GOD AND GOLF: KOREANS IN NEW ZEALAND

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Introduction

Consider the Track II diplomatic dialogue held between Korea and New Zealand in Seoul in May 2012. New Zealand’s six-person delegation, of people who lived and worked in New Zealand, included only two New Zealand-born delegates. The remaining delegates were born in China, England, the Philippines and Hong Kong. The spouses of these delegates were even more diverse: their birthplaces included England, Malaysia, Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea. New Zealand’s Ambassador to South Korea, Patrick Rata, is Māori. Given the perception of New Zealand as a white Anglo-Saxon former colony of Great Britain, this multi-ethnic representation fairly portrays New Zealand of the 21st century.

Setting the scene in this way is both important and necessary in our consideration of the settlement of migrants to New Zealand. It is important because New Zealand has been – and is being – “reshaped” by immigration. New Zealand is not ethnically homogeneous. Whereas once New Zealand’s population was dominated by English, Irish and Scots, with later migrant inflows from Western Europe, from the 1950s large Pacific populations and then, from the mid-1980s, large Asian populations migrated to New Zealand.

This article considers the settlement experiences of a subset of Asian migrants to New Zealand, South Koreans (henceforth ‘Koreans’). At one time Koreans were the largest Asian migrant group to New Zealand and, as this article will show, they present unique characteristics of settlement amongst other Asian migrant populations. This article begins with a brief overview of the bilateral relationship between New Zealand and Korea. The historical relationship between the two countries is traditionally traced back to New Zealand’s involvement in the Korean War. Contemporarily, the relationship is shaped through trade, particularly in education, and through significant outward migration from Korea to New Zealand. It is also characterised by the transnational links of Christian churches, and by the success and popularity of Koreans playing golf in and for New Zealand. Yet, despite these varied links, New Zealanders’ knowledge of South Korea is not as great as its knowledge of the other North Asian countries of

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Japan and China. Nevertheless, the Republic of Korea (South Korea) is New Zealand’s fifth-largest bilateral trading partner, second-largest source of overseas students and seventh-largest source of overseas visitors.²

Migrants to New Zealand come with certain expectations about what New Zealand will be like and how easy or difficult it will be to settle in it. Unlike earlier migrants to New Zealand, however, migration is not a permanent one-way journey. Annual, affordable, comfortable flights back to Korea are possible for Korean migrants so that, emotionally, a migrant may never really leave Korea. Moreover, New Zealand, for Korean migrants, as for other migrants, may be only one of many destinations across a life-span. New Zealand may be the new home for a time - for children’s education or for lifestyle – but other reasons may see these migrants move elsewhere, perhaps back to Korea to look after elderly parents, perhaps to follow children in their careers, and then perhaps back to New Zealand for retirement.

Some migrants may come to New Zealand with an expectation that it is a Christian country. But the religious ‘landscape’ of New Zealand is, we would argue, particular to New Zealand, and is shaped by its bicultural history, its relatively small population, the large scale migration from Asian countries to New Zealand, and its decline in those New Zealanders who identify as Christians. Koreans, unique among other Asian migrant populations to New Zealand, are predominantly Christian. Where Koreans settle, they start churches.

For Koreans in New Zealand, as for Korean migrants in other Western countries, the church plays a crucial and significant role in their settlement. There are different expectations and experiences toward the Christian church between Koreans migrants and many other church-going populations in New Zealand. For Koreans, the church has a social as well as a spiritual function. That is also true for others who attend church, but in the context of Korean migrants, the church also reinforces what it is to be ‘Korean’. As with many Pacific Island and other Asian churches, the Korean church protects Korean values, language and culture as well as promoting it to its children. This reinforcement of being ‘Korean’ may be traced back to the Japanese occupation of Korea (1910-1945), during which the church sought to protect Korean identity in order that it seem less ‘Western’ and more identified with ‘Koreanness’. Koreans are more inclined than other migrant groups to establish churches of their own.

Koreans in New Zealand also come, deliberately and unapologetically, with a missionary zeal. This spiritual impetus, when combined with the social reinforcement of Korean values, means that there can become distinct fault-lines between Korean Christians and other Christians in New Zealand. Korean Christians tend to be both more socially and spiritually conservative. For example, Koreans preserve traditional Church practices, such as singing ‘Amen’ after hymns, and maintain church structures brought to Korea by 19th century American missionaries. These divisions also exist within the

Korean communities, compounded by job or financial insecurity, inter-generational difference and in-fighting over leadership and the (mis-)appropriation of church funds. Divisions are also present within and between Korean churches, between those that rigidly reinforce Korean values and those that do not and might, for example, have an English language service stylistically similar to any other youth-oriented church service in New Zealand. The values and beliefs by Korean Christians in New Zealand are further reinforced by the strong transnational links that exist between Christians in New Zealand and in Korea. Teaching material, staff and direction often come directly from Seoul to Auckland. This ensures that Korea-based and Korea-trained church leaders can, and do, exert considerable influence.

While there is much about the settlement experience of Koreans in New Zealand that is unique, there are also parallels that we might draw to illuminate our understanding of that experience. One such parallel is with the experience of Samoans in New Zealand. Samoans arrived in significant numbers in New Zealand as part of the large-scale migration from the Pacific in the 1950s and now form a distinct and celebrated part of New Zealand society. Like Korean migrants, Samoan migrants have a strong Christian affiliation. The Pacific is one of the most Christianised parts of the world, with extremely high church attendance.³ There are similarities between these two migrant groups (Samoans and Koreans), in the expression of their conservative values, in inter-generational tensions, and in recalibrating and renegotiating their experience in the context of being simultaneously shaped by New Zealand and, for some, identifying themselves as “New Zealanders”.

