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Proceedings of the 19th New Zealand Asian Studies Society
International Conference

Editorial Committee
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Dr. Robyn Andrews
Dr. Penelope Shino
Dr. Imran Muhammad
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New Zealand Asian Studies Society (NZASIA), Palmerston North
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# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Editorial Committee</strong></td>
<td>II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2011 NZASIA Conference Organising Committee</strong></td>
<td>V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Acknowledgements</strong></td>
<td>VI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Introduction</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State Processes and Modernity</strong></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of a Primary Curriculum Framework for Bangladesh (From Grade I to Grade VIII)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syed Mohammad Masud Jamali</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liang Qichao, Japan and the Use of Military Songs in the Forging of a New People</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong-Yu Gong</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Labour Challenge and State Corporatisation: The Case of Wenling</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kevin Lin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender and Modernity in Kerala</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malcolm McKinnon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encouraging Citizen Participation - The Saibanin System in Japan</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hannah White</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive Authoritarianism and Internet Control: Case Studies from Thailand and Malaysia</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yangyue Liu</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protectors or Attackers: Do United States Forces in Japan (USFJ) protect the Japanese People or harm them?</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takao Sebata</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Evolution of China’s Rural Land Tenure System</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jason Young</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Environment and Sustainability</strong></td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babar Chohan, Muhammad Imram and Christine Cheyne</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women and Sustainable Urban Transport in Pakistan: Key Points from the Literature</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waheed Ahmed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noise pollution from high-speed and conventional railways in Japan</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brian Harrison</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Global/Local Links and Connections</strong></td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Right Stuff: Ross Intermediate School’s Trip to India</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robyn Andrews</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Museums: Old Collections, New Responsibilities: Asian Collections for 21st Century New Zealanders</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Susan Abasa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ways of Seeing: Local Collection—Global Connections</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sita Venkateswar and Susan Abasa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Te Manawa and Manawatu Chinese Community Projects: Toward a ‘Learning History’</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tony Rasmussen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Argentine Tango Dancers: Cross-cultural Experiences</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Etsuko Toyoda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Narratives, Legacies and Historical Representation</strong></td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IDENTITY DISCOURSE AND COLLECTIVE MEMORY: AN EXAMINATION INTO LIN RUIMING’S RESEARCH
APPROACH ON LAI HE
YU-WEN CHIH .................................................................................................................. 129
JAPANESE COLONIAL TAIWAN: ‘COLLABORATIVE LITERATURE’ AND STRATEGIES OF INTERVENTION
ROSEMARY HADDON ............................................................................................................. 136
MEMOIRS OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND REA YANG’S SPIDER EATERS
WENJUN SUN ......................................................................................................................... 143
THE LEGACY OF QIU JIN (1875-1907): A VARIETY OF FORMS AND VOICES OF REMEMBRANCE
ROBYN HAMILTON ................................................................................................................. 149
WHITE-WASHING AND BRAIN-WASHING: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE NARRATIVE STRATEGIES AND
DESCRIPTIONS OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR IN JAPANESE AND RUSSIAN HISTORY TEXTBOOKS, CA. 1997-2010
ELENA KOLESOVA .................................................................................................................... 157
LEE MYUNG-BAK, CHEONAN, AND THE NEW COLD WAR
TIM BEAL ..................................................................................................................................... 165

RELIGION, POLITICS AND IDENTITY ...................................................................................... 172

ISLAM AND MUSLIMS IN NEW ZEALAND
CHRISTOPHER VAN DER KROGT ............................................................................................. 173
INSTITUTIONS AND FAITH: BUILDING CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY IN SOUTH KOREA
ROBERTA JENKINS ................................................................................................................... 179
GOD, LAND AND DEVELOPMENT: THE SARAWAK 2011 STATE ELECTION IN THE BA’ KELALAN CONSTITUENCY
ARNOLD PUYOK ......................................................................................................................... 186
RECONNECTION AND RECONSTRUCTION: INFLUENCING OVERSEAS CHINESE IDENTITY
JAMES TO .................................................................................................................................... 195

POPULAR CULTURE AND FILM ............................................................................................. 205

YOUTHFUL BODIES: CHINESE YOUTH CULTURE IN 1988
PAUL CLARK ............................................................................................................................... 206
AIR OUR DIRTY LAUNDRY IN PUBLIC: A STUDY OF JIA ZHANGKE’S HOMETOWN TRILOGY
YUNXIANG KELLY CHEN ............................................................................................................. 212
SHE-WOLF OR PRISONER OF LOVE? GIRL POWER AND DEPENDENCE IN ENGLISH AND JAPANESE POPULAR MUSIC
KATHRYN MARR .......................................................................................................................... 220
TRANSCATING ‘BOY LOVE’ IN NAGUSAMEGUSA (1418): THE SOFT POWER OF LITERATURE IN MUROMACHI JAPAN.
PENNY SHINO .............................................................................................................................. 230
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Acknowledgements
At the 18th New Zealand Asian Studies Society International Conference, 2009, I accepted without hesitation the invitation of Professor Paul Clark to hold the 19th biennial conference at Massey University. Prior to this time, the conference had not taken place at Massey since 1997. Thus, despite some apprehension, colleagues and I welcomed the opportunity to hold the event here. As the organising got underway my apprehension turned to honour at the opportunity of convening an event that is a vital part of the Society’s activities. My first thanks thus go to Paul Clark for his show of confidence in me and for his follow-on suggestions regarding structure and keynote speakers.

Organising an international conference is no easy feat. The success of the event was due to the time, energy and input of many individuals and groups. I acknowledge Massey’s College of Humanities & Social Sciences and the School of Linguistics & International Languages who underwrote the cost of the conference. Professor Cynthia White, Head of School, offered encouragement and support. I am grateful to Cynthia for her endorsement, leadership and friendship.

The conference officially opened with a morning ceremony on Saturday 2 July 2011. I appreciate the contributions of the following individuals who opened the conference and provided a warm welcome to the conference delegates:

- Professor Sir Mason Durie, DVC and AVC Maori & Pasifika, Massey University
- Mayor Jono Naylor, Palmerston North Mayor
- Professor Susan Mumm, Pro Vice-Chancellor, College of Humanities and Social Sciences, Massey University
- Professor Henry Johnson, NZASIA Society President

The 19th NZASIA conference was my introduction to the role of conference convening. Throughout the entire process, I depended on the expertise of those with more experience. I am indebted to the Conference Services (CS) division of Massey University who offered
assistance and guidance on a range of essential matters. The CS division created the website and administered the practical side of the conference arrangements. Sarah Siebert, National Conference Manager, was both reassuring and supportive, and I am grateful to Marlene Ryan and Joanna Hanzi for their presence during the long hours of the two and one-half days of the conference. More to the point is the guidance provided by the New Zealand Asian Studies Society executive. These individuals patiently answered my many questions about numerous issues. Henry Johnson and Michael Radich proved to be particularly patient throughout the process.

On a more personal note, I owe an enormous debt of thanks to the members of the organising committee. They faithfully attended meetings during the period prior to the conference and provided ongoing enthusiastic input into various issues. The latter included the conference theme, structure, keynote speakers, programme, the abstracts and paper submissions and the proceedings. Srikanta Chatterjee provided consistent support and suggested the conference theme and other matters. I am grateful to Srikanta for obtaining sponsorship from IPC and for seeking out and securing the entertainment. Imran Muhammad provided important input into the plenary sessions and recommended the keynote speaker for the session on the environment and urban planning. Douglas Osto offered suggestions for and contacted potential keynote speakers. During our time as programme colleagues Penelope Shino has provided me with ongoing collegiality and friendship. Penny took the initiative to procure several sources of sponsorship. Geoff Watson undertook the onerous task of drafting, revising and updating the programme. Christopher van der Krogt edited the conference abstracts. Finally, Robyn Andrews provided input into many matters and proved to be an invaluable source of optimism and good cheer. I could not have asked for a more wonderful and enjoyable group of individuals to work with. The positive outcome of the endeavour was due in large measure to their team effort.

The conference was fortunate in obtaining financial support and sponsorship from various sources. I gratefully acknowledge the assistance provided by the following individuals and bodies:

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A final vote of thanks goes to the New Zealand Asian Studies Society that paid for the production costs of the publication.

Rosemary Haddon

19th NZASIA Conference Convenor
**Introduction**

In 2010 the conference organising committee began posting notices and calls for papers. We subsequently received close to one hundred and fifty abstracts and expressions of interest. Ultimately, one hundred registered delegates attended the event representing countries such as India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, the United States and Canada. The New Zealand cohort included scholars of Asian Studies in New Zealand’s universities. Following the morning ceremony on the 2nd of July Professor Joseph Yu-shek Cheng, City University of Hong Kong, delivered the Nicholas Tarling keynote lecture. There were two plenary sessions and twenty-two concurrent panels over the two and one half days. The event concluded at noon on the 4th of July. In the wake of the conference we issued invitations for submissions to the conference proceedings. The editorial committee reviewed and considered for selection the thirty-seven submissions. The present publication comprises the selected papers that were subjected to a standard process of peer review.

The papers represent the broad range of issues and themes common to Asian Studies conventions. An underlying focus is the subject of modernisation and social and political reform. This topic is directly linked to the Resurgent Asia theme and the developments that take place locally with rapid change. China’s transformation is a key part of Asia’s resurgence, and the need for political reform was headlined in the Chinese pro-democracy protests that came on the heels of the Arab Spring. Professor Cheng addressed these concerns in his lecture that was aptly titled The ‘Jasmine’ Revolution in China. Many selected papers reflect the focus on modernity, reform, globalisation, and state policy and processes.

In Asia, the positive aspects of change, such as higher standards of living, cannot be underestimated. At the same time the impact on the environment tends to be particularly harsh there. Professor Mee Kam Ng, University of Hong Kong, delivered the talk at the plenary session on the environment and urban planning, which provided a point-of-departure for discussions about sustainability and the depletion of natural resources. Her speech titled ‘Sustainable Development in World Cities: Compelling Reality or Utopian Fantasy?’ focused on sustainability reporting in the context of Hong Kong. The talk included a comparative ranking of five Asian cities based on four key indicators. Among the selected papers several deal with transport and sustainability in Asian urban centres.
The conference that began with China closed with the historic origins there of westernisation. In China, modernity traces to the colonial modernity that marked the import of cultural capital from the western world. Translated modernity is a construct shared in common by all regions grappling with ways to be modern, even more so in view of the cross-flows of globalisation. In her keynote talk, ‘Was it a birth or a death? Or, how after the 1911 Revolution nothing was ever quite the same again’, Professor Antonia Finnane, University of Melbourne, focused on the changes in civic society with the impact of western ideas. Professor Finnane used the example of civic marriages to illustrate the cross-cultural ‘modern’ traces during the Republican period. The plenary session on the centenary of the end of imperial China spearheaded discussions about colonisation, transnationalism, historical legacies, women, gender, and identity. Many of these ideas are represented in the present collection.

Our modern world is experiencing rapid social and political change. The effect of change is borne out in diasporas and social and religious trends, the effects of which can be felt as far afield as New Zealand. Notions of reconfigured identity and new social theory offer up alternative modes of exploration with which to examine these concerns. This subject is represented in the remaining papers that deal with international relations, popular culture, global/local links and religion and religious processes both overseas and in New Zealand.

RH
State processes and modernity
Development of a Primary Curriculum Framework for Bangladesh (From Grade I to Grade VIII)

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Background
The curriculum framework developed in this study is designed for Bangladesh. Bangladesh is a south Asian country, once under colonial rule as part of undivided India. Thus, its education system has been partly influenced by the British education system. The policy report of Kudrat-e-Khuda can be considered as a foundation document for all structural changes in the education system of Bangladesh. All the major education documents in Bangladesh, including that report, recommended that primary level of education continue until grade VIII. This research provides a model curriculum based upon the implementation of this proposal.  

It has been revealed from different studies that many of the children do not attain the standards required for learning set through a competency-based curriculum. There is also evidence to the effect that many students who complete primary education do not attain the acceptable standards of literacy and numeracy. Many factors seem to contribute to this real and perceived lack of quality education: weak organisational and institutional framework for delivery of primary education, lack of a proper physical environment at schools, the staggered system with its comparatively short school contact hours, and lack of support materials (Primary Education Development Program [PEDP II], 2009). To overcome the shortcomings in primary education, the Government of Bangladesh took some initiatives. One of the most important initiatives was to develop a New Education Policy (2010). The New Education Policy (2010) suggested increasing the duration of primary level education from grade V to grade VIII by the year 2018. It is not known how this change will encompass objectives, subject matters and timetables. This study develops a primary curriculum framework (up to grade VIII) and examines the following questions:

• What objectives should be focused on during primary education?

