming language difficulties, discrimination and a lack of personal assets (Ng, 2001). After the gold rush, a core of these immigrants remained in New Zealand and established themselves through small businesses such as market gardens, laundries and fruit shops (Meares et al., 2010). However, it was not until 1944 when the Immigrant Restrictions Act 1920 was abolished, that Chinese in New Zealand were reunited with their wives and children (Meares et al., 2010). From the 1950s onwards, New Zealand society became more accepting of the Chinese community and there was a loosening of immigration regulations to allow the reunification of families before the new Communist government in China closed the gates on emigration in 1951 (Ng, 2001). The expectation with New Zealand was that the Chinese would acculturate and eventually assimilate into the dominant western culture in the country. However, they could not fully assimilate because they were visibly different, retained strong ties to their traditional culture and adhered to strong family obligations (Ng, 2001). These challenges were not as prevalent for their New Zealand-born children as they grew up with free Western education and childhood friendships with their European and Pacific peers, and were not afraid of the loss of their Chineseness. Yet these young Chinese-New Zealanders could not completely assimilate because of their adherence to the values and traditions handed down by their parents. They were generally more comfortable with the concept of multiculturalism which had its roots in the 1960s New Zealand, although
multiculturalism has never been formally adopted as official policy (Fletcher, 1999). They also saw their future in higher education and entered into most aspects of New Zealand life as confident New Zealanders of Chinese ancestry (Ng, 2001).

A second wave of Chinese migration occurred when there was a historical shift from predominantly European immigration to a more liberal New Zealand immigration policy in the mid-1980s (Meares et al., 2010). The passing of the Immigration Act 1987 changed the criteria for migrant entry into New Zealand and facilitated a significant rise in the intake of highly skilled labour migrants and entrepreneurs (Meares et al., 2009). Earlier immigration policy had been based on preferred source countries such as Australia, UK and Western Europe (Selvarajah, 2004b). However, the new policy considered a perspective migrant’s personal qualities such as age, educational levels, work experience, and the ability to bring investment capital into the country (Bedford & Ho, 2008). This abandonment of the preferential-country system for immigration opened New Zealand to all nationalities based on equitable selection criteria (Selvarajah, 2004b). A point-system qualification was introduced in 1991 (Bedford & Ho, 2008) which coincided with the liberalisation of China’s internationalisation policy. These changes gave Chinese citizens the opportunity to trade and travel internationally and facilitated increased migration to New Zealand. The second wave of immigrants are no longer subject to the same level of discrimination as those from the first wave (Meares et al., 2010), however de Bruin and Dupuis (2000) argued that the media wrongly portrayed them as rich, lacking commitment to their new host society, exhibiting self-interest and keeping to their own. The second wave began with arrivals from Hong Kong and Taiwan but since 2000 the majority of arrivals have come from mainland China. The majority are well-educated, skilled individuals with considerable business experience and/or investment capital (Ho & Bedford, 2006). They speak mainly Mandarin as opposed to the first wave who were Cantonese-speakers and come from a range of provincial origins in China (Bedford & Ho, 2008). It should also be noted that immigrants have come from regions other than simply China, such as Britain, Korea and South Africa (Bedford & Ho, 2008). After 2000 the Chinese migrants dominated arrivals in New Zealand - second only to those arriving as permanent arrivals from the United Kingdom (Meares et al., 2010). Furthermore, Chinese immigration numbers are forecast to reach 667,000 by 2021 (Chen & McQueen, 2008). Many of these immigrants have established businesses within New Zealand and have also invested personal capital from overseas (Chen & McQueen, 2008).

The second wave of Chinese immigrants have faced obstacles. Firstly, there is evidence to suggest that immigrant unique skills are underutilised in New Zealand (de Bruin & Dupuis, 2000; Watts & Trlin, 1999). Secondly language has been identified as a limiting factor for Chinese immigrants (Benson-Rea & Rawlinson, 2003). In support, (Selvarajah, 1998) highlighted that because of the language affinity between Malaysia and New Zealand, the business migrants of Chinese ethnicity from Malaysia have adjusted better than those from China itself. Thirdly, research has highlighted the importance of a greater understanding of intercultural communication and diversity brought about by globalism (Cruickshank, 2007). For example, Chinese business culture is based on trust and places great emphasis on trustworthy sources (Benson-Rea & Rawlinson, 2003).
3. Method

This is a study of the experiences within an ethnic minority in New Zealand. It uses case study analysis to extrapolate the ethnic minority intragroup differences in terms of the Chinese entrepreneurial behaviour in New Zealand. New Zealand has a dominant European culture with immigration trends and policies that are comparable to those of other major receiving countries. The country has established a reputation for being highly entrepreneurial (Frederick & Carswell, 2001; Hamilton & Dana, 2003), and has a large small business sector in which businesses with 19 or fewer employees contribute 39% of the country’s economic output (Statistics New Zealand, 2007).

Two multiple case studies were developed. The first case study was ethnic minority entrepreneurs who were New Zealand-born descendants of the 1st wave Chinese immigrants that arrived in New Zealand from 1860-1900; and the second case study was the 2nd wave of Chinese ethnic minority immigrant entrepreneurs who arrived after 1987. The first multiple case study (first-wave) consisted of semi-structured interviews with five New Zealand-born Chinese entrepreneurs from: market garden, restaurant, clothing, hardware retail, and consultancy business backgrounds. One interviewee was also heavily involved with local-body politics. The second multiple case study (second-wave) consisted of semi-structured interviews with five overseas-born Chinese entrepreneurs from: fast food, immigrant services, retail, biotechnology and finance business backgrounds. These interviews consisted of narratives in which the respondents told their own story and expressed their own views – in essence the voice of the Chinese ethnic minority entrepreneurs themselves. The study then analysed their stories through comparative analysis to consider the phenomenon: to what extent the two waves of Chinese migration to New Zealand have convergent or divergent entrepreneurial behaviours.

4. Findings

A major element of social and economic adjustment to life in a host country can be tied to the status attained through some form of employment - which impacts on factors such as their family viability, social acceptance and personal esteem (Masurel, Nijkamp, & Vindigni, 2004). The literature has identified that a prominent means of satisfying this need has been to engage in entrepreneurial activity within the small business sector of the host country (Aldrich, Jones, & McEvoy, 1984; Hammarstedt, 2004; Henry & Caldwell, 2006; Levent, Masurel, & Nijkamp, 2003). Furthermore, extensive research has addressed the inter-connection between self-employment and ethnic minority entrepreneurship (Basu & Altinay, 2002; Levie, 2007; Li, 1993; Masurel et al., 2004; Ram, 1997; Thuno, 2003; Waldinger, Howard, Ward, & and associates, 1990; Zhou, 2004). All Chinese immigrants, throughout the two eras of migration to New Zealand, have been confronted with the dual challenge of holding true to their cultural values whilst striving to find their place in a new society. Within the Chinese ethnic minority community in New Zealand 24.1% have engaged in self-employment; whereas 20.3% of Europeans and 18% of the total resident population are involved in some form of self-employment (Statistics New Zealand, 2006). The findings of this study expand on the views and voices of current Chinese ethnic minority entrepreneurs from the two waves of migration to New Zealand.
First Wave (1860s to early 1900s)

**Historical background:** The respondents spoke of their historical roots in the Cantonese region of China. They outlined family migrant histories of discrimination, racism and hard times experienced by their grandparents and parents, as in “he retired and returned to his wife in the Chinese village, dying four years later just 58, after 44 years of hard grind in Gore [New Zealand town].”

**Upbringing:** The respondents were from New Zealand market gardening and restaurant family backgrounds. They had 2-4 siblings and stated that Cantonese was spoken at home. They all spoke of parents that worked long hours and of working in family market gardens or restaurants as children, “we worked in the gardens after school and weekends until quite late at night.” They referred to overcoming prejudice and discrimination during their upbringing, but suggested it was far less than that experienced by their parents and grandparents.

“Not anything that we can’t overcome. I mean there will always be prejudice and I guess prejudice will always be around; it’s just that it’s a little bit more subtle. When my grandparents came to New Zealand it was like the government would say we don’t like Chinese coming into New Zealand so we will whack a hundred pound poll tax on them. You know anyone else can come into New Zealand free of charge but if you are Chinese well you need to pay. So it was a lot more obvious in those days growing up…. If anything it makes you try to succeed more I guess subconsciously. You know if you get one or two people express racial prejudice then in the back of your mind you say well I’ve got nothing to worry about because I’m a lot smarter than that idiot anyway, and you show it in your performance. It makes you more determined.”

However, the respondents did highlight the challenge of living in two worlds. Backwards in honouring their culture and traditions and forwards in making their way in New Zealand society, as in: “you retain some of the traditional or some of the critical cultural heritage obviously. But in terms of your thoughts and behaviour definitely more New Zealander than Chinese.” They also referred to their lack of acceptance because of physical differences.

“I mean it wasn’t that long ago that I would go and speak somewhere and say ‘us Kiwis’ and people would laugh at me. So I think it is always going to be there because I think the stereotype of a Kiwi [term depicting a New Zealander] is still somebody who is white.”

**Education:** Four of the five respondents had tertiary education although none had any business qualifications. They stated that their parents and grandparents, who had been accustomed to hard manual labour, placed a great deal of emphasis on higher education for their children.
Manual labour is quite hard work and while my parents didn’t have so much of a choice because of their language and their educational background, they certainly made sure that the children had a higher level of education.”

**Ethnic Connection:** Generally there wasn’t a strong affiliation to the New Zealand Chinese community among the first-wave respondents. In fact there was a distancing from the Chinese who had arrived in the second wave. This was in part because of language, as in: “recent Chinese immigrants speak Mandarin which is the national language now. So you can imagine the old established Chinese community speaking Cantonese and don’t understand the Mandarin and vice-versa;” and an unwillingness to associate with the new community “we see ourselves as quite different and distinct from that part of the Chinese community.” So there is a definite disconnect between the two waves of immigration.

“Now with many of them [new wave], their accent gives them away, there is a reluctance to get away from the groups from which they are comfortable and so that means that groups of Chinese stick together, they live together in the same suburbs. Their social behaviour is the same and their shopping is done in very Chinese areas now. And that is great for them but in terms of integration it is probably not hugely helpful.”

**Influence of Chinese traditions and values on business orientation:** The respondents all spoke of working long hours and felt that their work ethic was inspired by their understanding of the hardship that their parents and grandparents had endured.

“I think through that hardship that sort of galvanised a very strong will to survive and to succeed in business. And I think that has been passed on down the years, you know, it’s just the sheer grit and determination to succeed.”

Therefore they often spoke of parents and grandparents being role models in their business success. Respondents also spoke of a strong family orientation influencing their lives.

“I think the sense of family. The closeness of family, the support of family which I still believe is there in a way that perhaps other ethnicities don’t have as strong a focus on.”

**Homeland/ancestral connection:** The respondents had no significant affiliation to their ancestral homeland but did feel a sense of connection.

“I was born here, lived here for 65 years, I know no other home except [New Zealand city]; but when I went back to China to find my roots there was a feeling there that is very difficult to put into words.”

However, another respondent commented on their time working in China as “ironically I didn’t blend in as I dreamed I would. I wasn’t accepted as one of them.”
None of the respondents had homeland business connections but did understand the importance of such relationships for New Zealand future prosperity.

“That’s where I think the future wealth is going to come from. And when you look at it from the point of view of relationships - that is Chinese do business because of relationships and the building up of relationships. And the Chinese who are here say ‘Okay we want to do something in China and I’ve got a cousin over there’. They would far rather partner with their cousin than with Joe Blogs who they don’t know at all. So that’s the kind of ‘blood is thicker than water’ thing.”

Business profile: The major business catalyst identified by the respondents was self-determination, as in: “I wanted freedom, freedom to do what I wanted and follow ideas without the restrictions of working for someone else.” They measured success through growth and profitability. They used professional advice from accountants and lawyers, had growth expectations, and a customer focus, as in: “the way I market we have got everybody. It doesn’t matter what race you are, what age you are, we make sure we market it for everybody.”

Family Business dynamic: Respondents spoke of a strong family business orientation and the importance of capital funding through the family. They also spoke of family involvement in the running of their businesses. As one respondent stated:

“Because all members of the family have had some sort of equity in the business. And there are a number of us of the family that work in the business as well. In many ways we have resurrected the family business.”

The respondents didn’t, however, display a preference for their children to be involved in the business, as in: “I don’t have expectations about my son taking over my business when he grows up.” They spoke of a preference for children to find their own opportunities.

“So what is the purpose of my life? The purpose of my life is to bring up my children so that they can do better than I have done. When I was growing up the number of Chinese market gardens were tremendous, but there are about three left now. And that has happened because we raise our children to go to University and buggered off. So the succession hasn’t come through that [the business]. The succession has come through give me the opportunity to do other things and move into professions and other realms of business.”

Second Wave (mid-1980s to current)

Historical background: The respondents came from a variety of destinations: Northern and Central China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. They were generally from prosperous and/or entrepreneurial families and had between one and four siblings. All respondents arrived in New Zealand between 1988 and 2002.
Migration and settlement: These respondents came to New Zealand for lifestyle and educational reasons rather than business opportunities, as in “mainly for the education system for our daughter and the better lifestyle.” They chose to reside in New Zealand’s largest cities and overall had limited knowledge about New Zealand and its society before migrating. When discussing their settlement in New Zealand they did refer to the importance of being Chinese.

“I am still a Chinese but of course I am a New Zealand citizen…. My English accent is not Kiwi and I don’t look like a Kiwi but of course I hold a Kiwi passport and I live in New Zealand.”

They spoke Mandarin as their first language although one respondent also spoke Cantonese. Furthermore, they were all conversant in English before arriving in New Zealand, but language integration was still a problem. For example “when I communicate with local people, sometime I can’t understand what they say… and they make me very aware that they can’t understand what I say.” The respondents also spoke of difficulties in career integration, as several respondents vocalised their frustration with the lack of job opportunities suiting their skill sets.

“But the Chinese people have some ability and they have some knowledge. They have very good knowledge, high qualifications and high skills, but very hard to find a job. So that is the reason why the majority of people start their own business.”

Education: All of the respondents had tertiary qualifications, with one having completed a PhD. Four had completed business qualifications. Furthermore, all placed emphasis on the importance of constant learning and practical business experience.

“Everybody should keep on learning all the time and be open-minded. It’s not how many times you succeed, it’s how many times you fail and are able to come back. And you learn from your mistakes.”

Ethnic Connection: Generally respondents had Chinese networks but no strong affiliation to the broader Chinese community. In part, this may reflect the respondents’ different geographic origins, as in “funny thing about the Taiwanese community in New Zealand is that it is quite small so everyone knows one-an-other.” Many of the respondents felt little or no connection to the first-wave descendants, thus reinforcing the disconnect between the two waves of immigration.

“Yes there is still a huge gap. The Chinese born in New Zealand, most of them, don’t speak Chinese for start. There is a gap in thinking, as most New Zealand born have not experienced the culture in Asia.”

Influence of Chinese traditions and values on business orientation: The respondents all spoke of working long hours and coming from a hard working business culture.
“Chinese people are hardworking people. We don’t really want to work for somebody else, we want to make our own company, set up our own career. So probably that kind of cultural thing that influence me.”

They did not speak of role models influencing their business activities. They referred to the importance of retaining their own identity in business whilst trying to ‘fit in’ to a new society, and they felt that their integration was different from the New Zealand-born Chinese.

“New Zealand born Chinese are more towards the Kiwi way of life. They want to be Kiwi, but their skin colour betrayed them. They will try to stay away from the traditional value of being a Chinese and move more and more towards the Western side of business. While immigrants, like myself, want to maintain our own identity of being a Chinese. But at the same time trying to adapt to the Western way of life.”

Having their own identity did, however, create its integration challenges, as in “our doing things back in other countries is sometimes totally different with New Zealand. A lot of things you have to learn and get used to it.”

**Homeland connection:** The respondent had strong homeland affiliations with respect to family connections, as in “yes, once a week in the office I will open my MSN and I can chat with my family,” and business connections as in, “I am going back in July this year for some business trips, to have a look around the whole business market.”

**Business profile:** The two major business catalysts identified by the respondents were the challenging job market in New Zealand, as in: “it is really, really hard to find a job here. So that’s why a lot of immigrants, if they have a lot of savings or whatever, will go into business.” They measured success through profitability, “profit one of the long term goals… if you can’t make the profit you will close anyway.” The respondents considered the major business difficulties they faced were language barriers, the small nature of the New Zealand market, and a lack of local knowledge.

“Business here in New Zealand is very, very difficult; especially for migrants when you don’t have extensive knowledge about the background. The way to do business, and all those systems, rules and regulations.”

Whereas, a major strength they highlighted was their strong Asian business culture. They used professional advice from accountants and lawyers, had growth expectations, and a customer focus, as in: “it’s not how much we know, it’s how much we care. So that is our differentiation from other companies.”

**Family Business dynamic:** Respondents did not refer to a family business orientation as in, “I don’t see the family can bring me any more values in business for me to bring them in,” and displayed little interest in the prospect of children becoming involved in the business. As one respondent stated:
“No, no, no, because we don’t want to interrupt my daughters studying. And I know some people who have the children work behind the kitchen or something. While they doing homework and then help out with the counter, but we don’t want that.”

With regard to the capitalisation of the business, respondents generally referred to personally funding the venture as in “I came into the country through the business investment criteria, so we should have some sort of investment to bring along with us.”

5. Discussion

The significant contribution Chinese migration has made to New Zealand’s economic and social development, from the first immigrants arriving in the 1860s to the most current new migrants, is supported in the literature (Chen & McQueen, 2008; de Bruin & Dupuis, 2000; Friesen, 2009; Ho & Bedford, 2006; Meares et al., 2010; Ng, 2001; Selvarajah, 1998; Noel Watts, White, & Trlin, 2004; Wong, 2002). Yet gaps remain regarding how this contribution is evolving. This study considered the changing nature of Chinese ethnic minority entrepreneurship in New Zealand from the perspective of two migration eras. Firstly, the descendants of the 1865-1900 immigrants who came to New Zealand as gold seekers, and secondly, the new wave of migration from China since the mid-1980s. Historically, the two waves have very different backgrounds with respect to region of origin, language, social status in China, and migration motivations. Findings of this study indicate that first-wave entrepreneurs were New Zealand-born, have a strong understanding of the New Zealand context, and consider themselves to be New Zealand-Chinese. However, the respondents did highlight the challenge of living in two worlds. That is, fitting into the current societal context whilst still retaining their Chinese traditional values. They referred to the struggle for complete acceptance in society but experienced less of the hardship and discrimination which plagued their parents and grandparents who had arrived as poverty-stricken immigrants in the late 1800s. Whereas the respondents from the second wave came to New Zealand for lifestyle and educational purposes, came from relatively affluent families, are well resourced, and consider themselves to be Chinese living in New Zealand. As a consequence they spoke of some social and employment discrimination based on language barriers and race.

Most respondents from both waves generally had tertiary qualifications. However, it was only those from the second wave who had business qualifications. They all spoke of the Chinese strong work ethic and first-wave respondents also referred to the positive influence of role models. Respondents from neither wave spoke of strong affiliation to the broader New Zealand-Chinese community. In fact, there was a disconnect between the first and second wave respondents because of language, values, and historical differences. Although first-wave respondents spoke of the historical hardship creating a bond between the descendants of the first wave, the second-wave respondents were from diverse regions within China and felt little connection to a unified Chinese community in New Zealand.
These broad differences between the two waves have led to variances in business start-up patterns. For example, first-wave respondents had no significant personal or business affiliations with Asia whereas the second generation had strong homeland affiliations and used these connections to benefit their business aspirations. Second-wave respondents did identify language, the small nature of the market and lack of local context as barriers to their business activity in New Zealand, whilst first-wave respondents highlighted their New Zealand upbringing and social networks as supporting their business activities. The first-wave respondents also identified a strong family involvement in the business and the importance of family financing. Whereas, the second wave of immigrants had minimal family involvement in the business and referred to personal funding of the venture. There was, therefore, a greater long-term commitment to New Zealand business within the first-wave respondents than the second-wave respondents. Never-the-less, both waves identified self-determination as a major catalyst for starting their own businesses, whilst second-wave respondents also highlighted the challenging job market as influencing their business start-up decision. Both groups measured success through profitability, used professional advice, and had strong customer focus.

6. Conclusion

How is Chinese ethnic minority entrepreneurship in New Zealand changing? Evidence in this study is of a profound shift in the Chinese demographic in New Zealand over the last 30 years, which has led to two distinct subgroups within this community. Data was collected from respondents of two waves of migration: descendants of the 1860-1900s migration and post-1980s migrants. Findings highlighted distinct differences with respect to social status, traditions and values; and suggested that it would be erroneous to consider both waves as one homogeneous Chinese community in New Zealand. Ethnic minority entrepreneurs from both waves who participated in this study did, however, have similarities in their entrepreneurial profile. They had tertiary education, strong work ethic, and similar business traits in respect to growth expectation, profit orientation and customer focus. Respondents from both waves never-the-less had a sense of disconnect from each other as sub-communities and different approaches to conducting business. For example, an affiliation to China of the second wave offered significant international business opportunities through the greater understanding of and connection to the Asian business environment. Tempering this was a lack of elegance or commitment to business in New Zealand in the long-term. On the other hand, the first-wave descendants appeared to have a stronger family business orientation and a long-term commitment to business activity within New Zealand, but lack the international connections of the second-wave participants. Therefore, although their entrepreneurial profiles are similar in many respects, the contrasting migrant history and behaviours inferred that there are significant differences in first and second wave business orientation and engagement with respect to international business connections and commitment to New Zealand.

This study places emphasis on the investigation of migration timeframes as an important addition to the existing ethnic minority entrepreneurship literature which
focuses predominantly on the impact of the environment within the host country. Findings suggest that in order to make effective decisions policy makers dealing with immigration, settlement and employment should consider the time context of subgroup differences and the subsequent difference in business behaviours. Future research should also look to understand to what extent an increasing global marketplace could displace the traditional ethnic minority business patterns, as immigrants could be behaving in a more transient fashion and not seek to establish themselves in the host society, but simply benefit from it financially, then move to another country.

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**Biographical notes**

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Rhonda Kantor is a PhD candidate at the University of Canterbury, currently undertaking research into ethnic minority dynasties. She holds a Masters degree in education from Concordia University, Canada and her research interests are in ethnic minority entrepreneurship and adult education.
Focus on North Korea

Introduction

On 16 – 17 November 2012, the New Zealand Asia Institute at the University of Auckland hosted an international conference of scholars from North America, Korea, Australia and New Zealand to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between New Zealand and the Republic of Korea. Titled “New Zealand, Korea and Asia-Pacific: From Distance to Closeness” and supported by the ROK Embassy in Wellington, the Korea Foundation and NZAI, the purpose of the conference was to examine the diminishing distance and increasing mutual interests between the two nations since the end of World War Two, a time when the Korean peninsula became divided into two ideologically opposed states in a changed international environment and New Zealand was beginning to reach out to non-European cultures and societies in its Pacific neighbourhood.

When in 1950 the Cold War erupted on the Korean peninsula in a bitter war both civil and international, New Zealand was one of the sixteen nations that joined the UN forces that fought alongside the South Korean army against the North and its allies.

So long as the Korean peninsula remains divided into two enemy states, New Zealand’s greatest political importance to South Korea seems to lie in security. Although traditionally and currently a strong ally of the ROK, New Zealand is unthreatening enough to the DPRK to engage in some positive ventures in the north and to provide a neutral ground on which improved understanding can be sought, if only for the time being at unofficial levels. The three articles on North Korea included in this issue of the NZJAS are contributed by participants at the conference and add precisely the expert information and insights on the domestic dynamics of the North Korean state on recent developments in the international context—the view from China and Australia in particular—that are needed to engage in any effective way in the region at any level.

Kenneth Wells, Research Fellow, NZAI
The last twenty years of North Korean history has been marked by a dramatic social transformation. Ostensibly, the country has retained a number of important features usually associated with a Leninist (or to be more precise: Stalinist) society. Its institutional structure, political rhetoric and propaganda are characterized by a remarkable continuity from the 1960s onwards. But this continuity actually masks radical changes in the economy of the country.

Prior to the early 1990s, North Korea could be seen as the perfect example of a Stalinist society – in some regards it was even more Stalinist than Joseph Stalin’s Soviet Union. Daily surveillance and control reached heights that would have been impossible in the Soviet Union of the 1930s – where short-term trips to other areas did not require permits, and where tunable short-wave radios were legal. In economic management, central command and control were taken to truly unprecedented extremes. From the 1960s to the 1990s, almost all foodstuffs and consumption goods were actually distributed through a complex distribution system. Money could not buy much in North Korea of the 1970s, since cash was all but meaningless if not accompanied by government-issued ration coupons. Private enterprise was unthinkable.

This system suffered a mortal blow in the early 1990s when the Stalinist economy nose-dived, being suddenly deprived of Soviet and Chinese subsidies. Virtually no economic statistics have been published by the North Korean state since the early 1960s, and therefore the scale of the economic crisis is not precisely known. However, according to the estimates of the Bank of Korea, widely believed to be the most reliable estimates of the North Korean economy, North Korea’s GDP in 1991-1999 decreased by 37.6%.1 By the early 2000s non-military industrial output was estimated to be barely 50% of the 1990 level.

The collapse of industry had a dramatic impact on the average North Korean, who for a long time had relied largely or almost exclusively on the rationing system. From 1993-94 rations ceased to be delivered regularly and around 1995 the rationing system came to a complete standstill. From then on a massive famine ensued, leaving some 600,000 to 900,000 people dead.

1 Bank of Korea, *Pukhan chuyo kyǒngje chipyo pigyo* (North Korea, a comparison of the main economic indicators), can be found on: www.bok.or.kr
2 Im Kang-taek, *Pukhan kyǒngje kaebal kyehwoek surip pangan yǒn’gu: Paet’ũnam saryerǔl* [Taking the example of Vietnam: Research on North Korea’s economic development planning] (Chungsimũro, Seoul: T’ongil Yǒn’guwon, 2010), 164.
North Koreans themselves found their own way to cope with crisis by rediscovering and reestablishing a market economy. From the early 1990s, all kinds of private economic activities resurfaced and began to grow with surprising speed. Many North Koreans now till their own private fields on mountains, are employed in private restaurants and workshops, and do all kinds of trade, smuggling and money lending, and engage in countless activities that are firmly associated with a market economy. It was recently estimated that in 1998-2008 the share of income from informal economic activities reached 78% of the total income of North Korean households.\(^3\)

The state’s attitude towards these private activities has remained quite negative, even though the degree of this official hostility has fluctuated over time. It was relatively strong in the mid-1990s, but with the advent of the disastrous famine of 1996-9, the government, or at least its lower functionaries, significantly eased its pressure on private economic activities, which remained illegal nonetheless. In 2002, some of these activities were formally decriminalized. This decision has often been presented as North Korea’s ‘attempt at market-orientated reforms’, but such oft-repeated descriptions are an exaggeration. The 2002 reforms meant in most cases a belated admission of activities that the government knew it could not control.

Soon after, the tide was reversed. From 2005, the North Korean government began to implement measures that were aimed at curtailing the influence and the scale of the unofficial market economy. These attempts to roll back the limits of the market reached their apex in the currency reform of 2009. The 2009 currency reform proved to be a disaster, though, leading to a major disruption of economic life in the country. As a result, in subsequent years, the North Korean authorities have chosen to turn a (renewed) blind eye to most of the activities that go on in the market place.

However, throughout all these oscillations, the official line (and associated rhetoric) has essentially remained unchanged. The official media kept silence about the economic changes and studiously ignored the growth of markets, while through confidential channels the North Korean propaganda apparatus has constantly reminded the North Korean people that private economic activities are not compatible with the lofty socio-economic ideals of North Korean society, even though some toleration of such activities may be unavoidable and necessary in times of crisis.

Due to official hostility, North Korea’s entrepreneurs have devised a number of strategies to create large, successful businesses that do not challenge the regime’s official ideals or attract too much unwelcome attention from the authorities.

One commonly employed strategy is to develop a private enterprise under the official cover of a state-owned firm – replacing the contents while keeping the outer shell unchanged. A significant number of ostensibly state-owned enterprises in North Korea are nowadays actually operated by private entrepreneurs who invest their money

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in the operations and for all practical purposes run the enterprises as if they are the actual owners. These pseudo-state companies are expected to make contributions to the state budget, as well as to pay bribes to their bosses’ patrons in the state bureaucracy.

There are different types of such enterprises of course, perhaps the largest being what is known in North Korea as the ‘Foreign Currency Earning Company’ (FCEC). Such companies are a peculiar feature of the North Korean economy, with few analogues in other communist states. Major factories, as well as large government agencies, are allowed (and indeed encouraged) by the central government to establish their own foreign currency earning companies. Theoretically such companies exist to sell the goods manufactured by a particular factory, or goods that are under the control of the founding agency. For instance, the steel products of a large steel mill can be sold by the FCEC of the mill itself. But in real life, most FCECs use their power and connections to get hold of everything that is sellable on the international market and then sell it for a large profit.

On paper, the FCECs are government-owned. On the ground though, FCECs are routinely taken over by private entrepreneurs who cooperate with the FCECs headquarters. In many cases, FCEC’s make deals with rich business people (known as ‘tonju’ in Korean) who then use their own money to buy equipment and/or raw materials and hire workers. It is also the business person’s responsibility to establish and maintain the networks necessary to acquire and sell merchandise, often overseas (in nearly all cases, in China). Such arrangements make perfect sense for both sides. The government FCEC acquires capital and expertise that would not be available otherwise, while private entrepreneurs receive a quasi-legal status and access to lucrative government monopolies.

In this regard the case of interviewee A1 is fairly typical. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, he made a lot of money in cross-border trade with China by selling scrap metal, seafood and occasionally even Koryŏ-era antiques. In 2002, he was approached by a military FCEC that operated under the auspices of North Korea’s secret police. Through some high-level lobbying, this KPA-founded company had acquired the exclusive rights to collect pine mushrooms in some border areas. A1 was put in charge of these operations and was even given the rank of a military officer.

From the company’s point of view, the involvement of A1 was necessary because he had enough money to pay local people who collected mushrooms. In earlier times, government officials could press local farmers into collecting mushrooms for small fees and access to some privileged rations of quality goods. Now, however, this is impossible, so farmers have to be paid a price not much below the market price for the mushrooms – and such an arrangement means that large initial investments have become necessary.

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4 All interviews were conducted as a part of a project supported by a grant from the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2010-330-B00187). Please refer to the bibliography for details of each interview.
To make sure that no significant competition would emerge the company also employed sentries on roads in the area in order to find and intercept people who attempted to move mushrooms without proper permits. Apart from buying the mushrooms, A1 also used his connections in China to arrange good wholesale prices for them. He believed they were eventually shipped to Japan.

During the interview, A1 was somewhat vague when asked about the amount of money he had to pay to his superiors (insisting that he could not remember exact figures). Nonetheless he said that he kept well over half of the revenues from the operation, which allowed him to double his private fortune within two to three years. A1 says that these officially endorsed operations were somewhat less profitable than smuggling/trade activities were, but the fact that he had a modicum of protection compensated for the smaller profit margin.

Interviewee A2 provides us with an even more interesting case. He, together with a few other investors, contacted a party-controlled FCEC and received the right to restart a long mothballed goldmine. Technically the goldmine was, when its operations were restarted, operated by a party FCEC, but for all intents and purposes it was the private operation of A2 and his companion. They bought the necessary equipment – albeit quite primitive – and hired the necessary workers; all this was financed by A2 and another investor.

Workers were usually hired from nearby cooperative farms, so an agreement with the farm managers was struck as well. A2 claims that the agreement was beneficial for all participants: the workers (young males) earned much more at the mine than would be conceivable at the farm, while farm managers received not only kickbacks but also some practical help.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Year of leaving North Korea</th>
<th>Region of residence</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Interview date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A1</td>
<td>~35</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>N.Hamgyŏng</td>
<td>Factory manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2</td>
<td>~40</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>N.Hamgyŏng</td>
<td>policeman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A3</td>
<td>~55</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>N.Hamgyŏng</td>
<td>College teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A4</td>
<td>~50</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>S.P’yŏngan</td>
<td>teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A5</td>
<td>~45</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>N.P’yŏngan</td>
<td>engineer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A6</td>
<td>~55</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>N.Hamgyŏng</td>
<td>clerk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A7</td>
<td>~50</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>N.Hamgyŏng</td>
<td>doctor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Workers were usually hired from nearby cooperative farms, so an agreement with the farm managers was struck as well. A2 claims that the agreement was beneficial for all participants: the workers (young males) earned much more at the mine than would be conceivable at the farm, while farm managers received not only kickbacks but also some practical help.
In an interesting twist, A2 provided his workers not just with monetary compensation for their work, but also with standard food rations. In practice this meant that A2 and his fellow investor used some of their own money to buy rice and other cereals at the market and then distribute the foodstuffs to their workers for free. The rations were given in accordance with the norms that were used for decades by the Public Distribution System (PDS). This meant that every worker at the mine, in addition to their wages, received 700-900 grams of cereals per day (800 or 900 grams for a worker doing hard labour, 700 grams for a clerical worker).

This arrangement reflects an ingrained North Korean perception of the benevolence and normality of the PDS and the related idea that every good employer should provide its workers with food rations. In my interviews with North Korean entrepreneurs this kind of arrangement has been mentioned often. It seems that until recently, many North Korean quasi-private enterprises provided their workers with both nutritional and monetary compensation. However, recent interviews with refugees seem to indicate that this practice has become significantly less common in the last few years as the North Korea public has become more acquainted with the workings of the market economy.

The gold extracted from A2’s mine was sold to Chinese merchants in North Korean borderland cities. The money raised was in part used to make contributions to the party budget, as if the money itself were the profits of the FCEC itself, not that of private investors running their own business. Nonetheless, monies remaining after said contributions, estimated to be around $2000 per month in 2007, were more than enough to pay for A2’s extremely agreeable lifestyle.

Like A1, A2 was also classified as a state employee by virtue of his operations. The Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party was officially considered to be his employer, even though he seldom went near their offices.

Both the case of A1 and A2 have much in common; the state essentially entering into a licensing arrangement with individual entrepreneurs. The state in effect is selling the right to undertake particular economic activities to entrepreneurs, who bring with them their money-earning abilities, capital, and connections that are used to maximize profits. In turn, the state provides monopoly rights, protection therefore from competition and, perhaps more importantly, legal cover to effectively undertake what would otherwise be illegal market activities. Taking into account the extremely corrupt nature of the North Korean bureaucracy, as well as the singular lack of transparency in such operations, it is very difficult to ascertain whether these operations are really beneficial for the state, or whether the profits are largely pocketed by the entrepreneurs themselves and their patrons in the bureaucracy. What is nonetheless clear is that without the involvement and expertise of private entrepreneurs, many FCECs would be non-functional.