While the Christian church plays a dominant role in the lives of Korean migrants in New Zealand, Koreans also play golf, often and well. Koreans and golf are almost synonymous; one wit described the US leader-board as a “Pusan telephone book”. And New Zealand, with the highest number of golf courses per capita in the world, is something of a magnet for Korean migrants looking for a leisurely life.

**From the peninsula to the Shore: a brief history of New Zealand-Korea relations**

Koreans were, for a time, the fastest growing ethnic group in New Zealand. There were 147 Koreans in New Zealand in 1976, 17,943 in 2001 and 28,821 in 2006.⁴ Even before 1990 there were barely 1,000 Koreans in New Zealand, but between 1986 and 1996 Koreans were the fastest growing Asian group in New Zealand. After a change in immigration policy in 1991, with the introduction of a points system based on skills rather than source country, the number of Koreans increased dramatically: in 1994 alone 3,752 Koreans were granted entry permits to New Zealand. In 2006, at the latest New Zealand Census for which figures are available, there were 30,792 Koreans living in New Zealand. However, this inflow has not continued; rather, it has fallen drastically.

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⁴ Data are not yet available from the 2013 census.
Korean migrants to New Zealand seem to be attracted by perceptions of a relaxed lifestyle and educational opportunities for their children. A significant number of these Korean New Zealanders are also self-employed entrepreneurs. Additionally, the majority of Koreans in New Zealand – an overwhelming 70 percent – are Protestant Christians, a far greater proportion than in Korea, and their presence is having a significant impact upon the religious landscape of New Zealand’s major cities, notably its largest city of Auckland.5

The bilateral relationship between New Zealand and Korea is both historically and contemporarily important to both countries. Historically, New Zealanders contributed troops to the Korean War. 4,700 New Zealanders served as part of the New Zealand contingent K-force under UN command and 1,300 served on frigates during the war and for a period after the armistice (1953-1957). Forty-five New Zealanders lost their lives, 33 of them during the war.

Diplomatic relations between New Zealand and South Korea were established in 1962, and 2012 marked the fiftieth anniversary of diplomatic ties between the two countries. New Zealand opened its first embassy in Seoul in 1971. South Korea is New Zealand’s seventh-largest bilateral trading partner and sixth-largest export destination,6 and a free trade agreement between the two countries is currently under negotiation.

New Zealand’s contribution to the Korean War has meant that New Zealanders, at least those of a certain age, had a more contemporaneous view of Korea than they did of other Northeast Asian countries, including Japan, toward which New Zealanders who lived or served during the second world war had great animosity, and China, which remained largely closed to most New Zealanders until the late 1980s. In other words, New Zealanders were familiar with Korea at a time when there were very few Koreans living in New Zealand, less than 1,000 in total, including fewer than 100 in Auckland.7

Contemporarily, migration from Korea to New Zealand has helped transform New Zealand society from a largely Anglo-Celtic society to an ethnically diverse country. Compared to Chinese and Indian migrants, Korean migrants are recent arrivals to New Zealand. There were two big waves of Korean migration to New Zealand – the first wave was in the 1990s, where New Zealand’s Korean population grew from 1,000 to 19,000, and the second wave was in the early 2000s.


As indicated above, the massive influx of Koreans to New Zealand is largely attributable to a change in New Zealand’s immigration policy in 1991, which relaxed criteria for entering New Zealand, did not discriminate by country of origin, and favoured skilled migrants, professionals and business-people. Koreans, like some other migrant groups, also tend to be what the literature calls “astronauts”; that is, those who commute from their place of work, which is in one country, to their place of residence, which is in another.  

Korean migrants share similar characteristics to Taiwanese migrants to New Zealand, but Taiwanese tend to be “subsumed within a larger Chinese ethnic category, which adds a layer of complexity to their identity construction in New Zealand absent from the more homogeneous Korean community.” But, as Stephen Epstein notes, the Korean population in New Zealand differs to Korean diaspora populations elsewhere, such as China, the United States, Japan and countries formerly in the Soviet Union, because,

New Zealand’s opening up [to wide-spread immigration from Asia] occurred after Korea’s economy had already passed through the most striking years of its frequently cited ‘miracle’. The strongest motivating factors in Korean migration to New Zealand thus have been a desire for a higher quality of life and a less stressful education for offspring, rather than economic betterment, unlike those who left for the United States in the 1970s and 1980s.

This is reflected in the demographic profile of the Korean population in New Zealand, which may be characterised as “well-educated, middle or upper-middle class, and thus relatively affluent.” As Epstein goes on to note, “Given New Zealand’s small size, the claim [in the New Zealand Herald] that in recent years the country has attracted up to 35 per cent of total out-migration from Korea is little short of astounding,” though others have doubted the veracity of that claim. However, the New Zealand Embassy in Seoul notes on their website that, per capita, New Zealand has one of

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8 “Astronaut families” is also a term used with reference to Chinese migrants from Taiwan and Hong Kong, as well as Korean families, see: Department of Labour, Astronaut Families and Cosmonaut Couples, Wellington: Department of Labour, 2000, online at http://www.dol.govt.nz/research/migration/pdfs/AstronautFamiliesandCosmonautCouples.pdf; Elsie Ho, Richard Bedford & Charlotte Bedford, Migrants in their family contexts: Applications of a methodology, Population Studies Centre, Working Paper No. 34, Hamilton: University of Waikato, 2000, online at http://researchcommons.waikato.ac.nz/bitstream/handle/10289/839/PSC-dp-34.pdf?sequence=1.