• What ought to be the structure of the primary curriculum? Significant issues to be discussed are: the ascertainment of appropriate subjects for primary education, the
duration of particular subjects, the alignment of timetables, the inclusion of particular subjects in national level examination, and the presence or absence of foreign language education and vocational training.

**Nature of research**

This is a descriptive study concerned with conditions and relationships that exist, opinions that help, processes that are in place, and evidence of trends (Best & Khan, 1993). This study used a questionnaire using two rounds of the modified Delphi survey method. The Delphi technique was administered via mail and email to gather information, provide feedback, and report conclusions (Skulmoski et al., 2007). The different steps followed through this study are summarised in Figure 1 (left).

**Participants**

The participants of this study were education experts of Bangladesh working in universities, teacher training colleges, primary schools and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). The participants were selected purposively.

**Data analysis procedure**

Data were analysed in two stages: after getting the data from the first and second rounds of Delphi.
Delphi one
After receiving responses from 42 experts out of 57, respondents were sent the second modified questionnaire providing certain conditions were met: if the mean of the items are higher than 3.5, and 55% professionals agreed with that item in the first section of the questionnaire, then the item was selected for the second round. The mean of the each item and the median and inter-quartile range were shown in the second questionnaire to potentially revise the opinion of the responses.

Delphi two
There were 26 experts who responded to the questionnaires. The final results were interpreted from the data gathered from the second round. The content validity ratio (CVR) was calculated for five point rating scales items based on the Lawshe (1975) formula as follows:

\[
CVR_i = \frac{ne - (N/2)}{(N/2)}
\]

Where
- \(CVR_i\) = CVR value for the \(i\)th measurement item,
- \(ne\) = number of experts “strongly agree and agree” with the measurement item, and
- \(N\) = Total number of experts in the panel.

A \(CVR\) higher than .36 was accepted as a valid result for this study. For analysis and interpretation the data Statistical Program for Social Sciences (SPSS) was used.

Findings and discussions
Experts were asked to choose the objectives of the primary education under the different developmental categories. This categorisation of objectives was based on the concept of holistic development. All these developmental aspects were regarded as important ones as per experts’ opinions. Overall, this study suggested the following objectives of the primary education:

Category A: Moral development

The learners will develop:
- a sense of affection and contribution.
- a sense of mutual understanding.
- a sense of justice.
- a sense of patriotism.
• respect for him/herself and other members of the society.
• respect for all kinds of physical labor.

Category B: Communicational development

B1. Mother language (Bangla)
• The learners will acquire four basic skills (reading, writing, speaking and listening) of his/her own mother language (Bangla) to communicate in daily life.

B2. Foreign language (English)
• The learners will acquire four basic skills (reading, writing, speaking and listening) of English Language to communicate globally.

Category C: Numerical development

The learners will acquire:
• basic numerical skills (addition, subtraction, multiplication and division).
• manipulate basic geometrical patterns and shapes.
• numeracy skills to think creatively, critically, strategically, and logically.
• numeracy skills to solve mathematical problems in their daily life.
• numerical skills to solve problems of other subjects.

Category D: Scientific literacy development

The learners will:
• achieve innovative, inquisitive and scientific attitude.
• know the basic facts of science.
• acquire skills on how to use their scientific knowledge to solve problems in their practical life.

Category E: Social development

E1. Knowledge about societal and community needs
• The learners will develop a sense of patriotism and nationalism.
• The learners will know about his/her own and others’ rights and duties in family and society.

E2. Knowledge about history
The learners will:
• gain knowledge about local history and heritage.
• gain knowledge about the national history and heritage.
• gain knowledge about the regional history and heritage.
• gain knowledge about world history and heritage.
• know how to analyse other fields of knowledge such as economy, geography, science, technology etc. through historical lenses and perspectives.

E3. Knowledge about geography and the environment
The learners will:
• know about five major geographical themes: place, locations, people’s interaction with environment, people’s migratory nature over time, and regionalism.
• know the interaction of geographical knowledge with history, economy; politics etc as well as use that knowledge in their daily life.
• possess an ecological sense.
• know about environmental dangers and ways to eliminate or reduce such problems.
• gain ideas about the effect of population growth on the basic needs of people.

E4. Knowledge about multiculturalism
The learners will:
• know about cultures of other ethnic groups and about people from other countries.
• show respect to other ethnic groups and their cultures.
• acquire knowledge to practice multiculturalism in their daily lives.

Category F. Technological development/ vocational skills
The learners will develop:
• reflective thoughts regarding their own interests, aptitude and career plan.
• technological and vocational awareness.
• technological and vocational orientation.
• career awareness.
• technological and vocational utilization in their practical life.

Category G. Aesthetical development
The learners will develop:
• aesthetical attitude.
• a sense of beauty.
• their imaginative and creative thinking.
• to use their aesthetical knowledge in their practical life.

Category H. Physical development
The learners will:
• develop manipulative skills (such as throwing, striking, catching, rebounding, and redirecting objects) through physical training and games.
• develop loco motor skills (such as jumping, hopping, running, skipping) through physical training and games.
• develop non-loco motor skills (such as bending, stretching, pushing, pulling, raising twisting etc) through physical training and games.
• develop special motor skills such as swimming.
• develop a physical awareness.
• develop knowledge about first aids to use it in their daily life.
• know how to save a life and avoid danger and risk.

The conducted study suggested 47 objectives in total that includes almost all points from the existing 22 objectives. However, it reflects a few notable differences. For example, the experts of this study suggested a number of objectives related to morality, but none of those were affiliated to religion. The existing curriculum has two objectives that directly link morality to religion. The suggested curriculum framework includes a new dimension in the objectives related to scientific and technological knowledge. Another significant difference is the suggested curriculum values the global context more. It is stated in the existing curriculum that the learners should ‘gain knowledge about and insight into national through history, heritage and culture’. According to the suggested framework, this is to be replaced by a step-by-step knowledge of local, national, regional and world history and heritage. Bronfenbrenner’s ecological model of development supports this suggestion. Valuation of globalisation is also shown by the added objectives related to multiculturalism. The
objectives related to physical development in the suggested curriculum added life saving skills and first aid competencies.

Curriculum structure deals with factors such as subject matters, arrangement of the subjects, and time allocation of the subjects in each grade. The proposed curriculum structure was formed according to the suggestions of education experts (see Appendix 1 at the end of this paper). Vocational and technology education is recommended in the proposed curriculum structure which is absent in the existing structure of the curriculum. In the proposed curriculum Bangla, mathematics, and a foreign language got higher preference, which is similar to the existing primary curriculum structure. In the existing primary curriculum for religious studies more time is allocated, compared to that of the proposed structure of the primary curriculum. In the proposed curriculum the subject physical education and arts got more emphasised in terms of time allocation than that of the existing primary curriculum. For assessing the learners at the national level the subjects chosen in the proposed structure are Bangla, mathematics, foreign language, social studies, and science. Vocational training was suggested from grade V in the proposed curriculum so if the learners drop out during the primary schooling, then they can build career with their vocational training.

The findings from this research will help to develop a curriculum framework that has socio-historical, economical and philosophical implications. This model will be useful in structural changes in education. As this model is not based on competencies, rather focused on goals and learners’ well-being and development, it will be easier to relate to a model for early childhood education. This model curriculum will be effective in this regard as a goal-based framework will be required for the younger ones, not a competency-based one. Again, the curriculum model offers a wide range of practical and vocational subjects, and also internship, this model can easily be linked with different fields of knowledge at secondary and tertiary level. As a result, the education system, from pre-school to tertiary, will be philosophically and practically consistent. This research can act as a base for implementing the Government’s plan to extend the primary level up to 8th grade.

References


### Appendix 1 Proposed primary curriculum structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Initial stage ~ Terminal stage</th>
<th>Optional/Compulsory</th>
<th>Periods (in weekly) by grade</th>
<th>Whether subject should be administered in the NLE?</th>
<th>If yes then, which grade</th>
<th>2nd Foreign Language</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mother Language (Bangla)</td>
<td>I ~ VIII</td>
<td>Comp. 6 6 6 6 6 6 6</td>
<td>YES VIII</td>
<td>Not required</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign Language (English)</td>
<td>I ~ VIII</td>
<td>Comp. 6 6 6 6 6 6 6</td>
<td>YES VIII</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mathematics</td>
<td>I ~ VIII</td>
<td>Comp. 6 6 6 6 6 6 6</td>
<td>YES VIII</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Studies</td>
<td>I ~ VIII</td>
<td>Comp. 3 3 3 3 6 6 6</td>
<td>YES VIII</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>I ~ VIII</td>
<td>Comp. 3 3 3 3 6 6 6</td>
<td>YES VIII</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Moral and Religious Education</td>
<td>I ~ VIII</td>
<td>Comp. 1 1 1 1 2 2 2</td>
<td>NO -</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Physical Education</td>
<td>I ~ VIII</td>
<td>Comp. 2 2 2 2 1 1 1</td>
<td>NO -</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>The Arts (Music, dance, Drama, Visual Arts)</td>
<td>I ~ VIII</td>
<td>Comp. 2 2 2 2 1 1 1</td>
<td>NO -</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Vocational and Technological Education</td>
<td>II ~ VIII</td>
<td>Comp. - 1 1 1 2 2 2</td>
<td>3 NO -</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Total periods (in weekly)</td>
<td>29 30 30 30 36 36 36 37</td>
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<td>Vocational training by grade (in month)</td>
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Liang Qichao, Japan and the use of military songs in the forging of a new people

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Introduction
This paper is part of a larger project that examines the use of song in the forging of a new national citizenry in late Qing China. Focusing on the linkage between the rise of nationalism and the emergence of xuetang yuege (modern school songs), the project aims to provide a study of how, when, where, and why Chinese reformers, broadly defined, and revolutionaries became active advocates of the school songs in the last two decades of the Qing. In addition to discussing music in the service of the nation, the project also examines Japan’s role in China’s struggles over issues such as modernity, iconoclasm, and social and political transformation.

In the first years of the 20th century, the prominent reformer Liang Qichao (1873-1929), inspired by his experiences in Japan, wrote a number of articles exalting the values of militarism. Rather than condemning the Japanese for their recent aggression against China, he expressed his admiration for their cult of militarism. In praising the warrior virtues of loyalty, patriotism, discipline, bravery, and physical strength, he virtually said goodbye to an old world of faith in pacifism. To forge a “new people”, he argued, a militant spirit needed to be rekindled first in the Chinese populace. To achieve this end, he suggested military songs, along with poetry, fiction, drama and other arts should be used. Based on his writings published in the popular fortnightly, Renewing the People (Xinmin congbao), published between 1902 and 1905, this paper first looks at Liang’s ideas of music as a tool to help shape public attitudes and behaviour in the process of making a “new people”. It then looks at the type of military songs Liang promoted. Particular attention is paid to his promotion of the poet Huang Zunxian’s military songs written at a time when China’s governing and intellectual elites were becoming increasingly obsessed with ‘military virtues’. By comparing Liang’s views on music before and after his exile in Japan, the paper argues that Liang’s promotion of military-style patriotic songs marked a major shift in his thinking. Music, as far as Liang was concerned, was to take on a role that was much more utilitarian and much broader in social and political significance. This utilitarian intent in turn was conditioned by
his times in Japan and his close association with future military commanders like Cai E (1882-1916). It was also consistent with his utilitarian view of literature and the arts as a whole.

In focusing on Liang’s preoccupation with military songs, the purpose of this paper is not to reduce the complexity of Chinese experience with music and militarism; but rather to bring out the most radical and pervasive voice within the cacophony of demands on music. By investigating why, when, where, and how a prominent reformer like Liang became an active advocate of this new form of Western music, the paper seeks to explain how ideas about the uses of music at the turn of the 20th century laid the foundation for the future political instrumentalisation of music —a key feature that characterised much of both the Chinese Communists’ and Nationalists’ attitudes toward the arts—, and helped to account for the current “red song” campaign.

Liang Qichao and the Promotion of Military-Style Patriotic Songs

Although militarist ideas began to flourish in China in the late 19th century as a result of European influences, calls for military education did not become widespread until the turn of the 20th century when a number of radical Chinese students in Japan began to idealise the military calling above other pursuits and write about the necessity of training a martial-spirited citizenry. Along with calls for martial values and ‘military national education’ came the appeal for the use of military songs and martial music as a tool of nation-building.