It is furthermore remarkable that many North Korean interviewees now talk about private investors (tonju – literally ‘masters of money’) as being a necessary and unavoidable part of some enterprises ostensibly run by the state. It is not clear to what extent such private investors are actively sort out by state actors and to what extent they themselves are active in trying to incorporate their operations within state structures in
order to avoid prosecution or other forms of official censure. It seems to be a case of active courtship on both sides, and whereas many such deals probably do not directly enrich the central government, they nonetheless serve the interests of local officials.

However, state protection is not absolutely reliable. It is telling that A2, in spite of (or even perhaps because of) all his successes in business, eventually got into trouble with his superiors, and being afraid of becoming a scapegoat, chose to flee the country. Available publications on the issue mention crackdowns undertaken by the central government aimed at controlling the growth of this peculiar type of private enterprise.\(^5\)

FCECs are by no means the only state-market hybrid in North Korea. Forms of privately managed and owned but ostensibly state-managed enterprises can be found in many parts of the North Korean economy.

One of the most interesting examples is the collapse of the state-run restaurant industry – and its revival under private capital. In the years 1996-98, when the food crisis began to accelerate, most North Korean eateries began to close, with the exception of a few *haut cuisine* restaurants in Pyongyang. From around 1998, however, new restaurants began to take their place. Many of them follow established tradition and even occupied the same buildings, but it is an open secret that nearly all these restaurants are actually financed by one or more entrepreneurs who run them pretty much as if they were their own businesses.

This is a widespread phenomenon. A recent study by Yang Mun-su and Kim Pyŏng-yŏn estimates that in 2009 some 51.3% shops and 58.5% restaurants were actually private retail operations.\(^6\) As we shall see later, the definition of ‘private’ in this case seems to be more than a little blurred, so the actual figure might be even higher.

A3 was one such entrepreneur. After her husband, a mid-level official, was arrested by the secret police in the mid-1990s and disappeared without trace, she tried a number of jobs in the private sector, but eventually chose the restaurant trade where the required initial investment is quite low and where her skills as an accomplished cook (learnt as a mother) could be put to profitable use.

A3 entered into a de-facto partnership with six other private investors, all women, and the group negotiated a deal with the local municipal authorities. They were given control over a defunct state restaurant that had been closed in the mid-1990s. Most of the old equipment was unusable and therefore had to be replaced. This expense was financed by private investors including A3 herself.

The management of the restaurant – that is, the investors – hired a workforce that almost exclusively consisted of people who had previous experience in the restaurant

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5 Chu Sŏng-ha. *Pukhan paro algi* [Knowing North Korea in the right way] (Seoul: Kyŏngch‘ŏn, 2009), pp 68-73.

business. Some of these people were former chiefs from defunct state-run restaurants
and one or two even worked in the state restaurant whose building the (all-female)
team of A3 took over. Only the waiting staff was largely recruited anew, since, as A3
mentioned, ‘experience was not even remotely as important as good looks’.

Theoretically the restaurant was supposed to pay 30% of its profits directly to the
local authorities. In exchange it was officially registered as a state-owned enterprise
that was on paper managed by the relevant department of the local People’s Committee.
Even though the essentially private nature of the operation was widely known and
understood, it had all the trappings of a state enterprise including the officially approved
accounting system.

However, A3 admits that the official accounts did not reflect the true financial
state of the business. In order to minimize required payments to the state, and also in
order to make it less attractive for bribe-seeking officials, the investors systematically
underreported their revenues. This allowed them to make their operations quite
profitable and have a monthly income that was very good by North Korean standards.

A4 also has a similar experience, though her operations began much later – in
2008. She rented a large new building in the vicinity of the railway station that was
probably the most coveted piece of real estate in her city – the county seat in North
Hamgyŏng Province. The building was constructed in the early 1990s, just before the
outbreak of famine, and was never put to use.

By 2008, A4 had amassed a large amount of capital through wholesale trade, so
that she was able to act as the sole investor in her project. Under the rental arrangement
with the city authorities, she was allowed to use the ground floor of the building. The
building was completely refurbished, upon which A4 hired a couple of experienced
cooks, waiting staff, etc., and then negotiated with the local authorities over the
conditions of the operation. It was initially assumed that she would pay 30% of her
income as a contribution to the local budget (the share was subsequently increased
significantly, to some 70%). As in the case of A3, A4 skillfully fiddled the books, and
revenues and profits were systematically underreported. As a result her operation did
not look particularly profitable and hence, she hoped, did not attract much unwelcome
attention from the authorities and bribe-seeking officials. In fact, A4 admits that she
became one of the most affluent people in her town. When business was good, her
income was often in excess of $1,000 per month. Nonetheless, she still complained
about attempts by local officials and policemen to turn up at her restaurant and order
whatever they wanted, on the assumption that A4 would not charge them.

When I discussed this type of business with the interviewees, I discovered an
interesting paradox. North Koreans themselves often do not see such businesses
(including sometimes even their own businesses) as private operations. On the one
hand, they understand that without the involvement of private entrepreneurs, such
restaurants would be unviable. But at the same time, when confronted with the question
of the nature of such operations, they usually describe them as being state-owned and
state-operated. They explain this by emphasizing the existence of rental arrangements
with the state: “How can we describe it as private if the building is owned by the state?”
[A7] seems to be a fairly typical reply. They also see the quasi-official nature of the arrangement as proof that the business in question is legal and is, *ipso facto*, a state-owned operation, since only state-controlled economic activities are considered to be fully legal in North Korea.

No such ambiguity exists when it comes to another type of pseudo-state operation – privately-owned transport operations. Such ventures appeared in the late 1990s when the dramatic increase in small-scale private trade necessitated the development of private transportation facilities affordable for small-scale merchants who had to move products in the range of a few hundred kilograms during their regular business trips. Some such merchants used (and still use) the official railway network, but its capacity is limited, while some other successful merchants have been known to make agreements with the travel police who allow them to stow their merchandise in a carriage’s toilet (which is then locked for the duration of the journey). Be that as it may, private transportation known as *sobich’a* (corrupted English word ‘service’ combined with the Sino-Korean word for ‘car’).

A sobich’a is usually a used bus or truck that is bought in China and then brought to North Korea. The operator makes a deal beforehand with a state local agency or government company that provides him/her with the necessary papers to bring the vehicle back and then register it as an item of state/government property. On paper then, an old Chinese truck may end up being the property of some military unit or local factory, whereas in real life the truck has nothing to do with the organization it is registered with, but is used by its real owner to earn money by moving merchandise and people across the country. The sobich’a operations are vital for North Korea’s unofficial economy (and, by extension, the survival of the population). As A6 noted: “One could not trade when there were no sobich’a.” Indeed, sobich’a appeared in the late 1990s and became common around 2000.

Needless to say, the operator pays the relevant agency (or rather its management) for the right to use their name and have their legal protection. There is a hierarchy of such payments. Military and secret police units are considered to be the best since such vehicle registration plates provide more protection. Accordingly, such a registration is expensive. Registration with the normal police or local authorities is next in the hierarchy, while registration with most of the state’s enterprises is the least attractive and also cheapest. In 2009, Good Friends reported that at the time the hierarchy of payments looked like this: military units would charge five to six hundred thousand won monthly per truck (roughly equivalent to US$200 at the time), the political police rate was four hundred thousand won, while civilian agencies and factories would be satisfied with two to three hundred thousand won.7 These figures basically agree with what we heard from refugees.

A5 can be seen as a good example of a successful sobich’a operator. He joined the unofficial economy when it was in its infancy in the early 1990s and began to his

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sobich’a operations in the late 1990s. He eventually became a member of an informal partnership that consisted of four investors who ran a *de facto* company that operated seven trucks. A5 admits that he prefers to have companions in his business ventures. Even though such an arrangement restricts managerial freedom and occasionally creates tensions, on balance the reduction of the risks involved in running the business more than make up for the downsides.

A5’s trucks were often used to move bulky goods to the city of P’yŏngsŏng – located in the vicinity of Pyongyang, P’yŏngsŏng is the place where the largest wholesale market in North Korea is situated. A5 transported, among other things, cement, bricks and salt, the latter being produced in privately-owned evaporation ponds near the sea coast. A5’s company had 15-20 employees, including drivers, mechanics and backroom staff. But officially the company did not exist. In this regard it was different from earlier examples of de facto private companies that operate disguised as state-owned enterprises. However, we should keep in mind that all the trucks of this invisible company were registered with military units and official enterprises. Therefore the company can also be seen as a good example of pseudo-state ownership.

**Conclusion**

Pseudo-state companies are not unique to North Korea – as a matter fact, there are precedents for such operations in both the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe – and FCEC-licensed operators are even reminiscent of Europe’s 16th and 17th-century governments with their notorious ‘tax farmers’. However, it seems that neither in the USSR nor Eastern Europe did this peculiar phenomenon reach a scale comparable with present-day North Korea.

In North Korea, the emergence and growth of pseudo-state enterprises coincided with the disintegration of the state-run command economy. This was not the case in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, where such quasi-state business operations flourished in the 1960s and 1970s and quickly disappeared after the collapse of the Socialist Bloc. Indeed, it was an open secret that many canteens and bars in the USSR of the 1970s, especially in southern republics (Georgia or Uzbekistan) were essentially private operations.

Such pseudo-state businesses are necessary and indeed unavoidable when the state cannot control significant parts of economic life, but cannot admit this inability officially. The state under such circumstances forces private entrepreneurs to disguise their operations as state-owned and hence politically legitimate.

From available anecdotal evidence, it appears that such an approach might help the regime to maintain its legitimacy, not least because many North Koreans continue to perceive such enterprises as legitimate state-owned operations, whose existence is compatible with Juche Socialism. Yet at the same time, these operations (especially large-scale operations ran by the FCECs) allow North Korea’s entrepreneurs to initiate and run businesses on a scale otherwise unthinkable. It is even possible that some of these pseudo-state businesses will eventually become the basis for full-scale private enterprise.
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*Onŭl-ŭi Pukhan sosik* [North Korea Today], January 13, 2009

Biographical note

Andrei Lankov completed his undergraduate and graduate studies at Leningrad State University (PhD in 1989). In 1996-2004 he taught Korean history at the Australian National University, and has since been a professor at the College of Social Studies at Kookmin University in Seoul. His major research interest is North Korean history and society. His major English language publications on North Korea include: *From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: The Formation of North Korea, 1945-1960* (Rutgers University Press, 2003); *Crisis in North Korea: The Failure of De-Stalinization, 1956* (University of Hawaii Press, 2004); *North of the DMZ: Essays on Daily Life in North Korea* (McFarland and Company, 2007), and *The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist State* (Oxford UP, 2013).
Strategic discussions about North Korea’s proliferation comprise a number of dimensions. The core assumption underlying this article is that the ideational aspects of North Korea’s decision making are important and give rise to a range of strategic considerations. This is not to underplay the strategic, materialist elements in North Korea’s provocative and at times belligerent behaviour. Rather, it is to argue that Australia is well placed to concentrate on the social dimensions of strategic discussions. As a less important middle power, a regional player, yet geographically distant from the threat, Australia is in a position to provide a point of differentiation from other, more entrenched players such as the United States or the Republic of Korea (ROK). A good starting point for developing this sort of engagement is to enhance non-state, track two cooperation between the two countries, which has been stalled since the early 2000s. In this article I will first canvass the ongoing debate taking place in Australian academic and policy circles regarding Australia’s place in the world. Of particular concern, is the question how Australia should balance its most important strategic relationship – that with the United States – with geographic and economic realities. I then sketch some of the limitations of current thinking, concentrating particularly on discourse that portrays North Korea as a rogue state and finish with a discussion of how non-state activity can act as a helpful precursor to more constructive relationships between states, and the types of creative engagement strategies currently taking place in the United States, despite the volatile political environment.

A number of assumptions buttress the arguments made here. First, that the social and ideational elements of strategic thinking are an important part of any comprehensive approach. Second, that the international community has an ethical obligation to consider security in North Korea from a broad perspective. That is, in a country like North Korea, where the populace has limited (if any) capacity to further their individual interests, only a comprehensive security approach that takes into account the wellbeing of the people within national borders (and not just the integrity of the borders themselves)¹ can bring about a just outcome. The most immediate corollary of this assumption is that any change in North Korea should be brought about in as controlled a manner as possible. Finally, this argument views North Korea as an actor whose rationality and strategic thinking are based on a set of normative beliefs that are often difficult to decipher and may not always be applied consistently.

¹ The case for a human security approach to North Korea, which speaks to some of these concerns, is made by Hazel Smith: Hazel Smith, Hungry for peace: international security, humanitarian assistance and social change in North Korea (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005).
This article represents the beginnings of a research project that aims to examine in detail a range of options available for smaller, middle-power nations, such as Australia, when dealing with a country that represents a serious security threat. I am particularly interested in the role that non-state actors may play in this arena that has traditionally been reserved for state actors. However, I do not wish to view non-state actions in a vacuum. Indeed, non-state actors can only operate in spaces that the state permits. In the case of Australia, for example, the current visa ban on North Koreans has had real and lasting implications for non-state engagement. Another example are the sanctions that have been applied to North Korea – at the level of the United Nations – in response to the North’s on-going provocative behaviour. Setting aside the question of whether or not the sanctions have been successful in curbing North Korea’s nuclear proliferation, they have restricted the capacity of development non-government organisations (NGOs) to continue activity that may involve either cash transfer or the import of goods – such as sporting equipment – into the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the degree to which non-state actors are able to operate inside the DPRK depends on the approval of the North Korean government itself. As such, I am interested in the interplay – which is often subtle and not overtly acknowledged – between the state and non-state actors. This cooperation allows much needed NGO activity to take place; activity that does not fit within the official state discourses of one or both sides, or which is not possible for a variety of diplomatic or security reasons.

Australia in Asia

Before turning to my discussion of the discourse around North Korea as rogue state, it is first worthwhile rehearsing some of the debates taking place inside Australia about the changing nature of international order, and Australia’s place inside it, as an Asia Pacific middle power. In this way, an argument for a more creative diplomacy vis-à-vis North Korea is an argument about how Australia sees itself and its role in what is increasingly being called the burgeoning Asian century.

The debate over the future of the United States-Australia alliance is animated by questions regarding the future of United States power in Asia. With Australia’s economic future lying increasingly with Asia in general and China in particular, questions have been raised regarding whether the country needs to start taking more responsibility for its own security, particularly in the Asian region. The debate, then, is rarely one over the value of the United States alliance per se, but rather over the degree to which Australia should be reliant upon the United States security guarantee. That is, what is at stake is not the question whether or not Australia should continue to conduct alliance relations with the United States, but rather an argument about taking a more independent position in the current policy environment. It is important to note that its allies’ quests for a more independent strategic capability is one that is supported by the United States, which is actively encouraging the development of bilateral ties between its allies. As United States capacity is increasingly strained, in the Asia-Pacific as elsewhere, strategists turn to well-worn phrases such as ‘burden-sharing’ to
describe the future of the United States alliance system in Asia, and the increasingly independent role it expects of its allies.²

As the United States ‘pivots’ or ‘rebalances’ towards Asia, debate in Australia has been portrayed as revolving around a choice between history and geography.³ This is a dilemma Australians have faced before, but never has it been so pressing. The urgency of the question is directly related to the rise of China, which most pundits argue is not only substantive, but also both on going and meaningful. In light of this, the central question driving contemporary debate is: how can Australia continue to benefit from China’s economic rise and simultaneously secure its own national interests? A range of responses has arisen about where Australia’s national interests lie and which mechanisms will best achieve them. On one side of the spectrum is the argument that, in light of what some believe to be an inevitable decline in United States influence in Asia, Australia (along with other regional powers) needs to dramatically reassess its alliance obligations to take stock of the shifting power balance, away from the United States-centred order to one that is increasingly multi-polar. On the other side is the argument that, in fact, the close economic interdependence of all states, including the United States and China, actually leads to an increased likelihood that cooperation, rather than conflict, will become the new default order in Asia.

It is between these two extremes that most debate lies. This discussion revolves around competing visions of the future of Australia and Australian identity in the ‘Asian Century’. Here, the febrile nature of the security arena is acknowledged to have created the exigency for the careful management of Australia’s relationship with China which in turn paints the backdrop for considerations of how the Australia-United States alliance can continue to shape Australia’s future. It is the apparent incompatibility of these goals, and the at times clumsy manner in which Australian governments have dealt with this difficult scenario, that have led to accusations of incoherence. The 2011 joint announcement regarding an increased United States presence in Australia (discussed below) is a case in point: widely seen as an effort to consolidate America’s influence in the Western Pacific in response to China’s growing influence, both Australian and United States policy makers fumbled publicly as they


³ Parts of the following section can also be found as part of a longer paper, published by CSIS: Danielle Chubb, “Down under and in between: Australian security perspectives in the ‘Asian Century’,” in Doing more and expecting less: the future of US alliances in the Asia Pacific, ed. Carl Baker and Brad Glosserman (Honolulu: Pacific Forum CSIS, 2013).
sought to make assurances, in press conferences and official statements, that this was not intended as a containment of China.

Since 2007, the Rudd/Gillard government has put in place a number of initiatives, in response to accusations that Australia has been slow to come to terms with the national security implications of China’s rise. Calls by some within the academic and policy communities to respond to the shifting balance of power through acknowledging that the ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-United States) treaty is ‘out of date’ notwithstanding, the government has reinforced the centrality of this alliance to Australia’s national security interests. The November 2011 announcement of an increased American presence in Australia has served to strengthen the country’s political commitment to this alliance. Under the bilateral, United States-Australia agreement, United States marines – totalling 2,500 by 2017 – will rotate through Darwin and the Northern Territory.

Long involved as a key instigator and supporter of regional multilateralism, it is through the establishment of cooperative institutions that Australia hopes to play a role in moulding the shape of the coming new order in Asia. In the context of the United States alliance, a number of opportunities are open to Australia. The United States-centred alliance system in Asia incorporates a wide range of stakeholders, such as the Philippines, Thailand, the ROK, and Japan. At present, a hub-and-spokes style model paints the backdrop against which Asian allies each work individually with the United States in the context of other domestic and regional pressures. Where cooperation between the allies – the spokes – is evident, this usually takes place under the leadership of the United States – the hub. While this bilateral (and limited multilateral) approach to security is likely to remain valuable, key players in Canberra are keen to expand cooperative efforts in new and innovative ways. There is, then, great scope for a country like Australia. Not only are we facing an era in which greater regionalism has led to a greater acceptance of where Australia’s greatest security opportunities and challenges lie, there are a number of new developments to take advantage of: stronger relations with the ROK and the dynamism of an alliance system that is looking for new and innovative ways to exploit the institutions and diplomatic relationships that decades of the United States alliance system in Asia has forged. And yet, for all Australia’s talk of creative diplomacy – which was most clearly evident in recent discourse regarding Australia’s successful bid for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council – I argue that its approach to North Korea has in fact regressed and displays a tendency to fall in quickstep with policies framed around an understanding of North Korea as a ‘rogue state’.

**North Korea: the rogue**

In 2012 the international community was remarkably silent on the question of North Korea, taking a wait and see approach, largely brought about by the death of Kim Jong Il (Kim Chŏngil) and the rise to power of his son, Kim Jong Un (Kim Chŏngŭn). It was

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not until the end of 2012 that activity started to ramp up again north of the 38th parallel. Since the December 2012 rocket launch, North Korea has conducted its third nuclear test and has peppered South Korea and the United States with a series of bellicose threats. Arguments for engagement are politically difficult in this environment as any state-led cooperation with a country that clearly contravenes the peace and security norms that hold the international community together would have to be carefully planned and managed. Instead, North Korea is once again attracting the attention of those who call for a hard-line response to its actions. From where we stand in mid-2013, engagement options seem a distant pipe dream.

This, however, has not always been the case and it is worth remembering that at least twice in recent history there have been more rigorous conversations taking place over the pros and cons of greater engagement with North Korea. In the mid-1990s (in the context of the debate over the Agreed Framework) and the early 2000s (in the context of the constant to-ing and fro-ing of the Bush White House) academic and policy journals deliberated a range of new possible responses to the North Korean nuclear conundrum. During this period, of course, democracy came to South Korea and, with the inauguration of the Kim Dae Jung (Kim Taejung) government, a whole new approach to North Korea in the form of the Sunshine Policy. Since this time, however, in the light of the breakdown of the Agreed Framework, the subsequent establishment and failure of the six-party talks, the Bush administration’s changed response to international outliers following the September 11 terrorist attacks and, most recently, provocations against South Korea and revelations regarding North Korea’s nuclear capacity, efforts to negotiate with North Korea have been deemed a failure. With the stalling of diplomatic efforts, so too has the academic and policy discourse petered out. Dramatic headlines have once again led to an essentialising rhetoric that depicts North Korea as irrational, evil and, above all, unknowable. We need to think carefully about this and ask the question: Is our lack of understanding of North Korea due to its inherently mysterious and unknowable – irrational and unpredictable perhaps – nature or is it due to the narrow confines of the conceptual frameworks through which we view it?

Homolar and Bleiker argue that the United States approach to North Korea is driven by its conceptualisation of the country as a rogue state. This reflects a Cold War-style security narrative and, since the early 1990s has largely served to buttress the assumptions that have driven defence spending and planning. That is, the threat-image of North Korea has served the interests of those who advocate a militaristic approach to the Asian region and, importantly, the on-going centrality of nuclear weapons by way of the United States Extended Deterrence umbrella. The immediate corollary of the rogue state doctrine has been the continuation of containment as a tool of United States policy, one that Australia has supported through public reification of the threat image of North Korea as a dangerous, NPT-defying outlier state.

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By its nature, a rogue regime is one dissatisfied with the status quo and thus dedicated to breaking down established structures and institutions. An unknowable regime is one with whom no meaningful diplomatic relations can be forged. And an irrational regime is one whose own policy agenda cannot be understood – by either itself or an outsider – as it is not based on any type of reasoned or rational assumptions. Understanding North Korea through any or all of these lenses narrows policy options to the degree that change is not seen as a variable and the only options available to the international community are coercion or isolation. This leads us rather to a dead end and constrains the imagination of policy alternatives and security futures. It rejects any suggestion that dialogue could contribute towards the overcoming of impasses and rules out engagement as a form of appeasement to a bad or mad (or both) regime. North Korea’s decision making seems based on a rationale that is evident only to policy makers in Pyongyang. Yet arguments by the rest of the world community, that the regime is irrational, are in the end only an admission that we do not understand the rationale. If North Korea is indeed capable of change, understanding the nature of the ideas that drive policy is a step towards understanding how this might come about. There is a large body of evidence that suggests that North Korea does want to engage with the international community. Certainly, existential questions constrain its options and it is a frustratingly difficult regime to deal with. However, with nuclear proliferation on the top of the agenda of the international community, I believe we are currently faced with no other options than to continue to find new ways to communicate effectively with the DPRK regime.

The discrediting of engagement

Strategic studies analysts viewing the Korean peninsula through a rational-choice prism present a perspective on Australian policy options that is at its heart, conflicted. Arguing, on the one hand, that the new strategic reality in Asia not only enables, but also requires, middle-power United States allies to take steps towards greater strategic independence and engage in creative forms of conflict mitigation, these analysts seem to quarantine North Korea from these calculations. In the introduction to a 2011 Special Issue of Korea Observer, which was dedicated to the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of Australia-ROK relations, the following observation is offered:

North Korea… is intensifying its claims for control of the entire Korean peninsula. It is determined to eradicate the American alliance system in Northeast Asia… Australia, as a highly modern, if geographically distant, economic partner of the ROK and as a strategic associate of the United States is totally entwined with the outcome of this drama. This is true notwithstanding Canberra’s intermittent efforts to reach out to the DPRK through the normalizing of diplomatic relations and by sponsoring intermittent training programs for North Korean specialists in agriculture and economics.

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6 Hazel Smith, “Bad, mad, sad or rational actor? Why the ‘securitization’ paradigm makes for poor policy analysis of North Korea,” *International Affairs* 76, no. 3 (2000).

7 William Tow and Ajin Choi, “Facing the crucible: Australia, the ROK, and cooperation in Asia,” *Korea Observer* 42, no. 1 (2011): 7. (my emphasis)
This statement is followed by an explanatory footnote, in which it is stated that the aforementioned diplomatic and training efforts had been largely unsuccessful, and which attributed the lack of success entirely to bureaucracy and intransigence on the side of the North Koreans. The assumption implicit here is that Australia’s support for South Korea’s continued security and the survival of the United States alliance system is incompatible with any type of outreach or creative approaches to conflict resolution (which are otherwise championed by the authors) that may involve diplomatic innovations of the sort that treat North Korea as a legitimate partner.

What this reflects is a trend towards equating any form of engagement with North Korea as a type of appeasement. On the back of a string of North Korean provocations - including the 2009 nuclear and missile tests, the Cheonan (Ch’ŏnan) sinking and the shelling of Yeonpyeong (Yŏnp’yŏng) Island in 2010, as well as the 2012 rocket launch and, most recently, the 2013 nuclear test and the accompanying threatening rhetoric that has followed the imposition of fresh sanctions – the concern is that any efforts by the international community to reach out to North Korea could be construed as a reward for bad behaviour. The speed with which analysts such as those above disassociate efforts to ‘reach out’ to Pyongyang with Australian recognition of the stake it has in establishing a peace and security regime on the Korean peninsula mirrors a similar trend in United States circles, where ‘engagement’ appears to have become a dirty word. As I noted earlier, the early 2000s saw a rigorous debate take place in newspapers, policy papers and academic journals regarding the pros and cons of various types of engagement. By contrast, in late 2011, an article originally published in the South China Morning Post with the title “Engage, don’t isolate” by NYU law Professor Jerome Cohen had its title changed to “North Korea: The American Dilemma” when the article was republished on the websites of the United States-Asia Law Institute and the Council on Foreign Relations.8

Incorporating the social and ideational elements of strategic thinking (or: why should we engage?)

As North Korea defies the norms of the international order, contravenes Security Council conventions and acts belligerently towards its southern counterpart, the instinctual response has been to bolster defences and relay the international community’s disquiet through a discourse that concentrates on the structural elements of the DPRK acts of aggression. It is difficult to criticize such responses: to ignore the danger of North Korea’s nuclear proliferation would be irresponsible. The DPRK’s proliferation activities represent a regional and global threat. Putting the question of how likely it is that North Korea would make use of a nuclear weapon capability aside, the potential for strategic miscalculation or even an accident on the enrichment sites themselves, would have disastrous consequences. It is for this reason that a comprehensive, state-based solution is a necessary element of any strategic plan. From a structural perspective,

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North Korea uses its nuclear capacity as a bargaining chip. Nestled, as it is, between China on the one side and the significant number of United States forces based in South Korea on the other, it seeks to prolong its own regime survival through a dangerous game of brinksmanship.

It is, however, a mistake to view North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons purely as a form of bargaining. Alongside these structural considerations, the DPRK’s strategic thinking has a number of important social and ideational elements. These elements are more difficult to predict, contingent as they are on prevailing domestic strategic and political discourses. To understand North Korea’s proliferation, we need to look carefully at the rationality behind North Korea’s nuclear program, from the perspective of North Korea itself. The DPRK’s nuclear program is an important element of its national identity. In the introduction to their edited volume, Holmes and Yoshihara remind us that “nuclear weapons engage nation-states’ sense of themselves, arousing their leaders’ and citizens’ deepest passions.” Not just their nuclear program, but indeed North Korea’s entire foreign policy is informed by a very particular worldview that is importantly driven by a sense of moral imperative. In this sense, the case of India under Nehru is informative – Bhupinder Brar argues that the major shift that can be witnessed in India’s foreign policies since the end of the Cold War is that it has moved on from a position that was once informed by “those reflective and normative ideas which inform a people of their location in the world and their moral destiny.” An examination of North Korea’s domestic discourses reveals this sense of moral imperative to be an important element of the country’s nuclear program.

There is not the space in this article to delve into a detailed discussion of the ideas and interests driving North Korean policy: the intention is to flag the importance of coming to a better understanding of these, and to encourage policy making that leads us closer to this goal. Despite the closed nature of the North Korean state, there is now much that we can surmise regarding the leadership’s rationality and the context in which foreign policy is made. For example, Kwon and Chung, in their cultural analysis of North Korean political culture, make reference to sŏn ’gun – military first politics – the ideology that informed policy under Kim Jong Il. The end of the Cold War, and the collapse of the international socialist political order, was an important event for North Korea, as the country’s leadership readjusted, not only their alliances and loyalties, but also the rationale behind the country’s authoritarian legitimacy. The new discourse is a sophisticated one, but at its core is an argument about exceptionalism. In what is

9 Attempting to view the world through the prism of the North Korean leadership is an uncomfortable exercise, as discussed above: there seems to be an element of concern – among strategic thinkers as well as the academic community – that giving voice to the DPRK’s strategic rationale is to legitimise the voice of an evil dictatorship.


considered the authoritative word on sŏn’gun – *Understanding Sŏn’gun politics* (2004) – the vanguard position of North Korea in the world is explained in the words of the North Korean élite:

> The flag of socialism was taken down in the former Soviet Union and former eastern European countries. In the broader international sphere, people who long for socialism are thrown into confusion and left with no guidance. During this time of great trial, we refused to make any change. Instead, we raised our red flag of socialism even higher than before. This way, our country became the only remaining bastion of socialism and was illuminated with the esteemed honor of doing so.12

The social and ideational elements of North Korea’s strategic thinking run deep and are deeply entwined in the country’s historical, cultural, ideological and political identity. This often translated into policy that seems not only subversive but also inconsistent and irrational to the international community. It is difficult for states to find a starting point with which to begin relations with North Korea. As United States negotiators have discovered first hand, dealing with North Koreans is a frustrating process. Mistrust thus dominates relations with North Korea, which leads to the fomenting of unhelpful threat perceptions, often resulting in situations of even greater instability. Yet the hostile environment that characterizes North Korea’s foreign relations continues to encourage state responses that turn almost exclusively around military-based approaches.13

Non-state and track two diplomatic encounters have the potential to act as useful precursors to deeper state-level engagement. A high level of mistrust, a situation that has only worsened over the first half of 2013, characterizes relations between North Korea and the United States. In light of recent developments, and in the context of a lack of progress during the first Obama administration, it seems unlikely that we shall see a return to the Six Party Talks or an improvement in United States-DPRK relations under the second Obama administration. On the other hand, we should expect to see continued engagement at the track two and civil society levels, which have a record of achieving sustained cooperation, relationships, and trust between the people involved. If there is a willingness on the part of governments to support the track two activities, they may well be used as a ‘warm-up’ to track one engagement. The same can be said of DPRK-Australia relations. Given Australia’s tendency to mirror the United States in its policy approach to North Korea, the damaged state-state relationship will need some time to recover. A reintroduction of a range of non-state engagement strategies would work here as a necessary first step.

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12 Cited in: Byung-ho Chung and Heonik Kwon, *North Korea: beyond charismatic politics* (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2012), 76-77. For a detailed discussion of sŏn’gun, and the ramifications that this political philosophy has for North Korea’s foreign policy – particularly the country’s relationship with the US – see: *ibid.*, 71-99.

**External drivers for change in North Korea?**

Roland Bleiker, in his discussion of peacekeeping options on the peninsula, argues that non-state actors can act as an important conduit for the reduction of mistrust between the two Koreas:

> Non-state interactions between North and South, particularly those that promote communication, information exchange and face-to-face encounters… are of crucial importance, for they provide an opportunity to reduce the stereotypical threat images that continue to fuel conflict on the peninsula.\(^{14}\)

Since the early 2000s, these types of non-state interactions have slowly developed, not just between the two Koreas, but also between North Korean and European actors as well as with a growing number of United States-based organizations. A review of some of the publicly disclosed programs operated by American NGOs reveals that the range of activities (which operate across a range of sectors) share the common goal of bringing about real and lasting change inside North Korea, whether through the introduction of new ways of thinking and researching, the establishment of a more robust economic policy-making élite or the provision of humanitarian supplies.

Talking about drivers for change in North Korea context is a fraught exercise, especially given a lack of tangible outcomes. External actors face particular barriers, as the country is highly resistant to outside pressures. In this sense, the most effective agents for change remain those that operate internally, such as drivers of domestic marketplace reforms, which may take place on a very small scale.\(^{15}\) In light of the authorities’ resistance to change, it often seems overly optimistic to hope that any action by the international community could bring about even the most modest impetus for change, such as more efficient economic development practices, greater equity in the distribution of humanitarian aid or exposure of epistemological communities to international best practice, such as in the fields of energy efficiency or health reform. Given, however, the high-stakes game that North Korea is playing and the regional threat that its nuclear program represents, the international community has a strong incentive to put into action a wide range of approaches. As I argued above, Australia is in a strong position to work on greater engagement as part of a more comprehensive approach. Working towards this goal, a first step towards greater state engagement is to acknowledge the important role played by non-state actors.

The range of NGO activity inside North Korea ranges far beyond the provision of humanitarian assistance. NGO personnel and organisations play an important role as sponsors of ‘informal diplomacy’.\(^{16}\) Education and capacity building programs strive

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16. This term has been borrowed from: Mi Ae Taylor and Mark E. Manyin, “Non-governmental organizations’ activities in North Korea,” (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011).
to engage North Korean individuals in their occupational activities, acting as a direct contact point with the experiences of the world beyond the borders of the DPRK. In addition (and, I argue, central) to these programs are track two diplomatic efforts. While track two encounters are usually considered as a complement to official dialogue, they can also play a beneficial role in supporting the kind of trust building required to establish successful and meaningful non-state programs.

A number of complex cooperative projects have been undertaken by United States-based organisations in collaboration with North Korean counterparts. Science diplomacy has been one particularly fruitful area, with the US-DPRK Science Engagement Consortium managing to progress to the stage of direct (albeit intermittent) researcher-to-researcher contact in 2011, despite a fraught political climate. The establishment of a Digital Library at Kim Chaek University in Pyongyang and the United States-North Korean Tuberculosis project have also recorded significant achievements. The Pyongyang University of Science and Technology, with South Korean and foreign faculty members, had its first intake of students in October 2010. This is possibly the largest engagement project we have seen to date (barring the Kaesöng Industrial Complex and the Kŭmgangsan Resort). It is touted as having the potential to greatly influence the next generation of élites though education.