9 Epstein, ‘Imagining the Community’, p.150.

10 Ibid, p.149.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid., p.150.

13 Including, Epstein notes, the then-NZ Ambassador to Korea David Taylor.
the highest Korean expatriate communities in the world. The Korean population is the third largest Asian population in New Zealand after Chinese and Indians. Koreans arrived, with their families, and settled in New Zealand’s largest city of Auckland. The largest Korean community in New Zealand is on Auckland’s North Shore.

Koreans in New Zealand can read locally-produced Korean newspapers, eat at a range of Korean restaurants and attend Korean churches. Moreover, as Carina Meares and her colleagues at Massey University noted in their report on Koreans in Auckland:

The churches do not simply provide a place of fellowship and worship; they are an important part of the networking and support of those Koreans that are attached to one church or another and they have provided an important institutional bridgehead to settlement. In this regard, there is a point of contact and similarity with other Christian New Zealanders.

A significant number of Korean New Zealanders are self-employed entrepreneurs, sometimes by choice, sometimes by consequence. Writing in 1998, Jacqui Lidgard and her colleagues from Waikato University noted that

...the links created by entrepreneurs and migrants with skills between their new homes and their source countries will strengthen New Zealand’s economic integration with Asia. Notwithstanding the current economic crisis in that region, long-term these links have positive benefits for the New Zealand economy. As New Zealand’s former Prime Minister [Jim Bolger] said in his introductory address to the Population Conference in 1997, “Migrants have a direct link with trade.”

These “kimchi networks”, as they have been called, serve not only to strengthen trade links between Koreans in New Zealand and in Korea, but also to reshape New Zealand’s major cities, especially Auckland. Moreover, high-profile Koreans in New

17 Meares et al, *Kimchi Networks*. 

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Zealand, including Member of Parliament and former broadcaster Melissa Lee and golfers Lydia Ko and Danny Lee, bring to New Zealanders’ attention that the links that were established on the battlefields of the Korean peninsula are now strengthened in the streets, suburbs, shopping centres and schools of New Zealand’s cities.

Despite the historical links between Korea and New Zealand noted above and other well-established connections, Korea is not as well known to New Zealanders as is China or Japan. The Asia New Zealand Foundation annually polls New Zealanders’ perceptions of Asia and Asian peoples, and one unprompted question asked each year is, “when you think of Asia which countries come to mind?” Since that question was first asked in 2007, China and Japan have always been the first and second countries New Zealanders recalled. In 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2011 South Korea was the sixth country to be recalled (after China, Japan, Thailand, Malaysia, India), while in 2008, Korea as a generic name, was third and in 2010 South Korea was fifth.

The survey also asks New Zealanders to rate their warmth toward countries of Asia on a thermometer scale, where 100 degrees is very warm and favourable and 0 degrees is very cold and unfavourable. For South Korea this question has been asked twice. In 2009, New Zealanders gave South Korea a warmth rating of 71 degrees, dropping slightly to 68 degrees in 2011. To put that rating in perspective, in 2009 the highest warmth rating went to Japan, at 76 degrees and the lowest to Burma/Myanmar at 69 degrees (Korea: 71 degrees) while in 2011 the highest warmth rating went once again to Japan and again at 76 degrees, while the lowest rating went to Brunei and Indonesia equally at 65 degrees (Korea: 68 degrees).

Inasmuch as the survey tells us anything about why New Zealanders recognise and rate countries the way they do, we may note that New Zealanders’ perceptions of Korea are shaped by what they read and see in the media about tensions on the Korean peninsula. Indeed, in most of the annual surveys just noted, except for 2007 and 2009,

23 New Zealanders’ perceptions of Asia and Asian peoples in 2011, p.28.
the same percentages identify South Korea as identify North Korea. It is perhaps also important to note Korea’s reputation as a “hermit kingdom”, which has traditionally shut outsiders out. Korea is a predominantly mono-ethnic society (though this is slowly changing), unlike Japan, China and Taiwan, which each have ethnic minorities. It is also worth noting that New Zealanders’ linking of North Korea and South Korea is only one dimension of awareness. Rather than not being aware of Korea, it might be that New Zealanders are only aware of one aspect of Korean realities. New Zealanders can probably name a range of famous Chinese and Japanese people from history – Mao Zedong or Emperor Hirohito, for example – and products such as Honda and particular Chinese food. Fewer New Zealanders would probably be able to identify famous Korean brands, perhaps with the exception of Kia and Hyundai, though the popularity of Gangnam Style is quickly changing this “brand” recognition of things “Korean”.

This lack of awareness is not for lack of links between the two countries. South Korea is New Zealand’s seventh largest tourism market in terms of visitor numbers and seventh largest source of expenditure. In the year ending March 2012, 52,552 Koreans visited New Zealand, though that was almost a 20 percent drop from the year before. (This drop in numbers is attributable to various factors, including the downturn in tourism generally after the earthquakes in Christchurch and Japan in 2011, ash cloud disruption from Chile’s volcanic eruption in the same year, and the global economic crisis that began in 2008.) The majority of South Korean tourists come on pre-packaged tours and combine their visit to New Zealand with visiting another country. 24 It should be noted too that the large Korean diaspora in New Zealand (relative to New Zealand’s population) would not necessarily be recorded as visitors and so we might expect frequent travel between Korea and New Zealand by New Zealand’s Korean population, particularly those who have business interests and family still in Korea.