Among leading proponents of military songs, Liang Qichao stood out as the most indefatigable. ‘If we want to transform the character of our people,’ he wrote in 1903, ‘the teaching of poetry and music then must be considered as one of the most important means.’ In 1904, he reiterated his conviction by saying: ‘If we are to engage ourselves in education, the subject of singing must be part of the school curriculum’ Apart from promoting military songs written by his friends such as Huang Zunxian, Yang Du, Tan Sitong and others, he also wrote a number of songs himself. So important was Liang’s role in promoting military songs in China that when naming the representatives of the school-song movement, Zhang Jingwei,
a prominent historian of 20th century Chinese music, had no hesitation in putting Liang’s name on top of the list.⁴

Liang’s enthusiasm for military marches was clearly a reflection of his desire to combat the Chinese pacifist tendency. But it is worth noting that up to the time of the Hundred Days of Reform in 1898, Liang, like his mentor Kang Youwei, took a broad social and cultural approach to music, emphasising its importance in moral, ethical, intellectual, and physical education.⁵ But, as Liang became more nationalistic in his political thinking after fleeing to Japan in late 1898, his attitude toward music also underwent a kind of transformation. By the beginnings of the 20th century, the nation in Liang’s view, although never was his sole value, had become the highest good.⁶ Instead of focusing on the transformative effect of music in moral and ethical cultivation, he became convinced of the efficacy of songs in the forging of a new citizenry in China. With a zest unmatched by any others of his generation, he argued passionately for the effectiveness of patriotic songs as an instrument of nationalist agitation. In fact, the promotion of military songs became such a dominant theme in his writings at this time that most of his references to music published in the *Xinmin congbao* can even be categorised as a blatant form of nationalist propaganda.

Liang’s utilitarian approach to music is nowhere more evident than his wholehearted endorsement of the marching songs written by his friend Huang Zunxian. In 1902 when he read Huang’s ‘Four Marching Songs,’ he ‘was deliriously happy.’ ‘To sum up in one sentence, I must say that anyone who can read these poems without dancing is not a real man!’⁷

Liang had always admired Huang’s effort to use his literary talent to promote Chinese nationalism. But it is very telling that, of the voluminous literary works Huang produced, Liang would find such motivational inspiration in the military marches.

As an architect of the 1898 Reforms and experienced diplomat, Huang Zunxian composed these marches for the express purpose of stirring up a martial spirit and patriotic sentiment among Chinese soldiers and ordinary citizens. In addition to the overwhelming tenor of ardent nationalism, of devotion to the cause of strengthening China, most of Huang’s

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⁵ Hong-yu Gong, “Missionaries, Reformers and the Beginnings of Western Music in Late Imperial China (1839-1911)” (Ph.D. diss., Auckland University, 2006), pp. 231-35.
marching songs had refrains with such soul-stirring words as ‘Fight! Fight! Fight!’, ‘Win! Win! Win!’, ‘Forward! Forward! Forward!’ or ‘Brave! Brave! Brave!’ These were clearly designed to awaken the martial spirit among the Chinese soldiers. These songs appealed to Liang not because of their refined aesthetic sense or superb literary merits, but due to their combative, belligerent tone and passion-stirring effects. In other words, in these songs Liang discovered an ideal form that could be deployed to achieve his pressing goal of setting the Chinese masses on a march toward creating a strong China.

It came as no surprise that Liang should be so enthusiastic about promoting Western-style marching songs in his effort to rejuvenate the nation. As a musical form, the revival of the march in the West was closely linked to the emergence of nationalism, patriotism, and militarism.\(^8\) John Philip Sousa, composer of the official march of the United States of America, *The Stars and Stripes Forever*, explained the appeal of marching music as follows:

> Like the beat of an African war drum, the march speaks to a fundamental rhythm in the human organisation and is answered. A march stimulates every centre of vitality, awakens the imagination and spurs patriotic impulses which may have been dormant for years. I can speak with confidence because I have seen men profoundly moved by a few measures of a really inspired march.\(^9\)

According to Xia Xiaohong, both Huang Zunxian’s and Liang’s interest in military songs was inspired by an essay entitled ‘On the Martial Citizen’, written by Liang’s student and the future military commander, Cai E.\(^10\) Serialised in Liang’s *Xinmin congdao*, Cai, then a student of the Imperial Japanese Army Academy, blamed China’s weak position in the world on her lack of a martial spirit. Citing Japan’s success in using militaristic songs to instil such a spirit in her people, he argued that if China were to regain the martial spirit it had lost, it would have to follow the Japanese example and use music as a means to carry out military and patriotic education.\(^11\)

Liang’s passion for military songs can be seen as a natural outgrowth of his search for a vehicle for great nationalistic appeal. For years he had been concerned with the lack of

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\(^9\) Cited in Moon, p. 347.


fighting spirit among the Chinese people. Like Cai E, he pointed the finger at Chinese music for being one of the factors that contributed to this passivity. ‘There are many reasons for the lack of a martial spirit among the Chinese, but the gentleness of Chinese music is certainly one’, he asserted.\textsuperscript{12} In his diagnosis, the lack of military songs was ‘closely related to the decline in our national fortunes.’\textsuperscript{13} Liang discovered in military marches a motivational tool whereby he could counter the national psyche of passivity and cowardice.\textsuperscript{14}

Liang’s belief in the efficacy of militaristic music in ultimately contributing to the building of the nation is also evident in his citing of the following ancient legend in support of his argument:

\begin{quote}
Formerly, when the Spartans were besieged and begged assistance from Athens, the Athenians responded by sending a one-eyed, lame schoolteacher, which greatly puzzled the Spartans. But just before a battle, this teacher composed military songs, which, sung by the Spartans, increased their valour a hundredfold, enabling them to win a victory. How deeply music is able to move men!\textsuperscript{15}
\end{quote}

Liang’s preoccupation with the instrumentality of military songs in creating a ‘new citizenry’ led him to repeatedly urge Chinese writers and musicians to appropriate Western, primarily European and American, march-type melodies and adapt them to Chinese settings. He even formulated certain critical views about the problems in the creation of a new Chinese music.\textsuperscript{16} Rather than advocating a wholesale importation of Western music, he counselled Chinese songwriters and musicians to make good use of indigenous musical forms such as ritual and ceremonial music (\textit{yayue}), regional operas (\textit{ju}) and popular music (\textit{suyue}) while keeping an open eye on musical developments in the West. As far as he was concerned, the future national music of China would have to be both modern and Chinese.\textsuperscript{17} This formula of combining indigenous and Western musical elements is not without historical significance. It continues to dominate the thinking of Chinese musicians even to this day.

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As a man of action, Liang Qichao was by no means satisfied with playing the role of a mere promoter. He not only took the trouble of translating foreign anthems into Chinese but also composed patriotic songs himself. Fearing the nationalist messages conveyed in these songs were lost, Liang took pains to explicate the rationale for writing them and reiterated again and again his hope that one day these songs, along with his novels and poems, would help awaken a national consciousness among the Chinese people. In explicating his political motives and phrasing his arguments in terms of the national interest, Liang time and again made plain his nationalist impulses.

**Conclusion**

How did music in general and songs in particular take on such a vital role in the forging of a new citizenry? The observations offered suggest that the Chinese interest in military songs had little to do with the artistic beauty of music per se. From the very beginning, the Chinese interest was conditioned by its utilitarian motives. Driven by a desire to use songs to serve the nationalist cause, the agitation to introduce this genre in China was rooted in larger concerns of creating and defining nationhood.

The above discussion has also touched Japan’s role in China’s search for nationhood. In their search for an effective tool to reinvigorate the national spirit, Chinese reformers and revolutionaries turned to Japan, rather than the West, for inspiration. By serving as ‘China’s model and active partner every step of the way’, Japan not only alerted the Chinese to the efficacy of music as a vehicle of political and social engineering but also showed them how to use singing to awaken a national consciousness among the masses.

To be sure, there is nothing new about music being used to serve social, political and ideological goals. Music as a means of edification has occupied an important place in Chinese cultural life from the earliest recorded times. Yet, compared to earlier Chinese diplomats, education officials, and visitors to Japan, Liang Qichao was more explicit in his utilitarian promotion of music in China. This is because his efforts were more directly tied to China’s nationalist struggle of the early 20th century. His emphasis on the social and political

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18 Da Wei, p. 40.
19 Liang Qichao, *Xin Luoma chuangi*, cited in Da Wei, p. 39.
functions of music not only struck a harmonious chord with the reformers at the time but also fitted in well with later and successive regimes’ view of music as public utility.
The labour challenge and state corporatisation: the case of Wenling

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In the past thirty years, the state-led restructuring of Chinese economy has sharply transformed state-labour relations in China. In particular, the dismantling of the state-owned enterprises and the lay-off of millions of state workers has been accompanied by the emergence of privately-owned enterprises and the employment of millions of rural migrant workers. Together they have significantly reconfigured the landscape of state-labour relations. But perhaps the most striking aspect of the reconfiguration is the growing unrest of migrant workers in the past decade that have been expressed mostly dramatically in labour protests and strikes. The widely publicised strikes at Honda plants in May/June 2010 unequivocally demonstrated the growing strength of migrant workers and simultaneously highlighted the urgency of coming to terms with the increasing power of labour and its implications.

This paper examines how the migrant workers in the privately-owned enterprises, the most exploited workers in China, are challenging the existing structure of state-labour relations by means of their collective action. This examination involves exposing the problems and weaknesses within the ossified structure, and a discussion on how recent state interventions in labour relations should be understood. These topics will be analysed using a case study of Wenling, where collective wage bargaining was institutionalised in 2003 in response to disruptive labour unrest. Fieldwork, including factory visits and interviews with workers, employers and trade union officials, was conducted in Wenling during 2009 and 2010, aided by extensive use of media reports to provide some background to and details of the labour relations in Wenling. The paper concludes that the case of Wenling is best understood as a process of state corporatisation of labour relations, but despite its apparent success the reconstituted structure of labour relations remains problematic.

The City of Wenling is located in the Yangtze River Delta near the coast of Zhejiang Province. Though generally known as the Wenling Model, what first drew national attention is the annual collective wage bargaining in Xinhe County, one of the eleven counties under the jurisdiction of Wenling with a population of 120,000. In the 1990s, a large number of family–based, workshop-like factories manufacturing of woollen sweaters sprang up in Xinhe
County with members of a family participating in both management and production. As production expanded, factories in Xinhe County heavily relied on rural migrant workers. Labour-capital conflicts appeared and intensified in the late 1990s and early 2000s. At the height of the conflict in 2002, there were three instances of strike and petitioning that involved a minimum of 100 workers each time, and there were daily instances of strike and petitioning involving a minimum of ten workers. Between 27 August to 6 September in 2002, 168 workers from eight factories made petitions to the local state about their unpaid wages including a case of 40 workers from a single factory, according to the Wenling Municipal Bureau of Labour and Social Security. While workers’ petitioning to the local state is not the same as strike in the factory, they essentially constitute partial strike and work stoppage when a large number of workers leave to petition during work hours.

There are multiple causes of the strikes and petitions which are in many ways typical of manufacturing industries employing migrant workers in China. While work in the woollen sweater industry is not particularly physically demanding, workers usually work very long hours with unpaid overtime and their work is repetitive and monotonous. During the busy season from September to October, workers would have one day every week or every month off only. Wages are low with the piece-rate unilaterally set by the employers, which has caused resentment and led workers to organise work stoppages to demand higher piece-rate. This is exacerbated by delayed and non-payment of wages. As employers rush to recruit skilled workers during peak production season, wages would be pushed up considerably which at the end of the season the employers are often reluctant to pay in full. In response, angry workers have organised frequent protests during busy season, destroying machineries and disrupting production.

This is a direct challenge to the existing structure of labour relations which appears unable to accommodate and control labour. One of the most useful analytical frameworks for understanding state-labour relations and the structure of labour relations is state corporatism. It emphasised the state strategy to direct the state-organised peak labour organisation, the All-

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3 Interview with Chen Xufeng (chairperson of an Enterprise Trade Union and Labour Representative in collective bargaining), April 23, 2009.
4 Interview with Chen Fuqing (deputy chairperson of Xinhe County Trade Union and chairperson of the Xinhe County Woolen Sweater Sectoral Union), April 22, 2009.
China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), to regulate labour relations as the state retreats from direct controls over society.\(^5\) However, the labour challenge has exposed two problems with the existing structure of labour relations from the perspective of state corporatism: the lack of labour representation and the lack of labour-capital coordination. The lack of labour representation can be seen in the detachment of the ACFTU and its local branches from labour in the private sector. In the woollen sweater industry in Xinhe County, there is almost no trade union at the enterprise level due to the opposition of employers. Whenever enterprise unions do exist, they are likely to be subordinate to the management. But more importantly, the local state is often aligned with capital and refuses to direct the local trade union, whose officials are appointed rather than elected, to intervene on behalf of labour especially in an industry that contributes significantly to the local economy.