Overseas exhibitions of North Korean artwork have been another successful avenue of engagement. Cooperation in the fields of agriculture, reforestation, agroforestry, medicine and public health have also been successful in small scale projects with several articles published in academic journals co-authored by the foreign and Korean participants in the projects. Further examples of engagement by non-state actors include: visits to the United States by the DPRK taekwondo team; the New York Philharmonic Orchestra performance in Pyongyang; the performance in North Korea by the Georgian choir, Sons of Jubal and the AP-KCNA photo exhibition.

17 Track II diplomacy refers to meetings and conversations over policy issues that take place outside the context of official inter-governmental relations.


19 Taylor and Manyin, “Non-governmental organizations’ activities in North Korea.”


Barriers to engagement

In Australia, the greatest barrier to direct peer-to-peer engagement between Australian experts, trainers and artists is the blanket ban on visas for North Koreans. This ban has extended to prohibiting the North Korean diplomat responsible for Australian relations – currently based in Jakarta – from visiting the country. The United States government, on the other hand, has demonstrated more flexibility and has at times made exceptions to the visa ban for a range of non-state activities. However, in their detailed overview of US-DPRK educational exchanges, Shin and Lee note that during times of increased political tension (such as the sinking of the South Korean corvette (Cheonan), rocket launches or nuclear tests) the United States also has a policy of not issuing visas to DPRK citizens to come to the United States to participate in these programs, which are subsequently derailed or put on hold indefinitely. The authors argue that educational exchanges should be delinked from political events in order to strengthen their meaning and utility.22

A 2010 report by the Council on Foreign Relations Task Force echoes that sentiment recommending that “the Obama administration should adopt a visa policy that provides maximum space for nongovernmental forms of engagement designed to bring North Koreans to the United States for exchanges in a wide range of fields. Political approvals for cultural, sports, and educational exchanges should be approved on a routine basis.”23 Shin and Lee also note that the sanctions and legal climate pose an additional challenge to educational exchanges. As well as the costs involved with ensuring that programs fit within the scope of the complex legal requirements as per export controls, not only equipment but also the sharing of technical information can become a complex legal minefield.24

Australia and North Korea

Over the past decades, Australian policy makers have, at various times, embraced the challenge of establishing a working relationship with North Korea. Through the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, relations had an on-again, off-again quality that slowly gained momentum with the 1994 signing of the Agreed Framework. Diplomatic relations between Canberra were renewed in 2000 and, in 2002, the DPRK once again opened an embassy in Canberra. Trade began between the two countries alongside a number of partnership training initiatives. In 2001, the United Nations Development Program funded some North Korean students to come to the Australian National University for a Masters in Economics of Development and, in the same year, several DPRK officials attended a Regional Nuclear Safeguards Training course in Australia.


At the same time that Australia was cautiously testing out its newly found creative middle power capacities with North Korea, United States policy towards the DPRK was becoming increasingly hawkish and the Agreed Framework was breaking down. Relations between the United States and DPRK hit their nadir in 2002, with President Bush’s infamous assertion that North Korea was part of a global ‘axis of evil’. Shortly following this announcement, Washington decided to scrap the 1994 Framework Agreement.

The North Korean ambassador tried to convince Australia that the nuclear issue was a bilateral one, but amid increasing outcry regarding North Korean proliferation, the work of many years that had been put into establishing a tenuous relationship between Australia and North Korea was rapidly wound back. Australia joined the United States in viewing North Korea as a state that needed to be contained rather than engaged with, and all Canberra’s plans for education and training of North Korean officials were abandoned. In 2003, North Korea withdrew from the Non-proliferation Treaty and in 2004 announced that it had manufactured nuclear weapons. The year 2006 saw a missile launch and nuclear test that led to UNSC Resolution 1718, which Australia supported. Under this resolution, Canberra imposed a range of bilateral sanctions on North Korea, including: further restrictions on DPRK officials in Australia; banning North Korean flagged ships from Australian ports; refusal to issue visas to DPRK citizens and a range of financial sanctions.

In December 2007, the DPRK announced the closure of its embassy in Canberra due to financial troubles. In 2012, reports emerged that Pyongyang was seeking to negotiate terms for the reopening of its embassy, an idea that was only recently quashed by the foreign affairs department in no uncertain terms. Making the announcement following a series of discussions with his counterparts in Washington DC, the foreign minister also announced that Australia would be seeking a tougher line towards the DPRK, seeking to put in place a range of sanctions that would go above and beyond those recommended by the Security Council.

Since 2007, Australian discourse depicting North Korea as a dangerous, outlier state has escalated. In an opinion piece written for The Daily Telegraph in 2011, the Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd argued that “North Korea is not an abstract threat. It is real. It is worsening. And it could prove to be our worst nightmare”. This reification of the North Korean threat-image leads to a pigeonholing of policy options. The position taken by Australia in this regard closely mirrors that of the United States, yet reflects neither the strategic nor the social reality of Australia’s position. Structurally, a more independent and creative Australian response would continue an on-going

trend within the United States alliance system that has encouraged regional responses to regional issues. As such, while United States policy following the February 2013 nuclear test seems to be to garner support for a hard-line stance against North Korea, a diversification of strategies would better serve the purpose of attempting to find a way to bring North Korea closer to the norms of non-proliferation. Bradley Babson argues that the United States should aim to implement policies that influence the change already taking place in a direction that does not run counter to United States interests:

The U.S. should take actions that will affect the incentives for desirable change and disincentives for undesirable change. In addition, the U.S. should provide political and financial support for activities that will further U.S. goals both bilaterally through official and non-governmental channels, and through complimentary policies and activities of other countries and organizations in multilateral and bilateral frameworks for engagement.

As a minor player in Northeast Asian security matters, Australia (and Australian actors) is unlikely to bring about any significant changes when acting alone. It is the policies of deeply entrenched states such as South Korea and the United States that will make the most difference to security futures in the region. In light of this, a call for greater autonomy by Australia seems counter-intuitive: policy makers argue that it is in coalition with our two allies – Seoul and Washington DC – that Australia should shape its foreign policy. The North Korean issue, however, is one that is deeply entrenched in the historical patterns of threat construction that have developed in the years since the Korean peninsula’s division. Taking away the United States security threat, as some analysts argue is necessary, would require more than a simple reversal of current policy. The very existence of external threats bolsters the DPRK regime’s legitimacy and strengthens its authoritarian hold on the country. It has no purpose, in the short term, in negotiating a formal peace with the United States, or with the ROK. Australia, on the other hand, has no such baggage and the two countries continue to maintain a formal diplomatic relationship. As recent overtures by the North Koreans regarding the reopening of the Canberra embassy indicate, the regime in Pyongyang does seem to have some interest in continued engagement with Australia. Australia, as a key player in the United States’ current pivot towards Asia, and on the back of the successful election as a non-permanent UNSC member, is in a strong position to play an important role in the realization of such engagement frameworks.


30 B.R. Myers, The cleanest race: how North Koreans see themselves and why it matters (Brooklyn: Melville House, 2010).
Bibliography


**Biographical note**

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When it became clear late in 2011 that Kim Jong Il’s third son, Kim Jong Un, would succeed his father as leader of North Korea, speculation began in the capitals of Northeast Asia as well as the United States and elsewhere as to whether this princeling, who had spent some of his youth at boarding school in Switzerland, would continue to pursue the often provocative policies and inherit the same belligerent political style of his late father, or whether he would act more in accord with global standards of behavior.

In the space of little over a year after Kim Jong Un’s accession, new leaders also assumed power in North Korea’s closest neighbors—South Korea, China and Japan, although Shinzo Abe had briefly been Japan’s Prime Minister in 2006-2007. Vladimir Putin continued playing musical chairs, moving back to the Russian presidency from the premiership. An election returned Barack Obama to the presidency of the United States, the major ally of South Korea and Japan, although Obama replaced all of his top foreign policy officials within the first six months of his second term. Most critical is the new leadership team in Beijing spearheaded by Xi Jinping, who holds the country’s top three positions: General Secretary of the Communist Party, Chairman of the Central Military Affairs Commission, and President of the People’s Republic of China (head of state). In the middle of 2013, there are thus a lot of moving pieces and uncertainty as regards the strategies, plans and motives of the unevenly experienced leaders of North Korea as well as the countries maneuvering to deal with it, directly or indirectly, willingly or unwillingly.

This essay focuses on relations between North Korea and China, more formally, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) respectively, in this period of leadership transitions. I argue that while the PRC might be the DPRK’s main diplomatic ally, their bilateral tie needs to be seen in the larger context of China’s “rise” and Beijing’s increasingly complicated relations with other countries in Asia and with the United States. China holds a number of cards vis-à-vis all the other players as a result of its longstanding ties with the DPRK, but Pyongyang is still able to keep Beijing off balance enough to derive whatever benefits it can from continuing to play the unpredictable, nuclear-armed bad boy in the neighborhood who will not permit others, however big, to push him around or tell him what he “must” do.
As Close as Lips and Teeth

Kim Jong Il (Kim Chŏngil) died of a heart attack on December 17, 2011 and over the course of the next half-year, his third son, Kim Jong Un (Kim Chŏngŭn), assumed what The Christian Science Monitor snarkily referred to as “6 super-duper titles.” These are: Marshall of the DPRK, First Chairman of the National Defense Commission, First Secretary of the Workers’ Party, Chairman of the party’s Central Military Commission, Member of the Presidium of the party’s Political Bureau, and Supreme commander of the Korean People’s Army. In North Korea, besides the Kim family itself, power resides in the party and military, so it does not really matter that Kim Jong Un has no state title. In fact, his grandfather Kim Il Sung (Kim Ilsŏng), whom he has been literally groomed to resemble physically, is president for eternity, never mind that he passed away in 1994. Many observers speculate that the young dauphin has been backed by his powerful uncle, Jang Song Thaek (Chang Song’t’aek), the husband of Kim Jong Il’s sister, Kim Kyong Hui (Kim Kyŏnghŭi), to help him consolidate power within all of the country’s key institutions. There have been personnel shifts along the way, and it remains to be seen what impact this will have on the country’s policy towards the rest of the world, to say nothing of its long-suffering masses.

China’s influence over Korea has waxed and waned over the centuries. China historically has seen Korea as a tributary state, its culture derived from China. By contrast, the Koreans, north and south, have a deep sense of their own peoplehood and independence as well as pride in their culture and history of resistance to outside forces. Over the course of the Cold War, in collaboration and competition with the USSR, China made enormous sacrifices for North Korea. An estimated 900,000 Chinese soldiers died during the 1950-1953 Korean War. This included Mao Zedong’s own son, Mao Anying. Cumings argues that “Mao determined early in the war that should the North Koreans falter, China had an obligation to come to their aid because of the sacrifice of so many Koreans in the Chinese revolution, the anti-Japanese resistance, and the

2 On April 15, 2012, North Korea celebrated his 100th birthday, which is also “Juche 101” in DPRK years. (Ben Piven, “North Korea celebrates ‘Juche 101’”, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/04/2012410111258757121.html.) The DPRK was supposed to be a strong and prosperous nation as a way to commemorate that momentous anniversary.
3 Also Romanized as Chang Song-t’aek. Uncle and Aunt received major promotions in the military and party upon Kim Jong-il’s death. (See Victor Cha, The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future. (New York: HarperCollins 2012, p. 100).
4 This is quite clear from visits to museums in South and North Korea where there are exhibits celebrating the expulsion of would-be invaders and resistance to occupiers.
5 Bruce Cumings, The Korean War: A History. (New York: Modern Library, 2010), p. 25. Victor Cha, ibid., says 800,000 (p. 318), but the point is that this was an enormous sacrifice of blood and treasure when the PRC itself was in its infancy, facing internal and external threats to its very existence.
Chinese civil war.⁶ The two countries inked a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance in 1961, with China providing huge amounts of aid to the DPRK even in years when its own economy was facing shortages.

This sense of shared weal and woe is at the root of the characterization of PRC-DPRK relations as being as close as those of lips and teeth (唇齿相依), though Beijing believes it has made and continues to make the greater sacrifice, and that the Koreans are not properly grateful or reciprocal when China needs their support. Of course, while lips can kiss they can also suck things dry, and teeth can chew but also bite, so the simile is not without flaws, and relations between the two have indeed encountered serious problems over the years.⁷

The PRC and DPRK both conceive of themselves as the ideologically and ethically superior part of nations divided by the Cold War, and national reunification has remained a top agenda item for both Beijing and Pyongyang, even as such sentiment and commitment has waned appreciably in their other halves: Taiwan (Republic of China) and South Korea (Republic of Korea). In both cases, their American-allied doppelganger experienced rapid economic development and social change over the course of the 1960s and 1970s, culminating in democratization in the late 1980s. While China undertook a massive change of direction along the lines of Taiwan and South Korea’s development strategies, North Korea resisted such a move. It clung to its policy of juche (chuch’e), or self-reliance, an ideological touchstone elaborated by Kim Il Sung and then Kim Jong Il. The ensuing poverty increased its dependence not only on Chinese assistance, but also, during the horrific famine years of the 1990s, on international aid, even from sworn enemies such as South Korea, the United States and the United Nations.

This major Sino-North Korean divergence of development paths began with the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in December 1978. It launched China on the road of opening to the outside world and reforming and enlivening the domestic economy. This strategy combined elements of marketization in place of the plan, privatization and securitization⁸ in place of state and collective ownership, and globalization of trade and investment instead of self-reliance. China’s adoption of many of the developmental state policies that had brought about miraculous growth in South Korea and Taiwan, and Japan before them, was an explicit acknowledgement of the tragic consequences of the juche sort of strategy once dominant in both China and North Korea. In the 1990s, Vietnam likewise did an about face, adopting a reform and opening strategy it called doi moi.⁹ But Pyongyang

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⁶ Ibid. (Cumings), p. 25.
⁷ See Cha (op. cit), pp.318-323 for examples.
⁸ State enterprises were reorganized as share companies and part of their shares were publicly traded on stock markets, although the major shareholders are other state enterprises and agencies.
Chapped Lips, Chipped Teeth

clung to juche, which was too closely identified with the infallible Great Leader Kim Il Sung and Dear Leader Kim Jong Il to jettison. The CPC by contrast undertook a painful evaluation of Mao Zedong, criticizing many of the late charismatic leader’s economic and political policies, a number of which bore close resemblance to those of the Kims. Without a similar reevaluation, however limited, the DPRK could not launch Chinese-style reforms. The DPRK in its entirety is much more closely identified with the personages of the Kim dynasty than China ever was with Mao, who did not attempt to establish a dynasty; this makes such an accounting so difficult.

The Chinese tried several times to persuade Kim Jong Il to follow their lead in opening the economy. They invited him to places such as Shenzhen and Shanghai, dynamic showcases of the results of opening and reform. If North Korea’s economy boomed, it would reduce its dependence on Chinese aid and also provide numerous investment and trade opportunities for Chinese state and private enterprises. It could offer access to the North’s minerals and other natural resources vital to the Chinese economy. It could shift the Korean leadership’s obsessive and costly concentration on military affairs under the sŏn’gun (military first) policy to building the economy and improving the lives of its long-suffering masses. Kim paid an unprecedented three visits to China in the short span of 2010 and 2011, the last in May 2011. He met all of the top party and state leaders and the two sides toasted their time-tested lips and teeth relationship. Chinese leader Hu Jintao stressed the importance of regional peace and stability as well as economic prosperity.10

Beijing and Pyongyang did try to work out development zones along the lines of China’s special economic zones. One was to be along the Tumen River, involving China, Russia and the United Nations Development Program.11 China’s plans to construct an industrial complex on North Korea’s Hwanggŭmp’yŏng and Wihwa islands in the Yalu River beside China’s Dandong city were suspended over the DPRK’s request to deploy troops there.12 Another one at Rajin and Sŏnbong (shortened to Rason) was even more closely patterned after China’s SEZs.13 These zones would also offer China access to the Sea of Japan. But they have gone nowhere.

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10 Top leaders of China, DPRK hold talks in Beijing,” kp.china-embassy.org/eng/zcgx/sbgx/t692927.htm; Dong Ryul Lee, “Still Lips and Teeth? China-North Korea Relations after Kim Jong-il’s Visit to China,” EAI Commentary No. 20, July 1, 2011. Soon after Kim returned home, Pyongyang announced it was ceasing ties with the ROK’s Lee Myŏng-bak (Lee Myøngbak) administration, which had taken a harsher stance towards the North than its predecessors, posing another threat to China’s desire for regional peace and stability.

11 SinoNK launched the on-line The Tumen Triangle Documentation Project in 2013.


Also going nowhere is the city of Sinŭiju, another aborted development showcase just across the Yalu River from China’s port city Dandong, the main conduit for trade between the two nations. Part of the fault for this failure lies with China, which disapproved of Pyongyang’s selection of a Dutch-passport carrying Chinese entrepreneur as its manager. At night, the bright lights and lively scene in Dandong stand as a stark contrast to the darkness that is Sinŭiju, down to its non-functioning ferris wheel, which stands as something of a metaphor both for a place frozen in time or, if not frozen, going around in circles. A new bridge that is being built across the Yalu at Dandong, slated to open in 2014, might facilitate legal trade.\textsuperscript{14}

Since the 1990s, China has diverged further and further from the DPRK in economic, social, cultural, ideological and political fields, as well as integration with the outside world. In fact, Chinese tourists of a certain age visit their neighbor out of a sort of nostalgia for the alternate reality and personality cult kitsch still vibrant there. It is also an object lesson of what China might look like had it rejected reform. China now much more resembles its once implacable Cold War enemies, Taiwan and South Korea, than it does its lips and teeth neighbor. Neither China nor North Korea bears much resemblance to socialism as envisioned by Marx.

In sum, many of the elements that cemented the lips and teeth relationship are no longer in existence or even viable, as the two countries’ development paths have diverged so fundamentally. While China has become increasingly a global player\textsuperscript{15} whose opinion (and cash) is welcomed and solicited worldwide, its neighbor has become increasingly isolated, largely due to its own behavior and refusal to be likeable or trustworthy.

\textbf{The DPRK’s Pariah Status}

China’s growing economic and military clout on the world stage contrasts greatly with the DPRK, which has become increasingly ostracized as a consequence of its anti-social and highly unpredictable behavior. There are several issues that have earned Pyongyang pariah status in the eyes of most other countries, particularly its neighbors in Northeast Asia.

First and foremost is its development of nuclear weapons and the possibility of North Korea proliferating nuclear technology to other states hostile to the democracies and to states involved in regional conflicts, such as Syria or Iran. In spite of a range of carrots and sticks from the United States and other members of the international community including the United Nations to stop its nuclear and missile programs, the DPRK has persisted by fits and starts, withdrawing from the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 2003. It conducted its first underground nuclear test in October 2006. This brought on UN Security Council Resolution 1718 demanding that Pyongyang refrain


from further tests and imposing sanctions. Nonetheless, the North conducted a second, successful test in May 2009. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted Resolution 1874 expanding sanctions. In February 2013 it conducted its third test, just before President Obama’s State of the Union address and during Chinese New Years celebrations, predictably bringing on yet more UN sanctions. In case this did not attract enough attention, Pyongyang also threatened to launch nuclear weapons at the United States mainland. The DPRK has demanded to be considered a nuclear weapons state and to be treated as such.16

In December 2012 it had launched a small satellite, having failed to do so earlier in April of that year. Most observers argued that this was a thinly disguised test of its ability to launch a nuclear-tipped missile. The early days of 2013 were thus particularly fraught, and the third nuclear test came in a context of escalating threats and bellicose verbiage against America and South Korea.

In a more direct piece of offensive action, in March 2010 the South Korean patrol ship Cheonan (Ch’ŏnan) had been sunk with the loss of 46 sailors near the maritime border of the two Koreas, with suspicion falling on a North Korean submarine. Then in October the North shelled the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong (Yŏnp’yŏng). Foreign observers saw these acts as efforts by Kim Jong Un to prove his military credentials and cement ties with the military establishment while his father was still alive. The audience may have been primarily domestic, but the damage to South Korea was direct and lethal, and the concern was international. This was followed by the February 2013 declaration that North Korea was scrapping the armistice that ended the Korean War. The drumbeat continued with Pyongyang urging foreigners to leave South Korea as well as Pyongyang in April. That same month, Pyongyang shut down the Kaesŏng Industrial Zone where South Korean firms had established factories employing tens of thousands of North Korean workers to produce goods for export.

North Korea’s belligerence towards South Korea, Japan and the United States reached a crescendo at that time. In addition to attracting numerous UN sanctions and condemnations for its external behavior, the North is also ostracized widely because of the atrocious situation of human rights in the country.

There is evidence that displeasure with North Korea has also spread among the Chinese citizenry. In May 2013 North Koreans hijacked a Chinese fishing boat and held the crew for ransom. Coming on the heels of a North Korean missile launch sparked discussion on the Chinese web, much of it expressing criticism of Pyongyang.17

16 For a sober analysis of North Korea’s nuclear policy, see Christopher R. Hill, “The Elusive Vision of a Non-nuclear North Korea,” The Washington Quarterly, 32(2), Spring 2013, pp. 7-19.

China’s Policies

Management of Sino-DPRK relations does not fall under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Rather, it is the International Liaison Department of the CPC, the Ministry of Public Security, and the People’s Liberation Army that take charge, indicating the primacy of security in the relations.

China’s policies towards its irksome neighbor have not been consistent or transparent. This needs to be seen in the larger context of China’s rise. While Beijing strenuously argues that its rise is “peaceful” and a threat to no one, many of its actions, including relations with Pyongyang, belie this protestation. At times it sides with the international community, signing on to sanctions and publicly calling on Pyongyang to cool it. More commonly it urges restraint by all sides. It has tried to broker deals between the DPRK and other countries. And there is much evidence that China itself has violated or not rigorously implemented sanctions that it has agreed to. In the first year and a half after Kim Jong Il’s death, the general trend of China’s policy and attitude toward North Korea has been one of barely concealed frustration and criticism, but continued substantive and symbolic support. This exposes the mutual dependence, mutual advantage, and mutual distrust between the two.


20 Zheng Bijian, former Executive Vice-President of the Central Party School and close advisor to the Chinese leadership, is most closely identified with this trope: “China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great Power Status,” Foreign Affairs, 84(5), September-October 2005, pp. 18-24.
China is the major supplier of food and energy to North Korea, although it does not provide this gratis, and in fact makes a profit. China has also invested in building the country’s infrastructure along with its own, to link the countries economically in case of a military emergency. This includes the Tumen and Rason projects mentioned above. Of course, these investments facilitate China’s access to the DPRK’s mineral and other natural resources, ports and cheap labor, so it is hardly selfless. These investments were also part of China’s repeated efforts to try to convince Kim Jong Il to follow its reform and opening model. It has run training seminars for North Korean economic figures and also welcomed laborers from across the border. China commonly turns a blind eye to the frenetic smuggling across the border, which provides a (black) market for many Chinese goods. This includes ignoring the export of many sanctioned luxury goods that the Kims use to reward their supporters and preempt possible discontent and which the North Korean elite purchases during trips to China. It also helps to supply consumer goods for the evolving North Korean market, another means of distracting people from the overall miserable conditions in the country and keeping them involved in non-(overtly) political activity.

On the other hand, China sends back many refugees trying to get to South Korea through China and then third countries such as Mongolia, Myanmar or Thailand, knowing full well that many will face harsh punishment once back home. It has imprisoned China-based activists supporting these refugees.

Although siding with the UNSC in approving sanctions and condemnation after the nuclear tests, the PRC has also urged constructive engagement with the regime to give it the face and dignity Pyongyang thinks it deserves and which, it suggests, will lead to better behavior. To this end, China hosted six rounds of the Six-Party Talks from 2003 to 2007 involving itself, the DPRK, ROK, United States, Japan and Russia. Pyongyang hoped that it could use this forum for direct bilateral discussions with Washington.


but the Americans refused to let this happen. In 2009, after UN criticism of its failed satellite launch, the DPRK announced it was pulling out of the talks. It then resumed its nuclear program, culminating in the May 2009 test. But Beijing did not join in the condemnation of North Korea after the sinking of the Cheonan in March 2010, claiming there was not enough evidence to lay the attack at the feet of Pyongyang. It likewise did not criticize the North for its shelling of Yeonpyeong Island which resulted in the deaths of 4 civilians, instead urging both sides to work towards peace.

Beijing also publicly supported Kim Jong Il till the end, and indicated support for his designated successor. It hosted Jang Song Thaek as a form of blessing of his nephew, Kim Jong Un, soon after the latter’s ascension, and his special envoy Choe Ryong-hae, the political chief of North Korea’s military, in May 2013 on the eve of the Xi-Obama informal summit in Palm Springs. Choe was the highest-ranking official to visit since the leadership turnover in December 2011. Kim Jong Un himself has not received an invitation, in spite of requests. Taken together, these can be seen as signals of displeasure from Beijing, although it continues to employ hortatory rhetoric when referring to the Kims as well as the lips and teeth relationship between the two nations and peoples.

But Beijing has also increasingly taken actions which explicitly and implicitly put Pyongyang on notice that there are limits to China’s forbearance and willingness to endure international criticism for standing up for its neighbor and defending some of its most egregious acts. Perhaps most galling to Pyongyang was China’s establishment of full diplomatic relations with the Republic of Korea back in 1992, a step once thought absolutely inconceivable given the Korean War-cemented lips and teeth relations between Beijing and Pyongyang and the decades of Cold War hostility between Beijing and Seoul. This was a tacit recognition of the ROK’s extraordinary development through a policy of state-led reform and opening, and its undeniable importance on the world economic stage. Additionally, it indicated China’s openness to South Korean direct investment, which, among other things, could transfer various forms of knowhow to China. This signaled that Beijing was willing to bypass Pyongyang and did not really care if its feelings were hurt.

China has also joined in UN sanctions and condemnations of North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests, even if it has not fully implemented the sanctions in practice. 

26 For a participant’s personal take on the Six-Party Talks, see Cha, op. cit., pp. 255-274. See also, Thompson and Matthews, ibid.
27 In fact, China opposed a UN resolution condemning the act, and Hu Jintao, who was General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, Chair of the Central Military Affairs Commission, and president of the PRC personally met Kim Jong Il in China in May and August.
It has sanctioned North Korean banks that the United States has charged are involved in money laundering and purchasing sanctioned goods on the world market.\footnote{Keith Bradsher and Nick Cumming-Brice, “China Cuts Ties With Key North Korean Bank,” www.nytimes.com/2013/05/08/world/asia/china-cuts-ties-with-north-korean-bank.html.} China on occasion implements more rigorous customs investigations searching for internationally-sanctioned goods being smuggled across the border. China also periodically raises the issue of boundaries between the two countries, suggesting that swathes of North Korea actually belong to China.\footnote{Taylor Washburn, “How an Ancient Kingdom Explains Today’s China-Korea Relations,” www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/04/how-an-ancient-kingdom-explains-todays-china=koren-relations/274986; Miles Yu, “Great Wall Estimate Angers S. Koreans,” http://p.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jun/13/inside-china-chinas-one-million-traitors, June 14, 2012.} Given the extreme nationalism of the Korean people, this is intended to hurt their feelings and put them on notice. Ironically, the South has responded to these claims more vigorously than the North.

President Xi Jinping’s June 2013 informal summit with President Obama included discussion of North Korea, with both sides indicating they should work together to ensure peace and stability on a non-nuclear Korean peninsula. Here again, China was going around North Korea and discussing its possible fate with its sworn enemy, an act that would have been condemned as superpower arrogance.

Observers of relations between the PRC and DPRK debate whether or not China is sincere in its criticisms of Pyongyang and support of sanctions promoted by the United States through the United Nations and whether it would ever abandon its ally. The Chinese claim that their overarching goal is peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in the region more broadly, so that they can focus on developing their economy and improving the lives of the Chinese people. Denuclearization of the peninsula would certainly contribute to peace and stability, but unlike the United States, it is not China’s primary goal in its relations with the North. From China’s perspective, if the DPRK denuclearized, this would still not solve the problem, given the nuclear weapons capability of the United States and its ties with nearby South Korea and Japan.

**China’s Strengths**

China brings many strengths to its relationship with North Korea, but at the same time also faces certain constraints in its ability to work its will over its neighbor. In most cases, what appear to be strengths are also liabilities.

Along with its phenomenal economic development, China has invested heavily in modernizing its armed forces. It could once again come to the North’s defense should war break out with the South, but it would be extremely reluctant to do so, especially if the North provoked a confrontation unilaterally. China can supply modern weaponry to the North, legally as well as illegally, and also help it develop its own capabilities. China is a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. China could use its military might to convince North Korea to restrain its own weapons development,
although this seems a non-starter given the role of the Korean People’s Army in the political system and the stated military-first policy.

China’s expanding and voracious economy provides many opportunities to exert leverage over the North. As the main transshipment point for goods coming from and going into the DPRK, China can open the spigot or close it off as one way to demonstrate support or unhappiness with the North’s behavior. China can import the North’s raw materials, and at prices favorable to Korea. China’s construction companies can continue to develop the North’s very backward infrastructure. Chinese companies can invest in the DPRK. China can provide needed food, energy and other vital goods to the North at below market prices. It can control the amount of smuggling across the border and can also turn a blind eye to the shipment of banned luxury goods that are used to reward loyalty among the elite. China can provide job opportunities to North Korean workers. China gives overriding priority to its own economic development, and North Korea is a key to revitalizing China’s northeast, an area formerly dominated by state-owned enterprises which took a long time to recover from the reforms of that sector. China has made huge investments in the region, much of it banking on North Korea finally shifting gears to the economy, where China would be a central and even dominant player.33

As the main land and air border, China can determine which North Koreans can pass through its territory, either to conduct business or travel within China or as a step to going elsewhere. It can also allow North Korean smugglers or refugees to cross unhindered. As the main conduit between the DPRK and the rest of the world, China can restrict the flow of possibly destabilizing information about the outside world into the North, or it can open the floodgates. In a society where information is one key element of power, facilitating information that offers alternative ways of thinking about their own country and the outside is a powerful tool. China has demonstrated a fair degree of success in controlling the internet, and can provide a similar service to the DPRK.

As the only powerful country with any regular relationship with the DPRK, China can protect Pyongyang from international condemnation and sanctions. Even if it supports these, as it did in 2012 and 2013, it can enforce them more or less strictly. China’s role in initiating and hosting the Six-Party Talks showed the North that it has the ability to bring major powers to the table to talk to it directly. Beijing is the only country with a direct pipeline to Pyongyang as well as Washington, Seoul and Tokyo. Warming or cooling relations with Seoul also signal to the North that Beijing’s support cannot be taken for granted. Beijing invited the newly-installed ROK president Park Geun-hye (Pak Kŭnhye) for a state visit in June 2013, according her a highly public and prestigious welcome. In a joint statement, the two sides “agreed on the importance of faithfully carrying out United Nations Security Council resolutions that called for sanctions against North Korea, as well as a multilateral agreement in 2005 under which the North was obliged to give up its nuclear weapons programs in return for economic

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33 This has already begun. “Rustbelt revival,” The Economist, June 16, 2012, pp. 51-52. South Korean firms are major investors.
and diplomatic benefits.\(^3^4\) Taken with the Xi-Obama meeting less than 3 weeks earlier, this clearly signaled to Pyongyang that China was more than willing and able to discuss how to manage North Korea with its two worst enemies. However, it does not resolve specific issues related to the Six-Party Talks, such as preconditions by all sides, how far China will go to actually sanction the North, and so on. Accompanied by a large business delegation, President Park also signaled the important economic relationship between China and South Korea, which far overshadows anything Pyongyang can show.

One of China’s strongest suits \textit{vis-à-vis} the North may be the demonstration effect: that the Communist Party can bring about exceptionally rapid economic development, and through this, improve its standing and prestige in the world at large and win support from its people whose lives have also improved dramatically, while maintaining power. Under Kim Jong Il the North balked every time it seemed on the verge of actually attempting to reform its economy along Chinese lines, with broad and multifaceted Chinese assistance. China’s prestige among many countries of the developing world is extremely high, and its soft power has attracted many leaders eager to study the Chinese experience. Perhaps more remarkably, the Western countries, still lumbering through a major economic slowdown, have humbly turned to China for financing and investment. The Chinese market lures businessmen and government officials from around the world who see opportunities within China while also soliciting investment in their own countries. In 2012 and 2013 the Chinese party and state undertook what seemed on the surface to be a smooth transition of power to a new generation of leaders. This also signals to the North that economic development and opening to the outside have only strengthened the party’s hand at home. All of this should give the Kim regime confidence that it can also undertake difficult reforms, focus on improving the lives of its people, loosen up a bit, and thereby reduce the burden on China of having to shelter and explain the erratic and dangerous behavior of its next door neighbor, and risk a loss of face and prestige for doing so.

China’s strength has also given it the ability to bless the ascent of Kim Jung Un, granting him legitimacy at least in the eyes of some observers.

\textbf{China’s Weaknesses}

We have just seen that China has many weapons, literal and figurative, in its arsenal that give it leverage over North Korea. But it also has a number of weaknesses that constrain its ability to bring the North to heel and reduce its own vulnerability as the champion of such an unpredictable and dangerous actor on the world stage.

China indeed wants to be seen as a major and responsible player in world affairs. When North Korea acts up, people turn to China to rein it in, yet Pyongyang repeatedly behaves in ways that make China look foolish, impotent or even acquiescent. China seems to condone some behavior, or not criticize it as forcefully as other powers want,

with the Cheonan sinking and Yeonpyeong shelling as examples. Yet it did vote for 
UNSC sanctions after the recent nuclear tests. This is probably because the implications 
of them go beyond the Korean peninsula itself, particularly when Pyongyang explicitly 
threatens the United States. China thus risks appearing vacillating and noncommittal, 
which makes it an unreliable partner for everyone, even if everyone turns to it. Xi 
Jinping’s June informal get-together with President Obama was an opening salvo in 
what the Chinese refer to as a new style great-power relationship, but if Xi can’t bring 
the DPRK in line, it seriously compromises China’s reputation and standing, certainly 
in the eyes of the United States.

The leaders in Pyongyang know full well that China fears instability on their 
border and that it does not want their regime to collapse, especially as this would likely 
result in an enhanced position for Seoul and its American allies. Much as Taiwan’s 
leaders believe that, under the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act, America will come 
to its aid should conflict break out with the mainland, North Korea’s leaders seem to 
believe that Beijing will do the same for them, even if they provoke a fight with the 
South and its American ally. Pyongyang continuously tests the limits of how far Beijing 
will go to shield and protect it, keeping China off-balance, satisfying no one, and even 
causing China much embarrassment, as with the February 2013 nuclear test against 
China’s publicly stated wishes.