Reconceptualising ‘religion’ in New Zealand

The nature of New Zealand as a “host” society shares many similar attributes to other host societies: it is a Western liberal democracy, a former British colony, English-speaking and has a long tradition of accepting (certain types of) migrants. That much is perhaps unremarkable. But New Zealand also differs from these comparative countries (Canada, Australia, and the United States of America) in significant ways, including the following. New Zealand has a small population of only just over four million (compared to 35,056,064;25 23,016,113,26 and 315,819,79427 respectively in the aforementioned countries). New Zealand has a particular history of dealing in various


27 As at 9 May, 2013: http://www.census.gov/popclock/.
public ways with its bicultural heritage, first through the Treaty of Waitangi, signed between the Crown and the indigenous Māori population in 1840, and then through various interactions, both antagonistic and productive, in the years since. These have taken form in designated Māori seats in Parliament, in Te Reo Māori as one of three official languages (the other two are English and New Zealand Sign Language), and in the use of Te Reo in the names of government agencies, universities and many other public and private institutions, and in the significant urban populations of Māori. Two of the holders of New Zealand’s highest constitutional office, the Governor-General, have been Māori, including the present incumbent Lt. Gen. Sir Jerry Mataparae GNZM QSO. Much literature on religion, migration and diversity concerns the religion of migrants which is different, perhaps even opposed, to the dominant religion (including secularism) of the host society. As Bader notes, “With immigrants often come ‘strange’ religious beliefs and practices that may force ‘us’ to reconceptualize religion, to find more adequate politics of accommodation, and to change established institutional arrangements of state/politics and (organized) religion.”

That is true of New Zealand as it is of similar settler societies. The latest (2006) Census data illustrate an overall decline in the number of people identifying themselves as Christian, from 60.6 percent in 2001 to fewer than 50 percent in 2006. While the traditional Christian denominations decreased (Anglican and Presbyterian) or grew only slightly (Catholics and Methodists), there were significant increases of those affiliating with “Orthodox”, “Evangelical”, “Born Again” and “Fundamentalist”, and ‘Pentecostal’ denominations. “Pentecostals” comprise an estimated 10 percent of those who designated themselves as Christians, 30 percent of churchgoers, and 3.5 percent of the total population. Census figures do not show what percentage of Christians regularly attend church, which can be charitably estimated to be at about 8-10 percent of the Christian population, and does not include those who make an annual church visit at Christmas time. “European New Zealanders” and “New Zealanders” were most likely to state they had no religion at 37.7 percent and 37.6


29 What the Census refers to as ‘religion’ in this context might be better described as ‘denomination’.


percent each. Statistically, the movement in the census since the Second World War among the European (New Zealand European) population has been from designating a particular denomination to ticking the “Christian” box (which for a while went up) to the “no religion” box (which is now on the rise). Other statistics seem to indicate that many people still believe in a God but not in any institutionalised religion. This indicates the problem is not a theological one as such but one of people’s perceptions of the Church and its social, personal and spiritual importance.

The Census data go on to show that there has also been an increase in other religions, which may be attributed largely to the increase in migrants from Asia. With the notable exception of Chinese migrants, many of whom identify as having “no religion” (though they may be inclined to “find” religion in New Zealand), most Asian migrants identify with a particular religion. There were significant increases in the Sikh religion, Hinduism and Islam, with the vast majority of those who identified themselves in one of these categories born overseas and in Asia. Of Hindus and Muslims, almost half had arrived in New Zealand during the previous five years (i.e. in the five years before the Census.) Of those who identified themselves as Asian, however, some 27% described themselves as Christian, a higher proportion than for Hindu (17%), Buddhist (11%) or Muslim (6%) religions, though a lower proportion than those of “no religion” (30%). Proportionately, Asians were 4.8% of total Christians in 2006, which was an increase from 3.2% of in 2001, compared to an overall decrease in the number of Christians from 2001 to 2006.

So while the proportion of New Zealand’s population that identifies as Christian is decreasing, that cannot be attributed solely to immigration. While the new migrant populations are clearly responsible for the increases in other religions, the decrease in Christianity in New Zealand may also be the result of problems of attrition and/or retention amongst New Zealand’s non-migrant Christian communities and an increasing number of sceptical European New Zealanders who would state they belong to no religion. As we have noted, Asian immigration has actually brought significant numbers of Christians into New Zealand and, while it is difficult to quantify, the growth in the Orthodox, Evangelical and Pentecostal denominations may be due to new migrant populations as much as to “natural” growth or non-migrant Christians changing denominations. In fact, Asian immigration has added significant numbers of people to Christian churches in New Zealand. This phenomenon is striking among Korean migrants.

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In other words, the New Zealand church’s decline has been both numerical and as a percentage of the population, as well as in the extent to which New Zealand society sees the church as an integral part of the community. If we take out of the equation the Pacific Island and migrant communities, the decline is catastrophic. What growth there is in religious attendance – or what prevents the decline being even starker – are the religious tendencies of new migrants. Two of the largest congregations in the PCANZ are Korean – the Lord’s Church of Auckland and Christchurch Korean Church. The PCANZ holds strong partnership relationships with two Presbyterian denominations in Korea – the Presbyterian Church of Korea (PCK) and the Presbyterian Church of the Republic of Korea (PROK). Their stated policy is to encourage their people who migrate overseas to join the partner Church.