This is compounded by the lack of labour-capital coordination. There is no institution or mechanism for workers to express their demands to and negotiate with their employers directly in a collective manner. This problem is particularly acute in the private sector, considering the poor treatment of migrant workers. As a result, in Xinhe County workers with grievances often have to end up using collective action to make their demands heard. From the point of view of a state corporatist structure of labour relations, the lack of representation and lack of coordination is problematic for the ‘organisation of consensus and cooperation’ by the state between labour and capital.\(^6\) It can be argued that despite the formal state corporatist structure of labour relations, it has singularly failed to regulate labour relations as demonstrated by the intensification of labour conflicts. This is not accidental. The state not only organised, but integrated the ACFTU into the state structure to such an extent that it has become an extension of the state bureaucracy rather than a representative body of labour in any meaningful sense. The state and trade union have increasingly recognised the problems with the existing structure of labour relations, and attempted to intervene to address them.

In Xinhe County, the persistence and escalation of labour conflicts from the late 1990s into the early 2000s threatened economic prosperity and social stability. Following a failed attempt by the employers to organise themselves in a trade association to deal with labour unrest, the situation eventually caused serious concern for the local state.


\(^6\) Unger and Chan, "Associations in Bind: The Emergence of Political Corporatism.", p. 51.
Subsequently, the local state decided to better coordinate labour-capital relations, and this took place in three stages. In the first stage, the local state directed the local trade union to approach the major employers in 2003 in an effort to persuade them to participate in collective wage bargaining. This proved difficult as local trade union is often powerless, but it was then backed up by the state coercion to force employers to agree to negotiate wages with workers. Having secured state participation, in the second stage the local trade union took a leading role in coordinating the preparation for collective wage bargaining in the next few months and then supervising the process of bargaining to ensure agreement. The first collective wage bargaining meeting took place on 13 June 2003. Thirteen workers joined with eight employers and officials from Wenling Municipal Labour Bureau and the local Xinhe County trade union to negotiate wage rates. To be sure, the notion of collective bargaining and collective agreement is not new to China, but genuine collective bargaining is rare as trade unions either at the enterprise or the local level rarely represent workers. This makes it all the more necessary from the perspective of the local state to supervise the process. The trade union encouraged workers at the bargaining meeting to make demands, and intervened to facilitate a compromise between workers and employers.

Having successfully concluded the first round of collective wage bargaining, the local state and trade union established the Xinhe Woollen Sweater Sectoral Union on the following day. It is worth noting that workers’ involvement up to this point had been minimal. Some workers were consulted by the local trade union in the process of gathering information to produce a preliminary wage standard, but they were neither organised nor mobilised enough to put pressure on the employers. While labour protests pressured the employers and the local state to establish collective bargaining in the first place, the actual process of establishing it had been state-coordinated in a paternalistic manner. Furthermore, while the sectoral union committee consisted of production workers from local factories, they were all appointed by their employers rather than democratically elected. The sectoral union was also managed essentially by the local trade union and state. Chen Fuqing, the deputy chairman of the local trade union, has acted as the chairman of the new sectoral union from 2003 to present.

The Wenling Model, as collective bargaining in Wenling has become known, has been universally described as a success, and it is most evident in the substantial reduction of labour-capital conflict. Statistics from the trade union in Wenling indicates that since the conclusion of the first collective bargaining agreement in August 2003 there were two

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7 Ibid.
8 Interview with Chen Xufeng, April 23, 2009.
petitions made by workers in the woollen sweater industry in the following year, only one
petition in 2004 and 2005, and none since 2006.9 In 2007, the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao
claimed that the Wenling Model should be promoted nationally and a national campaign
followed to institute collective bargaining and collective agreement.10 More recently, the
Wenling Model has been repeatedly discussed and endorsed in labour relations reforms in the
aftermath of Honda strikes.

How should the case of Wenling be understood? This paper argues that the three
stages of establishing collective bargaining should be interpreted as state intervention to
restructure labour relations under the pressure of labour protests by incorporating capital and
labour, and constructing a system of labour-capital coordination. Specifically, the local state
has attempted to address the lack of labour representation by establishing a new sectoral
union, and the lack of labour-capital coordination by setting up collective bargaining. In
essence, this constitutes the state corporatisation of labour relations that is aimed to
operationalise the existing, dysfunctional state structure that has failed to accommodate and
control labour’s challenge.

However, the structure of labour relations remains problematic despite the reduction
of labour conflicts. In late August 2004, one year after the conclusion of the first collective
bargaining agreement, workers at one of the largest woollen sweater factories in Xinhe
County went on a strike over piece-rates. What is significant about this strike is that workers
bypassed the sectoral union and the labour representative at the enterprise who was also the
chairwoman of the enterprise union appointed by the employer.11 But the labour
representative and chairwoman of the factory union also happened to be the only trade union
member in this factory. In other words, both the enterprise union and sectoral union have not
acted as the workers’ representatives and were probably not seen by workers as their
representatives. So instead of raising grievances with the union, workers bypassed both the
enterprise and sectoral unions and went on a strike. This has again highlighted the
contradiction of state corporatism. By not only organising but continuing to control the
sectoral union and by failing to open the sectoral union to democratic elections, the local state
and trade union have made the sectoral union detached from labour, raising questions about
the success of incorporating labour into the reconstituted state corporatist structure.

9 “Zhejiang Changyu Gongzi Zhidu Xieshang Jishi [Report on Zhejiang Changyu Wage Negotiation].”
10 “Laodongzhe Gongzi Gongjie Nandian Duo [Labour Wage Co-Determination Face Difficulties],” Liaowang
accessed on 17 June 2011.
What is the significance of the case of Wenling? To some extent, the situation of Wenling mirrors that of many manufacturing regions in China. Facing the challenge of labour, the Chinese state has pushed for changes, and the establishment of trade union branches and the institutionalisation of collective bargaining are among the most significant initiatives. Therefore, the experience of Wenling serves as a useful case study to understand the state intervention and its implications. But it also has to be pointed out that Wenling is arguably the most successful case of collective bargaining, in terms of subsequently reducing labour conflict. Very often, it proves difficult to organise any meaningful collective bargaining in the first place. Therefore, the state’s attempt to operationalise the corporatist structure of labour relations in order to contain the challenge of labour appears to be a difficult task. But still much remains indeterminate. What is clear, however, is whether the state could succeed to contain labour will have significant ramifications for not only state-labour relations, but for Chinese society as a whole.
Gender and modernity in Kerala

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Introduction
(1) Kerala has widely been regarded as a progressive state, not least in certain indices of
gender relationships. For example, in one study that compared demographic and health
outcomes in fourteen states of India, Kerala ranked highest in life expectancy for both women
and men. Similar results have been observed for female literacy and the median age at
marriage among women with Kerala near the top in both instances (Bloom and Griffiths
2006). The gender ratio in Kerala favoured females—a marked contrast to the rest of India,
especially some of the northern states—and natural increase was virtually below replacement
rate. In the cultural sphere too, Keralan writers have given vivid expression to emancipated
arguments and outlooks (Devika 2006). This outlook has been referred to as the Kerala
model. However, two other perspectives have been identified, both of which take a more
somber view.

(2) It was thought by some analysts that Kerala’s development had been ‘lopsided’,
by which was meant that there had been more human development than economic growth.
More recently the argument has been made that this has been rectified (Chakraborty 2005;
Kannan 2005). This might, however, have been at the possible expense of some of the
gains of the Kerala model, in particular in terms of access to public health and education, although
it might also have opened up other opportunities for women to participate on equal terms
with men in Kerala’s economy and society.

(3) In addition, there was a questioning of the Kerala model itself in terms of its
benefits for women. This argument played out in two ways. A more general one stressed that
modernisation in Kerala, going right back to the 19th century, fostered particular conceptions
of what one writer has called ‘enlightened domesticity’ (Srinivasan 2009), in effect this is the
‘separate spheres’ argument found in western feminist historiography. A more focused
criticism looked ‘beyond the indices’. Rates of employment were relatively low, particularly
for educated women (Kodoth and Eapen 2005; Mitra and Singh 2006); the widespread
acceptance of dowry was both inherently ‘un-modern’ and had had a negative impact on
female ownership of property, and the incidence of certain kinds of crime against women was relatively high (Kodoth and Eapen 2005; Srinivasan 2009). The gender ratio did not look as good if the overwhelmingly male migrant community was incorporated in the statistics (Srinivasan 2009). Two of the critics summed up: ‘gender parity in select social indicators does not amount to equity in gender relations’ (Kodoth and Eapen 2005).

In this paper I present some ethnographic observations about gender relations in Kerala, gathered during a stay in the northern part of the state in the last three months of 2010. I then examine what light they cast on these approaches to gender relations in Kerala.

A narrow set of ethnographic observations cannot, of course, on their own overturn or confirm hypotheses based on quantitative as well as qualitative findings but the reverse can hold good—the interpretations need to be able to explain these episodes.

Three preliminary comments: Firstly, the author was very indebted to a Kerala-resident Malayalam speaker for guidance. Secondly, Kerala is approximately 50% Hindu, 25% Muslim and 25% Christian, however all the subjects of this paper were Hindu. Thirdly, caste matters have not been addressed systematically in the paper, not because they are not important but because (i) insufficient information was acquired about caste status to be able to talk confidently about its influence; (ii) the conclusions would be reinforced, not undermined, if caste was shown to be a significant factor.

The episodes

The widow # 1

D was widowed in 2005, at age 48 with three adult children, two sons and one daughter. She lived in Wayanad district in northern Kerala. Being of a religious bent, she put remarriage, even were it an option, out of consideration. She had a limited amount of assets mostly in form of land, some jewelry, but was ‘cash poor’. Some of the assets could be expected to be needed for her daughter (about whom I will comment further below). She worked on a coffee plantation to earn income to meet daily needs and was eligible for subsidised goods: sugar, rice and others, under a state government scheme to enhance living standards for low-income Keralites.

She had few ties with her deceased husband’s family, owing to a falling out some years ago, which had led to D and her husband relocating from his native place in central Kerala. She had a brother, and other male relatives, but there was relatively little contact with them and they did not live close. A teenage nephew came to stay, but when he was found
stealing he was sent back home. A cousin of hers borrowed money then failed to repay all of it. D kept a dog, partly for security, as a women living on her own. She had some expectation that her sons would provide support later in her life, though at the time of writing this was in doubt.

The in-laws

R was 27 years old, the daughter of D. She grew up mostly in Wayanad, as her family moved there when she was quite young. She completed a college degree in tourism management five years ago and then got work at an eco-sanctuary, a very luxurious one, also in Wayanad. There she became friendly with one of the managers. B was also Hindu, but much better off, and of higher caste. B was the only son of the family and his parents were ambitious for his marriage; an ambition underlined because his sister had married and had gone to live in the United States.

B and R nonetheless decided to marry. A wedding took place without any of B’s family being present, a fairly unprecedented circumstance. B’s parents then however seemingly ‘faced facts’. They paid a visit to R’s family and subsequently R and B were established in B’s family household. This arrangement however lasted only six months before an ‘explosion’ occurred with the effect that R left the household and R and B, at the instigation of B’s parents, went through a form of divorce.

R and B continued their relationship, but clandestinely, and as of the time of writing future developments were uncertain; clearly children would be a big issue; another would be if B’s parents found a suitable bride and put pressure on B to re-marry. R for her part would find it difficult to find another husband within the conventional framework, but then she claimed no interest in such a quest.

The bigamist

J and X rented a flat in Nilambur, also in northern Kerala. X, however, worked in Tamil Nadu, a somewhat unusual example of a migrant worker (Tamils frequently go to work in Kerala). J stayed at home and looked after their two children, a girl of about 8 and a boy of about 3. X returned to Nilambur about once every three to four weeks.

While in Tamil Nadu X paid court to the family of a young woman; they agreed to a marriage and an accompanying dowry. The marriage was duly contracted and presumably the dowry paid over. Very soon after the family became aware that X was already married and
with the police taking action, his actual wife also learnt of his deception. So too did their landlord. He evicted them from the flat, saying that he was not prepared to tolerate ‘immorality’. At the time of writing it was not clear where the wife and children were living although it seemed that the marriage (the real one) had remained intact.

The vigilante group
B was a widow who was also living in Nilambur. About 20 years back B had married a much older man, by whom she had one child, a daughter. When he died B inherited the house and some land — she was therefore relatively financially independent. Although in such circumstances she might be expected to have resumed close ties with her birth family, she chose not to do that, but continued to live on her own with her now late teenage daughter, at some distance indeed from her relatives.

In the latter part of 2010 the household — mother and daughter — were in the habit of receiving evening visits from a married man who lived locally. This became widely known and frowned upon in the neighborhood. It would be almost impossible, given the layout of such neighborhoods, that it would not become known.