PRC-DPRK bilateral relations need to be seen in a larger regional context. Of 
great importance are recent ongoing and escalating conflicts between China and many 
of its neighbors, conflicts that the Chinese appear to have initiated. China claims to want 
peace and stability above everything else, yet has raised tensions throughout Northeast, 
Southeast and now West Asia. The first case is conflict with Japan over the Diaoyu 
Islands (Senkaku in Japanese). Then there are serious conflicts with Vietnam and the 
Philippines and to a lesser extent Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei, over the Nansha and 
Xisha (Spratley and Paracel) Islands in the South China Sea. As perhaps the strangest 
case, in April China sent soldiers into India’s Ladakh region where they stayed several 
weeks, right on the eve of Premier Li Keqiang’s visit to India.

Observers are puzzled as to why China has been so vigorously asserting its 
longstanding claims to these far-flung territories at this particular time. Is it because it 
demonstrated such economic strength during the post 2008 global recession that it felt 
it could push against weaker neighbors? The main backer of the Philippines, Japan and 
South Korea is the United States, and it too was in economic distress, as well as trying 
to pull troops and commitments out of Iraq and Afghanistan. So did Beijing perceive 
this as the optimal time to make a move that the United States could not counter? In any 
event, it appears to be backfiring in the court of public opinion.

But these territorial disputes – and China has also asserted claims over Korean 
lands, stirring up resistance from South Korea – have had the consequence of pushing 
America’s allies such as Japan and South Korea closer to the United States and to 
each other, despite their historical mistrust and animosity. The Philippines believes the 
United States will support it in a conflict, and even America’s Cold War foe, Vietnam, 
has sought American assistance against what it sees as China’s bullying. As America 
has pulled out of Afghanistan and Iraq, it has shifted its attention to Asia. This has been
referred to as a “pivot to Asia” as well as “rebalancing.” The former term seems to imply that China’s military modernization and assertiveness have drawn America’s attention and commitment to constrain such a move; America has spun around to refocus on Asia. “Rebalancing” sounds more neutral – America has always had a major presence in Asia, but in recent years has tipped to the Middle East and West Asia, so now needs to recalibrate, but it is hardly anything new or targeted at China. No matter which way it is interpreted, the Chinese see this as an American policy to constrain China, and stir up trouble in the region to derail China’s rise and influence.

These numerous potential flashpoints have put China in a game of whack-a-mole, and the last thing it needs is for North Korea to act up and add to its problems. China has protested that it is a still poor developing country engaging in a “peaceful rise”, but many of its neighbors are quite skeptical of these claims and Beijing’s own behavior belies them as well. While testing India, China has also strengthened ties with Sri Lanka and continues to build up the Shanghai Cooperation Organization with Central Asia. Meanwhile, it is aggressively investing in Iraq and Afghanistan to take advantage of the wealth of natural resources there, particularly oil and minerals. It is sending special envoys to global trouble spots, such as Syria, and increasing its participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations.

In addition to the ongoing East and South China Sea conflicts that China fanned, there is the matter of Myanmar. This country on China’s southwestern border was quite close to Beijing. China’s economic presence there is massive, and Chinese businesses have established claims over much of Myanmar’s riches. China took the deference of its military dictators for granted. But in 2011 the generals suddenly undertook fundamental political reforms, freeing political prisoners and opening all sorts of freedoms. This won major plaudits from the West and Japan who began to pour in the aid and investment they had denied when Myanmar was a military dictatorship. This has seriously weakened China’s clout there, and the regime has stood up to some instances of Chinese running their country as a virtual colony.

Taken together, these cases indicate that China may be overextended, opening several cans of worms that it cannot manage. While this may limit its ability to protect North Korea, at the same time it may signal weakness to Pyongyang who might then raise demands for various kinds of assistance from Beijing.

**Conclusion**

China’s new leader, Xi Jinping, speaks often of the “Chinese Dream.” Unlike the “American Dream,” which involves individual aspirations for success based on hard work, the Chinese version sounds more like Manifest Destiny: after enduring a century of humiliation by imperialists and civil war, the CPC has led a national rejuvenation and China can now reclaim its place at the center of world affairs. Xi has also spoken a “new Great Power Relationship” with the United States, and his informal meetings with President Obama in June 2013 appear to indicate that the United States is prepared to acknowledge China’s importance and meet with its leaders to discuss all manner of global issues. North Korea sits right at the top of the agenda and, correctly or incorrectly,
Washington believes that the key to bringing North Korea into line – abandoning its nuclear dreams, stopping missile development and ending threats to South Korea and Japan for starters – lies in Beijing.

This attention offers China a tremendous amount of face that the regime can show to its people at home. Given the very serious brewing issues it faces domestically – economic slowdown, financially strapped banks, unemployment, an aging population, corruption, pollution, street protests, ethnic unrest, and a disbelief in any political ideology besides nationalism – demonstrating its new global clout is one way to distract people from their day-to-day concerns. But it carries risks if the regime suffers a serious loss abroad. As the population becomes more aware of world affairs through many channels and demands that Beijing take a firm stance against its foes, China’s inability to achieve its international goals cannot be kept secret. It is raising stakes and expectations at home as well as abroad about what it can do.

There is also a belief fostered by Beijing that China is a rising power and the United States a declining one, a situation that offers much opportunity for China. Beijing is gambling that the United States is so worn out and financially strapped after more than a decade of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, that the last thing it will do is challenge China’s functional equivalent of America’s “Monroe Doctrine” to assert its sovereignty and influence in its own backyard.

There is plenty of mistrust to go around. Beijing and Washington do not trust each other in terms of their motives or aspirations. Right after Obama hectored Xi about China’s cyberhacking, former National Security Agency analyst Edward Snowden popped up in Hong Kong (a Special Administrative Region of China) to reveal the extraordinary extent of American hacking and spying on China. While America accuses China of shielding and even encouraging North Korea, Beijing launches the same accusations about America and the other claimants to small islands in the East and South China Seas.

China tries to play it both ways. It claims it is a victim of imperialism now tying up some leftover matters from history; it has no aspirations on the territory of any other country. At the same time, it relishes being at the center of global affairs and having a seat at the table with the other powers, particularly the United States. It will discuss the internal affairs of other countries, such as the DPRK, with other powers, fueling expectations that it can deliver on its promises as well as the demands of others, but then throws up its hands and says this is beyond its abilities. It also sends its own envoys to trouble spots such as Syria, and welcomes the leaders of Israel and the Palestinian Authority to try to mediate that situation.

Reviewing the evidence, such as it is, suggests that China is playing a risky game. It appears to be thrusting itself into external affairs that it cannot manage without having a grand strategy or thinking through all of the implications. If its promises are too self-contradictory, or if it cannot deliver on its pledges or fulfill the expectations it has led others to have for it, it is asking to be bypassed or not taken seriously. It may respond by stirring the pot even more, raising the stakes and risks.
For Pyongyang, keeping China guessing as to its motives and plans is part of its own game. Korean distaste for Chinese meddling and arrogance has a long pedigree, and Kim Jong Un has inherited, directly and through the people around him, a desire to suck everything they can out of China while yielding as little as they can in return. There is no endgame in sight. All in all, the metaphor of lips and teeth is now only a rueful memory, or as a top official confided in me in July 2012, in a meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing, “Sometimes I wonder which is the worse job, dealing with the United States or North Korea.”

Bibliography


**Biographical note**

Thomas B. Gold is Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Berkeley and Executive Director of the Inter-University Program for Chinese Language Studies at Tsinghua University in Beijing. He studies social change on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. His book, *State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle* (1986) was the first to apply theories of dependency, world systems and dependent development – up to that time based mainly on the experience of Latin America – to an East Asian case. He visited North Korea in 2009.
In the 19th and early 20th century, China underwent a transition to modernization to cope with the serious challenges brought about by the Western powers and the humiliating defeat by Japan in the Sino-Japanese war of 1895. While this modernization was by no means equivalent to Westernization,1 many Chinese intellectuals saw the West as a model for modernization. In this process of learning from the West, translation played a crucial role in introducing Western knowledge, ideas and concepts.

Liang Qichao (1873-1929) is among the Chinese modern pioneers who considered translating Western thoughts and knowledge as an effective means to “renovate the people” and transform Chinese society and culture. Liang’s socio-political and intellectual impact on the late Qing period China is profound, as can be testified by the large volume of existing Chinese literature and an increasing volume of Western scholarship detailing his impact. Among the scholarship published in the Chinese language, *Liang Qichao nianpu changbian* (Chronological biography of Liang Qichao) edited by Ding Wenjiang and Zhao Fengtian is the most detailed chronological record of Liang’s entire life. The academic value of this book was well explained by Fogel:

> Everyone who works primarily in the late Qing period, especially those in intellectual and cultural history, has had to make use of Liang’s *nianpu*. There is simply no avoiding it. Liang knew so many people and had contact through the mail with so many more that he virtually lived the period itself. Easier access to Liang’s chronological biography pushes the scholarly bar one level up (2005: 19).

In terms of Western literature published in the English language, Tang Xiaobing’s *Global Space and the Nationalist Discourse of Modernity: The Historical Thinking of Liang Qichao*, is the most cited according to Google scholar. There are many other seminal studies in Chinese, Japanese, and English that explore topics ranging from

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1 See Joseph Levenson (1965), in his *Confucian China and Its Modern Fate: A Trilogy*, used the word “westernization” rather than “modernization” in describing the transforming efforts in late Qing China.
Liang’s intellectual development and contribution, to his socio-political role in this period to his influence on Chinese newspapers.  

While much research was carried out on Liang’s contribution as a newspaper journalist, a reformist and an intellectual, few have studied his thoughts on translation and his translation practice. Fewer still have tried to connect Liang’s translation practice with his “translingual practice” and examine this connection in a historical context. Liang’s thoughts on these matters and his translation and translingual practice provide evidence of Chinese intellectuals’ commitment to China’s modernity. They are also the product of the historical crisis that developed at a time when China’s own cultural heritage, when faced with the threat of Western and Japanese military superiority, became obviously inadequate and incapable of self-regeneration. Liang, and other Chinese intellectual elites, such as Wei Yuan, Huang Zunxian, and Kang Youwei, were compelled to seek the seeds of China’s future rejuvenation.

As described below, the process of intellectual exploration and the move toward modernity was embodied in, among other things, Liang’s writings to promote translations as well as his own translations. Believing that learning from the West could be a “sharp sword” strengthening China, renovating its people, and transforming its society, Liang Qichao not only wrote many articles promoting translation of Western ideas, but he also put such ideas into practice. Compared with other prestigious intellectuals, Liang’s voice had maximum impact owing to his prominence in China’s emerging tradition of journalism. This helps to explain why most of the new terms and ideas that appeared in Liang’s articles all became widespread in China.

It is widely known that Liang lived in exile in Japan from 1898 to 1912 after the failure of the Hundred Days Reform, where he wrote voluminously and translated many works from Japanese into Chinese, some of which were retranslations of Japanese translations of Western works. Nevertheless, the impact of his translation practice and his efforts to introduce Western concepts and terms in this process have not been clearly delineated nor adequately documented in Western scholarly writings. This paper aims to fill this research gap by providing a contextual analysis of Liang’s thoughts and practice of translation and investigating some of the major concepts and terms that were either introduced or popularized through Liang’s introduction of Western ideas from Japanese writings.

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2 e.g., Wu Mingneng, *Liang Qichao yanjiu cong gao* (Studies on Liang Qichao in traditional Chinese) (Taiwan, 2001); Collaborative research on Liang Qichao: Meiji Japan and the reception of modern Western thought (in Japanese), ed. Hazama Noaki; Liang Qichao, Meiji Japan, the West (in Japanese), also edited by Hazama Noaki; Joseph Levenson, *Liang Chi’chi’ao and the Mind of Modern China*; For an analysis of Liang’s political role in this period, see Philip C. Huang, *Liang Chi’chi’ao and Modern Chinese Liberalism* (Seattle, 1972); and *The Role of Japan in Liang Qichao’s Introduction of Modern Western Civilization to China*, ed. Joshua A. Fogel.

3 The term was adopted by Lydia H. Liu (1995) to refer to the process by which new words, meanings, discourses, and modes of representation arose, circulated, and acquired legitimacy in early Modern China through contact with Japanese/European languages and literatures. The term “translingual practice” refers to the same meaning in this paper.
Encounter between Languages

Translation: a means to “renew” the nation

The last decades of the Qing dynasty witnessed traumatic defeats for China in the Opium War (1839-1842), and then in the Sino-Japanese war of 1895, and finally the overthrow of the Qing dynasty in 1911. It was during this historical period that China experienced a breakdown of the dynastic socio-political order and long-standing cultural insularity. The humiliating realities of the defeats, the unequal treaties, and the mid-century mass uprisings, the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864), all forced the Qing court to recognize the need for change.

China’s loss in the Sino-Japanese war came as a considerable blow that shook the self-confidence of the Chinese people, not only because historically, Japan had long been China’s disciple, but also because this failure came after the Qing government had tried to modernize its naval forces by purchasing expensive warships from the West and training its military staff with advanced Western knowledge. The defeat also provoked a radical response among Chinese intellectuals towards the previous reform efforts of the Qing dynasty and called for a more systematic institutional reform following along the lines of the Meiji reforms introduced in Japan. Kang Youwei (1858-1927) and Liang Qichao, two chief advocates, called for fundamental reform of the crippled dynasty. This reform, known as Wuxu Reform, or Hundred Days Reform, was intended to make sweeping social and institutional changes for the Chinese nation’s survival.

The first effort to emulate the Japanese Meiji reform was to embark on Western learning. The Datong Translation Bureau (Datong Yishu Ju) was established in 1897 in Shanghai with a goal to translate and introduce Western learning. Liang Qichao was the main founder of the organization. Liang decided that the Bureau should mainly translate Japanese works or Japanese-translated Western works (dong wen), and that the Bureau should also mainly translate political works (zheng xue) with more focus on introducing the reforms of other countries (Liang, 1999: 57-58).

The late Qing period witnessed a great surge in the translation of Western works with more than half of such works retranslated from Japanese. Among the 533

4 See Zhongguoren liuxue riben shi (The history of Chinese Studying in Japan) by Shi Teng Hui Xiu (trans. By Tan Ruqian and Lin Qiyan) published by Sanlian shushe, 1983. This book is written by a Japanese professor, who gave a detailed account of Chinese people studying in Japan from the late Qing period (1896 to 1937), and the Republic of China period. In the beginning of Chapter 1, the author mentioned that since the 7th century, Japan had started to send students to study in China. For about a thousand years, Japan was always the one who sent students to learn from China, and China was always the one who received disciples from Japan.

5 In Japan, the Meiji Restoration (1868-1912) led to enormous changes in Japan’s political, economic and social structure and finally made the country a great power. They carried out educational reforms and learning from the West by translating Western thoughts and knowledge of modern science and technology. Japan’s success in modernization made the Chinese people recognize the necessity to learn from the West.

translations of Western works in the late Qing period, 321 of them were retranslated from Japanese, accounting for about 60% of the translations (Saneto, 1983: 241). Among these, Japanese political novels of the Meiji period were popular fodder for Chinese translators between 1898 and 1903. Shiba Shirou, Yano Humio, Miyahemikoya and Suehiro Tetcho were included among the popular translated authors of the time (Tarumoto, 1998: 40). Liang, later ventured to write a political novel also, translated Shiba Shirou’s *Jiaren zhi qiyu* (Romantic Encounters with Two Fair Ladies) and introduced Yano Ryuukei (1850-1931)’s *Jing guo meitan* (A Beautiful Story of Statesmanship). These translations from Japanese proved to be an efficient means of introducing and disseminating Western knowledge and thoughts, and they soon outnumbered translations by foreign missionaries from the originals.\(^7\)

Under the direction of modern-thinking Chinese officials, Western science and languages were studied, special schools were opened in the larger cities, and arsenals, factories, and shipyards were established according to Western models.\(^8\) In March 1896 (according to the Chinese lunar calendar), the first 13 Chinese students were sent to Japan by the Qing government to study Western science, technology, medicine, economics and political science (Saneto, 1983: 1). The reform that began in 1898, three years after the Sino-Japanese War, and 30 years after the Japanese Meiji Restoration (which began in 1868) revealed the reformers’ ambition to copy Japanese success with modernization. But all these efforts climaxed in a short-lived movement in 1898, the Hundred Days Reform.\(^9\) Liang was sentenced to death as one of the chief advocates of the reform, and fled to Japan in September, 1898.

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7 Foreign missionaries did a lot of scientific and technical translation in this period, e.g. the Chinese mathematician—Li Shanlan (1811-1882) collaborated with the British missionary Alexander Wylies (1815-1877) on a translation of a work on differential and integral calculus. The Chinese mathematician Hua Hengfang (1833-1902) and the British Missionary John Fryer (1839-1928) translated a text on probability taken from the Encyclopedia Britannica.

8 See Elman, Benjamin A. ’s “Rethinking the Twentieth Century Denigration of Traditional Chinese Science and Medicine in the Twenty-first Century”, prepared for the 6th International Conference on the New Significance of Chinese Culture in the Twenty-first Century held at Charles University in 2003. Available at: http://www.princeton.edu/~elman/ and also Sang, Xianzhi’s *Wanqing shehui yu wenhua* (Society and Culture in Late Qing China) published by China Social Sciences Press, 1996.

9 The imperial edicts for reform issued by the emperor, Guangxu (1871-1908), covered a broad range of subjects, including stamping out corruption and remaking the academic and civil-service examination systems, legal system, governmental structure, defense establishment, and postal services. The edicts attempted to modernize agriculture, medicine, and mining and to promote practical studies instead of Neo-Confucian orthodoxy. The court also planned to send students abroad for first-hand observation and technical studies. Empress Dowager Cixi (慈禧 1835-1908) forced the young reform-minded Guangxu into seclusion and she herself took over the government as regent. The Hundred Days’ Reform ended and the new edicts were cancelled.
Liang’s promotion of Western learning through translation

Liang’s translation of Japanese works began during his exile journey on a Japanese warship to Japan in 1898. However, his support of learning from the West and reforming the decadent Qing dynasty started well before his exile to Japan. Liang showed his familiarity with the existing literature of the Western world in Chinese in his book list “Dushu fenyyue kecheng” published in 1894, in which he recommended the Wanguo shiji (Okamoto Kansuke’s A History of the World), Xu Jiyu’s Yinghuan zhilue (Short treatise of the maritime circuit), Lieguo sui ji zhengyao (Frederick Martin’s The Statesman’s Year Book) and the informative journals on the West such as Xiguo jinshi huibian (A collection of current events on the West). Liang believed that these readings could provide Chinese readers with knowledge of Western reforms, politics, economies, current events, as well as world geography (Liang, 1999: 5).

Liang shared the population’s rebellious dissatisfaction with feudalism and imperial tyranny, and was an ardent advocate of reform. He attributed the success of modernization of Meiji Japan to its assimilation of Western ideas in its existing economic, social and political traditions.

At the beginning of his famous “Xixue shumu biao” (A bibliography of Western learning) published in the newspaper, Shiwu bao (Contemporary Affairs) in 1896, Liang wrote, “(i)n order to reinvigorate the country, we shall translate more Western works; in order to become an independent thinker, one should read more Western works.”10 Liang’s list of Western works was arranged by subject matter into three major divisions: xixue (Western learning), xizheng (Western politics), and zalei (Miscellaneous). There were also 28 subdivisions, ranging from sciences to applied technology, travel accounts and Western cookbooks (Liang, 1999: 82-86).

Also in 1896, Liang published a selected list of Western works on Agriculture – “Xishu tiyao nongxue”, in Shiwu bao, arguing that China’s economic development should be based on the growth of agriculture. He contended that even in the West, the revenue from the agricultural sector accounted for much more than that from the trade sector (ibid.: 87).

One year later, in 1897, Xizheng congshu (Collectanea of the Western art of government) compiled by Liang was published. As mentioned above, Liang pointed out that previously translated Western works were mostly on military studies. For Liang it was regrettable that few works on Western politics and the art of government were introduced into China. Therefore, this Collectanea was Liang’s attempt to fill the gap in existing translated Western literature. The book was composed of 32 categories, covering topics ranging from agriculture (e.g., the illustration of Western sericulture), education (e.g., Western curriculum), to mechanics (e.g., the illustration of the textile machine) (Liang, 1999: 137).

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10 The original is “国家欲自强，以多译西书为本，学者欲自立，以多读西书为功” (guojia yu ziqiang, yi duoyi xishu weiben, xuezhe yu zili, yi duodu xishu weigong). The translation is mine.
In the same year, Liang published “Lun Yishu”, an article that gives the most comprehensive account of his thoughts on translation. He stressed the necessity of adding English courses into the elementary school curriculum, arguing that the effect of this change would be felt 10 years later. He also stated the necessity of retranslating the selected Western works from Japanese and also some relevant Japanese works. Indeed, Liang firmly believed that translation was crucial for the survival of the Chinese nation. He said that “isn’t it obvious that if China is to stand among the world nations, the foremost thing to do now is to strengthen the country through translating Western learning” (Liang, 1999: 44). In this article, Liang put forward the idea that China should first learn from Japan since “when we looked into the Japanese laws, we saw the most detailed regulations and postulates, which, however, were mostly learnt from the West. Therefore, to expedite the process of learning from the West, we should first and foremost translate from the relevant Japanese works” (ibid., 47). Liang even commented on how the translator should translate. Though translation strategy is still receiving much attention among researchers in translation studies, Liang, more than 100 years ago, pointed out that word-for-word translation would not produce good translation. In translation, addition and deletion can be regarded as legitimate as long as the translator could convey the gist of the original text. An ideal translator, according to Liang, should be someone who had the background knowledge of the subject he intended to translate because it would be more likely that the translation can convey the gist of the source text. Liang considered Yan Fu’s translation of Huxley ’s Evolution and Ethics (Tian yan lun) as such an example (ibid., 50). Liang also commented on the overall quality of Chinese translations of Western texts. Also in “On translation”, Liang aired his views on the common mistakes that a translator may make such as allowing Chinese thinking to misinterpret Western meaning, or preserving Western meaning but presenting such ideas awkwardly in Chinese text (Liang, 1999: 50).

Concerning the need to first translate from Japanese translated Western works, Liang explained in “Datong yishuju xu li” (xu li) that as most important Western works had already been introduced to Japanese, it would be wise to take advantage of the Japanese translations (Ding and Zhao, 1983: 176). Liang stated in the “xu li” that the Datong Translation Bureau (founded in 1897) in Shanghai was to give priority to translating the Japanese-translated Western works, and translating the original Western works would have a lesser focus (yi dongwen weizhu, er fuyi xiwen) (ibid., 132).

Liang’s translation practice

Liang’s own translation practice started in August, 1898 (according to the Chinese lunar calendar). When Liang fled for his life on a Japanese warship to Japan, the captain gave him Shiba Shiroo (1852-1922)’s Romantic Encounters with Two Fair Ladies (in Japanese) to read. Liang started to translate this novel into Chinese while aboard the warship (Ding and Zhao, 1983: 158). This Chinese translation, Jiaren zhi qiyu (Jiaren), was later published in serial form in Qing yi bao (Journal of Pure Critique).

Although a suspicious scholar might argue that in 1898, Liang didn’t know much Japanese, thereby questioning how he could translate a Japanese novel, Xia (2006: 200)
provided an explanation for this conundrum. She compared the beginning paragraph of the original and Liang’s translation of *Jaren*, showing that a shallow knowledge of Japanese would help Liang to grasp the main idea of the original text (2006: 201). Liang also explained in “Lun xue ribenwen zhi yi” (The benefits of learning Japanese) that the written Japanese at the time still contained a lot of Chinese characters. Even if “hewen” (hiragana and katakana) has been more widely used in Japanese, Chinese characters still accounted for 60 to 70% of Japanese writing (qtd., Xia: 172). In fact, in the late 19th century, the Japanese were still using many kanji (Chinese-character) words in their own writing and in the translations of Western works, which made it possible for Chinese translators to grasp the main idea of a Japanese text without too much knowledge of the Japanese language.

Liang suggested in his *Hewen han dufa* (Learning Japanese from Chinese) that learning Japanese should take up much less time than learning Western languages, especially as regards reading. Given the geographical proximity and linguistic affiliation between Japan and China, a lot of Chinese intellectuals including Liang Qichao tried to gain Western knowledge through Japanese translations (Xia, 2006: 174).

It is worth mentioning here that Liang, as a translator, was different from other Chinese student-translators in Japan at that time in that Liang was, by then, already an influential political figure who had sought refuge in Japan. Therefore, his intention to translate a Japanese political novel was certainly not just to introduce another literary work to the Chinese readers. Instead, Liang intended to promote a particular political message. In the “Yi yin zhengzhi xiaoshuo xu” (Forward to the Publication of Political Novels), Liang wrote that novels were read and discussed by persons in all walks of life. A good novel could even influence and change the views of the whole nation. In the case of the political novel, it “should be given the highest credit for being instrumental in the steady progress made in the political sphere in America, England, … and Japan” (Liang, 1996: 73). So, when Liang decided to translate Japanese political novels, he chose *Jaren* to present and diffuse the idea of “national rights” (Asian nations’ rights to avoid oppression from Western nations) that the original novel advocated.

It was mentioned earlier that Xia compared the first paragraph of Liang’s translation and the original, and found that Liang followed the original faithfully in terms of content and even the wording. When we look at the first half of the novel, we can see why Liang translated the first half faithfully, but made changes and adaptations to the latter part. Japan, as well as China, was depicted in the first half of the novel as one of the oppressed countries, suffering from the aggression of Western powers and striving hard for national independence and freedom. This is the most appealing part for Liang Qichao (Wong, 1998: 111).

But this faithfulness to the Japanese text didn’t last long. As soon as Liang came across the part in the original that expressed Japan’s desire to become the leader in Asia (see Chapters 10 to 16 of the novel), Liang made changes in his translation of the novel. Wong pointed out that when the Japanese author moved from the original topic of nationalism to that of imperialism, Liang’s translation strayed owing to his opposition of imperialism and his Chinese identity (qtd., Wong: 113). When China’s interest was in
conflict with Japan in the novel, Liang’s own nationalism immediately took precedence and he did not hesitate to rewrite the original. However, Liang’s alterations went so far at some points that his translation did not accord with the story line any more.11

After Jiaren, another Japanese political novel Keikoku Bidan (A Beautiful Story of Statesmanship) by Yano Ryuukei, was published in Qing yi bao with Jing guo mei tan (Jingguo) as its Chinese title. For a while, it was believed that Jingguo was translated by Liang Qichao. However, researchers have argued that Liang was not involved in the translation of Jingguo (Kou, 2008: 77). According to Xia, when Jiaren and Jingguo were published in Qing yi bao, no translator’s name was given for either book (2006: 201). It is now widely acknowledged that Liang was the translator of Jiaren, yet there is no consensus on whether Jingguo is Liang’s translation.

It is clear, however, that Liang thought very highly of both Jiaren and Jingguo, saying that the two novels stood out among Japanese political novels, as well as filling a gap in existing Chinese literature. In the preface of Qingyi Bao Quanbian (A complete collection of Qingyi Bao), Liang listed 10 features of the book, one of which was that the two political novels (Jiaren and Jingguo) were included in this larger book. Liang wrote that once begun, one could hardly put them down. What’s more, these works could easily arouse a patriotic feeling in readers (qtd. in Xia, 2006: 201). For Liang, the value of translating political novels was to disseminate political ideas and to promote political reforms. Liang observed that a fictional work could exert an immense power if it could move people. Fiction, as Liang saw it, was a powerful vehicle to “renovate the people of a nation” (Liang, 1996: 74).

Shiwu Xiao Haojie (Shiwu) (Two Year’s Vocation), that Liang co-translated with Luo Xiaogao, became an instant success when it was published in Xinmin Congbao in 1902 from issue 2-24. Two Year’s Vocation (French: Deux ans de vacances) is an adventure novel by Jules Verne published in 1888. There is no evidence that Liang knew any Western language even though he stayed in Australia in 1901 for two months, and America (e.g., Liang stayed in Honolulu for about half a year in 1900), so it’s not surprising that Liang and Luo retranslated this French novel from the Japanese translation. Interestingly, the Japanese version was also a retranslation from an English translation of the French novel (Wang, 2000: 64). No wonder, when we compare the Chinese translation with the original, it’s barely recognizable any more.

In his translation, Liang tended to adopt a style of translation that has been referred to as “haojie yi” (meaning free translation). Liang combined the unique features of Chinese traditional vernacular fiction and the original story into a new compound. Compared with the Japanese translation of Shiwu, the Chinese translation shows some of the traditional Chinese vernacular novels: the interplay between audience and storytellers associated with popular orality (Wang, 2000: 72). These features were added to the original text with the aim of making a foreign adventure story familiar to Chinese readers. As Wang (2000: 66) rightly pointed out, this change also was designed to adapt a long novel to a newspaper serial: the long novel was divided into different

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11 See Wong (1998)’s paper for more information of the story line of Jiaren and contrastive study between the original and the translated text.
installments, which began by directly addressing the “readers” (kan guan), and ended with an endearing cliché: “Please read the next installment, if you want to know what will next happen” (yu zhi houshi ruhe, qie ting xiahui fenjie).

Liang retranslated two more short stories from Japanese translations: Shijie mori ji of Camille Flammarion (1842-1925)’s La Fin du Monde (The End of the World) and E huanggong zhong zhi Rengui (Ghostly Humans in the Russian Palace). The latter, according to Liang, was written by an ambassador of France to Russia, although Liang didn’t identify who this ambassador was. These two stories were both published in Xin xiaoshuo (New novel) magazine in 1902.

Liang tried his hand translating Byron’s poem, “The Isles of Greece” (Liang, 1999: xix: 5631), when he wrote the Xin zhongguo weilai ji (Xin zhongguo) (The Future of New China), a political novel in which Liang wanted to project a picture of a strong China 60 years in the future. Unfortunately, he was not able to finish this work (xia, 2006: 68-69). Although Xin zhongguo showed an obvious influence of Japanese political novels and was constructed in a rather crude manner (Wong, 1998: 115), it is the first Chinese political novel (Xia, 2006: 62), and added a new genre to Chinese fiction.

It has been pointed out that Liang’s other political writings also manifest an influence of Japanese writings. Tokutomi Sohō (1863-1957), a Japanese journalist and writer, influenced Liang’s thinking and writing profoundly. For instance, there are cases in which Liang appropriated Soho’s articles directly into his own writing. Liang’s “yan shi pi li chun (INSPIRATION)” is such an example. Liang even kept the original title of Soho’s article, and adapted or deleted sections of the original text, and then had the article published in Qingyi Bao without giving credit to the original author (Xia, 2006: 248). Liang also translated the following three articles of Soho: “Wuming zhi yingxiong” (Unknown hero), “Wuyu yu duoyu” (No desire versus many desires), and “Jiai de geyan” (Jiai’s motto).

Nevertheless, to view Liang’s appropriation of such Japanese writings as an exact copy of the Japanese model is to underestimate the creative element of his writing. As Xia observed, Liang’s appropriation of Japanese writing was most often combined with his own interpretation and narration in an attempt to alleviate the historical crises that were threatening China’s existence (2006: 249). Liang himself also admitted to have borrowed ideas from Japanese writers in the preface of his Yinbinshi ziyou shu (Yinbinshi collection of articles on freedom) (qtd. in Xia, 2006: 249).

Liang’s above achievement at this time gives grounds for thinking that he “represents a central figure in translation in the transition from the 19th to the 20th century” (Luo, 2009: 124) in that translation actually played a major role in Liang’s writings. Although Liang’s achievement in translating Western works seems secondary when compared with two other translators of his generation, Yan Fu (who translated Huxley’s Evolution and ethics and Social Darwinism into Chinese) and Lin Shu (who made available to Chinese readers more than 170 Western novels).  

12 For more comment on the two translators, see: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/112603/Chinese-literature/61300/19th-century-translations-of-Western-literature
For such reasons, I argue that the contribution of Liang’s translations in the late Qing period mainly lies in his efforts to promote translations and to introduce Western works to help strengthen the Chinese nation-state. Likewise, Liang’s immense influence as a journalist paved the way for him to diffuse Western ideas and concepts in his periodical articles to a wider audience. This might explain why Zheng Zhengduo wrote in his memorial article “Liang rengon xiansheng” (Mr. Liang Rengong-Rengong-Liang Qichao’s pseudonym) that it is Liang, rather than Yan Fu, who made Western thoughts and concepts more accessible to ordinary Chinese readers (Zheng, 1934: 122-123). Liang’s view and practice of translation, therefore, constitutes an indispensible part of his achievement as a highly influential figure of his time. With Liang Qichao and his translingual practice, we also witness the process of combining the neologisms, new words, into the Chinese language.

**Liang’s translingual practice**

Liang played a momentous role in the transformation of the Chinese language from the traditional Chinese, “wen yan”, to the modern vernacular Chinese, “bai hua”. As described by Kellman, translingual writers such as Liang could “flaunt their freedom from the constraints of the culture into which they happen to be born” (2003, ix). Indeed, Liang’s translingual practice between Chinese and Japanese helped to introduce “a vast number of new terms from Japanese into Chinese”.

As stated above, from the 19th century, Japan began to import a large amount of information about the West, firstly from relevant texts written by Chinese authors or Protestant missionaries in China, e.g. Wei Yuan’s *Haiguo Tuzhi* (Illustrated account of the maritime countries) (Masini, 1993: 84). In this process, they adopted “a good many” terms contained in the works from China. For example “tielu” (railway), “xinwen” (news), “yiyuan” (parliament), “wenxue” (literature, often mistaken as a loaned word from Japan) and “gongsi” (company) were terms that first appeared in *Haiguo Tuzhi* before being introduced into Japan (*ibid.*, 85, 86).

However, after China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese war in 1895, and especially after the failure of the Hundred Days Reform in 1898, “China’s intellectual elite” started to view Japan as a model for a fundamental and comprehensive reform in China. Liang’s involvement in this monumental evolution of the Chinese language is inextricably connected to the fact that he took refuge in Japan for 14 years, where he came into contact with an enormous amount of Western thoughts and concepts that were already translated into Japanese.

Again as described above, Liang had retranslated novels and articles from Japanese into Chinese, but most of the time he absorbed what he read from Japanese writings and included the seminal ideas and concepts in his own periodical articles. In some cases, even his writing style emulated Japanese writings (Xia, 2006: 247-259). There are numerous studies of the neologisms and language contact between Chinese

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and Japanese. Those studies, (e.g., Masini 1993), provide a very general overview of language borrowing between Chinese and Japanese. This paper focuses on just some of the loanwords that can be found in Liang Qichao’s periodical articles.