The Koreans started churches

According to Gil-Soo Han, “‘There used to be a saying, ‘Wherever the Chinese went, they started restaurants; the Japanese, electronic goods stores; and the Koreans, churches.’”

Recent New Zealand research has illustrated the role that the church in New Zealand plays in the migration and settlement of Korean immigrants. For example, Meares et. al. note that “the [Christian] churches do not simply provide a place of fellowship and worship; they are an important part of the networking and support of those Koreans that are attached to one church or another and they have provided an important institutional bridgehead to settlement.” This is not unique to New Zealand. Korean migrants in Australia and North America have also used the Korean immigrant church as a site to maintain their Korean identity. The bridgehead role that the Korean church plays to new migrants, or even to foreign students from Korea, is an important function.

For many Korean migrants, the church does not just fulfil their spiritual needs, but also their material and social needs. Indeed, in this way the Korean churches in New Zealand (or, at least, the Korean approaches to church in New Zealand) may be seen to differ from churches in the host society generally, inasmuch as church interactions for Koreans are both more public and broader. As Han notes, “a significant proportion of

40 Han, “Foolish Jesus”, p.310.
Korean immigrant churchgoers... take non-religious dimensions of the church seriously. New churchgoers quickly learn that the church serves the role of social clubs as well as the church.\textsuperscript{41} This important and explicit social function may also draw Korean migrants that otherwise might not have attended church in Korea. Thus at the same times as it draws Korean migrants into a socially supportive network it also reinforces isolation and exacerbates insularity from the host society\textsuperscript{42} and therefore does not provide migrants with support for them to adapt to the host society.\textsuperscript{43} By implication, too, inter-ethnic marriage is discouraged.\textsuperscript{44}

Churches, in this view, play three roles with respect to Korean migrants: (1) a place of fellowship; (2) reinforcement of “Koreanness”; (3) and an entry-point into the Korean community in New Zealand. Korea is one of the most ethnically homogeneous countries in the world, though this is slowly changing. But reinforcing ‘Koreanness’ outside Korea remains important, partly because of language – while principal migrants will have to have an adequate English language ability to migrate, this will not necessarily apply to their dependents, who may not speak much or any English at all. Partly, too, because being “Korean” becomes the defining feature of a migrant community in a way that might not still be true in Korea itself.\textsuperscript{45}

Some Koreans are in New Zealand as missionaries. Some are in relationship with New Zealand denominational bodies; for example, the Reverend Hseop Kim, a missionary sent by the Korean Baptist denomination to work in New Zealand, collaborates with the Baptist Churches of New Zealand. Other Korean missionaries to New Zealand are independent, such as the Reverend Daniel Yi, Korean pastor and entrepreneur, who has established a language school and an international church in Manukau, South Auckland, and provides office space for several mission agencies in one of his commercial properties. While some denominations have established formal relationships with equivalent Korean denominations (e.g. the Presbyterian Church of Aotearoa-New Zealand (PCANZ)); in other cases local congregations find their own way to receive, relate to and partner with Korean Christians.

Apart from the issue of language, fuller partnership between Korean congregations and indigenous New Zealand churches can be impeded by different expectations of Christian life and ministry, including in the following ways.

- Korean Christians are often more conservative in matters of church practice (e.g. the public role of women) and in social attitudes.
- Korean churches often place high value on academic qualifications, e.g. requiring pastors to have at least a Master of Divinity (M.Div.) degree. New

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  \item \textsuperscript{41} Ibid., p.314.
  \item \textsuperscript{42} Ibid., p.315.
  \item \textsuperscript{43} Ibid., p.325.
  \item \textsuperscript{44} Han, ‘Korean Christianity in Multicultural Australia’, p.119.
  \item \textsuperscript{45} Ibid., p.121.
\end{itemize}
Zealand training institutions do not award a M.Div., typically using a Bachelors degree (in Ministry, Theology or Applied Theology) as their ministerial training programme. Korean churches may struggle to accept that this is adequate. As is discussed below, Korean churches may therefore tend to look to Korean-trained ministers rather than New Zealand-based Koreans who might have fuller understanding of the New Zealand context and greater ease of relating beyond the Korean community.

- Korean Christianity stresses earnest public prayer (regular 5:30am prayer meetings), often involving all present praying aloud simultaneously. In comparison, the quieter (and much less frequent) prayer offered in New Zealand churches can seem tame and half-hearted to Korean immigrants.

- As will be discussed further, Korean patriarchy and respect for seniority sit uneasily with Kiwi egalitarianism and casual style in relating to pastors and leaders.

Korean and Kiwi cultures can sometimes struggle to understand each other, even within a shared religious faith. On a visit to Korea one of us (Wieland) talked with a Korean theological student who had spent a short time in New Zealand. He said that in retrospect he realised that Kiwi young people in the church had been trying to offer friendship, but he had not understood their overtures in that way at the time. He had been invited to a barbeque, to “hang out” – he was puzzled, as there did not seem to be a clear goal in mind (such as training, or partnering in a mission project). The young Korean Christians had not seen the point in just “hanging out”, but he said that he now appreciated that there would have been value in building relationships.

However, these lines of commonality (language, being ‘Korean’ etc.) can also become lines of division, especially where Korean immigrants compensate their marginalisation or lost status in the host country (especially in the labour market, where few are in white-collar occupations or have job security) by creating or otherwise reinforcing their status within the Korean church or migrant community generally. As Han goes on to note,

For [Korean migrants] the church has been the most significant place to speak [the] Korean language, share Korean foods, [and] exchange with fellow Koreans their past and current information about the home country... The church is also a place for comfort and fellowship when a person’s immigrant life is harsh.... [It] is also the place where conflicts and tensions are most commonly observed.