On one evening, shortly after the man concerned had arrived for one of his evening visits, an all male group of neighbors turned up uninvited. They called out the man and beat him up; he had to be taken to hospital though he was discharged the next day. The widow and her daughter left the house immediately afterwards, it was not clear where to, probably to one of her brothers. For weeks the house remained shuttered, then, without any fanfare or seeming hostility, the widow and daughter returned and resumed their regular life. There were no more visits from the married man, however.

These were four stories which played out within quite a short space of time through 2010. They could be complemented by others, although it is fair to say that these were amongst the most striking.

Discussion
A subjective reaction to spending time in Kerala over the last half dozen years, when coupled with the four episodes that recounted above, was that Kerala did not ‘feel’ like a state in which women’s place in society had been modernized. Leaving aside the issue of whether that can truly be said of any society, Kerala seemed to have marked gender roles, with men having considerably more autonomy and freedom than women.
Public space on Kerala streets, while it was not as overwhelmingly male as in the Middle East, was much more male than female. And where that ‘space’ was female, it was in very stereotypical ways, for example massive roadside advertisements by gold jewelry firms featuring attractive young women. Men also appeared to have much more leisure time, certainly time to congregate with friends at tea stands or other such places, than did women. In terms of the interpretations presented at the beginning of this paper, therefore, the third—that the indices of the Kerala model should not be taken as the reality, which was much ‘darker’—seemed the most convincing.

All the episodes seemingly reinforced the prevalence of gender asymmetry and inequity in Kerala life. In all the episodes, the play of events worked markedly against women. The daughter-in-law who was not regarded as such; the wife a victim of her husband’s greed; the widow seemingly punished for conducting her own social life; another widow constrained in her choices. It was possible, however, to identify elements in the episodes which lend some credence to the two other explanations presented at the outset of the paper.

**Argument for (1) the Kerala model**

It could be argued that three of the examples were instances of female agency, embedded in the Kerala model of female independence. In these three settings (the in-laws and the two widows) women exercised agency. They made choices, independent choices. In two cases they were then ‘punished’ for them, but the final outcome in both was uncertain at the time of writing. Moreover in the case of the Nilambur widow the most extreme punishment was inflicted on the married man, not the widow herself.

The fourth example of the bigamist involved the least educated woman of the four, and a husband who was also not educated. Arguably, that episode therefore also supported the case for the Kerala model, in kind of reverse fashion.

**Argument for (2) an end to ‘lopsided development’**

This was harder to assess but perhaps applied to a degree to the episodes involving the younger woman from Wayanad, R. The ‘new’ Kerala has seen marked growth in the tertiary sector as distinct from agriculture and industry (Chakraborty 2005; Jeromi 2005). R had found employment in it, firstly in the high end tourism industry and subsequently in retail.
Conclusion

On balance though, argument (3) was the most powerful. While all the women in these episodes, barring the wife of the bigamist, had some ability to act on their circumstances, it was in contexts where that action, in a society with more substantive as well as formal equality, would not have been so necessary. Was Kerala then an example of ‘incomplete modernity’? Put that way, there was an evolutionary ‘text’ in the argument which may not be merited. It is more useful to put the point structurally. The Kerala model (1) faltered to the degree that women did not have economic independence. In the case of the episodes under review here, where they did have it, as with R and the two widows, the outlook was more hopeful and where they did not, as with J, the wife of the bigamist, it was less hopeful. In other words without economic independence, the other markers of emancipation and gender parity had limited impact.

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Encouraging citizen participation-the saibanin system in Japan

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Citizen participation will be encouraged when a public information campaign successfully portrays citizens as equals to bureaucracy and as partners together with the government. In Japan’s saibanin seido, or lay judge system, we find a case for deepening democracy. The saibanin system began in Japan on 21 May 2009. A jury system based on the European continental model: 6 citizens and 3 judges together decide on the guilt and sentence in criminal trials where there is potential for imprisonment of longer than one year.

What commonly underlies these reforms is the intent that each and every person should break out of the consciousness of being a governed object (tōchi kyakutai) and become a governing subject (tōchi shutai), with autonomy in building a free and fair society in mutual co-operation and will work to restore creativity and vitality to this country (Judicial Review Council Report, English version, 2001:3).

Introduced to ‘substantiate popular sovereignty,’ the new jury system is an opportunity to develop active citizens in Japan. Participation may be the key to making established democracies more responsive, but how does greater participation come about?

This study highlights the roles governments have in encouraging citizen involvement in the public sphere. Direct participation can only be asserted to be a good thing when those participating are educated. A public information campaign is ‘government officials’ deliberate attempt to shape public attitudes, values, or behaviour in the hope of reaching some desirable outcome’ (Weiss and Tschirhart, 1994). Public communication is thus at the heart of the democratic process. Democracy requires an informed electorate and active public participation. The state, with the monopoly over administrative capability and legitimate force, is the institution with the power to lead social change (Hague and Harrop, 2004). It has a responsibility to inform its people, to set goals, communicate and promote objectives. Yet, there is inherent irony in the state giving up its power; that there should be any need to
convince people to want to take over. This seemingly natural irony springs from the predominant self-interest articulation theories of representative democracy. These assume that citizen participation works against government and depict civil society as a site of conflict. It is through this same lens that mainstream media represented citizens active in the Arab Spring. An anti-government portrayal of political participation can also be found in Japanese Marxism, where the word for citizen (shimin), is connected with bourgeois society and a struggle for power. Yet, Lam (2003) sees participation as a potential act of support.

And for Bell (2000), participation is a commitment to the national political community. In Japanese we can make the distinction between the ‘communitarian’ (kyō), beneficial only to the needs of a specific group, and the ‘public’ (kō), which belongs to everyone, is morally disinterested, and thus is worthy of encouragement. Rather than assuming a contradiction, the Japanese government may indeed be empowered by citizen participation. Indeed, according to Migdal (2001), states may actually encourage citizen participation in order to gain strength through the organising of a population for a specific task. Political participation can lead to greater political stability as it provides a place to grow to be a better citizen, to learn one’s political role, and to raise one’s interest and faith in politics. Growing citizen interest in public affairs potentially increases the accountability that citizens require of their government.

Thus, participation in the saibanin system will lead to greater participation in society and in turn to deeper democracy in Japan. The jury has been called a ‘pillar of democracy’ (Bloom, 2005). It is democratic participation in its direct form; an act of citizenship, which brings the people and one branch of state together toward a common goal. Jury experience becomes the school of democracy as it requires consideration of others’ rights and responsibilities and provides an opportunity to express and discuss one’s own (Maruta, 2001).

Justice reform in Japan must be situated in its wider political environment. Reform has been initiated for the sake of economic rationalism, justified by an idea of fair governance associated with less government and more people, greater decentralisation and thus more resident involvement, and within the flailing cult of the bureaucrat amongst financial scandals and the associated limited capacity of the bureaucratic state to act. Above all this, the socio-political implications of saibanin reform have thus far been sidestepped by scholars. Issues of omakase democracy have significant implications. These include the confidence in governance which can be sourced from citizen trust in the judicial branch of government and decreasing the distance between the courts and society. The Judicial Reform Council (2001)
asserts that a deepened trust in the judiciary will grow from involvement in the system itself. That is, the chance to participate is of far greater worth than any popular arguments against the capacity of Japanese citizens to make judicial decisions.

Despite its potential significance, a Supreme Court Survey of 2008 found that while only 5.5% of the population were ignorant of the introduction of the new system; a third said they would not participate even knowing that it was compulsory to do so. Either Japanese citizens were not convinced of the value of their participation as the government had not sufficiently explained the worthiness of participating or participation itself is not valued in Japan. Consequently, the research sought to identify meanings and types of participation in Japan by analysing the message and presentation of all public information materials on the saibanin system produced by the Supreme Court and Ministry of Justice of Japan between 2005 and 2009. Where a political culture of hierarchy and leave-it-to-the-expert exists there is no reason for reform to have any relationship to the individual. Thus, a successful public information campaign, which encourages greater democracy through participation, must enhance perceptions of citizens as equals so that citizens see themselves as having something to offer. Public information must shift the perception that citizens are in some way unqualified to get involved. For when there is a role to play, becoming an active citizen is worth the effort entailed. An information campaign must accordingly establish equality, so that the individual citizen is both affected and interested.

Equality was established in the saibanin public information campaign by decreasing distance. This in turn brought less feeling of obligation and enforcement, further dulling the compulsory nature of the participation requirement. Invitation or asking for cooperation as a favour was one method of achieving a sense of equality. The government invites citizens to become involved where they have not previously had the opportunity. The invite is into a domain where citizens have had no prior right or experience. The verb phrase sanka shite morau (get to participate for us) or sanka shite itadaku (get to participate for us - more polite) was overwhelmingly favoured against more simple statements like sanka suru (to participate). Should the citizen choose to act, it would be a favour to the bureaucracy. Instead of calling jury service a new duty to be required of citizens, we see statements such as ‘please support justice’ or ‘let’s think about crime together’.

But why frame participation as a favour? The method was favoured not simply as a matter of hierarchy but as one which tries to evade the link between duty and burden. To take on a duty in Japan implies a greater burden (futan) than responsibility (sekinin) or role
(yakuwari). The term futan greatly exceeded other terms in the information materials examined. Juxtaposition of option and obligation in survey questions purposely confuse the compulsory nature of the system, since asking whether a respondent wants to participate at all, suggests they have a choice in the matter. Far from being desirable to normalise the reform by situating it within a discourse of citizen duty, rather the saibanin system is attacked for its obligatory nature. Compulsion is seen as contradictory to participation.

The campaign recognises individual burden, whilst sacrificial contribution is shown to be meaningful for society. Duty is not removed upon the grounds that it is not personally desirable. Rather, participation is depicted as the opportunity to contribute to society. The saibanin system is depicted as attractive because social change can be expected to flow from it. In a set of Ministry of Justice posters, a female high school student says, ‘When I turn 20, the courts will change. I wonder if both the law and the courts will become much more friendly?’ A baseball player says, ‘When I turn 20, the courts will change. You could say crime will be everyone’s problem.’ And a group of table tennis players say, ‘When we turn 20, the courts will change. I think this society will begin to change bit by bit.’ The sub-text is repeated across the poster series. It is, ‘My own experience and knowledge will be made use of in the courts. All types of crime will be considered our problem. And we hope that this society will get even a little bit better. I think as the courts start to change, society will also start to change.’ In another Federation of Bar Associates publication a new saibanin chats up a young female member by acting cool, pretending that he did not want to be selected, but could not get out of jury service in the end. He proposes it is not that he was not interested, in fact considers being a saibanin a social service, and trying to impress the girl puts his involvement down to having a volunteer heart.

While mood can be humorous, formality can increase distance. The phrase sanka shite itadaku implies that the favour is being forced from a position of authority; that the benefactor is providing for opportunity. Citizens and government remain unequal partners. Distance is re-established each time government agencies produce documentation using the Japanese calendar over the Julian one. Official use of kokumin (national citizen) is a favoured term, which defines a citizen by his/her relationship to the state. Kokumin no minasan/sama (all of you citizens) is a fairly paternalistic expression which stands out for its frequency. The public information campaign also sought to heighten equality through establishing a keen theme of togetherness. Togetherness brings citizens to believe they are capable of fulfilling the new role, appeals to participation as a group act and accordingly lessens fears as burdens.
are shared. The previously mentioned Ministry of Justice poster series is intentionally designed around powerful societal norms such as values of doing one’s best, fulfilling one’s role properly and getting involved in a team. Involvement in club activity is strongly esteemed, particularly at junior high school in Japan. Many hours are spent at practice and contributing to the group by spending time together. By employing the team motif, the table tennis poster incites a friendly atmosphere of sacrificing, achieving and enjoying time together. The team motif detracts from any fears. Sleeves rolled up, the characters display an eagerness to get into action. One Supreme Court produced film Hyōgi depicts teamwork both verbally and visually. No member of the panel is thrilled to have been chosen but over the course of deliberation, each defrosts and starts to work well together as a team. We see each layperson contribute by jogging one another’s memories. Through working together, they succeed at piecing together the evidence without needing the assistance of a judge. On day three of the trial, judges and laypersons walk down the hallway together in a group removing any remaining hierarchy. Judges and citizens have become a team. The image and accompanying music is one of conquering, accomplishment and, consequently, the task being worthwhile. By break time friendships have been built, and a statement from one member reiterates the value derived from teamwork. He thought taking time off would be difficult, but has found it to be worthwhile (yarigai o kanjite kitemasu). As the job is completed, the head judge sums up with a statement that the saibanin system is about saibanin and judges coming together as one team (saibanin seido wa saibanin to saibankan ga hitotsu no chīmu to natte) and cooperating in a joint effort (kyōryoku shiai, kyōdo sagyō), and that he personally felt it to have brought new light into the court process. The final scene where lay members take leave of each other outside the court restates the sense of fulfilment.