For example, “jingji” (economy) is a returned Japanese loanword, which can be found in the four-character word “jing shi ji su” ( Govern the country and serve the people) in the Chinese language since the 4th century. In a Taoist book, Baopuzi written by Ge Hong (284-364) during the Eastern Jin Dynasty (317-420), the author used the word “jing shi ji su” to comment on the value of Confucianism (Ge, 2005: 12, 365). “Jingji” was shortened to a two-character word (but the meaning remained the same as “jing shi ji su”) later in the 7th century, in Jinshu (The Book of Jin), according to Liu (1995: 315) and in Songshi (History of Song Dynasty) in the 14th century, according to Liu and Gao (1984: 163).

“Jingji” had been borrowed into Japanese to translate the Western term “economy” and then, reloaned from the Japanese lexicon to Chinese that bears the meaning of this key Western concept, “economy”. Interestingly, this term was once translated by Yan Fu (1854-1921) directly from English as “jisheng” (see Yan’s note in Guo fu lun, a Chinese version of Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations). Distinct from Masini’s account that Yan translated “economy” in 1898 (1993: 115), Yan began to translate the book in 1897, and completed the project in 1900. The translation Guo fu lun was published in 1902 by Shanghai nanyang gongxue yishu yuan (Song, 2005: 73). However, Liang had mentioned previously in 1896, that the Japanese translation of “economy” was “jingji” in his article “Lun yishu” (On translation of books), and Liang used the word “jingji” in his “Lun zhongguo renzhong zhi jianglai” (On the future of the Chinese race) published in 1899, which is part of his seminal work Bianfa tongyi (General ideas on reform) (Liang, 1999: 47, 262). What became widespread in China is the term “jingji” introduced by Liang, not Yan Fu’s “jisheng”.

The term, “falü” (law), first appeared in 1838 in the American missionary Elijah Coleman Bridgman’s Meilige heshengguo zhilue (A brief account of the United States of America; published in Singapore in Chinese, 1838), and then was cited in Wei Yuan’s Haiguo tuzhi. It was in this latter text that Liang most likely picked up the term (Masini, 1993: 82) and Liang subsequently helped to introduce this term to Chinese society in his article “Lun zhongguo yi jiangqiu falü zhi xue” (Why China should promote the study of law) published in 1896. Although it is clear that missionary publications also


15 Jing shi ji su was mentioned in Ge Hong’s volume 10- mingben, Bappizo, the internal chapter. The original reads “…huan you li yue zhi shi, jing ji jisu zhi lue, ruzhe zhi suo wu ye” (欢忧礼乐之事, 经世济俗之略, 儒者之所务也), meaning those who believe in Confucianism take care of the ritual things and concern themselves about how to govern the country and serve the people)

16 Mori Tokihiko gave a detailed analysis of Liang’s inconsistent use of “political economy” or “economics” in his own writing. Liang wrote that “in Japan, Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations was translated as the book of jingji” (“富国学之书日本名为经济书”) in his article “On Translation of Books” published in Shiwubao (Contemporary Affairs).
contributed to the enrichment of the Chinese language with the “modern” words they created in their translations, such words would have been confined to a much smaller circle had they not been cited in Liang’s articles.

The following table shows us four words that exemplify key Western concepts that are return loans from Japan and they became widely known in China through their appearance in Liang’s articles:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chinese romanization</th>
<th>English</th>
<th>Sources that identify the loan words</th>
<th>Usage from Liang’s articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>zhengce</td>
<td>policy</td>
<td>Liu and Gao, 1984: 405</td>
<td>Lun zhina duli zhi shili yu riben dongfang zhengce (On China’s independence and Japan’s Asian policy, 1899) (Liang, 1999: 316).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shijie</td>
<td>world</td>
<td>Liu, 1995: 342</td>
<td>Lun zhina duli zhi shili yu riben dongfang zhengce (On China’s independence and Japan’s Asian policy, 1899) (Liang, 1999: 316).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In “Dongji yuedan” (A review of Japanese books) published in 1902, Liang introduced most school subjects that were already well-established in Japanese schools but were just beginning to enter into the Chinese educational system, e.g., lishi (history), dili (geography), shuxue (math), wuli (physics), huaxue (chemistry), fazhi (law), jingji (economics), and tiyu (physical education). Among the names of the subjects, “wuli”, “huaxue”, and “tiyu” were direct loanwords from Japan, and were spread in Liang’s above article.

In *Lun Xue Riben Wen zhi Yi* (*The Benefits of Learning Japanese*) published in *Qingyi bao* in 1899, Liang compared the Chinese and Japanese translations of the following terms: political economy (licai xue in Chinese and jingji xue in Japanese), philosophy (zhixue in Chinese and zhexue in Japanese), and social studies (Qunxue in Chinese and Shehui xue in Japanese) (Zhao and Ding, 1983: 176). Indeed, it is such borrowed Japanese translations that have been retained in the Chinese language to the present day. Such examples testify that when the loanwords from Japan clashed with the terms bearing the same meaning in China, but the Chinese terms had been translated into Chinese directly from English, the Japanese loanwords usually prevailed. Although it is difficult to give an exact reason why this was the case, it is possible, however, that Chinese intellectuals like Liang Qichao used Japanese loanwords in their articles.
to spread Western learning, and when these articles were published in periodicals, a medium that was becoming popular in the late Qing period, these loanwords could go beyond the small literary circles and reach a wide Chinese readership.

Sapir (1884–1939), in his seminal work, *Language*, expounds how languages influence each other, remarking that “the language of a people that is looked upon as a center of culture is naturally far more likely to exert an appreciable influence on other languages spoken in its vicinity than to be influenced by them”. Sapir also says that “Chinese has flooded the vocabularies of Corean, Japanese, and Annamite for centuries, but has received nothing in return” (1921: 205). But now, we can see clearly that in modern history, Japanese exercised a similar influence on Chinese, and moreover, that Chinese actually borrowed heavily from Japanese during Sapir’s lifetime. Particularly in the late 19th century, the terms and loanwords were brought to the attention of Chinese readers by elite writers such as Wei Yuan, Huang Zunxian, and Liang Qichao. It is widely acknowledged now that intellectuals have been extremely important in this language borrowing process. Influential intellectuals are pioneers in introducing new terminology and concepts. It is normally these people like Liang Qichao, who finally get loanwords established. Likewise, Japan borrowed classic Chinese terms from China, and these terms then became firmly established in Japanese language through the work of Japanese scholars.

Indeed, languages of the same writing style usually borrow more easily from each other than those of a different style. For example, English can easily borrow much from French but comparatively little from Chinese and Japanese. That explains why most terms introduced by Liang Qichao prevail in Chinese. Basically, Japanese kanji and Chinese have the same writing style and the borrowed words can easily be assimilated, although it should be noted that even borrowed words undergo change when introduced into a new language. Thus, most Chinese words experienced semantic change after they were loaned into Japanese. Compared to their Chinese origins, the meaning of these words might be extended, narrowed, or completely changed when introduced into Japanese. Likewise, when modern Chinese loaned considerably from Japanese as Liang’s case demonstrates, the same words could mean something quite different and represent totally different concepts.

It is estimated that there are at least 1,000 Chinese words borrowed from Japanese. Liang, in his efforts to introduce Western ideas to China is thought to have imported more than 141 new words, that is more than 10% of the total borrowed words (Li, 2003: 40). As stated in *New Terms for New Ideas* published in Shanghai by the Presbyterian Mission Press in 1913, the new terms were then “cull(ed) from the pages of Chinese Mandarin newspapers” (qtd. in Lackner et al., 2001: xi). Furthermore, almost all of the 141 loanwords have remained well established in modern Chinese since Liang’s introduction. The neologisms and concepts introduced by Liang have not only enlarged the lexical stock of Chinese, but they have enriched the expressive power of the Chinese language, and most of all, they have helped with the dissemination of Western ideas. It seems likely that Liang’s effort to spread Western thoughts has exerted a profound impact on the values of the Chinese people and also on China’s road to modernity.
Conclusion

Liang took advantage of his career in journalism, and used periodicals as a forum to spread Western thoughts, emphasizing that “translating Western learning is the most important tool to rejuvenate China” (Liang, 1999: 45). He advocated the practice of “Chinese learning as the fundamental structure for Chinese society, and western learning as a useful tool with significance for practical matters (zhong xue wei ti, xi xue wei yong)” (ibid., 85). Liang’s thoughts on translation and his efforts to bring new ideas into China were an attempt to strengthen China so as to survive the political and military aggression while the Western powers and Japan vied for position in China in the late Qing period. Liang’s translations and thoughts on translation served an important role at this time and therefore, deserve more focused study and analysis. The language borrowing activity between Japanese and Chinese in the late Qing period has received wide attention in both Asian and Western academia. The present paper has contributed additional groundwork, examining Liang’s contribution in this process and hopefully, can serve as a stimulus for more studies on Liang’s translation and translingual practice.

References


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**Biographical note**

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CATHOLICISM AND THE GELAOHUI IN LATE QING CHINA

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Introduction

Christianity reached China as early as in the Tang dynasty (618-907), but exactly when and how Christianity arrived in China is still under dispute. Internal crises, together with the demand of conservative Confucianists to crackdown on “foreign religions” in the 750s caused a great decline in the number of Christians in China. In the Yuan dynasty (1271-1368), Christianity’s presence in China was still limited to foreigners and almost had no influence on the indigenous population. Christianity began to really make an impact in China only from 1600 onward, when the Society of Jesuits arrived in China. This period produced several highly influential missionary figures in early modern Chinese history: Matteo Ricci (1552-1610) and Michele Ruggieri (1543-1607) were among them. After a period of domination by the Jesuits, Spanish Franciscans, Dominicans, and Augustinians also arrived in the 1630s. However, the number of missionaries was only 30 to 40, and it remained small until 1680. The Rites Controversy in the 18th century was a heavy blow to the development of Christianity in China. Many missionaries were forced to leave the country, others had to stay underground.

After the Opium War, many missionaries from different countries and mission societies went to China. The most obvious change was the increase in the number of missionary societies. In 1842, there were only seven protestant societies. By 1860, there were twenty more societies. The number of Protestant missionaries increased from barely 100 in 1860 to about 3,500 in 1905. This was largely due to the “improved” international relations of Western powers with the Chinese government, in particular thanks to the treaties signed between Western countries and the Chinese government that guaranteed the freedom and protection of Western missionaries in China. However, three decades after the Second Opium War (1856-1860), anti-Christian movements in

2 Ibid., 10.
3 Ibid., 14.
4 Ibid., 22.
5 Ibid., 30.
6 Ibid., 48.
7 Ibid., 68.
the country almost completely destroyed the Christian flock. The decade from 1890 to 1900 saw the movement reach its zenith. Many of these persecutions against Christians were directly or indirectly related to the Boxer Uprising (1898-1901), but some of them had no connection with Boxers at all. Numerous researches have been carried out to study those anti-Christian incidents. It is hoped that the studying of these anti-Christian incidents will serve as a lens through which to understand late imperial Chinese society.

Previous scholarship on the study of anti-Christian incidents of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century can be roughly divided into three categories. The first argues that anti-Christian incidents happened because Christianity and Chinese culture are irreconcilable due to fundamental cultural differences. The most well-known discourse from this school is from Jacques Gernet. In his research of Christianity in China in the seventeenth century, he argues that the Chinese found it difficult to accept Christianity because “at all events, the intellectual traditions, modes of thought and vision of the world of the Chinese differed markedly from those of Europe. Together with the social organization and political traditions of China, these differences constituted a considerable obstacle to Christianization.”8 The second type of argument sees missionaries as representatives of Western imperialism in China, and missionaries’ imperialistic behaviours provoking Chinese hatred. In his study of the origins of the Boxer Uprising, Joseph W. Esherick argues that it was German missionaries’ arrogance in west Shandong province that made the Boxers evolve from a cultural organization to a defensive and protective one against missionaries.9 Esherick’s argument is widely supported by Chinese scholars.10 The third type of argument claims that Chinese people’s anti-foreignism was the cause.11 For these scholars, missionaries were simply victims of China’s xenophobic tradition.

Among these studies, several scholars particularly claim that members of the gentry class were instigators or leaders of many anti-Christian cases. The gentry class in Chinese society was the traditional elite and the protectors of Confucianism, the foundation of Chinese civilization. However, with the extra-territorial rights obtained from treaties between Western powers and the Qing government after the Opium War, missionaries often intervened in the Chinese government’s business in order to protect


Chinese Christians. Thus, the presence of missionaries posed a direct threat to the gentry, making the conflict between missionaries and the gentry unavoidable.12

The above arguments may serve as the main or one of the most important factors of China’s anti-Christian movement in the late nineteenth century as a whole, but given the regional varieties of China, these factors cannot be generalized. Once we analyze the stories behind such events in detail, we may find that sometimes none of the above-mentioned explanations are convincing. In her study of Chongqing, Judith Wyman refutes the traditional view of anti-foreignism which was based on race and ethnicity, because Chongqing itself had been a place where people of different ethnicities living together and foreign missionaries for Sichuan were only another group of outsiders.13 Through the study of Catholics in rural Jiangxi province, Alan Richard Sweeten demonstrates that in rural Jiangxi province Chinese Catholics were not separated from the community because of their religion.14 In his research about Christianity in Fuzhou, Ryan Dunch also argues that becoming Christian did not separate one from Chinese culture, as much Christian knowledge could be understood within Chinese culture.15 These findings proved that anti-foreignism, anti-imperialism, and cultural conflict were not universally applicable to explain the anti-Christian incidents that took place everywhere.

This paper aims to offer an alternative interpretation of these anti-Christian incidents of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. It focuses on Belgian Franciscans in Enshi 恩施 of Hubei province from 1890 to 1910. By looking into the social context of Enshi and Franciscans’ mission history in this region, especially the interaction between Franciscan missionaries and the secret society, the Gelaohui 哥老会 (Society of Brothers and Elders), this paper argues that in Enshi, and many other places in the Yangzi River valley, the anti-Christian activities were led by the Gelaohui. Since the Gelaohui did not have a direct connection with the Boxers, this paper urges scholars to divert their attention from the over-studied Boxer Uprising to other parts of China. By studying other regions and other forces that were both anti-Christian


and anti-government, it is hoped that this paper will enrich our understanding of both Christianity in China and late imperial Chinese society.

Enshi and Secret Societies

Enshi’s full name is Enshi Tujia and Miao Autonomous Prefecture (Enshi Tujiazu Miaozu Zizhizhou). It shares a border with Sichuan province in the north and west, with Tujia and Miao Autonomous Prefecture of western Hunan (Xiangxi Tujiazu Miaozu Zizhizhou) in the south, and with Yichang in the east. Qing rulers had followed the administrative system of the Ming dynasty in this region. Enshi was called Shinan prefecture (Shinan fu施南府), and included the following counties: Enshi, Xuan’en, Laifeng, Xianfeng, Lichuan, Jianshi, Badong and Hefeng. Enshi had been governed by local chiefs until 1735 when the Qing government replaced hereditary local chieftains with nonhereditary appointees from the central government (Gaitu guiliu) in minority areas. In this paper, Enshi refers to both the Shinan prefecture and Enshi County.

Enshi was a mountainous region and greatly lacked good transport routes. The most obvious terrain feature of this region is mountain. The territory is situated between the Mount Ba (Daba shan) and the eastern ridge of Mount Wuling (Wuling shan). The local gazetteer described Enshi as: “it is situated among thousands of mountains, and it could be reached neither by road nor by water”. Belgian priest Théotime Verhaeghen noted that: “Traveling in Enshi, the only view one gets are big mountains. They are divided into many smaller ridges and canyons by rivers”. In some parts of Enshi, people from one village could hear voices from the neighboring village, but they were never able to meet face to face because the mountains between them were too steep to build roads.

Besides the comparatively isolated geographical location, Enshi also suffered from frequent natural disasters. The most common were floods. Others like droughts, hail storms, and gales were also frequent. Between 1821 and 1865, there were twelve natural disasters in Enshi County, including floods, droughts, landslides, locust plagues.

16 Replacement of hereditary local chieftains with nonhereditary appointees from the central government. Since the Yuan dynasty, the central government had relied on local chiefs to govern the minority people in China. As there had been many rebellions by local chiefs, the Yongzheng emperor of Qing dynasty began to apply the new policy of Gaitu guiliu in minority regions in 1726. Enshi Tujiazu Miaozu Zizhizhou minzu zongjiao shiwu weiyuanhui [Enshi Tujia and Miao Autonomous Prefecture Ethnic and Religious Affairs Committee] ed, Enshi Tujiazu Miaozu Zizhizhou minzuzhi [Enshi Tujia and Miao Autonomous Prefecture Ethnic Gazetteer] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2003), 133.


18 Théotime Verhaeghen, Les derniers jours d’un martyr: relation de la persécution de 1898, dans laquelle périt le R.P. Victorin Delbrouck, de l’Ordre des Frères-Mineurs, Missionnaire Apostolique (Malines: Imprimerie S. François, 1903), 2. All translations in this article are my own.

19 Enshi Tujiazu Miaozu Zizhizhou minzuzhi, 273.
and leopard attacks. This meant that on average there was one serious natural disaster every three to four years. Due to frequent natural disasters and bad medical conditions, contagious diseases such as cholera, malaria, black smallpox and all types of typhus were common during the Qing dynasty.

As a peripheral region with weak government control, the society of Enshi developed its own rules and regulations. Among its own mechanics was the constant interaction between people and secret societies. In the late nineteenth century, the most active secret society in this region was the Gelaohui 哥老会 (Society of Brothers and Elders), also called Hanliu 汉留 (Heritage of Han).

About the origin of the Gelaohui, there is a general agreement that it originated from the Guluhui 咕噜会, an armed organization in Sichuan province made up of immigrants from other provinces and local brigands during the early Qianlong reign (1736-1796). During the Jiaqing (1796-1820) and the Daoguang reigns (1821-1850), when the southern-based Tiandihui 天地会 was spreading toward the north, it absorbed some elements of the White Lotus Teaching (Bailian jiao 白莲教) and the Guluhui in the Sichuan-Hubei-Hunan region, and the merging of all these elements gradually formed the Gelaohui. However, the detail of the Gelaohui’s formation remains unknown due to the lack of sources. The Gelaohui was originally quite active in Sichuan province, and later spread to Hubei, Hunan and many other places in the Yangzi River valley. Its core region was part of astern Sichuan that was located at the upper Yangzi River. Its headquarters were based in the border region between Sichuan, Hubei and Shanxi. Enshi’s location of the border areas of Sichuan, Hubei and Hunan province made it a natural hotbed for the Gelaohui.

What made the Gelaohui stronger in the latter half of the nineteenth century was the dissolution of the Hunan Army (Xiangjun 湘军), a temporary army established by Zeng Guofan on the bases of local militias in Hunan province in order to fight the Taiping army. After the dissolution of the Hunan army, many soldiers had no land to farm and they did not want to return to become farmers, neither could they find jobs, so most of them became vagabonds. Many joined the Gelaohui because they were enticed by promises of mutual aid. The second expansion of the Gelaohui took place.

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23 Tan, *Zhongguo mimi shehui*, 151.


following the treaties signed between Western countries and the Qing government after the Second Opium War. Because of these treaties, many inland Chinese cities were opened to Westerners. The entrance of Western steamships in those port cities further outdated the tradition of men pulling Chinese boats in the Yangzi River Valley, especially in the gorges, thus facilitating the development of the Gelaohui. 26 During this transformation, the port cities of Chongqing and Yichang were affected greatly, resulting in increased Gelaohui followers in these regions. Since Enshi is located between Chongqing and Yichang, this region became a shelter of the Gelaohui by the end of the nineteenth century.

As an organized group, the Gelaohui had an important role in the local society. Sometimes it was even more powerful than the local government. In 1899, Zhang Zhidong was informed that one of the local Gelaohui leaders Huang Heting pretended to be a military official of the Qing, and controlled strategic locations with his followers. Another Gelaohui leader Jin Xingwa pretended to be a leader of the Red Banners, and collected road taxes at four locations along each pass from all passengers. 27 Gelaohui members protected opium traders and in return charged protection fees. Those traders who passed Enshi only needed to visit local Gelaohui leaders Liao Hongju, Pan Zifang and Shang Jiwu in order to have safe passages. Because the Gelaohui had branch “offices” almost everywhere, so opium traders were able to move around freely and safely by building good relationships with the Gelaohui leaders. 28 In fact, a quarter of opium taxes in the province came from this area, an indication that this region might have contributed one quarter of the opium output for the province. 29 The Gelaohui was so strong that when Chiang Kai-shek’s government retreated to Chongqing while facing Japanese attack, he was able to raise an army solely based on Gelaohui members. This army was called unit No. 163. While it resided in Laifeng County of Enshi in the winter of 1945, it revived the local Gelaohui activities because of its Gelaohui origin. During this time, older generations of Gelaohui members resumed their earlier activities, and young people actively joined the society, creating a golden age for the Gelaohui. For conveniences, even law-abiding commoners also joined the Society. 30

26 Wu Shanzhong, *Wanqing Gelaohui yanjiu* [Study on Gelaohui in Late Qing] (Changchun: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 2003), 113-116.
30 Tang Qifa, “Wo de fandu shengya” [My Life As a Drug Dealer], in *Hubei wenshi ziliao*, eds.
Missionaries and Gelaohui

Western missionaries reached Hubei province during the Ming dynasty. Since there were frequent persecutions, early Western missionaries could only enter the mainland and work secretly. The first missionary who arrived in Hubei was an Italian Jesuit, Michael Ruggierius. He established a base in Xiangyangfu in 1587, but later returned to Europe in order to persuade the Pope to send envoys to China. The next missionary who entered Hubei was Jesuit Pierre de Spira. He arrived in 1627, but was murdered while crossing a river by boat on his way of arrival. In 1635-1636, Father Rodrigue Figueredo attempted to establish a base here, but failed due to the persecution by local government. The period from 1724 to 1844 witnessed many imperial persecutions of Christianity throughout China. Despite this, missionaries continued to work in China. Christianity reached Enshi in 1837. In that year, Christianity was introduced to Zhiluo village of Lichuan County by merchants. These merchants reported the development to Bishop Théotimus Verhaeghen of Vicariate Apostolic of Yichangfu. The bishop sent priests to Lichuan and began to convert more people in Enshi. In 1870, Hubei province was divided into three dioceses: North-West Hubei, East Hubei and South-West Hubei. In the same year, Belgian Franciscans were officially assigned to work in South-West Hubei, which included Enshi. They soon spread Christianity to most parts of this area. At the same time, the Venetian Franciscans worked in east Hubei, and Florentine Franciscans worked in north-west Hubei. The fast spreading of the Gospel at this region was the direct result of the experience these missionaries had gained from their previous mission work in other parts of China. It was also the result of the French protectorate of Catholicism in China, particularly regarding Catholic missionaries’ right to purchase properties in interior China.


33 Ibid., 119.

34 Lichuan tianzhujiao dashiji [Major Events in Catholic History of Lichuan], Catholic Church of Enshi.

35 Missions Franciscans de Chine. Archive of Belgian Franciscans cathedral, Sint-Truiden, Leuven, Belgium.

36 In the 1860s, French government conducted a series of negotiations with the Qing government regarding missionaries’ legal right to purchase properties in China and Chinese people’s freedom to convert to Christianity. Those negotiation documents could be found in Convention Berthemy: Réglant L’acquisition de terrains et de maisons par les missions Catholiques dans l’intérieur de la Chine, KADOC archive center in Catholic University of Leuven.
Figure 1. A hand drawn map of Yichang diocese. From Archive of Belgian Franciscans cathedral, Sint-Truiden, Leuven, Belgium.

Figure 2. A Christian family in South-West Hubei province. From Verhaeghen, Les derniers jours d’un martyr, 21.
Having come through persecutions and changes of political environment in China, Belgium Franciscans had gained experience in adjusting mission policies according to different situations. Although they reached Enshi a bit late compared with many other places in the province, they were able to establish systematic infrastructure here once they arrived. The central cathedral was located in Yichang. The cathedral included one advanced seminary and one mission school. Chapels were built in counties that had Christians. Similarly with Catholicism in other parts of the country, mission schools were built. The first one was built in Lichuan County in 1885. Teachers were selected among local Christians, catechists and missionaries, and sometimes from local scholars.

Reading through the mission archive sources left by those Belgian Franciscan missionaries, one could feel that they worked quite smoothly overall in Enshi in the nineteenth century. Occasionally there were minor disputes between the missionaries and different kinds of people, but such disputes largely remained regional incidents. Since 1890, the Gelaohui appeared more and more frequently in their records. The missionaries’ fear and hatred of the Gelaohui also became more and more intense. Such evolution was reflected in Chinese records as well. Before the Gelaohui was well formed and active, its predecessors already posed a serious threat to the Qing Empire in the 1850s. In a memorial submitted to the Xianfeng Emperor in 1853, Zeng Guofan reported that:

Last year, rebels from Guangdong province entered Hubei, and most members of the Tiandihiu 添弟会 also went with them…Furthermore, there are so-called Chuanzihui 串子会, Hongheihui 红黑会, Banbianqianhui 半边钱会, Yiguxianghui 股香会. Those secret societies have various names, and often move around with large parties and settle in mountainous areas…Recently some realized that those secret societies collaborate with and cover for each other, so that cases accumulated in past decades that should have been solved remain unsettled, criminals that should have been beheaded remain at large.

Zeng thus recommended investigating and arresting those outlaws in all the provinces. The Xianfeng Emperor replied to this memorial that those outlaws should be punished harshly and the source of the trouble removed. In the following years, Zeng and his generals were busy arresting bandits and secret societies in Hunan province and nearby regions.

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37 Lichuan zongjiao diaocha baogao [Report on Religious Investigation in Lichuan], 1951. Enshi shi dang’an ju [Enshi Archive].
38 Ibid.
39 Zeng Guofan, Li Hanzhang, Zeng Wenzheng gong (Guofan) quan ji [Complete works of Zeng Wenzhang], Juan shou, Zouyi (Taibei Xian Yonghe Zhen: Wenhai chubanshe, 1974), 284.
40 Ibid., 288.
41 Ibid., 291, 299, 339.
In fact, many articles from newspapers published during the late nineteenth century also suggested that the secret societies were the main trouble maker against missionaries.42

The Gelaohui’s anti-Christian activities started around 187043 and reached its peak after 1890. Most anti-Christian incidents that took place in Hubei province before the 1870s were not directly related to secret societies. In the Qing government’s records, anti-Christian incidents involving secret societies could only be found after the 1870s.44 The situation was gradually aggravated after 1870. Besides placards and rumours, anti-Christian incidents also started to emerge frequently. After October 1898, the Gelaohui began to attack Christians in all parts of the south-west Hubei vicariate. The persecution had started in Sichuan province and later spread to Hunan and Hubei.45 In these three provinces anti-Christian incidents took place one after another.46 According to the church records, the Gelaohui divided themselves into many groups to attack the churches in different places. Each group had as many as one thousand well-equipped soldiers.47 The two most serious anti-Christian incidents that occurred in Enshi were priest Victorin Delbrouck’s murder in December 1898 and the massacre of Bishop Théotime Verhaeghen in 1904. Evidences show that both were committed by the Gelaohui.

**Priest Victorin Delbrouck’s Assassination in December 1898**

The assassination of priest Victorin Delbrouck in 1898 was due to the direct influence of Yu Dongchen’s revolt in Sichuan province in 1898. Yu Dongchen was a Gelaohui leader in Sichuan, and he led anti-Christian activities in 1890 and 1898.48 Delbrouck’s death was the first anti-Christian incident in Enshi that brought serious diplomatic trouble to the Qing government.


43 Other studies also show that the Gelaohui became active only after the 1860s. See Carl Whitney Jacobson, “Brotherhood and Society: The Shaanxi Gelaohui, 1867-1912” (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 1993), 95; Robert Herman Felsing, “The Heritage of Han: the Gelaohui and the 1911 Revolution in Sichuan” (PhD diss., University of Iowa, 1979), 96.


47 Annales des Franciscaines Missionnaires de Marie, 1898, 23.

48 Qin Baoqi, Zhongguo dixia shehui [Underground Society in China], vol. 2 (Beijing: Xueyuan chubanshe, 2005), 420.
At the time, Father Victorin Delbrouck worked in the district of Lichuan County, under the administration of Father Polydore. This district, according to the observation of then Bishop Théotime Verhaeghen, was “obviously blessed by God”. There were many conversions; the local mandarin was very favorable toward the religion and the missionaries.49

After Yu Dongchen’s revolt, anti-Christian rumors spread to all the counties in Shinan fu, particularly in Lichuan County, which shares border with Sichuan province. From these rumors Delbrouck came to know that “they (Gelaohui) burned the missions and killed many missionaries in Sichuan and Hunan provinces”. Accompanying those rumors was some alarming news that Gelaohui troops were coming to look for him. On 10 November, Gelaohui troops were about five to six days’ marching from Delbrouck’s residence.50 Realizing that he was in danger, Delbrouck tried very hard to save his mission, but he did not succeed. He sent a letter to the local official in Badong, promising three hectoliters of corn if the mission was successfully protected.51 Unfortunately the Chinese official did nothing to protect him.52 Although some local notable men joined together to protect the church,53 this seemed inadequate because the Gelaohui troops came closer and closer. On 25 November Bishop Théotime, who lived only three days’ walking distance from Delbrouck, sent him a letter, informing him about the danger:

In Lichuan, there are persecutions in our neighborhood. For about a month Christian inscriptions disappeared everywhere, being torn apart by the hands of sectarian. The placards instigate the killing of missionaries and the plundering of Christians. Christians and missionaries here are prey to all kinds of injustice. All honest Christians and pagans fled. Finally a real persecution came. More than two hundred Chinese joined the Ko-ti-houi (Gedihui), Society of Brothers: a secret association and they are waiting for the signal (to attack). Yesterday was the date designated to burn my residence and kill us, they have not arrived yet… We stand in defense, but I hope it will not be necessary to come to this extremity.54

Warned of danger by this letter, and even more by the information collected by his Christian informers, Delbrouck eventually sent a letter to the Yichang government

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50 “Letter on 10 November 1898 ”, *La derniere Lettre du P. Victorin: Massacre en Chine*.
51 Ibid.
52 “Letter on 28 November 1898 ”, *La derniere Lettre du P. Victorin: Massacre en Chine*.
53 “Letter on 10 November 1898 ”, *La derniere Lettre du P. Victorin: Massacre en Chine*.
asking for protection. The Yichang government sent a letter to the Badong official, but
the letter arrived too late to be useful.\textsuperscript{55} On 29 November, Delbrouck was urged by
his Christians to leave his base in Shekoushan to take refuge in another district called
Xiaomaitian, where they expected to find a shelter. On the same day, the rebels took up
arms and marched in the countryside, led by a lettered man Xiang Ce’an. They destroyed
missionaries’ residences, burned houses of Christians, and killed many people. Father
Delbrouck found himself hiding with three Christian companions in an inaccessible
cave. Unfortunately, the bandits found them. He was taken to Shekoushan after being
insulted and brutally tortured. On 11 December he was killed by the bandits.\textsuperscript{56}

Similar to Yu Dongchen’s revolt in Sichuan, this anti-Christian incident was led
by the Gelaohui with organized troops. The revolt was well organized, with Xiang
Ce’an as principal marshal, and Li Shaobai as vice marshal. They also had a flag with
the motto of “destroy the foreign”. Leaders Xiang Ce’an, Li Shaobai and Li Qingcheng
were all leaders of the local Gelaohui.\textsuperscript{57} Shinan fu and Yichang fu were important bases
for the Gelaohui for a long time because of the topography. It was not easy for the
government troops to defeat the Gelaohui in these two regions.\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{55} “Letter on 28 November 1898 ”, \textit{La derniere Lettre du P. Victorin: Massacre en Chine.}
Archive of Belgian Franciscans cathedral, Sint-Truiden, Leuven, Belgium.

\textsuperscript{56} Gubbels, \textit{La vie et le martyr de Monseigneur Théotime Verhaeghen}, 168-169.

\textsuperscript{57} Zhang Zhidong, \textit{Zhang Wenxiang gong quanji} [Complete Works of Zhang Zhidong], vol.1.
(Peking: Zhongguo shudian: xinhua shudian shoudu faxingsuo, 1990), 871.

\textsuperscript{58} Jiaowu jiao’an dang, vol.6, 1146.
The Murder of Bishop Théotime Verhaeghen in 1904

The death of priest Delbrouck did not stop the Gelaohui’s persecution of the missionaries. Soon after the end of this case, more anti-Christian incidents took place in Lichuan, Badong and other counties. Before Father Delbrouck’s death, Bishop Théotime Verhaeghen had written to warn him about the danger. Despite the death of Father Delbrouck, and continuing threat posed by the Gelaohui, Bishop Verhaeghen continued to work in this region.

This incident took place in a market center called Shazidi of Enshi County. On 17 July 1904, bishop Théotime Verharghen went to Shazidi on a pastoral tour with the priests Frederic Verhaeghen and Florent Robberecht, and a Chinese Christian Jia Chengqing. When they were resting on the street, a personal dispute between a passerby and one of the group developed into a big conflict between Christians and a local lineage. To solve the conflict, both party agreed that the chief of the lineage would invite the Bishop and his companions to have a public banquet in his house.59 The Gelaohui in Shazidi had already noticed those missionaries and their activities a long time ago, and this incident gave them a good opportunity to interfere. On the pretext of taking revenge for the local lineage, Gelaohui leader Xiang Xuetang killed those missionaries.60 During this incident, the chapel and some Chinese Christians’ houses were burned. Local Gelaohui leaders also quickly sent the news to Gelaohui branches in other counties and asked them to come to discuss a larger plan. Xiang Xuetang and other leaders were soon captured and executed by the Qing government. The diplomatic troubles caused by this incident made governor Zhang Zhidong punish local officials heavily. Thus the county magistrate of Enshi, Wang Hongbin, was fired, and the interim prefect of Shinan prefecture He Xizhang’s head badge was removed for two months.61

These two incidents showed that members of the Gelaohui were in leading roles in attacking missionaries and Chinese Christians in South-West Hubei in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. In other parts of China, Gelaohui branches were also active in similar activities. For example, in Shaanxi, the anti-Christian activities after the 1890s were also largely organized by branches of the Gelaohui.62

As a matter of fact, these anti-Christian incidents in Enshi after 1870 were part of a larger development in south China that was largely led by the Gelaohui. In the entire Yangzi River Valley, most anti-Christian incidents that took place in the late nineteenth century were directed and organized by them. The most influential anti-Christian incidents directed by them in the Yangzi River Valley in the nineteenth century were: the Li Hong incident, the Yangzi anti-Christian movement and the Yu Dongchen revolt. They were connected with each other in such a way that the Li Hong incident was

59 Zhang, Zhang Wenxiang gong quanjii, 60.
60 Ibid.
preparation for the Yangzi anti-Christian movement, and the Yu Dongchen revolt was the peak during the Yangzi movement. The anti-Christian incidents that were created by members of the Gelaohui were so widespread that the viceroy of Huguang, Zhang Zhidong, sent a memorial to the Qing Emperor in 1891, stating that:

In all the provinces the Gelaohui is the biggest threat to local society. These bandit members’ whereabouts are difficult to tell because they always move around secretly. They often spread rumors and create problems. If we do not destroy them completely, they will form a “larger river” and bring about more serious problems. Generals and officials in all provinces should investigate meticulously, punish leaders of the Gelaohui heavily, and disband these lower ranking members of the Gelaohui…The Gelaohui members formed alliances by swearing brotherhood with each other and establishing sub-branches. The big branches have tens of thousands of followers. Even the smaller ones have more than one thousand followers. All the arrested members of the Gelaohui have shown similar piaobu (a small piece of cloth), haobu (identity card with member number), and seals. It is obvious that they are plotting to revolt. They are in all the provinces along the Yangzi River. Hubei province is located in the upper Yangzi River, and is in the conjuncture of the north and south; the Gelaohui is especially active here. Earlier in the summer of this year, there was an anti-Christian incident in Wuxue; the Gelaohui used this opportunity to spread rumors against Christians.63

It is not clear why the Gelaohui were opposed to Christianity. Several factors might have contributed to their causes. Firstly, Western missionaries’ interference in local affairs forced members of the Gelaohui to act against them. In Lichuan County, where Christians were constantly harassed by the Gelaohui in the 1890s, it was reported that missionaries purchased land and houses and rented them out to Christians. The local magistrate did not dare to interfere with Church affairs. There was even Christian who claimed to be bishop of Lichuan, and interacted with local officials in the name of the bishop. During court procedures, missionaries and Chinese Christians sat together with local magistrate as judges. The local officials’ tolerance of missionaries’ interference in local affairs was blamed even by their superiors for breaking the system. With this amount of Christian involvement in local government affairs, the anger felt by local non-Christians is understandable.