46 Ibid., p.120.
47 Ibid., p.124
48 Han, “Foolish Jesus”, p.307.
49 Ibid., p.327
There are, Han argues elsewhere, many “questionable aspects” of Korean Christianity: the practice of religio-economic entrepreneurship, misappropriation of church funds and “attempts to inherit the head pastorship.” There are also charges of racism within the Korean church, as there is outside it.\(^5\)\(^0\)

The Pew Forum notes that on the 2005 South Korean national census approximately 30 percent of Koreans identified as being Christian, an increase of almost ten percent within two decades. By comparison, 47 percent were Buddhists. (Though some of the largest Christian churches in Asia are to be found in Korea, Christianity is still, proportionately, a minority religion.) But, as Ward Friesen notes, the Korean migrant population in New Zealand is disproportionately Christian (70 percent), compared to the Christian population in Korea.\(^5\)\(^1\) According to Stuart Vogel, a weekly Christian newspaper published in the Korean language has a circulation of 3,500.\(^5\)\(^2\)

Korean Christianity in New Zealand has particular features relevant to this discussion. For example, Korean Christians in New Zealand have publicly voiced significant concern about same-sex marriage legislation in New Zealand, with one pastor saying that he would return to Korea if the bill were passed.\(^5\)\(^6\) These Korean Christians teamed up with New Zealand conservative Christian organisations, including Family First, to oppose the bill. The conservative aspects of Korean Christianity in New Zealand are evidenced in other ways too: in the formal dress on Sundays, which is not as common among New Zealand Christians as it used to be, though remains a feature of Pacific Christianity; and in conservative theology and practice, including restrictions on the public roles of women.\(^5\)\(^7\) Many Korean congregations in New Zealand, perhaps the majority, come from PCK, “Haptung” and PROK backgrounds. These denominations are not Pentecostal in orientation as such although they are socially conservative. The PCK, which has 3 million members in Korea, has accepted women ministers. The “Haptung” numbers 5 million. They are institutionally conservative, hierarchical and

\(^{50}\) Han, “Korean Christianity in Multicultural Australia”, p.118.

\(^{51}\) Ibid., pp.127 – 128.


\(^{53}\) Donald Clark, “Christianity in Modern Korea”, *Education about Asia*, (11),2: 35-39, p.39, online at www.asian-studies.org%2Flea%2FClark-Korea.pdf?ei=F8WKUdvGBqTziAenmIGIBQ&usg=AFQjCNEgxc7iiJO2-YyYNF9I0FSkmCaU7A&sig2=krUk-ckBGMDDxJXAOBr6oQ.

\(^{54}\) Friesen, 2008.


\(^{57}\) Han, “Foolish Jesus”.
committed to the “Korean Way”. This provides a similar situation to the Pacific Island situation where the minister of the Church is a kind of Matai. The Korean minister is not a “chief” but still holds similar patterns of power and authority.

However, Korean pastors in New Zealand have also received publicity for other reasons. For example, one “self-styled pastor” Luke Lee was convicted of manslaughter after an attempted exorcism. A newspaper article noted that “He and his church have been deregistered by the Assemblies of God and most of his followers have dispersed, with many Koreans reportedly returning home.”\footnote{Monique Devereux and Paul Yandall, ‘Exorcist pastor jailed for six years on manslaughter’, \textit{New Zealand Herald}, Dec 20, 2001, online at http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=383571 (13 June, 2013).} Interestingly, and somewhat oddly it must be said, the victim of this exorcism, Joanna Lee (no relation to the offender) has her own Wikipedia page.\footnote{‘Joanna Lee’, \textit{Wikipedia}, online at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joanna_Lee (13 June, 2013).} In a study of this event, Heather Kavan notes that “Joanna’s submission [to Luke Lee] reflects deeply patriarchal Korean Christianity.”\footnote{Heather Kavan, ‘The Korean exorcist meets the New Zealand justice system’, \textit{AEN Journal}, 2 (2), 2007, online at http://www.aen.org.nz/journal/2/2/Kavan.html (13 June, 2013).} Exorcism is not unique to Korean Christians; indeed, it is a feature of Pentecostal Christianity generally, but Kavan argues that

Korean Pentecostal Christianity is much more exuberant than its Western equivalent, usually incorporating shamanistic rituals of freeing people from evil spirits accompanied by thunderous sounding prayer. For Lee and his followers, exorcism was a normal activity – the earth is swarming with demons. While the practice of exorcism is in keeping with Assemblies of God culture, Lee’s exorcisms were relatively plentiful and vocal. His all night prayer-chanting sessions, which took place in his home, involved participants making grunting noises, screaming at the top of their lungs, playing horns, trumpets and drums, and blowing whistles to keep demons away.

We have to be cautious about taking this public expression of Korean Christianity as being either normative or representative. Much of what is experienced or practiced by Korean Christians in New Zealand does not feature in the public domain; nevertheless, these public expressions of Korean Christianity give an otherwise ignorant public impressions of what Korean Christianity looks like, even if that is not necessarily a true or accurate representation.