Any discussion of democracy must take into account political culture. This empirical study contributes to the democratic theory literature as it depicts the process whereby deeper democracy might actually come about. We must wait to see how those who do complete jury service play out their role as active citizens in wider Japanese society.

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*Where not otherwise cited all translations are the researcher’s own.*
Competitive authoritarianism and Internet control: Case Studies from Thailand and Malaysia

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Abstract
After the early expectation that the Internet system is uncontrollable waned, increasing attention has been paid to the political control of Internet. Previous studies, however, are mostly focused on politically closed regimes, while Internet control in countries with some democratic traits receives little examination. Moreover, theoretical explanation on why Internet control occurs in democratic or semi-democratic contexts, to some extent, remains underdeveloped. This paper seeks to answer such questions by investigating how Internet-related political threats are generated and how institutional factors shape the strategies of Internet control. It chooses two intermediary (hybrid) regimes in Southeast Asia, Thailand and Malaysia, as two cases to explore the interaction between regime types and Internet control strategies. Both countries have recently gone through Internet-facilitated political crisis and have tightened up Internet control practices, in different ways, since then. This paper argues that the political threats associated with Internet usage in fact derive from the cleavages within respective political systems. In other words, it is the nature of a political system that creates a particular set of opportunities and thus particular forms of Internet threats. By analysing the trajectories of regulatory regime evolving around the Internet system, it further points out how the government’s capacity for Internet control is limited by various institutions and structures.

Introduction
The last two decades have witnessed the worldwide, dramatic development of information technologies, especially the Internet system. Accompanying such technological transformation is an ongoing debate over the social and political impacts of the new information age. On the one hand, an early optimism that the decentralizing and anonymous nature of the Internet would eventually dismantle authoritarian rule and generate a new wave of democratisation has persisted and been buttressed by recurring events of Internet-associated movements and revolutions. However, some authoritarian regimes have shown strong resilience against this observation. Through monitoring online community, blocking IP...
addresses, and harassing bloggers and netizens, authoritarian governments are able to control the Internet system at different levels. The fact that the third wave of democratisation has stagnated as a global trend since the 1990s also weakens the belief in Internet’s democratic capacity. Both sides of this debate find updated and ceaseless threads and theories to develop their respective arguments. While Larry Diamond (2010:70) expatiates on the way liberation technologies ‘expand political, social, and economic freedom’, Deibert and Rohozinski (2010:48-55) caution against the next generation of Internet control, as the mechanisms of control ‘are growing in scope and sophistication as part of a general paradigm shift in cyberspace governance and an escalating arms race in cyberspace’.

In general, the existing literature on Internet control has two major features. Firstly, previous studies are mostly focused on politically closed regimes, while Internet control in countries with some democratic traits receives little examination. Moreover, theoretical explanation on why Internet control occurs in democratic or semi-democratic contexts, to some extent, remains underdeveloped. It seems that authoritarianism per se is not sufficient in explaining Internet control (or Internet freedom) in different settings, and especially in explaining why Internet control takes different forms. Therefore, this paper intends to investigate the factors that affect Internet control practices in countries with at least some democratic characteristics. It chooses to look at those competitive authoritarian regimes, political systems bracketed in between politically closed regimes at one side, and liberal democracies at the other side. Those hybrid regimes have serious defects in electoral process or in civil liberty protection, but they do allow genuine political competition to exist and develop. This paper argues that Thailand and Malaysia represent two different subtypes of competitive authoritarianism: Thailand is a liberal authoritarian country in which electoral politics have been somehow paralysed by alternate social confrontation and movements while these movements per se suggest that civil liberties are protected constitutionally; Malaysia has been considered by many scholars (Case 2006; Schedler 2006; Case 2009) as an electoral authoritarian country which employs various methods to restrict civic freedoms but meanwhile allows multi-party competition in elections.

Since previous studies have pointed out the importance of threat in states’ decision for repressive action (Gartner & Regan 1996; Davenport 2007), this paper will investigate the nature of threat that the Internet space has posed upon political systems in Thailand and Malaysia. Each case starts with a brief discussion about how a particular political regime type has been shaped in Thailand and Malaysia respectively, and analyses how regime characters
generate particular sets of opportunities for political contention which are further facilitated by information technologies. It then discusses the outcome of Internet control in each country, showing the internal connection between regime types and Internet control practices.

**Internet control in Thailand**

Following the 2005 general election in which the Thai Rak Thai party (TRT) won an even larger margin, a series of incidents marked the long-lasting political crisis in Thailand. Four elections and a military coup have reflected the unstable nature of Thai political regime, which was also polarised between rural poor (standing for red shirts) and urban elites (in yellow shirts).

The red shirts are organised under the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD). Despite remaining abroad, Thaksin Shinawatra, the de facto master of the movement, was able to communicate with his supporters through the Internet. Establishing his ‘Thaksinlive’ account in 2009, Thaksin has used the Twitter (a microblog website) to ‘attack his political rivals, mobilise his supporters, console and encourage his three children, defend himself against any allegations and publicise his charitable activities’ (*Bangkok Post* 26-2-2010). As of now, this account has gained him nearly 180,000 followers. His official website www.thaksinlive.com carries his biography and updates his statements, past speeches and videos. He also holds a video and radio broadcast account at the Ustream website in which his images and speeches can be projected to supporters during political rallies and meetings. On this score, Jon Russell (2010b) dubs Thaksin as the ‘master of social media’ which ‘gives Thaksin a free platform to air his opinions and views whilst allowing him to maintain contact with those who can no longer see him in person’.

Moreover, the polarised confrontation between the red and yellow shirts mirrors the deeper impact of Internet technology on Thai politics. During the past decades, Thai political system has been built around the central ideology enshrining ‘democracy with the king as head of state’ (Baker & Pasuk 2009), or in other words, the political idiom of ‘royal liberalism’ (Connors 2008), while the Internet has provided an alternative channel for different voices and ideas, thus weakening and splitting this state-manipulated ideology. If in the past the traditional media has monopolised political discourse in Thailand, now the Internet has largely circumvented such monopoly. In the new information era, an alternative political ideology, or the ‘ideology of democracy’ nurtured by the abolished 1997 constitution (Chairat 2010:304), has found its way to express and develop itself in cyber
space. This ideology incorporates more and more anti-monarchy sentiments after 2006 because the royal family is considered by many as backing the military coup. With no access to print media, these sentiments are increasingly posted on the online forums, blogs and social networking sites, antagonising people with long-held royalist sentiments. As a result, the Internet has played a critical role in transforming Thai politics that have been united around the royalist ideology. According to Kitti Prasirtsuk (2009:178), ‘Whereas previous uprisings (in 1973, 1976, and 1992) entailed a struggle between people and government, this current conflict is a clash among citizens with different political orientations’.

However, when the Internet has contributed to expanding the public sphere and facilitating political discussion to an unprecedented extent, it has also eroded the ideological unity upon which the Thai political system has been constructed. It is much more difficult to totally wipe out the anti-royal sentiments online than to oust an undesired politician from office. Regarding this point, political scientist Chaiwat Satha-Anand (interview, 24-3-2011) comments that the Internet ‘is both constructive and destructive’. Since the political challenge of Internet becomes systematic in the post-coup period, the next section will look at how the Thai regime reacts.

Although the authoritarian attempts to control the Internet emerged immediately after the military coup, including the promulgation of Computer Crime Act in 2007, the Thai blocking system functioned more restrictively during the confrontation between yellow shirts and red shirts from 2008 to 2010, which reached a new height in the violent crackdown on red-shirt protesters in May last year. However, evidence shows that the major target of Internet control is the anti-coup, pro-Thaksin red-shirt movement, rather than its yellow-shirt counterpart. As the figure on the left illustrates (Figure source: iLaw Project, 2010), after the enforcement of Computer Crime Act in July 2007, there were 9 cases in the latter half of that year involving the offence of this law, while 28 cases were reported in the
subsequent year. The number of cases, however, rose strikingly to 72 and 76 in 2009 and 2010 respectively, a period that experienced Abhisit government and massive protests by red shirts. Among those cases 54 (29.19%) are related to defamation of third parties and 31 (16.76%) involving lese majeste content (iLaw Project 2010:10).

According to Global Voices Advocacy (2010), during and after the draconian actions the Abhisit government took against redshirt demonstrators in 2010, a shocking number of 113,000 websites has been blocked, most of which were related to anti-government campaigns and charged under the lèse-majesté law. This figure has vastly outnumbered the accumulated number recorded from judicial court orders during the same period. It indicates that many blocking practices were taken without arbitration from the court. Besides, MICT also announced a blacklist of 200 persons banned from posting to the Internet, including former Minister of the Prime Minister's Office and Thaksin's confidante Jakrapob Penkair, and Professor Giles Ji Ungpakorn from Chulalongkorn University (Chachavalpongpun 2010). The latter has fled Thailand to Britain in 2009 in the face of a lengthy sentence under the lese majeste law and has thereafter set up a website to fight against that law (Campbell 2009).

The government has employed a diversified repertoire of Internet control mechanisms; nevertheless it is also restrained by the semi-democratic regime featured by empowered and outspoken civil society. For instance, when the Association of E-Commerce, consisting of Ministry of ICT, Ministry of Culture, Trade Union and other agencies, proposed last year to install a server which could scan Internet information flows, ostensibly for fighting against online piracy, strong public opposition stormed in fear of its potential for Internet control. Public complaints in large quantities were directed to the Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva when he attended the Sunday-morning TV program ‘PM Meets the Citizens’. Consequently the Prime Minister had to proclaim that no such server would be deployed to detect online information (interview, Arthit Suriyawongkul, 27-3-2011). With similar grounds, most of my interviewees refer to the democratic system and open society in Thailand as the principal restraining factor against government control of the Internet.

**Internet control in Malaysia**

After a short campaign period of 13 days and a 70% voter turnout, the 12th general election of Malaysia was held on 8th March, 2008 (Singh 2009). It was politically significant not only for its astounding result, but also for what it has brought to the politicization of Malaysian cyber space. The change of political dynamic on the Internet was further presented by a recent state
The 2008 general election has been viewed by many observers as an historic event in Malaysia that marks the commencement of political transition from electoral authoritarianism toward liberal democracy (Abdul Rashid Moten 2009a; Case 2009, 2010; Johan Saravanamuttu 2009). However, though before the election few would expect that BN could obtain a victory tantamount to the 2004 one in which BN won 62% of the total votes and 90% of parliamentary seats, no one would anticipate either the opposition’s triumph in depriving the BN coalition of its two-thirds majority and five state governments.

The historic 2008 election has prompted curiosity in explaining the unprecedented setback of ruling coalition. Most analysts acknowledged the role the Internet has played during and before the election. As Tang Hang Wu (2009:17) precisely argued, ‘While the presence of Internet activism per se does not guarantee political success, the confluence of all the factors […] together with the presence of credible Internet news portals and a remarkable proliferation of social political blogs and websites proved to be detrimental to Barisan Nasional’. In fact, as following discussion reveals, though not decisive, the Internet is not dispensable either in interpreting the 2008 election.

During the electoral period, the Internet has facilitated the communication among opposition forces, and more importantly, the communication between opposition parties and their electorate. First of all, instead of suffering blackouts on traditional media, which were a common phenomenon in previous elections, information and political appeals of opposition parties were disseminated and amplified through independent online new media. Malaysiakini.com, which was established initially for the 1999 general election, became the most dominant source of information this time, rather than the discredited government-controlled media. Through these new channels, opposition politicians were able to, in urban areas at least, circumvent the discrimination of print media by airing freely in the cyber space their own political discourse that would be otherwise blocked. Furthermore, the bloggers-turned politicians, such as Jeff Ooi and Tony Pua, demonstrated strong popular support in the election, implicating the dramatic political power embedded in the cyber space. In all, five bloggers have successfully transferred their online popularity into polling majority and parliamentary seats. As Tong Pua admitted, the Internet was politically important for him to express opinions and find followers (interview, Tony Pua, 19-Apr-2011).
On the other hand, the new media not only provided a platform for interaction and communication between opposition parties and their constituency, but also spoiled the ruling coalition’s image by revealing the sex, sleaze and corruption scandals related to top elites. For instance, Chua Soi Lek, the Health Minister, resigned in January 2008 after a secretly filmed sex video was leaked on YouTube which identified him and a female friend. The usual tactic of ruling coalition by, in close cooperation of traditional media, promoting its own political ideology while defaming the opposition politicians has been somehow overturned in the cyber space. In addition, compared with the opposition’s active employment of information technologies, the BN’s embrace for new technologies was far less impressive. Barisan Nasional’s campaign site, http://bn2008.org.my, was unveiled only two weeks prior to the election, and its content mainly highlighted its past achievement while trying to counter the opposition’s allegations (Abdul Rashid Moten 2009b:27).