Secondly, Gelaohui’s anti-Christian activities might have been part of their larger anti-imperialism agenda. Many of its members were unemployed boatmen, who suffered the direct impact of Western imperialism after the opening of port cities in the interior of China. At the same time, the Gelaohui, like the Tiandihui, and other branches of the Hongmen organization were anti-Qing as well. The leader of the Li Hong incident in 1891 planned to put the Qing in conflict with foreign powers so he could use the opportunity to revolt against the Qing.

Thirdly, the Gelaohui’s anti-Christian and anti-government orientation might have been a result of the military tradition of highlander societies. This tradition was closely tied to weak government control and the necessity of self-government. In this area, self-defense included two components. The first one was building fortresses. Villages with fortresses were called Zhai寨 or Bao堡. These villages usually stored food and weapons in case of attack. The second component was local military troops. Compared with many places in China, this area’s local military defense was supplied more by secret societies instead of government-approved local militias. As early as during the Jiaqing reign (1796-1820), from 1796 to 1804, the White Lotus Society in Hubei, Sichuan and Shaanxi provinces revolted against the Qing. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the Gelaohui often acted as a counter-oppression mechanism, both against authorities and other oppressive individuals. This tradition of self-defense continued until the early twentieth century, when the Divine Army (Shenbing神兵), who was active in this region as an agency of anti-high taxes and other oppressive governmental policies, was eventually cracked down by the Republican government. Thus the Gelaohui’s activities fitted well into this military tradition of this area.

64 Zhang, Zhang Zhidong quanli, vol. 6, 4741-4742.
Independently or together, the above factors may explain some of the Gelaohui’s anti-Christian actions. Nonetheless, the Gelaohui’s attacks on Catholics do not mean that they were anti-Christian or anti-foreign per se. Their persecution of the Catholic priests and Chinese Catholics might be closely tied to the competition between Catholicism and Protestantism, or between different European organizations and individuals in China. It was well known by Belgian priests that the Gelaohui who attacked them embraced Protestantism in Sichuan because of fears of punishment, and particularly, were under the protection of a Mr. B. This Mr. B claimed that he was from France, and was the direct descendent of one of the Lords, with whom William of Normandy conquered Britain in 1066. On other occasions he claimed that he was related to the king of England. When he was in Paris, he developed strong interests in missionary vocation. He obtained his passport as a tourist, which allowed him to move from one province to another more freely than as a missionary. He spent many years in China, had seen many different provinces and spoke Chinese well. He did not belong to any congregation or society of Protestant missionaries. He was called by the Chinese “European beggar” (Yang jiaohuazi). His adherents had the duty to provide a bowl of rice to him in the morning, noon and evening, on a rotating basis. His teaching was against the Catholic doctrine, and was also against the doctrine of Rome, although he called his teaching “the religion of Rome”. However, he compared himself to St. Paul. Before the massacre of Bishop Théotime Verhaeghen, this Mr. B had been working for two to three months in this region. To Belgian Franciscan missionaries who worked in this area, Mr. B’s teaching increased the boldness of disbelievers, and encouraged their brutality against the Franciscan missionaries and Chinese Catholics.67 In fact, it seems that most people in Enshi were affiliated with Protestantism, and Belgian priests believed that the promised support from Protestant missionaries increased the audacity of these local Chinese.68 An article published in the North China Herald in June 1891 also stated that the Gelaohui was not really anti-Christian:

May it not be the case that these disaffected classes are easily brought into sympathy with the Ko Lao Hui or the Hunan “brave”, and that they think by involving the country in a war with foreign powers, the long-wished for opportunity will arise, and the evils of the present government may be remedied by a change?69

Just as the newspaper article pointed out, the Gelaohui did create many social problems for the Qing government. However, the military weakness after the Taiping Uprising made it difficult for the Qing government to suppress them. In the year of 1891, the government of Hubei province twice reduced military expenses; sixteen infantry units were disbanded, and only six units were left in the entire province. Among these

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67 Gubbels, *La vie et le martyre de Monseigneur Théotime Verhaeghen*, 256-258.

68 Ibid., 262.

69 North China Herald (June 12, 1891), 735, cited in Robert Herman Felsing, “The Heritage of Han: the Gelaohui and the 1911 Revolution in Sichuan” (PhD diss., University of Iowa, 1979), 99.
six, three of them were used to maintain order in the treaty port of Hankou, and the other three units resided in other parts of the province. Jingzhou, Yichang, and Enshi had no official troops at all.\textsuperscript{70} In order to suppress Gelaohui troops in Lichuan County after Victorin Delbrouck’s assassination in 1898, Zhang Zhidong had to dispatch fifty Mauser guns and ten thousand bullets from Yichang, and one hundred soldiers from Hunan province to Enshi.\textsuperscript{71} Such lack of punishment from the government allowed the Gelaohui to be one of the active players in the social unrest that includes millenarian upheaval, peasant rebellion, common banditry and the Muslim and Miao uprisings.\textsuperscript{72}

Other parts of the Qing Empire also suffered the consequences of a weak military in the second half of the nineteenth century. When Guangdong province was under threat of the French invasion in 1883, the military force in Guangdong was so weak that the Qing government had to order Peng Yulin, one of the chief generals of Zeng Guofan, to recruit soldiers in Hunan and bring them together with some of his old troops to Guangdong immediately.\textsuperscript{73} Because of the distance, it was difficult for Peng’s army to arrive on time; he instead suggested recruiting people locally to organize militias (tuanlian).\textsuperscript{74} This was a more efficient and at the same time a desperate means of defense, and even leaders of pirates were enlisted.\textsuperscript{75}

It is necessary to reconsider the essence of the anti-Christian movement which took place in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century China. To what extent did the anti-Christian movement represent the conflict between Christianity and Chinese culture? To what extent did it represent the hatred of Chinese people against Western missionaries as an imperialist enterprise? It may not be as much as some scholars have argued. If it was not national, it is very likely that at least in some places the anti-Christian movement was solely a result of dealings between missionaries and secret societies.

Until recently, the study of Christianity in China has been overly focused on the Boxer Uprising. However, the Gelaohui deserve more attention. The reason why the Boxers attracted so much attention might be due to the consequences brought by them, which were the invasion of Beijing and the burning of the Summer Palace by the Eight-Nation Alliance in 1900. This was the ultimate crisis faced by the Qing. Nonetheless, a comparison of the causes and consequences between the Boxer Uprising and the Gelaohui’s anti-Christian movements shows many similarities. Both the Boxers and the Gelaohui were anti-Christianity. The difference was that the Boxers supported the Qing while the Gelaohui was against it. The original motivation of both the Boxers

\textsuperscript{70} Zhang, Zhang Zhidong quanli, vol. 2, 797-798.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., vol. 10, 7948.
\textsuperscript{72} Albert Feuerwerker, Rebellion in Nineteenth-Century China (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, 1975), 66-71.
\textsuperscript{73} Peng Yulin, Peng Yulin ji (A collection of Mr Peng Yulin), shangce. Zougao, diangao (Changsha: Yuelu shushe, 2003), 347.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., 349.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., 388.
and the Gelaohui had elements of self-defense or mutual aid but no clear political agenda. While both the Boxers and the Gelaohui’s anti-Christian activities brought diplomatic issues to the Qing, the difference lies in the scale of them. For example, the anti-Christian incidents that happened in Badong, Changyang and Changle counties of Hubei province in the 1890s made the French consul in China request 425,000 liang of silver money in compensation from the Qing government. The amount was so unbearable that the governor of Hubei, Zhang Zhidong, wrote to the Qing ministers in Paris to urge for a reduction in the amount through diplomatic procedures.76

Conclusion

Based on the history of Belgian Franciscans in Enshi from 1890 to 1910, this paper focuses on the relationship between Belgian Franciscans and the secret society Gelaohui. The argument is that the anti-Christian activities in Enshi, as well as in other parts of the Yangzi River Valley during this period were mainly organized by the secret society Gelaohui. The causes and consequences of anti-Christian activities led by the Gelaohui and the Boxers had many similarities. Nonetheless, the Gelaohui’s anti-Christian activities have not been sufficiently studied to date.

The history of the Gelaohui, especially its expansion in the middle of the nineteenth century shows that they might not be anti-Christian per se, but rather in the eyes of the Gelaohui, Christianity belonged to the larger framework of Western imperialism that should be contained. Thus, the Gelaohui’s anti-Christian activities reflected the deep impact of Western imperialism on China. A study of secret societies such as the Gelaohui would reveal how ordinary Chinese found other ways to living, particularly through secret societies and Christianity, when government was weak under Western pressure and the traditional Chinese way of life was in jeopardy.

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Inter-group exclusions and animosity are frequently framed as conflicts arising from cultural and particularly religious difference. These conflicts can lead to exhortations from political elites and those in religious authority to shun interaction with others who are different. In Malaysia there are numerous examples of this that range from the apparently trivial to the significant. This article focuses on the Malaysian context and seeks to describe how the writings of two individuals from the region have sought to facilitate inter-religious exchange and acceptance through their writing which draws on their religious traditions that, in the Malaysian context, are often framed as in conflict. I begin by describing two issues that have engendered inter-religious conflict and disharmony in Malaysia. The first of these is related to a Malay translation of the Bible and the second to the ability of Malaysians to convert officially from Islam to another religion. The description of these issues demonstrates the need for religiously framed discursive tools that encourage positive inter-religious interaction. I then turn to an examination of the work of John Prior, a long-time resident priest in Indonesia, and Jahaberdeen Mohd Yunoos, a Malaysian Muslim writer. Of particular interest to me are their renderings of the ideas of the ‘pilgrim-in-dialogue’ by Prior, and the ‘Rapera’ by Jahaberdeen. By bringing these two writers into conversation, as it were, I explore paths towards exchange and interaction emanating from those traditions that are ostensibly at odds.

Malaysia, a site of Muslim-Christian tension

Individuals and organizations of Islamic authority in Malaysia have periodically issued directives that seek to reduce interaction between Muslims and those of other faiths. An example of this occurred in late 2008 when the National Fatwa Council declared that it was haram (forbidden) for Muslims to do yoga. Although the fatwa qualified that yoga was haram when done while reciting mantras, the National Fatwa Council Chairman, Dr Abdul Shukor Husin, went on to note in an interview that ‘doing yoga, even just the physical movements, is a step towards erosion of one’s faith in the religion,

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hence Muslims should avoid it’. In Malaysia, there is a well-developed discourse that positions Islam and other religions as occupying mutually exclusive spaces. Even interactions by non-Muslims with Muslims as Muslims is discouraged. Although in Middle Eastern States it is common for Muslims and non-Muslims to exchange the greetings *Assalamualaikum* (peace be with you) and *Waalaikumsalam* (and peace be with you), in Malaysia it is widely asserted that such greetings should not be exchanged with non-Muslims. Even if a non-Muslim were to initiate such a greeting, it should only be responded to by Muslims with something like ‘good-morning’.

The frequently expressed fear that Muslims may suffer from any contact with non-Muslim religions extends so far as informal warnings to refrain from even looking at non-Muslim places of worship, and to restrict, for example, Sikh gurdwaras from having domes on them lest Muslims mistakenly enter thinking that it is a mosque. Concerns over the impact of engagement by Muslims with other religions are well illustrated by guidelines from the National Fatwa Council in 2005 dealing with Muslim participation in non-Muslims events. Among events that Muslims should not attend are those where there is ‘a speech or a sign that compliments the Non-Muslim’s religion’, where there is ‘red clothing imitating Santa Claus’, or ‘sounds such as the church or temple bells, putting up decorations on a Christmas tree or enact acts such as breaking up a coconut’. To further ensure Muslims do not suffer from contact with non-Muslim ideas, free booklets distributed in temples and churches throughout Malaysia have printed on the cover ‘For non-Muslims only’.

But it is not only publications from other religions that Muslims in Malaysia must be prevented from possessing, it is illegal to distribute literature, or even voice opinions, that contradict a fatwa. Although fatwa is commonly translated as ‘opinion’, in Malaysia fatwas can carry the weight of the law. Article 12 of the Federal Territories Syariah Criminal Offences Bill 1996 states that

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7 As Islam is administered at the state level and not the federal level, federal bodies, such as the National Fatwa Council do not have any law-making power. However, national bodies do seek to formulate laws, policies and fatwas to then be replicated at the state level and thus come into law. Therefore, when the National Fatwa Council declared yoga as haram, it is not illegal to practice yoga, or to disagree with that view, until it is reiterated by the relevant state body (usually the Majlis Agama Islam).
Any person who gives, propagates or disseminates any opinion concerning Islamic teachings, Islamic Law or any issue, contrary to any fatwa for the time being in force in the Federal Territories shall be guilty of offence and shall on conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding three thousand ringgit or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to both.

There are thus multiple exclusions in Malaysia – those that seek to circumscribe inter-faith dialogue, and those that seek to restrict intra-faith discussion. Such exclusions in other settings have been criticized at a number of levels. With reference to inter-group exclusions, Ulrich Beck has suggested that non-engagement with others is sometimes ‘justified with the argument that the chasms between two cultures are too wide to be bridged.’ However, he goes on to say, this ‘incommensurability assumption amounts to a non-intervention pact between cultures that can easily degenerate into violence’.8

Similar arguments have been used with respect to the notion of ‘tolerance’ with regard to inter-group relations. The Malaysian scholar of Islam, Patricia Martinez, pointed out to me that the problem with ‘tolerance’ can be found in the word’s roots. She noted that ‘the etymology of the word “tolerate” started in the eighteenth century, in relation to experiments related to how much poison a person could tolerate before it killed him or her. Thus, this notion of endurance, as the term means now, means that one “suffers” the Other. It is, therefore, an inadequate paradigm for thinking about positive inter-ethnic or inter-faith relationships’.9

The nature of the inter-religious unease that prevails in Malaysia is illustrated by two issues which I explore here in order to provide the context for my remarks that follow later on about the establishment of grounds which may facilitate inter-religious dialogue. The first issue is that of the banning of translations of the Bible into Malay. The second relates to the inability for Malaysians to formally convert from Islam to another religion, despite the Constitution containing a provision on freedom of religion.

The ‘Allah issue’

On 31 December 2009, Justice Lau Bee Lan overturned a 2007 ban imposed by the government on the use of ‘Allah’ by the Catholic weekly publication, The Herald, which had challenged the ban.10 The response to Justice Lau’s ruling, both before and after it was stayed on 6 January at the request of Malaysia’s Attorney General, included protests held at mosques. Most notably, however, a number of churches were attacked with Molotov cocktails. In these attacks, significant damage was done to the Metro Tabernacle Church and minor damage done to other non-Muslim places of

9 Personal communication in 2011.
10 There was, however, also an older ban on the non-Muslim use of ‘Allah’ from 1986, along with the words ‘solat’, ‘Kaabah’ and ‘Baitullah’.
worship. Later in the month of January, a number of severed pigs’ heads were found at mosques in what appeared to be reprisals for the attacks on churches, but which some commentators, including a Muslim opposition politician, believed was the work of agent provocateurs.\footnote{Ahmad Dzulkefly, ‘Pig heads flung into mosques to confuse, divide M’sians’, \textit{Dr. Dzulkefly Ahmad} 27 January 2010, http://blog.drdzul.com/2010/01/27/pig-heads-flung-into-mosques-to-confuse-divide-msians/, accessed 3 March 2011.}

The rhetoric from segments of the Muslim community in response to the overturning of the ban has been severe. Much of it affirms the view that ‘Allah’ is a word that can only be used by Muslims, and the strength of sentiment around the importance of this restriction of use appeared considerable. According to one protestor at the National Mosque in Kuala Lumpur, ‘We can fight to the death over this issue’.\footnote{BBC 8 January 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8447450.stm, accessed 2 April 2013.} The manner in which the issue was framed by some politicians, commentators and particularly protesters, was that this challenge by \textit{The Herald} threatened the inter-ethnic harmony of the nation through its insensitivity to the ‘feelings of Muslims’.

\textit{The Herald}’s difficulties began in 2007 when the paper’s publishing permit was withdrawn on the grounds that it used ‘Allah’ for ‘God’ in its Malay language section. However, when the permit was reissued soon after, the permit contained no proviso relating to restrictions on its use of ‘Allah’. This permit, however, was quickly withdrawn again and subsequently reissued with the restriction on the use of ‘Allah’.\footnote{Asia Sentinel 3 January 2010, http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2217&Itemid=164, accessed 3 March 2011.}

While the difficulties experienced by \textit{The Herald} may be the highest profile of their kind, they are by no means isolated. In 2008, the Ministry of Internal Security confiscated 163 publications because they were non-Muslim publications that had used ‘Allah’. In March 2009, 5,100 copies of a Malay translation of the Bible, which were imported from Indonesia by the Bible Society of Malaysia, were confiscated at Port Klang on the same grounds. This issue arose again in March 2011, when 30,000 Bibles imported were impounded in East Malaysia.\footnote{Christian Federation of Malaysia, ‘Media Release: Detention of Bahasa Malaysia Bibles Yet Again’, \textit{NECF Malaysia} 10 March 2011, http://www.necf.org.my/newsmaster.cfm?&menuid =43&action=view&retrieveid=1275, accessed 12 August 2012.} And in 2004, a government directive sought to ban Christmas carols that referred to Jesus at a celebration to be attended by the Prime Minister and the Sultan to ‘protect Muslim sensibilities’.\footnote{Ioannis Gatsiounis, ‘No invite for Jesus to Malaysian Christmas’, \textit{Asia Times} 23 December 2004, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/FL23Ae01.html, accessed 13 March 2011.} These restrictions are among many faced by non-Muslim religious groups in Malaysia which also include being able to build houses of worship and have (non-Muslim) cemeteries.\footnote{Lee, \textit{Islamization}, 88.}
Many Malaysians, including non-Muslims, frequently did not understand the rationale behind *The Herald*’s desire to legally fight for the right to use ‘Allah’. Some of this rationale was outlined in an article by Research Director of the Kairos Research Centre (Malaysia), Ng Kam Weng.\textsuperscript{17} It begins by noting that elsewhere in the world ‘Allah’ is used commonly by non-Muslims to refer to God in the context of other religions. More importantly, however, Ng seeks to justify *The Herald*’s position that there is a need for ‘Allah’ to be used in Malay translations of the Bible on the grounds of ‘a coherent linguistic philosophy of translation of Scripture’.

The idea that ‘Allah’ might be amicably replaced by the word ‘Tuhan’ is rejected by Ng because the meanings of the words are different, with ‘Allah’ referring to ‘God’ and ‘Tuhan’ to ‘Lord’. ‘Allah and Tuhan have different senses even though they have the same reference’. Furthermore Jesus Christ is referred to as Tuhan Yesus and if Tuhan were to carry the meaning of God instead of Lord, ‘many Biblical references to God and Jesus Christ [are rendered] incoherent’.

First, the substitution is incorrect since the meaning of Allah and Tuhan are different. Second, it creates an absurd situation when Christians try to translate the paired words Tuhan Allah (LORD God). Are Christians now required to call the LORD God, Tuhan Tuhan? This sounds like committing linguistic redundancy. Worse still, the repeated words Tuhan Tuhan come across to Malay readers as suggesting that Christians believe in a plurality of Lords/Gods.\textsuperscript{18}

As well as its importance at the linguistic level as described by Ng, the contest by *The Herald* also has a wider ethno-political importance to which Ng does not refer. It is part of a wider contestation that is ongoing in the socio-political field in Malaysia in which claims to ethno-religious precedence are being affirmed by individuals, parties and organizations that ostensibly seek to ‘protect’ Muslims/Islam from the ‘threats’ they face from non-Muslims. Muslims and their religion are portrayed as requiring defense from attacks that come in the form of challenges to the rights and privileges that Muslims enjoy over non-Muslims, or when Muslims are allowed to convert to other faiths.

**Lina Joy and the issue of religious freedom in Malaysia**

The question as to whether a Malaysian who is administratively regarded as a Muslim may officially convert to another faith is among the most contested political and legal ones in Malaysia.\textsuperscript{19} Of particular issue is the meaning behind the interpretation

\textsuperscript{17} Ng Kam Weng ‘Allah can’t be substituted with Tuhan in Bible translation’, *Mysinchew.com* 5 January 2010, http://www.mysinchew.com/node/33523, accessed 3 April 2013.

\textsuperscript{18} Ng. In Malay, a noun is made plural by repeating the noun. Therefore book is *buku*, whereas books is *buku-buku*. Thus *tuhan-tuhan* would be lords.

of Article 11 of Malaysia’s Constitution. Article 11 states that ‘every person has the right to profess and practice his religion and, subject to Clause (4), to propagate it.’ (Clause 4 gives territories and states power to control the propagation of religion to Muslims.) However, in the case of a woman who wished to officially convert from Islam to Christianity, the High Court found in 2001 that she was not freely able to do so.

This woman, Lina Joy, was told to apply to the Syariah Court in her state for a declaration to that effect because the civil courts have no jurisdiction in this matter which related to the Islamic faith. Lina Joy’s counsel appealed to her constitutional right under Article 11 but was told that even though that article states that ‘every person has the right to profess and practice his religion’, this did not imply that she ‘was to be given the freedom of choice to profess and practice the religion of her choice’. Malaysia’s highest court later concurred that Lina Joy did not have the right to choose her religion. While the arguments deployed to both defend and deny her right to convert from Islam were at times complex, the judges, in short, found that she could not be regarded as a non-Muslim without a declaration emanating from the Syariah Courts.

The civil courts’ decision not to recognize Lina Joy’s right to unilaterally change her faith was informed by the notion within orthodox Islam that apostasy (murtad) is not permissible. Among the impacts on Lina Joy and others who are unable to convert from Islam are that she is unable to marry a non-Muslim (unless he converts), she has little control over how her estate is disbursed upon her death, and that she is subject to behavioural constraints including being unable to drink alcohol in public and needing to observe the fast during Ramadan.

A parallel case illustrates the possible wider implications. In 2002, the previously Hindu husband of a Hindu woman converted to Islam and subsequently converted their two young children to Islam. This woman, Shamala Sathyaselaan, applied to the High Court to annul the conversion and to obtain custody of them. This application was dismissed and she was told to wait for Parliament to address her quandary or to raise the matter in the Syariah Court. The latter she refused to do because, as a non-Muslim, she had no legal standing there. In 2004 she appealed the dismissal (in the civil court) and was granted custody. However, in a caveat, the judge ruled that should the mother attempt to influence the children’s religion, for example by teaching them about Hinduism or by making them eat pork, she would lose custody of them. Of pertinence in this case was that even though the Guardianship of Infants Act declares both parents as having equal influence in determining a child’s health, education and religion, and despite the mother’s disapproval of the conversion, the children’s religion was deemed


by default to be Islam rather than their pre-conversion religion. Such an assumption indicates the privileging of Islam and Islamic Law.

The privileging of Islam and Islamic Law, and the consequent marginalization of non-Muslims (and unorthodox Muslims) has not gone unchallenged. Indeed, the cases of Lina Joy and Shamala Sathyaselaan precipitated the formation of a coalition of non-government organizations (NGOs) called Article 11, named after the above-mentioned constitutional article.

The coalition was formed to organise social and political activism when members realised that political and legal attitudes that gave undue deference to conservative interpretations of Islam had significant social and legal impacts and was not a problem that could be remedied by action within the courtroom alone. It was a socio-political problem that could only be countervailed if accompanied by socio-political engagement. At a forum organised by Article 11 (and which I attended), lawyer and activist Malik Imtiaz Sarwar said,

There is no benefit to be gained now…in waiting for some magic miracle to occur in the courts… The courts are merely, in their minds, correctly reflecting political will as they understand it… I think the issue is not a legal one at all. It is a socio-political consideration.

Thus, members of Article 11 conducted their first public forum on Saturday 26 June 2004 in Kuala Lumpur to protest against the privileging of Islam in civil court cases and to argue for a liberal reading of Article 11 and freedom of religion in Malaysia.

It is worth pointing out that at stake for members of Article 11 are not only particular judgements and political decisions with which they may disagree, but the very space in which they may register their protests and consequently behave as empowered citizens. This space was under threat owing to court findings suggesting that non-Muslims had to seek redress in Syariah courts where they had no legal standing and, furthermore, if they did attend them, would very likely have their cases found against them.

This diminution of this space necessitated the active creation of space elsewhere and thus public forums were held in various locations around Malaysia. In the state of Selangor in March 2006, more than eight hundred people attended another forum at which discussants affirmed that the constitution should be regarded as the supreme law of Malaysia. An open letter signed by 450 attendees – both non-Muslim and Muslim – expressed concern over civil court judges’ declinations on ruling on cases that involved Islamic law, and which therefore left many litigants without legal remedy. Toni Kasim, speaking of a forum in Selangor, noted the increasing willingness of people to

23 Where ‘Article 11’ appears in italics, it refers to the social movement here described. Where it is not in italics, it refers to the article in Malaysia’s constitution.

discuss issues such as those with which the forum dealt. Furthermore, she observed that ‘the fact that all these people are here on a Sunday morning and stayed on till the end is very telling of the lack of discussion on the fundamental issues of freedom and rights. We need more space for dialogue’.  

However, the attempt by *Article 11* to publicly discuss issues relating to the impact of Islam on non-Muslims and Muslims alike was interrupted in May 2006. Over one hundred Muslim demonstrators gathered outside the hotel in the island state of Penang in which the forum was being conducted to protest against the forum. One placard stated that ‘Undang-undang Allah mengatasi hak asasi manusia’ (Allah’s laws prevail over human rights). When some protestors ‘tried to storm the hotel’, however, the police asked the organisers to wrap-up the forum. One of the speakers said that ‘it is of grave concern that we should stop a legitimate discussion when the people outside were the ones who were turning unruly’. Emphasising that the forum was an open space where both affirmations and criticisms of *Article 11*’s agenda could be expressed, Haris bin Mohamed Ibrahim said that ‘if [the protestors] had their own point of view, they should have come in and voiced it out.’ He went on to affirm that ‘We [*Article 11*] have never practised censorship. In fact, we allocated two hours for a question-and-answer session. They could have equally participated’.

I should note that subsequent to the ill-fated *Article 11* forum in Penang, then Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi announced a gag order on discussions of the constitution, especially as it relates to freedom of religion. And indeed, at the Fifth Malaysian Studies Conference which I attended in August 2006 in Malaysia, a panel on the topic of the constitution and freedom of religion was cancelled in view of this directive. But as one reporter wrote, ‘Abdullah has seen enough - not from the hardliners, though, as one might expect, but from Article 11’.

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25 Theophilus, Public reminder.


27 Theophilus, Police ignored mob.

28 See Ooi Kee Beng, ‘Malaysia: Abdullah does it his own vague way’, *Southeast Asian Affairs* (2007), 185-6


Rulers (the Sultans). This memorandum urged the Prime Minister ‘to act against those quarters who challenged [the position of Islam] and “encourage aberrations” in Islamic beliefs.’ It also urged Parliament to ‘amend Article 11 pertaining to religious freedom in conformity with syariah laws and teachings’.31

It is also worth noting that a number of members of Article 11 have had various threats made against them. Most notable of these was the death threat made towards high profile lawyer Malik Imtiaz Sawar.32 The frequent threats of violence by sections of the Islamist community towards those who advocate for a liberal or secular understanding of Malaysian law and politics is naturally not conducive to an open public sphere but have become almost to be expected in Malaysia. A subsequent forum held in 2008 on the issue of freedom of religion organised by members of the Bar Council of Malaysia was also curtailed by police, owing to threats made by Muslim protestors outside the forum.33

Conflict in Political Context

Contests over the right to use ‘Allah’ and freedom of religion in Malaysia may be seen as standing in as proxy battles over the legitimacy of non-Muslim/non-Malay belonging in Malaysia and the equality of non-Muslim and Muslim citizens. If it is the case that non-Muslims can be prevented from using ‘Allah’, and if those who are administratively regarded as Muslim can be prevented from apostatizing on orthodox religious grounds, and if those seeking even to hold discussions about liberal interpretations of laws pertaining to religion are prevented from so doing, then the underlying political and legal framework may be seen as unequivocally Islamic. This privileges Muslims and marginalizes non-Muslims, and discourages inter-group interaction.34

However, these contests are also products of particular political contexts. It is important to acknowledge the views of many Malaysian commentators who note that the heat produced by religious issues serves specific political interests. Many would agree with Ng that the protests against the decision to overturn the ban on the word ‘Allah’ were ‘staged’ and ‘must be seen to be as cynical manipulations by Malay

politicians to gain votes from their community’. The respected Malaysian journalist Jacqueline Ann Surin has similarly observed that, despite the current government’s gestures towards supporting inter-faith initiatives and financially assisting the Metro Tabernacle Church, the ruling Barisan Nasional (Nation Front) coalition is responsible for the way the ‘Allah issue’ manifested itself. As well as making use of draconian legislation and invoking the spectres of past inter-ethnic strife, the Barisan Nasional has played an overt role in scuttling (and demonizing) attempts from civil society to spearhead various inter-faith initiatives that have sought to address the fundamental issues that have given rise (and continue to give rise) to religious disputes. In the view of many observers, the apparent (if not actual) strife caused by the ‘Allah’ and religious conversion issues serve the interests of the ruling government in a number of ways, including legitimizing the continued existence of draconian legislation which is used, so the story goes, to maintain social stability. The government comes to be framed as the maintainer of the inter-ethnic peace, and arguably benefits by distracting citizens from other issues. In his book, which was temporarily banned in Malaysia, the cartoonist Zunar depicts a scuffling crowd of men arguing over the ‘Allah’ issue (with individuals shouting ‘Allah for everybody’ or ‘Allah only for Muslim’) while Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak utters ‘Thank God, he, he, he’ and sweeps under a carpet other potentially damaging issues for the government including those relating to a murdered Mongolian model-cum-arms dealer and a new submarine bought by the government that is allegedly unable to dive.

In this context where religion is politicized, religious beliefs and behaviours are subject to law-making and policing, and where inter-religious suspicion and animosity may be deliberately provoked to serve political ends, there is a need to both recognize and foster genuine inter-religious exchanges that build bridges over the trenches that others seek to dig. Proliferating the idea that the conflicts serve the political ends of some can be seen as helping by reframing the issue as one related not to religion but to politics. Also helpful, however, would be illuminating discursive grounds that fostered inter-religious interaction, understanding and congeniality from religiously informed perspectives. Thus, I turn now to examining two such perspectives put forward by two individuals writing from the perspectives of their own religious traditions – Christianity and Islam – and which I seek to bring into conversation with each other.

35 Ng.
John Mansford Prior and Jahaberdeen Mohamed Yunoos:
The Pilgrim in Dialogue and the Rapera

In his article *Dialogue and culture: Reflections by a temporary sojourner*, John Prior – a priest whose residence is on the island of Flores, Indonesia, and whose work has recently become the subject of a large *festschrift* – outlines some of the dangers that he sees in some of the processes associated with globalization present in the world today. One of these is cultural globalization which results sometimes in materialistic orientations and bland homogeneity. A second process or phenomenon – the one on which I focus here – is the tendency for societies or cultures to close in on themselves, to react with hostility to others, including neighbouring groups of different religions and ways of life. Drawing on his observations of society in Indonesia and elsewhere, Prior observes how, when threatened, ‘minority groups can become mentally isolated and culturally encapsulated’, and ‘the more encapsulated we are by our own group the less transcendent the values by which we live’. However, an ethnic or religious group need by no means be a minority to feel threatened. As we have seen with the Malaysian example, Muslims and Islam are positioned as being under threat by those with which they share social, political and national space.

In view of developments of concern to Prior both in Indonesia and abroad, and within and beyond Christianity, he declares that there is a need to ‘face the rise of religious and cultural extremism’, and at the same time there is a need to engage in ‘consciously creating an open communicative culture in the church itself’. This open communicative culture, he notes, ‘is created by the pilgrims, the probers, the adventurers among us.’ And it is Prior’s exposition of such persons, which he calls the ‘pilgrim-in-dialogue’, citing Walls’ ‘pilgrim principle’, that I wish to explore here for what it can tell us about approaching the apparent inter-ethnic difficulties in Malaysia.

For Prior, there is an opposition between individuals whose orientation is towards dialogue and those whose orientation is more exclusively towards their own culture. The latter are orientated inwards, towards those who are the same. They inhabit their comfort zones. An orientation towards dialogue, however, ‘urges us to become pilgrims, to step out and go beyond, while “culture” encourages us to set down roots and feel at home.’ Thus the pilgrim-in-dialogue ‘lives at the frontier – socially, culturally and religiously’.