\textbf{Winning souls from Seoul}

Another way in which those outside the Korean Christian community might be informed about Korean Christianity in New Zealand is through their representation in what we might call “religious ethnoscapes.” This may be seen principally through Korean-language
signage outside predominantly European churches or outside dedicated buildings.\textsuperscript{61} A number of Korean Christians in New Zealand have what might be called a “missionary zeal.” (This is borne out by data that suggest Korea sends out 20,000 missionaries.)\textsuperscript{62} As one (Korean) blogger in New Zealand expressed it, “we [Korean churches in New Zealand] work together for the evangelisation of this nation [New Zealand]”.\textsuperscript{63} In the same blog post (in 2011), which was talking about the establishment of 11 new Korean churches in New Zealand, the blogger noted that among its attendees were: the preacher,

The General Secretary of the Presbyterian Church of Korea, Rev Dr Sung Ki Cho, and Rev Dr Yang, Myong Duk, the Missions Co-worker based in Korea with responsibilities for the PCK’s relationships with the South Pacific was also present… representatives of the PCK were present, the ministers joining come from both the PCK and the Presbyterian Church of the Republic of Korea and the Haptong Church.

The significant and high-level representation from Korean churches in Korea is noteworthy. Technology enables transnational connections between Korean churches in Korea and in New Zealand to the extent that teaching material, staff and direction can follow a one-way route from Seoul to Auckland.\textsuperscript{64} This supply of teachers/pastors from Korea also relates to the over-supply of theological graduates in Korea,\textsuperscript{65} though there are concerns as to the quality of their training.\textsuperscript{66} It also, however, means that Korea-based church leaders “exert considerable influence” and can “consolidate Korean theological trends.”\textsuperscript{67}

On the other side of the coin, and on the same event as above, in October 2012, PCANZ

recognised... its growing number of Korean and other Asian congregations with a decision to adopt a policy statement about becoming a cross-cultural church.... The Church is responding to the needs of this growing community, most of whom live in the greater Auckland area, by providing a place of welcome and belonging. Presbyterian churches are active at a local level providing mission and ministry to many of Auckland’s large Asian migrant communities.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{64} See Han, “Foolish Jesus”, p.319.
\item \textsuperscript{65} \textit{Ibid.}, p.317.
\item \textsuperscript{66} \textit{Ibid.}, p.328.
\item \textsuperscript{67} Han, “Korean Christianity in Multicultural Australia”, p.118.
\end{itemize}
In addition to the statement by the PCANZ, eleven Korean churches formally joined the PCANZ, an Asian council was established and a Korean minister was appointed as an Asian Missions Co-ordinator. Spokesman Stuart Vogel noted that,

A cross-cultural church is a community in which there is cross-pollination among all its members of new ideas and ways of being Christian. It values, listens to and reflects together upon what each ethnic, cultural or language group brings to the cross-cultural community. It dares to learn and change when new insights about the Gospel, faith and life are brought into its midst. The Presbyterian Church has decided to begin the process of becoming an active, vibrant cross-cultural community.68

A comparison: Samoans in New Zealand

The influx of heavily Christianised migrants is not new for New Zealand. In the 1950s, New Zealand experienced a high volume of migration from the Pacific, though outward migration from the Pacific Islands to New Zealand had begun in the decade earlier. From 2200 Pacific Islanders in 1945, the number had grown “exponentially” to 202,000 by 2001, half of whom were Samoans; the next largest and fastest-growing cohort were Tongans.69 Now New Zealand has some of the largest Pacific populations in the world. The experience of Samoan migrants is, however, instructive for our understanding of the experience of recent Korean migrants. We can draw several parallels. Both the Samoan and Korean cultures are hierarchical and gerontocratic (i.e. elders are both respected and deferred to.) In the case of Korea, they are also patriarchal.70 This can create inter-generational tensions, particularly between first-generation migrants (i.e. those born outside New Zealand) and their children, brought up and/or born in New Zealand.71 Some of this inter-generational tension is true across generations in any family, in the form of independence versus dependence, authority versus autonomy, filial piety versus individualism. However, among both Koreans and Samoans in New Zealand this is overlaid by recalibration and renegotiation of ethnic identity. Macpherson and Macpherson, drawing on the work of Melanie Anae, note that “in real terms, then, there was a gap between what [Samoan] parents considered the attributes of a ‘Samoan’ and those possessed by children.”72

Anae, in highlighting the tension between parents and children over ethnic identity, noted that parents drew attention to the differences between their own lifestyles and


70 Han, “Korean Christianity in Multicultural Australia”, p.119.


72 Ibid., p.33.
values and the lifestyles and values of their New Zealand-born children, which they would express in a variety of contexts and in a variety of ways. In a Samoan family “[t]he traditional church was one such context in which the very decision [by the children] to affiliate with the “English Speaking Session” constituted a symbolic judgement about one’s Pacific ancestry and identity for both those who took the decision and those who observed it.”\(^{73}\) This symbolic, and actual, affiliation took place in the face of pressure by parents “to be proud to be Samoans” and “to show that Samoans can do anything as well as the Palagi.”\(^{74}\) One way, the Macphersons note, in which children responded to and attempted to resolve this tension, was “to remove themselves from at least some of the situations in which these issues surfaced,” including moving away from Samoan churches to evangelical churches in which ethnicity was de-emphasised. Thus, “[i]n these contexts, children’s spiritual and religious needs and preferences could be met without the added complication posed by questions of ethnic identity.”\(^{75}\) The departures of Samoan children from Samoan churches were, therefore, “part of a set of decisions which young people were making about their ethnicity.”\(^{76}\)

Like Korean churches in Auckland, Samoan churches also had strong links to the homeland. In the 1980s two powerful Pacific Island churches in Auckland, the Eklelesia Fa’apotopota Kerisiano i Samoa (the Congregational Church of Samoa), Siasi Tonga (Church of Tonga) and Ekalesia Niue (Niuean Church) were all headquartered overseas. These Pacific Island churches, akin to the Korean churches discussed earlier, had a separate social structure and were the places where “Island languages and protocols dominated, and where both routine and important events could be conducted.”\(^{77}\) The church played an important part in the settlement experiences of Pacific migrants to New Zealand.