As discussed above, though the historic election in 2008 was the collective product of various political, economic and social factors, the Internet has acted as an indispensable element in explaining the sound performance of opposition parties. This contributed to Abdullah Ahmad Badawi’s regret that the government had lost the online war. As he acknowledged, ‘we didn’t think it was important. It was a serious misjudgement. We thought that the newspapers, the print media, the television were important but young people were looking at text messages and blogs’ (New Straits Times 2008).

Since political blogs have been proved critical in the 2008 political election, the foremost task for the Malaysian government is to engage, and co-opt if possible, the blogger community before tsunami strikes again. Right after the election, the Information Minister, Ahmad Shabery Cheek invited bloggers to go on television in a 20-minute programme on Sunday evening beginning from 20th April to discuss social, political and economic affairs. A recent example has seen a prominent blogger from Blogger House Malaysia invited by the Press Office to follow the Prime Minister Najib Razak in a Turkish conference where this blogger broadcast the PM’s speech and other live information via his blog site (interview, Syed Akbar Ali, 5-Apr-2011). Parties and politicians in the ruling coalition even hire bloggers and other netizens as ‘cyber troopers’ to disseminate pro-government information, counter online criticism, and publish articles that attack opposition leaders. When co-optation fails, the government turns to harassment. On 6th May 2008, within less than two months since the general election, blogger and owner of Malaysia Today (www.malaysia-today.net), Raja Petra, and former banker Syed Akbar Ali became the first and second Malaysian
netizens to be charged under the Sedition Act. These were not the only cases of harassment against netizens: in 2010 Khairul Nizam Abd Ghani, another Malaysian blogger, was arrested for allegedly insulting the late Sultan of Johor, Sultan Iskandar ibni Almarhum Sultan Ismail (Daniel Chandranayagam 2010); Irwan Abdul Rahman, executive editor of the Malay Mail daily, was prosecuted for publishing falsehoods as he satirized the nation’s biggest power producer Tenaga Nasional Berhad in his ‘clearly tongue-in-cheek Internet posting’ (Baradan Kuppusamy 2010). Thanks to these repressive incidents to deter and contain the Internet threats, Malaysia’s ranking on the Press Freedom Index plumped from 131 in 2009 to 141 in 2010 (Reporters Without Borders 2010), even somewhat lower than Singapore, its peninsula neighbourhood with a harder form of electoral authoritarianism.

Meanwhile, instead of buttressing institutional capacity for Internet control, the government is seeking some covert and indirect means to fight back on the cyber space, especially during the polling days. The recent Sarawak state election has exemplified BN’s shifted strategy of Internet control.

The largest state in Malaysia, Sarawak, is traditionally considered a stronghold for the incumbent ruling coalition Barisan Nasional. However, with another state election in Sarawak looming, opposition forces began to plan a replication of their 2008 victory. What supported their hope was the gradual transformation of mindset among urban voters. Already in 2008, or even earlier, have these urban voters turned their major concern into bigger issues such as human rights, integrity, transparency and accountability (Mersat 2009). The Internet thus provided a useful platform for opposition parties to inform people about and mobilize them around such issues, given traditional media were tightly in the government’s hands. A website called Sarawak Report (www.sarawakreport.org), established by Clare Brown, the sister-in-law of former British PM Gordon Brown, became highly popular ahead of the election. It revealed the extraordinarily tremendous assets and properties that BN party cronies, particularly the billionaire Chief Minister, Abdul Taib Mahmud, have grabbed through exploitation of local natural resources.1 In a similar vein, the electoral campaign of opposition parties was also centred on Taib’s corruption and called for a change in chief minister. Just like what they did in 2008, opposition politicians printed online stories and articles and distributed them among rural voters who had little access to the Internet (interview, Khoo Kay Peng, 12-Apr-2011; interview, Tony Pua, 19-Apr-2011).

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1 Relevant information on the corruption of Taib Mahmud and other officials in Sarawak could be found on Sarawak Report’s website at http://www.sarawakreport.org.
Facing the strong opposition force in Sarawak, the Malaysian government played its old tricks of Internet control. It ordered the Malaysian Communication and Multimedia Committee (MCMC) to investigate Radio Free Sarawak, accusing the latter of defamation (interview, Khoo Kay Peng, 12-Apr-2011). But more importantly, the government adopted a covert and indirect strategy. Firstly, a website under the name of Sarawak Reports (www.sarawakreports.org) was created, plausibly confusing the Internet users due to its strong resemblance to the original site. The content it covered was mainly the full complement of the BN party’s achievements in developing Sarawak, a stance countering the anti-government Sarawak Report. Secondly, Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks were used for several times ahead of the polling day. It was reported that websites of Sarawak Report and Malaysiakini were bombarded by the unremitting influx of data requests several days before the election day. Sarawak Report was totally brought down and forced to switch its address (The Malaysian Insider 12-Apr-2011). However, none of these actions were directly associated with government agencies, despite pervasive speculation that the hackers and imitative website were paid by ruling parties (interview, Khoo Kay Peng, 12-Apr-2011). In fact, this new style of government-sponsored, privately executed Internet control has been widely witnessed in countries like China, Russia, and Iran (Klimburg 2011; Morozov 2011). The ‘Sarawak report vs. Sarawak reports’ story, symbolizing this changed strategy, would be likely to recur when the next general election is approaching.

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Protectors or attackers: do United States Forces in Japan (USFJ) protect the Japanese people or harm them?

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Introduction
This paper examines the Status of Forces Agreement between the United States and Japan (SOFA) and the reality of USFJ (In this paper, USFJ include their family members and civilians who work for USFJ), whose supposed role is to protect the Japanese people under the United States–Japan Security Treaty (hereafter referred to as the Security Treaty). The Japanese people are told by their government and the United States government that USFJ are there to protect them. However, statistics show that USFJ in many cases harm the local people. Moreover, the Japanese government pays huge amount of money to USFJ for Host Nation Support (HNS) every year. In other words, the Japanese people are actually paying money to the people who hurt them. Therefore, the paper recommends that Japan first decrease HNS, then eliminate it. Japan should also ask the United States to reduce USFJ and insist that SOFA be revised so that Japan regains its sovereignty and protects the Japanese people.

Crimes and accidents caused by USFJ and HNS
Over the last sixty years, there have been many accidents and crimes committed by USFJ. As many statistics show, USFJ hurt the local people, instead of protecting them under the Security Treaty. The number of the average incidents is more than 10 cases per day during 1952-2008. Moreover, the Japanese government pays huge amount of money to USFJ for HNS every year, even though Japan has no obligation to pay such money to the United States under SOFA.

Between 1952 and 2008, the total number of accidents and criminal cases caused by USFJ (excluding Okinawa before 1972) was 206,892. There were 1,084 Japanese deaths. Among them, 48,060 cases with 518 Japanese deaths were on duty and 158,832 with 566 deaths were off duty. (Akahata Seijibu Anpo Gaiko Han, 2010, p. 111) On average, about 3,700 cases occurred per year. In other words, about ten cases take place every day.
Nonetheless, the United States government contends that USFJ are to protect the lives and
properties of the Japanese people, which is one of the main purposes of the Security Treaty. However, the statistics and the United States’ statements clearly contradict each other.

In 1953, a secret agreement was signed between the United States and Japan. According to this agreement, Japan gives up the right to try a case even when Japan has the primary right to try the case. Japan relinquishes its right except for cases which are very important to Japanese interests. Even though USFJ did not request Japan to abandon the primary right, Japan voluntarily gave it up (Yoshida, 2010, pp. 46-47, 81). The system that the Japanese judiciary would not indict suspects of USFJ personnel is one of the main reasons why so many crimes and accidents took place. For the Japanese government, a rape or a murder is neither a national crisis nor a matter of national interest although it is a serious issue for the victim. One can clearly see the attitude of the Japanese government which does not help to protect its own citizens. The Japanese bureaucrats and politicians give USFJ personnel priority over the Japanese people. Relations with the United States are of the utmost importance to the Japanese government. In other words, Japan gave USFJ ‘extraterritoriality’ since USFJ are in fact beyond the Japanese law.

Many statistics show that Japanese law does not control USFJ. For example, between 1973 and 2009, the total number of criminal cases against the Japanese people caused by USFJ was 7,334. Among them, there were 39 murders, 454 robberies, 36 cases of arson, and 184 sexual assaults (Akahata Seijibu Anpo Gaiko Han, 2010, p. 111). The average number was 203 cases per year. That is, criminal cases brought about by USFJ take place almost every other day in Japan. USFJ disturb the peaceful life of the local people rather than protect them. USFJ personnel violate the Security Treaty or neglect their duties, which are supposed to defend Japan and protect the Japanese people.

If we take a look at all ‘off duty’ and ‘on duty,’ cases, it is obvious that USFJ are beyond the Japanese law. Between 1952 and 1977, the total number of all cases that were on duty was 36,075 and 486 Japanese lost their lives. However, no one was tried in the USFJ military courts. In addition, between 1978 and 1995, no one involved in the cases was tried in the USFJ military courts. Between 1996 and 2004, only one person was tried. Between 2006 and 2008, 1,058 USFJ personnel, who committed crimes, which include traffic accidents, were not indicted. Only ten people were indicted. These 1,058 people were comprised of all the people, whom Japan had the primary right to try the case against, but did not exercise that right. In the same three-year period, there were 434 USFJ personnel, who committed crimes (including traffic accidents) and against whom USFJ had the primary right to try a case.
However, none of these 434 people were tried at the USFJ military courts (Yoshida, 2010, pp. 214-218). These figures do not include cases in Okinawa before 1972. Okinawa was under the United States’ military occupation from 1945 to 1972. If we include cases in Okinawa before 1972, the number will certainly increase. Over twenty-seven years, 486 Japanese were killed by USFJ. However, none of USFJ personnel took responsibility of 36,000 cases of accidents and crimes including the 486 deaths in Japan. From the point of view of many victims, where is justice? Americans often say that the United States is based on justice and law, but I must assume that their justice and law do not apply to the Japanese victims.

Between 2001 and 2008, the total number of all cases that were off duty including traffic accidents was 3,827 and 645 people were indicted and 3,182 people were not indicted. In other words, only 16.9% of all cases were tried by a court and 83.1% were not tried. If we exclude traffic accidents, the total number was 1,260 cases with indictment of only 218 people or an indictment rate of only 17.3%. More than 82% of those who committed crimes walked away, or 1,042 people were not tried (Yoshida, 2010, pp.86-89). This is an extraordinary situation; it clearly shows that USFJ are lenient with the suspects, which leads to the repeat of many crimes and accidents.

According to the agreement, it is the Japanese court that decides whether a suspect is on duty or not. However, the agreement says that unless there is a piece of evidence to the contrary a document, which states that said person is on duty issued by a United States base commander, constitutes enough evidence. Therefore, in reality, whenever USFJ say ‘on duty,’ it becomes ‘on duty.’ Since 2001, when the Freedom of Information Law became effective in Japan, no case was disputed over this issue between the United States and Japan at a Japanese court (Fuse, 2010, pp. 73-78). Under the agreement, a United States base commander issued the above mentioned document, stating that said person is on duty, after the suspected member of the USFJ is indicted. In fact, however, such a document is issued even before indictment, and the Japanese judiciary accepts the document (Yoshida, 2010, pp. 158-159).

When a member of the USFJ has a traffic accident and says ‘he is on duty,’ the Japanese police would have difficulty confirming whether he is actually on duty or not. As a result, even though he was off duty, the Japanese police have to hand him over to USFJ. Once the Japanese police turn him over to USFJ, even after the police found out that he was off duty it would be very difficult for the police to investigate the accident since USFJ have the
right to detain a suspect until indictment. As a result, the Japanese judiciary cannot exercise its right to try the case, and the case would often lead to non-indictment (Yoshdia, 2010, p. 144). In this way, it is extremely difficult for the Japanese judiciary to challenge the proof of ‘on duty’. In many cases, the Japanese police hand over a suspect to USFJ, which in turn give a lenient sentence or do not even try the case.

Since 1978, the Japanese government has been paying HNS to USFJ. Under SOFA, Japan is obliged to provide land but is not obliged to pay HNS. It is the responsibility of the United States government to pay the maintenance cost of USFJ. In the 1970s and 1980s, Japan’s economy looked invincible, while the United States economy was experiencing serious problems. Therefore, the Japanese government decided to help the United States with a small amount of HNS or ‘Omoiyari Yosan’ (a sympathy budget). Since then, HNS continued to increase every year. Unlike the economic situation in the 1970s and 1980s, however, Japan’s economy has been in a serious depression over the last two decades. Japan cannot afford to show its sympathy for the United States any more. On the contrary, in the 1990s during the Clinton Administration, the United States’ economy remarkably improved and steadily grew. It is now Japan that should be sympathised.