Life at the frontier, however, is not easy. Interacting with those for whom different vocabularies dominate, and different worldviews apply, can be difficult. And there is no


39 John M. Prior, ‘Dialogue and culture: Reflections by a temporary sojourner’, *East Asian Pastoral Review* 39/4 (2002), 328-49, http://eapi.admu.edu.ph/capr002/prior.htm, accessed March 2011. Throughout this chapter, quotations of Prior’s writing which do not bear a citation will have been taken from an electronic version of this article which is without pagination. Any emphases are original.

instruction manual to guide one’s path, especially if that path is lined with the debris of past hostilities and failed attempts at bridge-building. ‘Like sailing the ocean there are no fixed points, no certain current, and yet’, Prior notes, ‘there is a direction and there are stars indicating, beckoning on.’ This journey is possible ‘when we are open to what is genuinely human in the other, and where our own culture is open to the transcendent’.

Such difficulties are exacerbated when not only do community leaders portray others negatively, but when representatives of the State and members of the government seek to restrict, sometimes using the power of law, interfaith interactions. As noted above, in Malaysia such interfaith interactions have been curbed by the government. But not only has interaction between faiths been affected, so have interactions within Islam. An example of the latter occurred in 2009 when the former Mufti of Perlis, Mohd Asri Zainul Abidin, was arrested for preaching without a license while giving a religious talk in the house of a businessman to over a hundred listeners.41

For lawyer and writer Jahaberdeen Mohamed Yunoos, this incident raised serious questions about the openness of Islam in Malaysia. Among them, he notes in his book, Rapera, is whether this means that academics and other writers will have to seek prior approval when discussing Islam (which Asri’s arrest indicates is the case). If so this will ‘stifle academic and intellectual development in Islamic thought since the ones who are going to determine whether permission should be granted or not are paid civil servants.’ Who then ‘is to question whether what is stated is indeed consistent with the Quran and the Sunnah? Under such a regime, any sincere effort to invite alternative thinking and to consider alternative interpretations will become a state offence’.42 That Muslims may even freely speak about Islam among themselves, he goes on to point out, appears not even to be protected by the Constitution. Section 4 of Article 11 states that ‘law may control or restrict the propagation of any religious doctrine or belief among persons professing the religion of Islam’, and arguably includes Islamic doctrines and beliefs.43

Jahaberdeen sees this situation as having dire consequences and as being an outcome of the institutionalization of religion and attempts to legislate faith. He gives the name ‘religionists’ to those who participate in and advocate for such institutionalization. Such ‘religionists’ depart from the Prophet Mohammed’s mission to facilitate people’s personal relationship with God and to take apart religious institutions. As evidence of this view, he once quoted to me Chapter 9:34 of the Quran: ‘O believers, many rabbis and priests devour the possessions of others wrongfully, and keep men away from the path of God’.44

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42 Jahaberdeen Mohamed Yunoos, Rapera, Batu Caves: Thinker’s Library 2010, 97.

43 Jahaberdeen, 97.

Here a confluence of views between Jahaberdeen and Prior, despite coming from different traditions – traditions sometimes in contest with each other – becomes apparent. Prior notes that the religious ‘institution tends to acquire and control’, unlike the uninstitutionalised ‘reverential community [which] can let things be….’ The truth claims of religious leaders are for Prior ‘human arrogance at its most dangerous, the kindling wood that blazes into communal riots, racial hatred, religious violence.’ Jahaberdeen appears to concur, writing that ‘Religious arrogance among the people in power and in authority is the worst form of oppressive conduct…They are unable to accept dissenting views because they take it as a personal affront to their power’. Drawing a parallel between such persons and a negatively portrayed character in the Quran (who not incidentally punishes unpermitted faith beliefs), Jahaberdeen points out verse 7:123 which states, ‘Said Pharaoh: “Believe you in Him before I give you permission? Surely this is a trick which you have planned in the city to drive out its people: but soon shall you know (the consequences)”.

In the writings of both Prior and Jahaberdeen we see a commitment to openness. Diversity of opinion, culture and religion is something positive, and perhaps brings into relief that which genuinely binds us as humans. For Jahaberdeen,

We are beginning to learn about the futility and danger of racial polarization. We are very slowly accepting the fact that the Creator does not put all the good guys in one ethnic grouping and all the bad guys in another. We are also learning that racism and tribalism is a result of ignorance and [a] misconceived sense of comfort with ‘group identity’. We are also very slowly learning that decency, acceptance of each other as human beings, love, respect, mutual assistance, and such can be [a] strong binding force between us which [is] more real than ethnicity and racial similarity. The Creator has in fact disclosed to us the reason why He has created us in diversity:

‘O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes so that you may know each other (not that you may despise (each other)). Surely the most honoured of you in the sight of the Creator is (he who is) the most righteous among you. And God has full knowledge and is well acquainted (with all things).’ (Quran, 49:19).

Similarly, Prior has noted the need to be ‘open to what is genuinely human in the other’, and also recognizes that no faith has a monopoly on articulating what is right. ‘There is no system or frame large enough to hold the immensity of Truth. Great theologians from John the Evangelist (Jn 21:25) through to the present day have always

46 Jahaberdeen, 92-3.
47 Jahaberdeen, 90.
acknowledged this.’ John 21:25, which concludes the Gospel according to John, avers that ‘Jesus did many other things as well. If every one of them were written down, I suppose that even the whole world would not have room for the books that would be written’ (New International Version English translation).

For Prior, the need to enter into the spirit of the pilgrim-in-dialogue is less an option than a duty. People are called to ‘step outside the comfort barriers of the enclosed Christian circle isolated in the cities or equally alone in the “Christian” village.’ By doing this, we participate in discovery, which ‘enlarges and refines our cultural and religious sensibility.’ For Malaysians of all religions, Jahaberdeen sees the same need. Rather than speaking in terms of a pilgrim-in-dialogue, however, Jahaberdeen writes of the Rapera, a neologism he coins. The Rapera is a citizen, but much more than a citizen, a Rapera is ‘courageous in the struggle to create a just society where all of Allah’s creatures can have a dignified space. He is forever mindful that if he turns a blind eye to the injustices suffered by others, the injustice will visit him or his relatives one day’.

In Malaysia where ethnic, economic and religious issues are greatly conflated, Jahaberdeen suggests more than just a passing acquaintance with other groups to advance positive interaction. Addressing the reader as a Rapera who detests racism, he writes that ‘If a Rapera feels very strongly against racism and you feel totally helpless to “change the system”, here is something you can do alone – marry someone from another ethnic group.’ And he approvingly cites Gandhi’s advice to a Hindu man who believed he was destined to hell for taking the life of a Muslim child in vengeance for the life of his son. Here Gandhi’s path out of hell for that man was that he adopt a Muslim child whose parents had died in the riots, and raise him as a Muslim.

Reading Prior’s and Jahaberdeen’s writing together, the closeness of the orientation of them both is clear. It may be argued that the scope for this similarity may be possible because of the closeness in the religious traditions – both of which are Abrahamic. This, however, is demonstrably not the case with discourses and projects that partake of the same spirit of the pilgrim-in-dialogue emanating from all other religious traditions. In fact, perhaps Prior’s and Jahaberdeen’s work is all the more important because, as has been noted by others, it is very often those with whom the distance is smallest – whether physically or in terms of religion – that the most severe conflicts often occur.

48 Jahaberdeen, 3-4.
49 Jahaberdeen, 15.
50 Jahaberdeen, 21.
51 Jahaberdeen, 20.
53 Rappaport.
Conclusion

The presence of religious discord divides individuals into groups whose relationships are too often marked by fear and suspicion. The anthropologist Roy A. Rappaport warned of the dangers that religions may pose, particularly with respect to the claims to absolute truth that are, as put by Prior, the ‘kindling wood that blazes into communal riots’. Rappaport writes that a religion’s claims to truth at least tacitly implies that other conventions, those espoused by the unorthodox and the orthodox conventions of other groups, are incorrect, immoral, or even unnatural. As such they may be regarded as abominations and thus evil. Those guilty of such ‘unnatural acts’ may therefore be regarded as other than, or less than human and, in full righteousness and justice, be treated as such.  

Rappaport goes on to note that what may otherwise have been minor cultural differences appear to be, when shone through the prism of religion, ‘fundamental natural differences’ and that this ‘may not only envenom enmities’, but also define these enmities, ‘thus setting humans and human communities against each other.’

In the Malaysian context, proof of Rappaport’s concerns are illustrated by the prickly relationship between minority religions and the religion of its dominant ethnic group which is supported by the State. There, communal disharmony did ‘blaze’ when Christians sought the right to share the word for God with Muslims. In Malaysia, and as has been observed elsewhere, the reaction of some communities that see themselves under threat has been to close in on themselves, as Prior has suggested, ‘to become mentally isolated and culturally encapsulated’. But it is not only in the context of Malaysia that the discussions of Prior and Jahaberdeen have their relevance. Especially as they emanate from religious traditions frequently seen to be especially at odds, the fact they possess the same orientation towards others is important.

The ideas espoused by Prior in his concept of the pilgrim-in-dialogue, and which find resonance in Jahaberdeen’s writing, is particularly significant in the contemporary age. Contact across ethnic and religious divides is especially common today, and records of the misdeeds of some can be rapidly transmitted long distances. There is then a clear need for co-operative efforts founded on common ground and goals, rather than on suspicion and political and personal gain. Co-operation is vital in efforts to offset harms done by humans to each other or the environment, to speak out against and work at overcoming the barriers imposed by both cross-national and cross-ethnic difference and blame, to be critical of the undergirding motive of contemporary political and economic systems, the profit motive. Ideas such as Prior’s pilgrim-in-dialogue and Jahaberdeen’s concept of the Rapera have a place in achieving such unified demands.

54 Raapaport, 438.
55 Rappaport, 438.
The openness demanded of Prior’s pilgrim-in-dialogue, I note in ending, does not mean any abandonment of one’s own faith or culture. In fact, as he notes, ‘Only those profoundly at home in their own faith tradition can live at the threshold with integrity and creativity…Pilgrims of dialogue are rooted in one culture yet belong to many.’ Concerns that exchanges with others will erode one’s own faith are to be rejected, just as Jahaberdeen does to those Muslims who would believe that practising yoga may erode faith. When he was a teenager listening to the Beatles song ‘Let it be’, which he felt contained an important spiritual sentiment, a religious teacher rebuked him saying, ‘How can you listen this song and say it is nice? Jaga nanti termasuk kristian’ [Take care lest you inadvertently become Christian]. Today to such a rebuke, and similar sentiments, ‘I will probably ask him if he really thinks I am [as] stupid as I may look or as weak as him to falter in faith due to a song’.56

Indeed, far from faltering in one’s own faith, exploring the perspectives, beliefs and worldviews of others may serve to enrich one’s experience of one’s own tradition. As Prior notes, the inter-faith cross-cultural pilgrim finds that ‘There is great poignancy and pathos when we re-discover the riches of our faith in the depths of another’s tradition.’

Biographical note

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56 Jahaberdeen, 87.
Reviews


The first of the books under review here is a very informative one that addresses the somewhat sensitive issue of the burakumin (outcast/es) from a variety of perspectives and bases, such as diachronic and synchronic, ideation, master narrative, conceptualisation, empiricism, and so forth. The main thrust is to demonstrate the variety in the burakumin through history, establishing that the modern-day burakumin are not simply a monolithic historical relic from the past. The author has spent many years researching on the burakumin and knows his topic thoroughly. He also uses new primary material. With its focus on diversity and heterogeneity his book might be called postmodernist.

On the negative side the structure is repetitive on occasion, which can and does lead to (minor) inconsistency. I personally also found the style repetitive and long-winded in places. In my view a good editor could reduce the book considerably, though the main text is not particularly long at 225 pages. There are 48 pages of notes and 29 pages of references, an indication of the depth of research. I would recommend it for any scholar of Japanese society or history.

The second book listed above is also an informative one, though, understandably, there are quite a few books in existence already on MacArthur, as one of the world’s most influential figures of the twentieth century. The best-known is probably William Manchester’s *American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964*. The value of the book under review is that it presents a Japanese perspective. Japanese perspectives of MacArthur are usually narrowed to the period of the Pacific War and Occupation, but this book provides information about him before and after, if rather brief. One matter highlighted is the ‘Bataan Boys’, fifteen officers serving under MacArthur having escaped from Bataan, and becoming his aides. Few books on the Pacific War mention this group. Another interesting point made in the book is that while the great majority of scholars believe that MacArthur was dismissed by Truman over the Korean War, Masuda notes that it may have been over—or at least partly over—Formosa (Taiwan), which involved a policy clash between MacArthur and the U.S. Government.

On a critical note, there are omissions such as the hasty and unprofessional trial of General Yamashita in the Philippines, which was pushed through by MacArthur, with
some historians feeling that it was retribution for the atrocities committed by Japanese troops in the Philippines, MacArthur’s second home, and grossly unfair. Another matter that could have been developed in more detail is the dislike of MacArthur by many troops, particularly Australians but also fellow Americans. He was nicknamed ‘Dugout Doug’, implying cowardice, and there was widespread dislike—even hatred—of him. His arrogance and readiness to claim credit did not help the situation. There is only one sentence on this nick-name. On another omission, at the very beginning of the Occupation, MacArthur was instructed by his government to destroy Japan’s nuclear particle accelerators (cyclotrons), for the Japanese too had been working on developing an atomic bomb. MacArthur did so, saying he was obeying orders, but that it was a blow for science. This is clearly evident in MacArthur’s memoirs, Reminiscences, 1964, and is of great importance. Moreover, photographic evidence exists, though many Japanese do not believe it. Another important matter that is omitted is that MacArthur almost always followed orders from the State Department, particularly from Hugh Borton and George Blakeslee. These two powerful and important—and self-effacing—figures are missing from this book. (Hugh Borton is probably the ‘unknown’ person who proposed the famous Article Nine—the antiwar clause—for the new constitution.)

Having pointed out a few omissions that I personally consider important, I do not wish to be too critical, for the Pacific War and subsequent Occupation are vast topics, and omissions are inevitable. This book is a very worthwhile acquisition not only for academics but for general readers.

Reviewed by KEN HENSHALL
University of Canterbury


The large-scale and intimate interactions between and among different cultures and civilizations constitute one of the most salient features of our age. This, nevertheless, does not mean that multiculturalism is a unique phenomenon of the modern and contemporary world. For centuries, the cross-cultural exchanges of ideas and goods, along with the cross-cultural immigrations of people as individuals and groups, have been far more extensive and intensive than is commonly recognised today. Just as is the case nowadays, medicine has been an essential part in a great variety of cross-cultural contacts and exchanges in the past. Asia is and was certainly not an exception in this respect.

This wonderfully-researched historical book by Andrew Goble presents a convincing account of the multicultural character of medicine in medieval Japan. It is based on an in-depth study of two historic medical writings by the Buddhist priest and physician Kajiwara Shōzen 梶原性全 (1265-1337): the Ton’isho (Book of the Simple Physician) written in Japanese for a wider audience and the Man’anpō (Myriad Relief Prescriptions) compiled in Chinese for his medical peers. Through investigating
Zhōzen’s medical works from the perspective of the transcultural contacts and interactions in Asia, especially between China, Japan and to certain degrees India and the Islamic world, Goble demonstrates that multiculturalism is and has long been an essential feature of East-Asian cultures and societies.

The book explores a number of key areas of transcultural exchange related to medicine, from the spread of medical knowledge via printed texts, the social networks of Buddhist priests and the medical facilities of Buddhist institutions, to the flow of *materia medica*. In the first chapter, Goble not only provides us with an understanding of the historical background in which Zhōzen practised medicine and wrote his medical works but also offers an alternative picture to the conventional view which sees this period of Japanese history as being largely closed to the outside world. Shifting attention away from the political centre of Kyoto and the state policies to foreigners, he highlights some other historical features, including long-term Buddhist religious networks across the East China Sea, the highly educated Chinese community in Kamakura, and the outward-looking attitudes of people as well as ruling elites of warriors and officials in the region. In Goble’s words, “Shōzen’s Kamakura was a vibrant, cosmopolitan city in an era when Japan had launched a new wave of human, cultural, and commercial interaction with China.” (p. 24)

It is therefore not surprising that Zhōzen had access to and actively engaged with a wide range of printed Chinese medical texts, especially Song dynasty (960-1279) medical knowledge. As is well documented in Chapter Two and also thoughtfully discussed in the Epilogue, traditional Chinese medicine was theoretically and practically founded in Eastern Zhou, Qin and Han Dynasties (770BC-220AD). A series of advances was achieved under the Song Dynasty, especially the Northern Song (962-1127), developments such as the compilation of the imperially-commissioned authoritative volumes of medical formulae. In his medical works, Zhōzen mentions nearly three hundred Chinese medical texts. As for medical formulas, Zhōzen relied extensively upon a couple of major Song medical texts. Being familiar with new medical achievements from the Song, Zhōzen was able to identify some deficiencies of Japanese medicine and physicians. It is possible that Zhōzen’s medical writings might have preserved some materials of Song medicine which were lost in China, just as another earlier well-known Japanese medical work, *Ishinpō*, had done for Tang medicine.

In Chapter Three, Goble explores what he calls “the Pharmaceutical Silk Road” and how the increasing availability of overseas *materia medica* in Japan from China as well as the Arabic or Islamic world had benefited Zhōzen and Japanese pharmacopoeia. In fact, traditional Chinese medicine and pharmacopoeia up to the fourteenth century had been greatly influenced by Arab (Islamic) medicine. In the process of the technical translation involved in adopting overseas *materia medica* in Japan, Zhōzen made innovative contributions such as clarifying and regularizing difference measurement and dosages and discovering domestic substitutes for overseas items.

In spite of important similarities and commonalities, the different healing arts in different cultural traditions always have different theories and belief systems on health and illness. In the fourth chapter, Goble examines how Zhōzen responded to
different theories and belief systems in medicine through focusing upon his changed understandings of a particular sickness, rai (leprosy). Medically and socially as well, rai was one of most vexing problems in Japan as leprosy has been in many other societies. According to medieval Japanese Buddhism, this was a sort of karmic illness because the human body, healthy or ill, reflected one’s accumulated karma. But, according to Song medical knowledge, the disease was explained in a naturalistic way, that is, by reference to the Chinese theories of qi and the five phases or elements. As a Buddhist priest, Zhōzen initially subscribed to the Buddhist understanding of rai. After many decades of clinical experience, as a physician however he was converted to the Song medical doctrine which for him offered a mode of better explaining the illness, offering more effective treatments, and somewhat freeing the patients from the attached social stigma. A quintessential speciality in later medieval Japanese medicine was concerned with injuries and wounds resulted from battles due to the outbreak of endemic warfare. But the medical works by Zhōzen were very much the intellectual products in the time of peace. Still, in Chapter Five Goble has documented and argued that Song medicine played a crucial role in the development of wound medicine in Japan. Japanese physicians had used materi medica adopted and domesticated from the Kamakura period in the treatment of wounds and employed the theoretical frameworks and tools of Song medical knowledge in conceptualizing wounds and healing interventions.

This book claims to be the first book-length study in the English language of Zhōzen’s historic medical works. As such, it is a valuable contribution to the history of medicine in East Asia, Japan and China in particular. More significantly, because the author had approached the two medieval Japanese medical writings explicitly from the angle of transcultural interaction in East Asia, the book is also a valuable contribution to the cultural history in Asia and Asian studies in general.

As a work in the history of transcultural exchanges and multiculturalism in Asia, the book would be even richer if the author had further contextualized the medical writings and practice of Zhōzen from an even broader perspective on how different medical systems in Asia have been translated and transferred in different Asian societies. Also, the book would be even more insightful, historically and theoretically, if the author had offered a conceptual framework in characterizing the transcultural exchanges and multiculturalism as such phenomena occurred in medieval Japan and were reflected in Zhōzen’s medical works. Yet, these are not so much criticisms as suggestions for future studies. By all means, more historical explorations and conceptual inquiries are certainly needed in order to more adequately comprehend the complicated and fascinating exchanges in medicine between Asian cultures and societies and the history of Asian multiculturalism in general. Doubtlessly, Goble’s Confluence of Medicine in Medieval Japan should and will be an essential reference for any of the future undertakings in these related academic areas.

Reviewed by JING-BAO NIE
University of Otago
Haomin Gong’s Uneven Modernity offers many insights on literature, film, intellectual discourse, and the nature of modernity in postsocialist China. Its central thesis is that modernity is based fundamentally on “unevenness”—on inequalities and structural contradictions that exist both within countries and between them. Within countries, Gong focuses on rich classes and poor ones, favoured provinces and neglected ones, expanding cities and declining rural areas, rising market forces and socialist legacies, state controls and individual freedom, high culture and popular culture, and tradition and change. At the international level, he deals with tensions and inequalities between East and West, between developed countries and less developed ones, and between the local and the global. All of this unevenness is linked to modernity, and its constituent parts are in constant and complicated interaction. Nowhere is this more obvious than in China, a country where modernization has been occurring at an extraordinary pace and where unevenness has been promoted by deliberate government policy linked to slogans like “Let some get rich first” and “To get rich is glorious.”

Gong is well versed in the international literatures on both unevenness and modernity and relates both literatures to China. His own approach, however, is distinctive because it is based on an unusually wide concept of unevenness. Whereas most analysts focus just on uneven relations between geographical regions, between countries, or between more and less developed sectors of the economy, Gong extends the concept to include uneven relations between classes, between the state sector and the private sector, between the state and intellectuals, between the forces of tradition and the forces of change, between high culture and popular culture, and between the local and the global. This extended application of the term “unevenness” has enough coherence to support a consistent overall argument, and it adds flexibility and breadth of reference to Gong’s account. His analysis benefits, too, from a nicely judged theoretical eclecticism that allows him to draw insights from both neo-Marxist and non-Marxist forms of structural explanation, as well as from postmodern perspectives.

The heart of Gong’s book consists of four carefully chosen case studies—two on literary figures and two on filmmakers. Gong locates these in the context of China’s changed economic and political context after 1989, linking them to the growth of the capitalist market, the rise of materialist values, the loss of faith in socialist solutions, a turn away from the search for political alternatives, and a sharp decline in the status of intellectuals. All of these factors influenced the subject of his first case study, the scholar and writer Yu Qiuyu, who became a public figure and intellectual celebrity in an era when other scholars were ignored. Yu’s success, Gong argues, was based on his skill in negotiating the uneven terrain that faced writers in the 1990s. He bridged the gap between the traditional and the modern by adapting established literary forms so that they appealed to a wider audience; he crossed the boundary between the academic and commercial worlds by promoting himself and his work through modern marketing methods and media appearances; and he showed great skill in touching on sensitive issues while not falling foul of the state.
Yu owed his success to his ability to straddle the fissures in Chinese society, but the neorealist writer Chi Li won fame by identifying herself squarely with a single class—the “petty urbanites” who have proliferated as part of China’s modernization. Her stories chronicle the mundane lives of ordinary people in the city of Wuhan, which stagnated while government policy singled out other cities for growth. Embracing a reality that had been written off by both the socialist realists of the Mao era and the reform-minded intellectuals of the 1980s, Chi Li constructs an ‘unheroic world’ that defies “all grand causes and discourses” and has lost all faith in “transcendent values” (pp. 57-58). Gong suggests that in the market-dominated 1990s Chi Li’s neorealism, like the political withdrawal and cynicism of China’s petty urbanites, was “a timely stance for survival.”

The rise of the market and a post-ideological audience also conditions the work of the commercial filmmaker Feng Xiaogang, who blends comedy with social commentary in movies that are “not intended for film festivals or scholars, but for his audiences” (p.86). Like Yu, Feng finds profitable trade-offs between the disparate elements of China’s uneven socio-political and ideological terrain. He makes films with a mix of state-sponsored, private and international companies, he uses humour to exploit the emergence of more liberal trends in Chinese society, and he draws on “vestigial socialist ideology” in his critiques of “rampant capitalist consumerism” and moral failure. Commercial film-making in China, Gong concludes, is “a survival strategy in the prevailing uneven social conditions,” a strategy that “combines both aesthetic exploration and critical agency” (p. 88).

Some of the same elements are present in the work of Sixth Generation director Wang Xiaoxuai, whose “art films” are the subject of the book’s final case study. Directors of art films, says Gong, “negotiate between the domestic and international film markets because their marginality in China is a kind of guarantee of their popularity in the West, which in turn brings them success among critics, and, paradoxically, an audience back in China” (p. 111). They strike a careful balance between ‘anti-establishment political stands’, the expectations of foreign art film audiences, the state-controlled filmmaking system, and ‘the increasing allure of the domestic market itself’ (p. 109). They are therefore not as different from commercial filmmakers as is sometimes claimed, in part because they are presented with many of the same pressures and opportunities by China’s uneven domestic and international terrain.

All of this is perceptive and well argued, but it in no way prepares the reader for the book’s conclusion. Gong started out by asserting that unevenness is not an “accidental feature” of modernity but is both “intrinsic” and “necessary” to it, and while his case studies do not require this proposition they in no way rule it out. In the book’s conclusion, however, he reverses his position completely, suggesting that China may be able to develop a new form of modernity based on the value of “evenness.” This can be achieved, he says, by reasserting ‘evenness’ as a universal human value—a value manifested in the traditions of the Enlightenment and revolutionary socialism, and a value that even (in his view) “exhibits its due place” in Confucianism (p. 136). Whether or not he is right about Confucianism, his position here involves an emphasis on the independent power of ideas that is at odds with the emphasis on structural determination in the rest of the book.
Will the universal value of evenness triumph over the structural obstacles in its path? Gong draws some hope from recent reforms in China, but he is well aware that they may simply be intended to shore up the rule of the Communist Party and consolidate the political unevenness that is part of the problem. So the question, perhaps understandably, remains unanswered. All we can say with any certainty is that if China does become a more even society it will show that Gong’s initial claims about the incompatibility of modernity and equality were too extreme. It will also provide proof that at least some of the unevenness in the modern world is not, after all, an intrinsic feature of modernity.

Despite the unresolved tensions in his argument, Gong has written a very good book. Its greatest strengths derive from the nicely balanced eclecticism of its theoretical approach and the diversity of its subject matter. By integrating neo-Marxist and non-Marxist structural perspectives into his analysis he achieves more depth than writers who have worked more narrowly within the frameworks provided by postmodernism, literary criticism and film studies; and by applying his approach successfully to different genres of both literature and film he has produced a wide ranging study with impressive explanatory scope. His book should be read by all who are interested in modern Chinese literature and film, and by both students and academics in the wider field of contemporary Chinese studies.

Reviewed by FENGYUAN JI
The Australian National University


China as the “Sick Man of Asia” or “Dongya Bingfu” (The Chinese as the Sick Man of East Asia); modern China can not be understood adequately if one ignores the role of this discriminatory image, originally perpetrated by the West and then absorbed back into China. The metaphorical meanings of the image have gone far beyond the medical connotations and become an essential element of the collective consciousness and identity of modern and even contemporary China. The establishment and development of China’ public health system constitute a collective Chinese response to it. “Total anti-traditionalism” and nationalism have been the two most persistent and sweeping social, cultural and political ideologies in China since the early twentieth century because they have proposed a solution to the identity of sickness through, respectively, abandoning the seriously ill tradition represented by Confucianism or strengthening China as a modern nation-state. The well-known statement Mao Zedong made regarding the establishment of the PRC, “The Chinese people have stood up from now on!”, makes better sense if one takes this background image into consideration. Adeptly exploiting the politics of the image, the Communist Party won its power struggle against the Nationalist partly because it had projected itself as the saviour of “sick China” to the populace. Many state and collective Chinese reactions in international affairs are less
puzzling if viewed as the kind of behaviour expected of a humiliated person fighting for his self-esteem and dignity. The extraordinary Chinese enthusiasm in sports like the Olympic Games also becomes much more apprehensible. In the collective Chinese psychology, the image has stimulated shame, anguish, and anger on the one hand, and the drive to reform, to learn from the West, and to self-strengthen on the other. To a certain extent, the history of China since the early twentieth century is a history of overcoming this negative image.

Initially, Larissa Heinrich was planning to “provide a concrete answer to the abstract question of how the stereotype of China as the ‘Sick Man of Asia’ reached maturity over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries” (xii). Over the years, her research project “evolved into a more general philosophical attempt to redeem beauty from its unlikely refuge in representing disease, trauma, prejudice, and imperialistic impulse” (ibid.). As the result of her intellectual exploration, The Afterlife of Images has investigated how the images of pathological bodies of Chinese, deriving originally from medical texts and contexts, were interpreted and transformed between Chinese and Western cultures from the late eighteenth century to the early twentieth.

This is a pioneering and extremely rich book. It does not offer a systematic historical survey. Rather, its main body presents four fascinating case studies in a chronological order. The first case study traces how the stereotype of China as the “cradle of smallpox” was created from the illustrations on the infectious disease in an authoritative Chinese medical anthology and spread to the Western societies. The primary historical text Heinrich has examined in this connection is the essay “De la petite vérole” (On Smallpox) written by French missionary Martial Gibot in the 1770s. The meanings of the concerned images have changed dramatically from representing proactive treatment for smallpox in the context of the Qianlong imperial project to symbolizing the perceived severity of Chinese smallpox and China as the cradle of not only smallpox but many other diseases. In comparing this text with an earlier and much more accurate, but ignored, one on smallpox in China, Herinrich demonstrates that Gibot’s grossly mistaken representation and its wide acceptance in the West says not so much about Chinese realities but rather about deep-rooted Western prejudices. In the late twentieth century and today, the images returned somewhat home at the National Palace Museum in Taiwan to serve the nationalist agenda because the images reflect the Chinese invention and societal practice of inoculation, a significant medical achievement representing the beginning of immunology far before the Western innovation of vaccination.

The other three case studies are as fascinating as the first one. Focusing upon the Western-style realistic oil paintings of medical portraits by the Cantonese artist Lam Qua in collaboration with the American medical missionary Peter Parker, the second case study shows how the popular views on certain Chinese “characteristics” had contributed to the creation and pathology of a Chinese identity. Focusing upon the development of medical photography in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the third case study investigates the transition from a more biological or descriptive mode of representing Chinese patients to a thoroughly colonial and racialized general image of China as the pathological other. The fourth case study traces the historical and cultural
transformation in which the introduction of Western dissection-based anatomy through such medical text in Chinese by Benjamin Hobson produced what the author calls an “aesthetics of anatomic realism” in the Chinese literary works of the eve of Chinese modernity in the hands of such writers as Lu Xun, the father of modern Chinese literature.

Altogether, these insightfully-chosen and marvellously-conducted case studies along with thoughtful introduction and epilogue have opened up an invaluable window into the complicated and intriguing process in which medical images have travelled across space and time and gained a series of secondary socio-cultural meanings, or an “afterlife” as the title of the book suggests, and have impacted on the power of modern Western medicine and culture, sickness and backwardness of China, Chinese identity, Chinese national and cultural characters, modernity, so on and so forth.

Methodologically speaking, Heinrich has taken a genuinely interdisciplinary approach. The author’s home discipline is literature, comparative literature in particular. In this investigation, she has successfully integrated historical inquiry, cross-cultural study, the study of the visual arts, and literary criticism. In return, she has made significant contributions to the history of medicine and science, Asian studies and cross-cultural studies, contributions one can hardly achieve via the single disciplinary approach. For instance, the introduction of Western-style anatomy in China is such a well-researched subject in the history of medicine. Bringing visual arts and literacy criticism into her investigation, Heinrich has cast new light on the far-reaching cultural and political impact of an anatomic and medical way of seeing upon modern Chinese society. In fact, due to her interdisciplinary methodology, she has casted new light on almost every topic she has addressed.

The book is illustrated by forty-six provocative figures and plates including medical illustrations and paintings. Eight colour plates of oil paintings of Parker’s Chinese patients by Lam Qua are visually striking and particularly poignant. Furthermore, as a scholar of literature, Heinrich has written this book in a beautiful and imaginative English prose, a feature that many academic works often lack.

The only thing I feel somewhat disappointed about in respect to this book is that the author had travelled away from her initial question in her intellectual journey. She has not always concentrated on how the prejudiced image of China as the “Sick Man of Asia” was conceived, born, transformed, and absorbed back into China. She has not explored how the image has played an essential role in the political, social and cultural life of China, especially in collective Chinese psychology. Nevertheless, in her book there are a great deal of wonderful materials on and insights into the original question. Her book certainly calls for more in-depth investigations of this important question. More significantly, the author has offered a methodological model for such future research projects. All in all, through this pioneering book Heinrich has explored a vast of uncharted area for the history of medicine and science, cross-cultural studies, visual studies, and Asian Studies.

Reviewed by JING-BAO NIE
University of Otago
Henry Johnson’s *The Shamisen: Tradition and Diversity* presents an extremely valuable body of knowledge on the *shamisen* and is a book that fills a significant gap in extant English language discourse on the instrument. Drawing on a diverse range of primary and secondary sources, Johnson has clearly conducted a great deal of research on practically all aspects of the *shamisen*. He meticulously documents the manufacturing process and component parts, accessories, grades, scales and tuning, playing techniques, and notation systems of the *shamisen* while also including discussion on the organology and ethnography of the instrument. Primary sources include interviews with numerous performers, scholars and instrument makers, observation of instrument manufacture, *shamisen* lessons with established teachers and examination of numerous *shamisen* collections. Johnson also consults an extensive number of secondary sources by both Japanese and non-Japanese scholars. These sources are documented in the bibliography and provide a valuable platform for current and future scholars or enthusiasts to conduct further research on the *shamisen* and its context in Japanese music. Throughout the book Johnson supplements written detail with exquisite images, including several that were taken during his own ethnographic field research.

In Chapter One (“History and Cultural Flows”) Johnson presents a basic history of the *shamisen*, outlining its transmission from China to Japan around the fifteenth century. The second half of the chapter describes the social, geographic, cultural and global flows of the instrument. Chapter Two (“Instrument Types”) provides readers with comprehensive information on the classification and morphology of the *shamisen* and related instruments (such as the *sanshin*) that successfully transitions, in Chapter Three (“Manufacture and Components”), to the meticulous provision of information on the manufacture and components of the instrument. Johnson documents the materials, shape, size and cultural significance of each of the *shamisen*’s component parts as well as outlining how the instruments are graded according to the quality of materials used and craftsmanship. This detailed information is supplemented with visual diagrams and colour images demonstrating the components of the instrument. In Chapter Four (“Performers”) Johnson examines three significant social spheres of *shamisen* performance: blind performers, gender associations and performing organisations. This investigation provides insight into the internal dynamics of the *shamisen*’s learning contexts and identifies aspects of the society and culture of the players and performers during its four hundred year recognised history in Japan. Throughout Chapter Five (“Performance Traditions and Music Genres”) Johnson attempts to unravel the complex network of traditions, sub-traditions, music genres and performers that use the *shamisen* as a means of musical expression. Unlike most discourse on the *shamisen*, Johnson provides definitions and descriptions of not only key lyrical styles (*utaimono*) and narrative styles (*katarimono*) but also *geza* music (off-stage *kabuki* music), new genres that have developed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, folk music and folk performing arts, and neo-traditional popular music. Chapter Six (“Performance”) is a particularly noteworthy section in the book for practitioners of the *shamisen*. The first half of the chapter provides valuable descriptions on the plethora of playing
techniques for the left hand and right hand plectrum supplemented with images visually documenting key techniques. The second half of the chapter documents the different notation systems (kuchi jamisen notations, vertical notations, and horizontal notations) used by practitioners of the shamisen over the past four hundred years. Johnson accompanies his written descriptions with illustrations of the notation systems accompanied by the Western staff transnotations. He also reminds readers “while some notations are written in a very descriptive way in order to include as much information about the music as possible, others are written in a prescriptive way and often only show an outline of the music” (p. 92). The final chapter of the book (“Conclusion”) summarises the development of the shamisen and highlights the paradoxical nature of the instrument as both a traditional and modern object. Johnson shows how the shamisen, rooted in the pre-Meiji era (pre-Westernisation and modernisation) retains its place in Japanese culture as a traditional instrument while continuing to see the invention of new music styles and performance traditions.