However, the experience of Samoan migrants departs from that of Korean migrants in several important ways too. First, the Samoan migrant population in New Zealand is less recent than the Korean population by several decades and therefore is more established. Second, Samoans in New Zealand in 2013 (at the time of writing) are treated with a welcome and recognition that they did not receive when they first migrated to New Zealand. On the contrary, as Spoonley and Bedford note, the early Samoan migrants and the term ‘over-stayers’ were used in the same context, and sometimes synonymously.\(^{78}\) Samoans are now All Blacks and are also in politics.\(^{79}\)

While Koreans also feature prominently in New Zealand sports (golf) and are also in politics, with one Member of Parliament (Melissa Lee, the first Korean MP outside

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73 Ibid., p.33.
74 Ibid., p.34.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid., p.35.
78 Spoonley and Bedford, Welcome to our World?
Korea), they could not at this point be said to be as established or as welcome as Samoan migrants to New Zealand. This speaks to a wider issue of the acceptance of Asian migrants generally in New Zealand. We could suggest that when Koreans have been in New Zealand as long as Samoans they will be accepted in the same way Samoans are, though New Zealand’s negative history of discrimination toward Asian, especially Chinese, migrants would not give that suggestion much support. New Zealand was a former colonial power of Samoa, so in accepting migrants from there and other Pacific countries New Zealand was doing its bit, not just as a good neighbour in the Pacific but also as a trustee and benevolent master. New Zealand’s relationship with Korea is entirely different. Whereas the asymmetry in the bilateral relationship between New Zealand and Samoa went in New Zealand’s favour, in the relationship between South Korea and New Zealand it goes the other way. New Zealand is not under the same obligation to accept Korean migrants as it was to accept Samoan migrants; furthermore, the reasons for Samoan migration to New Zealand are almost entirely different to the reasons for Korean migration to New Zealand. “Lifestyle, leisure and learning” might be a short-hand way of expressing the motivation of many Koreans to migrate to New Zealand, and one of the most ubiquitous forms that takes is in playing golf.

“Like a Pusan telephone book”: Koreans and golf

One could gain the impression that all Koreans do in New Zealand is attend church and church-related activities. But they also play golf, and not just in New Zealand. Four of the top ten female golfers in the world are Korean, as are 38 of the top 100 and 144 of the top 500, including Korean-born New Zealander and world number one amateur Lydia Ko. As New Zealand Golf Chief Executive Dean Murphy relayed to the New Zealand Herald, “As one writer observed, the names on the leaderboard of a recent US Open read like a Pusan phonebook - Bae, Jang, Kim, Lee, Pak, Park, Park, Shin.” Danny Lee, another Korean-born New Zealander, is also a high profile and successful professional young golfer, as is Cecilia Cho. New Zealand has also been the training ground of Korean golfers (Sharon Ahn/Shin Ae, Yeon Song Kim, Da Som Lee, and Jenny Park) who turned professional and subsequently returned to Korea. Around 1,000 Koreans learn to play golf in New Zealand and comprised almost 70 percent of the qualifying field for the New Zealand Open in 2010/2011. In New Zealand, golf is the most popular participation sport for men (attracting over 25% of adults) and the second most popular participation sport for women. New Zealand also has the highest

82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
number of golf courses (400) per capita in the world.\textsuperscript{84} Comparative to other countries, not least Korea, golfing in New Zealand is an affordable sport.\textsuperscript{85}

**Conclusion**

The bilateral relationship between New Zealand and Korea was forged on the Korean peninsula. It is now shaped by interactions in New Zealand. This article has principally focused on one of these interactions: the church. The church provides a useful site of enquiry for various reasons. Koreans, unique among other Asian migrant populations, are church-goers. Their missionary zeal and desire to retain Korean identity and values motivates them. The church’s social function plays a crucial role in the settlement of Korean migrants in New Zealand. However, the experience of Korean migrants in New Zealand is part of a wider story. It is a story that encompasses New Zealand’s changing ethnic diversity; according to estimates based on the 2006 census, 16 percent of New Zealand’s population will be of Asian ethnicity by 2026.\textsuperscript{86} It is a story that also represents a changing religious landscape. As with other similar Western nations, New Zealand was ostensibly a “Christian” country for most of its history; statistics bear out that this is no longer the case. New Zealanders are increasingly of no religious affiliation, and also increasingly Hindus, Buddhists and Muslims. In New Zealand’s cities, mosques stand alongside cathedrals. New Zealand’s religious diversity is matching its ethnic diversity. These diversifications, in turn, challenge notions of New Zealand’s identity as a country and as the peoples that inhabit it. Geographically New Zealand is not a ‘Western’ country; its capital city is closer to the capitals of Asia than the capitals of Europe. Transnational links, eased and reinforced by technology, create deep and influential links between Asian communities in both Asia and New Zealand; these links impact upon the interaction between migrant communities and the host society. Koreans are one group that relies heavily upon these transnational linkages and do so in two of the most transnational forms available, religion and sport. Koreans move to New Zealand for a slower pace of life, for a clean, green environment, for reconnecting with family and friends, but also to play golf and to do God’s work.

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