In compiling The Shamisen: Tradition and Diversity, Johnson has clearly executed his purpose “to bring together a body of knowledge [that] contribute[s] to a better understanding of a musical instrument that today is firmly established as an object of traditional Japanese culture in a diverse number of styles across the nation and internationally” (xix). The depth and tremendous detail in the information, images and diagrams presented ensures that The Shamisen: Tradition and Diversity is a fundamental contribution to the literature on the shamisen in English. I would highly recommend this book to anyone interested in the shamisen or more broadly, in Japanese music and culture.

Reviewed by CATHERINE HALLETT
The Australian National University


This book relates the history of one “officially registered” Christian Congregation in China in the turbulent years under Communism from 1949 to 1989. The book was first published in 2012 and the last chapter of 26 pages adds a summary of developments in the period since 1989. It is a pity that the history and themes that have emerged over the last 23 years in China generally have not been as fully developed as those of the earlier period.

Shortly after I received this book for review, I had the opportunity to attend the evening service at Moore Memorial Church. The Church is in easy walking distance away from Shanghai’s famous Bund and looks like any traditional European style, central city Church anywhere in the world. The church was full with what seemed like 900 to perhaps a 1000 people, including many in their 20s and 30s, although I did not notice any children. The immediately visible paradox was that, although the Church of
Christ in China claims to be a truly Chinese church, the service itself was conducted in a very western, Reformed, Protestant style and format. The minister wore a “dog collar” and the hymns were straight from traditional nineteenth century British hymnals. Yet, as Keating notes, there were no prayers of confession or assurance of forgiveness and no “passing of the peace” to each other that are standard aspects of Protestant Churches. Everyone appeared to leave straight away and the ministers did not shake hands or attempt to speak with anyone afterwards.

Reading this book after that visit made considerable sense of the historical context of what I had experience in that service.

Keating breaks new ground in looking in detail at the history and experiences of one “officially recognised” congregation in the People’s Republic of China. While many books on the history of the Church in China rely only on missionary records, and indeed these have also been considered here, Keating makes extensive use of Chinese sources, such as Government and Church archive documents. Interviews with members of the Church who have lived through this period are thorough. As a result, Keating provides interesting answers as to whether the people at the church were happy to see the missionaries leave, what happened to Church members during the Cultural Revolution and how the Church has related to the Communist Party over the years.

A weakness of the book is perhaps that in his interviews, Keating does not explore what people actually believed or their personal faith. There is little “theology” in the work. He focuses on what people remembered of events. Keating locates the history of MMC effectively and efficiently in the wider context of the ebbs and flows of social and political movements in the PRC. The major contribution of this book lies in its historical analysis of the never-simple, shifting relationships between the Church, the PRC Government, the Church of Christ in China Three Self Movement and the swirls of events in China since 1949. Keating is clearly committed to MMC, but his book remains scholarly and does not “take sides”, between the official and the “underground church.”

Keating writes his book as a case study of the history of one Church in the PRC. It is however more than that. He gives an overview of Church State relations in this period. On page 240, he notes: “This is not a study of the rules and regulations governing religious practice in China, but rather a study of how the relationship between Church and state has been played out.” Chapter One “1887 to 1949 The Pre-Communist Era” achieves this; as well as providing a summary of the early period of the Church, it serves as a useful summary of the politics of the period, of the American missionaries in Shanghai, their relationship to the Republican KMT party and the situation during the Japanese invasion. Later chapters of book are a useful resource for summaries of the Government’s policies on religious belief. Keating discusses the experiences and rationale of Christians who opposed the Government, such as Watchman Nee and Wang Ming Tao as well as the lives of Christians who chose to participate in the “open” or “official” Church.

Freedom of religion is guaranteed under the constitution of the People’s Republic of China, but the degrees to which religion has been allowed to be practiced has been hotly debated. So too has the question about the Christian nature of the “official church”.
The discussion of the Church in the 1960s is particularly insightful. The exposure of the Li Chuwen, who was Secretary of the YMCA and minister of the Community Church in Shanghai, as a secret member of the Communist Party is an embarrassment to the Church of Christ in China. In contrast, Bishop Ding Guangxun of the officially-recognised National “Three Self Patriotic Church” (self governing, self supporting, self propagating) never signed the Christian Manifesto and was never seriously accused of being a CCP member, although he moved in Party circles. Keating notes that Ding at first supported the students in Tiananmen Square in 1989 and then had to affirm the Government crackdown. The relationship has been tense and complex.

It is fair to ask how typical of Churches in China MMC actually is. MMC is exceptional in that it is in downtown Shanghai, the most cosmopolitan of Chinese cities. It was the first Church in Shanghai to reopen in 1979. Keating argues in Chapter Nine that it is fairly typical and he (rightly) hopes that his book will be the first of many such in-depth studies of individual congregations. However, any comparison with other Churches is problematic and clearly, the treatment of Christians during the Cultural Revolution varied greatly from place to place. That in itself is a point worthy of further research. While acknowledging the lack of resources, Keating makes the best use of what can be known to show that the ministers at MMC were treated harshly, more so than the congregation during the Cultural Revolution. MMC was closed for 13 years at this time and the church did not dare to meet in underground house churches as happened elsewhere, although there were some small scale prayer meetings. In contrast, some churches in other Provinces took a lot longer to reopen, or were never reopened. Keating shows as successfully as can be expected that sermons at MMC were never actually vetted during its open periods. Depending on the seriousness with which local cadres took their supervision of churches, this may well have been not the case in many parts of China.

Equally it could be argued, and Keating does not deal comprehensively with the possibility, that MMC has become, at least at certain points of its history, a “show-piece” congregation, similar to some operating churches in Moscow during the Soviet period, and claims today made about Bongsoo Church in Pyongyang, North Korea. There is some evidence that this is the case. On page 175, MMC is not only “the pre-eminent Protestant Church in China” but “was being used as a show piece for international guests”, including visits by Billy Graham in 1988, the Australian Council of Churches in 1982 and the British Council of Churches (including the Archbishop of Canterbury) in 1983. Further research might throw up interesting perspectives on the extent to which the CCP promoted such a policy.

This is a very well researched work, richly documented with an extensive and well selected bibliography, timelines and biographies of people associated with MMC. It is a welcome addition to the literature on the Church in China.

Reviewed by STUART VOGEL

Auckland
Reviews


According to the editors’ preface, all but three of the fourteen essays in this pathbreaking and absorbing book are based on papers presented at an international symposium on creation and origin myths held in Beijing in 2008. The essays are by leading specialists in China, Taiwan, South Korea, the Netherlands and the United States, among them An Deming, Liu Yahu and Ye Shuxian from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Yang Lihui from Beijing Normal University and Mineke Schipper from the University of Leiden.

While the essays draw freely on data relating to creation and origin myths in other parts of the world, most of the contributors are concerned with the creation and origin myths of Han Chinese and other ethnic groups living in China. The essays are divided into three sections, on comparative perspectives, reassessments of early written texts, and oral traditions. A fourth, valuable section serves as an appendix with “modest samples” (p. 279) of oral creation and origin myths of the Han Chinese and fifteen Chinese minorities, including Koreans, Manchus, Mongolians, Uyghurs, Bai and Dai. The preamble to this section actually mentions twenty minorities, but myths from Kazakhs, Kirgiz (Kyrgyz) and three other named ethnic groups are not in fact included.

One of the editors’ intentions is to lay to rest the view that China is rare or unique among ancient civilizations in lacking creation myths. This view is attributed mainly to the American scholar Derk Bodde, but also to the Chinese writer Mao Dun and the German philosopher Georg Hegel (pp. ix, 192-193). Various contributors seek to debunk this view, in part at least by highlighting and documenting the extraordinarily rich diversity of creation and origin myths to be found among oral traditions, particularly the oral traditions of China’s minority peoples.

In an informative essay Wu Bing’an tabulates sixty-seven such creation myths identified and documented in recent years. According to Wu these myths have been found among the oral cultures of thirty-eight of China’s fifty-five officially recognised minorities. A further ten involve Pangu, the hero of many Han Chinese and non-Han creation stories. Wu describes all these materials as constituting “a dazzling wealth of… full-length creation epic texts…mostly transmitted in the style of long narrative sung poems” (pp. 182-192). He adds that the oral myths and legends of both ethnic minorities and Han Chinese were ignored for much of the twentieth century because “the Chinese research community… erroneously concentrated on Han culture as the sole orthodox culture” while focusing entirely on ancient books and records, excluding oral traditions and also “denying the convergence and overlapping of marginalized minority cultures and Han culture” (p. 193).

Wu also draws attention to some of the oral creation myths now being documented among Han Chinese (pp 184, 193-194), notably *Heian zhuan* (variously translated as *Biography of Darkness* and—less inaccurately—*Legend of Darkness*), the set of elaborate sung creation myths from Hubei province put into book form in 1983, as well
as various oral myths and legends being brought to light among communities on the central plains of north China.

When Derk Bodde described China as lacking creation myths he was referring to the absence of substantial early written—as opposed to oral—evidence of creation myths of the kind found in, say, early Greek writings. In the end the contributors to this book do not have a great deal to add to Bodde’s views in this respect—though there is some discussion of hitherto-underrated aspects of myth in texts like *Dao de jing*, and an implicit sense that the wealth of new discoveries, including textual materials, currently being unearthed in China may soon bring about further reappraisals of early written resources. In the meantime fresh interpretations are offered of some of the myths and legends available in long-established textual sources, notably those relating to gods and godlike entities such as Hundun, Fuxi, Nüwa (also known as Nügua), Pangu and San Huang (the Three Sovereigns). One contributor, Kao Lifeng, reconsiders the fourth century BC silk manuscript from the southern state of Chu discovered some seventy years ago and now in the Sackler Gallery in Washington DC, arguing that there are references to three creation myths in it—though without shedding light on the important question of whether or not these myths were peculiar to Chu.

In her initial survey of the world’s creation and origin myths Mineke Schipper notes (pp. 17-19) that the study of such myths often results in questions rather than answers. The same can be said of this book, which leaves unanswered a fair number of important questions, some of them alluded to but only a few dealt with in any detail. Such questions include the following. To what extent are particular creation and origin myths in China *sui generis* rather than being drawn from a larger body of shared beliefs, either within the geographical region of China or more broadly? Are there even shared Eurasian myths of national origin of the kind boldly suggested by Christopher Beckwith in his *Empires of the Silk Road* (not mentioned in the book under review)? How far if at all can one go in conflating the oral myths now being documented in various parts of China—and reconstructed for tourist purposes—with early textual references to such myths? What approach should be taken to the study of the myths of ethnic groups that straddle contemporary international borders? Does it make sense to investigate the creation and origin myths of Chinese ethnic minorities whose cultural origins go beyond the frontiers of the People’s Republic—the myths of Kazakhs, Kirgiz, Koreans and Mongolians, to take the most obvious cases—without investigating those of their ethnic cousins elsewhere?

There are also questions to be explored more fully relating to definitions of ethnic identity, particularly in the Chinese context. Is the identity of Chinese national minorities as constructed and reified from the 1950s onwards a reasonable basis on which to consider creation and origin myths found among their communities? How much consideration needs to be given to the “convergence and overlapping” of Han and non-Han cultures that Wu Bing’an thoughtfully refers to? Then there are broader questions of language and context. What, for example, is the contemporary Han Chinese understanding of the term myth or *shen hua* 神話? At the outset Mineke Schipper briefly defines and discusses the English word ‘myth’ (pp. 3-4), but not its Chinese equivalent, with its distinct overtones.
One other issue that contributors to the book could have addressed is the role that Han Chinese creation and origin myths have played in the reimagining of the Chinese nation—that is, the citizens of the People’s Republic of China—that has taken place during the past two decades, as nationalist, Confucianist and other notions have gradually eclipsed Communist ideology. More generally the conceptual frameworks that contributors bring to bear tend to be underdeveloped, so that (despite passing references to the ideas of Karl Marx, Bronislaw Malinowski, Mary Douglas and Anne Birrell—the latter only mentioned twice despite the importance of her work), there is a risk of their discussions of myths becoming little more than loose-limbed narratives or catalogues, without the creative anthropological, linguistic, cultural, political and historical analysis needed to give them substance.

This is a book of ambitious breadth of scope, and clearly reflects the energy and enthusiasm of a discipline only now really re-establishing itself in the Chinese context. This being so we will all hope that the editors and contributors will address some or all of these questions more fully in their subsequent work. At a more trivial level, there are a few minor omissions and editorial shortcomings. Some relevant early texts (Lie zi and Lun heng for example) are conspicuous by their absence, as are some obvious cases for considered treatment—frog deities are discussed at length, for instance, but dragons hardly merit a mention. Sourcing is patchy, with a number of the sources cited left out of the bibliography, or else cited with incorrect dates or without page numbers or dates. Finally the absence of Chinese characters in all but a few instances is a drawback. Otherwise the book is attractively presented and is a significant addition to the Brill ‘Religion in Chinese Societies’ series.

Reviewed by PETER HARRIS
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As Timon Screech acknowledges in his introductory comments to this volume, pictorial art objects can find significance beyond their existence as objects of visual attention and contemplation. They assume roles in, or inform culturally significant functions in, wider socio-cultural worlds. For this reason, Screech focuses on what he describes as the “extra-visual aspects of images.” His title assumes a dual engagement with appreciations of “obtaining” either as acquisition and ownership, or as “obtaining to,”—as he describes it, “conveying senses that are accepted and understood.” As such his investigation promises to shed light on Edo period arts beyond, or around, appreciations based solely on the attractions of the visual engagements offered by its pictorial images. That said, Screech does take, as the objects of his attention, the visually appealing pictorial media of Edo period paintings and prints. In examining the practices of image making, Screech acknowledges the complex forces of art world interests as they emerged during this period. In focusing on practices of display, consumption, ownership, and engagement he addresses the complex relational factors of audiences,
agendas, institutional arrangements and taste that emerged in Edo. Most importantly, he recognises how the city’s diverse participants engaged with, and valued, the art works of their time, and situates his study of those engagements securely within the social and institutional arrangements of that time and place, recognising the diverse social, cultural, gender, class, ethical, administrative or governmental forces that impacted on and conditioned art engagements. These complexities encourage departures from the nationalist, essentialist or mono-dimensional constructs of some earlier Edo studies. The result is a generous agenda, one that recognises, and embraces, temporal, social and aesthetic diversity. Thus Screech’s purvey embraces the engagements of the Kanô, Tosa (and in Edo Sumiyoshi), the more recent Rinpa school painters, and the Sinophile, intellectual nanga painters into his account of Edo arts, in balance with the plebeian ukiyo-e arts that dominate popular views of Japanese pictorial arts of this era. This in turn recognises audiences and patronage beyond the mercantile or chônin townsman, to embrace the refined tastes of Edo authorities and literati.

The first four chapters of this study address issues around the themes of the relations of artistic “production and display” in Edo. In the first instance, Screech establishes an Edo period view on the proper occupation of artists and contemporary expectations of pictures and pictorial production. He recognises how older East Asian principles for pictorial engagement informed the inventive, creative intersections of imaginative impetus, media fluency and representational facility of Edo. He juxtaposes these facilities against expectations of pictorial likeness, representation, or in Chinese precedence “Correspondence to the Object,” as phenomena of “comparison” or “matching” that can explain the coincidence of mimetic, allusive, or playful mitate agendas alike. Screech acknowledges motivations of aesthetic pleasure and personal status, but, adopting the term “auspicious pictures” (kisshô-ga) to describe the underpinning pictorial ethos of the age, posits notions of enhancing a sense of “well-being” or felicitous experience as an umbrella motive for the pictorial engagements of Edo audiences. The potentials of images for enhancing the experiences of “just” or “auspicious” life gave painting, and its enduring themes of seasonal and natural world subjects, a degree of significance and power beyond the mundane or everyday. This exceptional cultural significance can explain also the adoptions of poetically evocative subjects and refined engagements in literary association—or “correspondences” (yoriai)—as sophisticated and playful engagements of taste.

Screech documents here both the pragmatics of Edo period relations of production and consumption of pictures, and the culturally significant power of pictures as objects of spiritual teaching, worship, ritual and belief. In explaining the former, he juxtaposes the practical aspects of media and format against the expectations, agendas and tastes of their different groups of consumers. In a similar way, his detailed explanations of the financial niceties of the Edo art market provide useful enlightenment on the ways the productions of different schools, and of different art forms, related both to the tastes, and to the purchasing power, of Edo’s different class-specific audiences. Screech’s descriptions of Edo art recognise the complexities of diverse operations and negotiations between art world participants of the time. He also recognises the themes of loss of art works and of art world knowledge, to the ravages of time and material failure, falls from grace, fire, theft, shady dealing or fakery, that have inevitably
compromised our appreciations of these arts and their worlds today. On the other hand, his acknowledgement of temples as sites of production, and of the sacral functions of images that generated and employed a diverse range of art objects recognises the pervasive breadth of Edo pictorial experiences still accessible today.

In the second section of this book Screech explores the broad diversity of Edo pictorial engagements, as demonstrated through the differing agendas, practices and sensibilities of Kanô, Tosa, Rinpa, nanga or ukiyo-e arts. His explanations for the activities of each school build through profiles of complementary interests in matters of taste and of pictorial function between audiences and artist-studios. As he explains, the substantial force of the Kanô School painters dominated the privileged cultural landscape through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries especially. This is hardly surprising. They served a sustained and profitable market for the decoration of castles and temples alike, and developed specialised secular painting modes consistent with the sympathies of governmental authorities of the Adachi-Momoyama period and into the Edo era. Screech describes how the Kanô School studio-workshop networks generated the prolific production and maintained the art learning that informed and sustained the School’s popularity through this period. He acknowledges the importance of maintaining their own house style to this end, melding the distinct but complementary forms of gakuga “Learned Pictures,” shitsuga “Personality Pictures,” and honga “Real Pictures” developed through waga (alternatively Yamato-e, “Japanese—and implicitly politically sympathetic—Pictures”) and kanga (or kara-e) ‘Chinese Picture’ conventional modes. This broad theoretical compass explains how the Kanô painters established a positive cultural presence, generating vast quantities of art objects with politically charged subjects and themes and distinctive pictorial tropes that complemented the interests of both court and Tokugawa patrons.

While acknowledging the broader lexicon of pictorial subjects, Screech makes a specific case study here of portraiture. He negotiates the delicate relationships between sitter, artist and viewer, and the dimensions of gender, class and authority as they impacted on the formation of concepts of what a portrait image should be. In doing so he is able to explain how the development of a range of pictorial functions—veneration, memorial, status, familial, private and public agendas—developed through the collusive resolution of these diverse interests. Portrait painting was no easy business. Screech details the circumlocutions around names, likenesses and identities in Edo that reflected oblique references to figures of the Fujiwara court or the characters of Genji monogatari. As he details, portrait (and ostensive self-portrait) representations traversed complex territories, through prohibitions and concealments, face-saving falsehoods, vanities and agendas, history and temporal contrivance (often either side of death), or codified message. Once again, in addressing the primacy of expression of character or aesthetic ideals over fidelity to appearance, Screech reveals much of the conventional language of painters. However contrived, formal, and even impromptu, private portraits breathed a sense of makoto, sincerity; Screech juxtaposes this sobriety against the thinly veiled fictions of floating world brothel and theatre quarter portraits.

The threads of waga and kanga ebb and flow contrapuntally through the history of Japanese painting, including that of Edo. As Screech explains, the Kanô could be adept in
both domains. Others, by aesthetic inclination or market allegiance, sustained the Japanese
tropes. Constructs of “Japanese picture” could be variously defined. Screech traces the
course of the Tosa court painters whose “Japan” was construed through memories of the
affective sensibilities and idealised world views of Heian court circles. If those themes
seemed remote, it should be remembered that the Tosa painters were sustaining threads
of poetic association from the past that in Edo were also to find purchase in the form
of highly allusive mitate and surimono ukiyo-e popular prints. Elegant classical themes
and motifs of social engagements, remote misty mountains, or the ubiquitous sweet flag
and Eight-plank Bridge, were nurtured also in other of “Japanese painting” projects.
Screech traces their intersections and departures through the Sumiyoshi painters to the
decorative detail of Tawaraya Sôtatsu and the fluid calligraphies of Hon’ami Kôetsu,
through the rhythmic designs of Ogata Kôrin and his Rinpa successors, to distinctly
Edo realisations in paintings by Sakai Hôitsu and his contemporaries. He juxtaposes
these complex trajectories against the amateur achievements of Chinese-style nanga
painters once so derided by Ernest Fenollosa. Consistent with recent scholarship on
artists like the husband and wife Ike Taiga and Ike Gyokuran, Screech adopts a positive
view of nanga painting. He develops a nuanced explanation of the intimate interface
between hand and brush and the apparent spontaneity of expression favoured in the
delicate calligraphies of their monochrome compositions. He explains the synthesis
between finely modulated ink density and elegant, intuitive, mark making that revealed
their expressions of the honesty of heart-mind, of “the character within the brushwork.”

Screech chooses to discuss the phenomenon of ukiyo-e, “floating world pictures”
within the aegis of genre representations of scenes from daily life—one of the early
appreciations of the field. This may seem slightly anachronistic, but it does suit the
larger argument here. It avoids a close focus on the more sensational worlds of Kabuki
or the brothel quarters, and allows Screech to consider the broader scope of the popular
art of Edo, and its preoccupations with the diverse engagements of life and leisure
of the “common people” who were an important audience. His account captures the
ambiguities between the balance of work, responsibility, leisure and play of real life,
and the dimensions of fantasy, dream, artifice or imaginary construction of the “floating
worlds.” This view also situates ukiyo-e firmly within the traditions of waga and
Yamato-e on which it draws so deeply.

The account of artistic, diplomatic and commercial intercourse between Europe
and Japan during the first two centuries of the Edo period neatly rounds out the
comprehensive scope of the volume. Screech describes the impact of nanban ‘Southern
Ban’ European presence and the roles of pictorial media as vehicles for provoking
interest, amongst artists and public alike, in European knowledge and ideas, and in
European artistic techniques, conventions and principles of opticality that continued
to interest artists as late as Hokusai. This final section provides a useful case study for
evaluating the central roles of art works and of processes of art production, exchange
and display of art works and art ideas, in incidents of intercultural engagement during
the first centuries of Tokugawa rule.

Three reservations arise. First, the text ends abruptly. Given its catholic scope,
it might have been useful to include an afterword to draw its diverse threads together
around its twin thematic appreciations of “obtaining.” Second, the text teems with examples of intriguing connections. The links are engaging, but why might Edo viewers have made them? Screech introduces an apparently plausible connection in a Harunobu print of a woman passing a temple with the thirteenth century poet Fujiwara no Teika. Edo audiences might in fact have connected her with a waka by the poet Ki no Tsurayuki (872-945) included in Teika’s later anthology Hyakunin isshu. Either way, what is it, precisely, about the picture itself that might have made an Edo viewer read it in either of these ways? Knowing why they made the connections might have illustrated the second appreciation of “obtaining” introduced earlier. Third, there are some errors, of spelling—‘been send abroad’ (p. 333); “canban” (p. 346)—or account—on woodblock process (p. 328) for example—that closer proofing might have avoided.

The volume’s exemplary profusion is also one of its attractions. Its sprawling, inclusive compass and numerous illustrations, both pictorial (245 images, mainly in colour) and documentary, support its diverse pathways with ample evidence. Every aspect of this survey is supported by exemplary or explanatory material drawn from mythical, historical, literary, anecdotal, philosophical, poetic, liturgical, or folklore sources in, and extensively beyond, Edo itself. The textual examples and illustration annotations are supplemented by extensive end-matter inclusions of glossary, chronology, detailed endnotes, bibliography, acknowledgements and index. Within the broad scope of this volume, Screech reveals his own polymath curiosities and talent for linking and connection making, between images and communities, ideas and practices, contexts and tastes, domestic and transcultural interests. In doing so he seeks to develop holistic explanations of the circumstances, institutional relations and pictorial arts of a specific time and place. No single lens can do this, but Screech’s multi-dimensional approach certainly does introduce and embrace the diverse provocations and scope of themes and ideas that occupied artists, dealers, and audiences for images in Edo’s flourishing art world. One outcome is to situate the ukiyo-e “floating world pictures” so closely associated with Edo within a broader range of art projects. Perhaps more subtly, in developing his investigation around the ways images could “obtain,” as in “conveying senses that are accepted and understood,” he illuminates the complex, changing, and nuanced appreciations of just what pictorial images should be as they were negotiated and shared by artists and their publics throughout the years of Tokugawa rule.

Reviewed by DAVID BELL
University of Otago


This volume examines the development of narrative and pictorial conventions for representations of idealised constructions of ‘girls’ culture’ (shōjo bunka) and relationships between girls that today inform the pervasive contemporary Japanese phenomenon of shōjo manga. It situates the media forms and themes familiar to
today’s audiences within the context of histories of girls’ novels and magazines, through well over a century from the decades of social, technological and commercial change following the Meiji restoration. More specifically, it develops a carefully moderated examination of the phenomenon of close, generally chaste, friendship between girls within the broader contexts of the development of shōjo bunka and the development of a media culture targeting, and responsive to, the engagements of girls throughout this period. Deborah Shamoon arranges her chapters in an historical sequence, tracing a thematic development through the Meiji period emergence of the shōjo, the development of shōjo bunka between 1910 and 1937, the emergence of the pre-war girls’ magazine, into the proliferation of shōjo manga during the post-war decades and the major innovations in the form from the 1970s. This approach, and the way she fashions the concluding construction of each chapter to establish a smooth segue into the next, makes for a nicely scaffolded structure and the smooth passage of her discussions.

Shamoon draws on diverse themes to inform comprehensive explanations of shōjo phenomena. In her opening chapter for example she founds the emergence of the shōjo in changes in practice and policy in education during the Meiji period that underpinned constructs of ‘the girl’, ‘schoolgirl’ or teenage girl as a new and distinct social entity, and melds these together with literary innovations and the appearance of shōjo in fictional narratives, and as the objects of male attentions, in Meiji period novels. A central feature in these constructs was their location against new and idealised notions of ‘spiritual’ love. New understandings of ren’ai, chaste, romantic, platonic love, social engagement and intellectual companionship underpinned the patterns of fashion, deportment, manners and marriage in modern Japan promoted in women’s magazines from the Meiji, through Taishō and early Shōwa periods, to the Second World War. Shamoon examines the emergence of these ren’ai engagements through a close examination of representations of girls, and conflicting ideals on intimate relations, through idealised constructions of the tensional relationships between girls and men and in Meiji period novels.

During the first decades of the twentieth century this construct of ren’ai became the locus of ideals of close spiritual love between girls, the ‘passionate friendship’ of this volume’s title. Shamoon locates the early development of intimate homo-social relations in single-sex girls’ secondary school communities and of its exemplary medium in the girls’ magazine. This medium adopted carefully contrived names like Shōjo no tomo, ‘The Girls’ Friend,’ and content like the serialised pictorial novel Otome no minato, ‘The Girls’ Harbour’ (the latter written, interestingly, by the novelist Kawabata Yasunari), and guiding themes of innocent, ‘spiritual’ love or companionship that complemented the social and behavioural ideals promoted in girls’ secondary schools. The magazines established the precedent for a media format targeted specifically at teenage girls, and for what later became the conventional format inviting active participation and contributions of letters, photographs, art works, poems or essays from its urban, middle and upper class girls’ readership. Shamoon describes the development of complementary iconographies, themes and languages that informed the engagements of S (sister) relationships as the medium evolved.
Shamoon’s analysis of modes of pictorial representation and narrative discourse in serialised girls’ novels (shōjo shōsetsu) reveals the crystallisation of a distinctive and recognisable shōjo aesthetic that established the idealised typographies of delicately-figured girls that populate popular media today. She describes how these representations evolved from the wistful sentimentality of jojōga lyrical pictures, through the development of slim, androgynous figure types, with small mouths and exaggerated eyes, and increasingly cosmopolitan identities and dress that underpinned the emergence of an aesthetic of sameness of appearance and demeanour. These decorative pictorial habits find their counterpart here in Shamoon’s explanatory description of the development of a complementary narrative aesthetic, characterised particularly through its distinctive inflexions of lyrical and emotional voice, its close identification with distinctively poetic, ‘flowery’ or emotional schoolgirl styles of speech in the decorative prose constructions of the serialised novel. These aesthetic conventions established during the pre-war years established a foundation for the conventional modes sustained in manga today.

While acknowledging the ways they draw on conventional pictorial, narrative and interactive precedent in the pre-war girls’ magazine, Shamoon situates the development of manga and shōjo manga forms securely in the post-war decades. This avoids the problematic causal associations with Tokugawa print media of some earlier accounts, allowing her to acknowledge the achievements of the key artists she discusses here – Tezuka Osamu and Takahashi Makoto – as discrete and innovative in their own right, rather than as derivations of ukiyo-e. Her discussions on both figures are measured, avoiding in particular the tendency to lionisation of Tezuka as the definitive manga innovator, and recognising Takahashi’s pivotal role in the crystallisation of a shōjo manga aesthetic. This also recognises the development of post-war shifts in audiences now embracing a discretely targeted younger pre-teen girl readership, and the generation of more diverse media formats including the powerful culturally conditioning force of cinematic media. She also explains the symbiotic relationship between readers and artists that created a climate of common interest and sensibility and the development of the state of flux through which a recurrent stream of new, and increasingly female, artists was able to emerge from the audiences of manga media.

Shamoon’s closing sections recognise significant shifts in the pictorial and narrative character of shōjo manga following this increased creative participation of women from the 1970s, and their development of more complex psychological narratives that attracted the imaginative engagement of girl readers. She also reaffirms the ways the sustained and pervasive presence of girls’ magazines and manga through to the present day have maintained a deeply significant force for conditioning the developing patterns of social engagement, market consumption, self-awareness, expectations, image, and identity in young girls, teenage girls and young adults in Japan for over a century. She recognises significant shifts in content—the development of fantasy plots with a distinctly European historical flavour in the wildly popular narrative of The Rose of Versailles for example, and the inclusion of social and gender critique and themes of desire and more explicitly sexual, including ambiguous and heterosexual, relationships. She also acknowledges the ways shōjo manga have maintained the diverse content and the distinctive aesthetic character of pictorial and narrative engagements established
Shamoon adopts both the literary narratives and the pictorial matter of girls’ magazines and manga as her primary source material, subjecting them to close analytical and critical scrutiny. The judicious selection of pictures includes five colour plates that illustrate a wide stylistic range from subtle tonal modelling to ukiyo-e style decoration. The 24 monochrome illustrations more than adequately represent both the clarity and the linear fluidities of the original printed media of girls’ magazines and manga, and the sense of asobi, or play in the constructions of serial narratives, character types and relationships, that engaged, entertained and provoked the imaginative constructions of their readers. The selections included here are telling. They illustrate the development of hybrid conventions of Western and Japanese device that meld the shallow picture space, colour and pattern of Yamato-e painting with the realistic tropes of yōga Western-style painting, juxtaposing Japanese and Western fashions in clothing and demeanour in idealised images of the new and modern young woman. Thus the first colour plate (and cover illustration) by Takabatake Kashō exemplifies the legacy of the Meiji and Taishō period adoptions of Western styles of couture and deportment, and a provocative sensuality, together with adoptions of Western means, evident in the soft modulation of watercolour pigments and tonal gradations of European realistic traditions. These are developed through a curious synthesis with Japanese-style shallow space composition, ukiyo-e patterned surfaces, Meiji period shin-hanga eyes and mouths and poses, together with the poignant image of the chill autumn wind, a melancholic Japanese motif suggesting the inevitable passing of time, youth, beauty and love. Other images juxtapose Japanese kimono with European flapper style and pleats, or suggestively sensual figure poses with motifs of coy innocence or delicacy. Takahashi Makoto’s later illustration of a starry eyed girl coyly holding a heart shaped bouquet in tiny delicate hands capitalises on the ambiguously suggestive figures of Harunobu and decorative tropes of Momoyama or Edo origin, melding them into the colourful contemporary media styles of kawaii fashion, manga and anime. In similar ways the monochrome illustrations reflect the arts of periods of flux or change, tensions between representational fidelity and cartoon contrivance, modernity and convention, gender identity and androgynous ambiguity, and clichéd associations of femininity and bouquets of flowers, the ambiguous kiss, passion and darkness, delicacy and sensuality, and the adoptions of curiously anachronistic European motifs of princes and princesses, palaces and fancy dress.

Situating the development of girls’ magazines and shōjo manga within diverse settings of historical, ethical, class, educational, aesthetic, narrative, and gender contexts informs a broadly structured view, avoiding the essentialist perspectives or stereotypical categorisations of some earlier commentaries, and focusing instead on the ways these diverse factors have conditioned the more idealised conceptions of ren’ai or S relationships and the social construction of girls’ culture. Shamoon’s carefully framed distinctions between chaste S relationships and lesbian, or between close friendship and more idealised notions of love or ‘spiritual,’ passionate friendship, are supported by finely modulated analytical readings of exemplary media, including contemporary
novels, girls’ magazines, serialised narratives and manga. Her close focus on the aesthetic and narrative character of these phenomena provides a balanced complement to Jennifer Prough’s recent ethnographic study of the history, institutional relations of production and consumption, and affective significance of shōjo manga (Honolulu, 2011). As Shamoon acknowledges here, these media still constitute a surprisingly significant proportion of the popular market in Japan today, and continue to maintain the themes she examines. Their ubiquitous role as media of fantasy, sexual and identity discovery and self-expression for girls and teenagers is still maintained, and this alone makes discourses like the one she develops here important for understanding the cultural phenomenon of shōjo bunka and media of ‘social agency’ like shōjo manga, and for appreciating their place within the wider discourses of Japanese culture today.

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