HNS is indeed very generous. For example, the Japanese government built 36 schools for USFJ with HNS. All schools of USFJ have air conditioning except for six schools in Misawa Air Base in Aomori Prefecture which is located in northern Japan. However, only 22.5% of the schools in the Metropolis of Tokyo have air conditioning (Shimbun Akahata, 22 December 2010). In Nagasaki Prefecture, none of the schools from elementary to high schools have heating, needless to say air conditioning. However, all schools of USFJ including ones in Nagasaki have heating thanks to HNS. It is difficult to say that the Japanese government does its job for the Japanese children, but it is certain that the government contributes to the children of the USFJ personnel. This is one more example that Japan is a vassal state of the United States.

The total cost of HNS and USFJ, which the Japanese government has paid to USFJ, amounts to more than 5 trillion yen, from 1978 to 2008. The highest amount was 275.6 billion yen per year in 1999 (Shimbun Akahata, 23 June 2009; Maeda, 2010, p. 220). Although the amount of HNS since 1999 has been decreasing, it was 188.1 billion yen in 2010. Moreover, in the next five years (from 2011), the Japanese government is scheduled to pay 188.1 billion yen, including utility fees of 24.9 billion yen for USFJ personnel and their family members per year (Ryukyu Shimpo, 22 November 2010). Currently, the Japanese
government pays 72% of utility fees such as gas, water, and electricity that USFJ consume (Kyodo Tsushin, 14 December 2010). Overall, Japan bears up to 75% of the cost to keep USFJ every year. No other United States ally pays more HNS than Japan does. After 11 March 2011, due to the disaster occurring at the nuclear power plants in Fukushima Prefecture, Japan faces a lack of electricity. The Japanese government asked the people to save electricity as much as possible throughout Japan. It is doubtful whether USFJ personnel save electricity since 72% of their electricity cost is covered by HNS, and they pay only 28%.

If the United States is a real friend and an ally to Japan, the United States government should voluntarily give up HNS over the next five years, because Japan faces one of the most serious crises in its history. Since the great earthquake, Tsunami, and a nuclear disaster took place in Tohoku region in 2011, Japan requires a tremendous amount of money to recover. The Japanese government should ask the United States government to voluntarily give up HNS between 2011 and 2015; the total amount would be about 1 trillion yen. Nevertheless, the Japanese government gives USFJ priority over the victims of the disaster. Given the fact that many USFJ personnel hurt the Japanese people, it does not make any sense at all for the Japanese people to continue paying a huge amount of HNS every year to the people who harm them.

**Conclusion**

This paper discussed crimes and accidents caused by USFJ whose supposed task is to defend the Japanese people. In reality, however, statistics show that USFJ personnel hurt the local people and the majority of the suspects were not tried in either a Japanese court or a USFJ military court. Nevertheless, the Japanese government pays USFJ a huge amount of HNS every year since 1978.

Now is the time to revise SOFA so that Japan regains its sovereignty and the Japanese government protects its own people, not the personnel of USFJ. It is very difficult, however, for Japan to do so as long as the Japanese government and people think that the Security Treaty and USFJ protect them. As a first step, since Japan does not face any imminent threat, the Japanese government should reduce HNS, which would make it difficult to maintain a large number of USFJ troops and bases in Japan due to high appreciation of the Japanese yen. Eventually, HNS must be abolished. Before 1978, Japan did not pay any HNS, but USFJ existed.
The Japanese government must also negotiate with the United States government to revise SOFA and to abolish the secret agreement because it is SOFA that protects suspects of USFJ personnel. SOFA and the secret agreement are beyond the Japanese law. The Japanese judiciary does not respect the Criminal Special Law or does not protect the Japanese people in many cases because of the secret agreement. Therefore, it is time to revise SOFA and abolish the secret agreement. As long as USFJ exist in Japan, it is extremely difficult to reduce crimes and accidents caused by them. This has been proved by the conduct of USFJ personnel over the last sixty years.

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The evolution of China’s rural land tenure system

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Rural China is experiencing significant evolution in the rural land tenure system. This is evidenced in the creation of large commercial farms and an influx of foreign investment made possible by experimentation with markets for the circulation of rural land use and management leases. This presents opportunities for rural development, but many challenges remain. The insecurity and ambiguity of land tenure rights obstruct investment in rural areas, impede efforts to adequately protect the rights of rural land leasers and distort the development of a ‘use value’ market for the circulation of rural land.

These challenges have antecedents in the evolution of the rural land tenure system. Now, with the new focus on agricultural modernisation there is opportunity for a new approach to resolving these issues through integration of rural and urban land tenure systems. This paper is presented in three sections. The first reviews the new focus on ‘economic transformation’, the ‘three agricultural issues’ and urban-rural integration. The second puts forward an historical review of rural land tenure. The third presents examples of how rural land is being commercialised and discusses the challenges and opportunities this presents.

Economic transformation, agricultural modernisation and urban-rural integration
Academics and officials are increasingly concerned by China’s ‘three rural issues’ (rural areas, rural people and agriculture). The 12th Five Year Plan promotes food security, adjustment of the agricultural structure and agro-technological innovation. The modernisation of agriculture is seen as a means of reinvigorating the economic vibrancy of rural areas and part of the broader goal to shift the economy away from an overreliance on exports through the promotion of domestic consumption, investment in neglected industries and in the development of human capital. Such an ‘economic transformation’ will be necessary to avoid the ‘middle-income trap’.

Scholars generally agree on these objectives but have different views on how to achieve rural development. Liao (2005) argues for strengthening the collectivised land tenure system to provide greater oversight for the fragmented and small household contract system and greater protections for use and management rights to avoid an increase in ‘landless peasants’. Liu (2009) argues it is necessary to strengthen the system of rural land tenure as a

Other scholars have promoted a new approach to rural issues that focuses on the problem of separate and disparate institutional arrangements in rural and urban China. They point to the *hukou* system which divides agricultural and non-agricultural residents, the social security system which creates different systems of health care, pensions and social services, and to the land tenure system which divides Chinese land into state (urban) or collective (rural) ownership. These scholars promote the breaking down of dualistic structures and the unification of rural and urban political systems, markets and society through an increase in movements of people, capital and goods (Ma 2011).

This paper applies the ‘urban-rural integration’ (*城乡一体化*) concept to problems in the rural land tenure system and the tensions between urbanisation and the traditional rural-urban dualism of Chinese institutions. It argues there are four major issues that need to be resolved. The first is the ambiguity of the system (Ho 2005). North (1993) argues ―an essential part of development policy is the creation of polities that will create and enforce efficient property rights‖. At present China’s rural land property rights are severely lacking.

The second is the multilayered nature of the system and unclear definition of the ‘collective’ (*集体*). There are three layers to the ‘collective’: the ‘rural (town)/township’ (*乡 (镇)*), formerly the ‘peoples’ commune’ (*人民公社*); the administrative ‘village’ (*村*), formerly the ‘large production team’ (*生产大队*); and, the ‘village organisation (society)/natural village’ (*村民小组 (社)*, formerly the ‘production team’ (*生产队*). Whilst regulation states that these groups must work together to manage rural land, it is unclear where decision-making power and ownership are ultimately situated.

The third concern is that extreme fragmentation of rural farmland prevents the development of larger-scale farms and more efficient and productive agricultural practices. “At present the average area of cultivable land per capita of rural households is a mere 0.10ha” (Ho 2005: 19). The final issue is that rural land leases are not freely traded in the market as the ‘value use system’ (*有偿使用制度*) has been prevented from developing as in urban areas. This system is “not good for rational use and effective management of rural
land” (Ye and Jin 2009:165). These issues are the product of the evolution of rural land tenure since the 1950s.

The evolution of rural land tenure

The evolution of the rural land tenure system revolves around changes in the bundle of land rights. These rights include, ‘land proprietary rights/ownership’ (土地所有权); ‘land usage rights’ (土地使用权), and ‘land management rights’ (土地经营权). These rights have shifted over three major stages: land reform (1949 to mid-1950s), collectivisation (mid-1950s to 1980s); and, household contracting (1980s onwards).

In the 1950s, the new government introduced a radical programme of land reform in rural areas. The focus of this reform was to redistribute land to landless peasants and to break the power of landlords. ‘Peasant associations’ (农民协会) were established to oversee a more equal distribution of land ownership. Land reform gave the newly established government a strong base of support as the vast majority of China’s rural people approved of the policy (Li 2009) and produced an ‘economic miracle’ with peasant incomes increasing by 48% and food production by 36% from 1949 to 1952 (Zhou et al 2009:124). Rural people enjoyed not only more equitable distribution of land but also the full bundle of land rights.

Soon after the programme of land reform, the state encouraged the establishment of ‘cooperative farming’ (合作式耕作) with the aim of moving toward full ‘collectivisation’ (集体化). By 1958 the collectivisation movement had shifted ownership to ‘rural people’s communes’ (农村人民公社) and rural people lost the household right to own, manage and use land, retaining only rights under the collectivised system. ‘Agricultural production cooperative societies’ (农业生产合作社) monopolised ownership of rural land, though small ‘individual plots’ (自留地) were allowed as sideline farming between the years of the Great Leap Forward (1958-62) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-76).

In 1962, these communisation ‘experiments’ were codified in regulation (CPC 1962). People’s Communes were designed to integrate government and society and were made the basic unit of rural governance. Of the three levels, ‘people’s communes’ (人民公社), ‘large production teams’ (生产大 队) and ‘production teams’ (生产队), large production teams were designated the site of collective ownership and finance and acted as the ‘unifying organisation’. People’s Communes were not officially disbanded until 1984 but spontaneous dismantling of the commune system and a move back to household farming occurred much earlier.
The ‘Household Contract Responsibility System’ (家庭联产承包责任制; HCRS) was started by farmers ‘dividing agricultural land into household plots’ (分田到户) and ‘contracting production to the household’ (包产到户) while ownership remained in the collective. Official support came in a 1980 speech by Deng Xiaoping and again in 1982 when the Party stated early adaptations of collectivised farming were ‘production responsibility systems of the socialist collective economy’ (CCCPC 1982: Article 2). The ‘contract’ (承包合同) between the ‘contracting household’ (承包户) and the ‘collective economic organisation’ (集体经济组织) served to privatise production without privatising ownership. Uptake of the HCRS was rapid. In 1981 45% and in 1984 99% of production teams had switched to the HCRS (Lin 1992).

This third stage can be characterised by two points. The first is the contracting of lease and management rights to individual households and the retreat but continual presence of the rural collective. This led to improvements in rural life and agricultural production in the early 1980s (Lin 1992). The second is the increasing mismatch between the HCRS, collective ownership and the reality of rural land tenure. Rural residents are urbanising or living across the rural urban divide and increasingly looking to mortgage, rent (sub-lease), or invest in their rural land. The failure of the collective system to keep up with changes in the urban system by establishing a ‘value use system’ to realise the market value of rural land is a major factor in the underdevelopment of rural areas, rural people and agriculture. It is in this environment that we are witnessing increasing experimentation with the commercialisation of agriculture.

**Commercialisation of agriculture**

We are now witnessing a new stage in the evolution of rural land tenure characterised by the development of land circulation markets, large commercial farming and an influx of foreign investment. In Chongqing experiments, moving toward an integrated rural-urban *hukou* system has occurred in tandem with efforts to remove many of the obstacles to the creation of a rural land lease market. By September 2010, 35% (4786 km2) of rural land management rights administered through the HCRS in Chongqing had been circulated through the market (Chongqing Times 6 January 2011).

With the hollowing out of rural areas through urbanisation, rural land is increasingly being collected into large blocks for either non-agricultural use or large commercialised farming. There are roughly four ways this happens. The first involves the confiscation of land
by the state turning collective-owned (and household leased) land into state-owned land. The second involves the rural collective cancelling leases, collecting up a large block of rural land and then renting it to commercial interests. The third involves a commercial interest arranging individual sub-leases with rural residents. The final method involves rural residents working together by pooling land and resources to create an agricultural cooperative.

Examples of commercialised agriculture include not only local agricultural companies like Guangming, Mengniu and Yili purchasing state farms or renting land from the state or collective but also foreign companies. New Zealand dairy cooperative Fonterra have used two methods to set up farming in China. At their Tangshan Farm in Hebei they secured a fifty-year lease from the state through a joint venture. At their second farm (currently under construction) in Yutian County, Hebei, they pay rent to use land in an agricultural development zone. The Japanese company Asahi also pays rent in Shandong to utilise rural land for commercial farming, much of which is reportedly exported to Japan.

This new stage of commercialised farming brings many opportunities for investment and development in rural areas but these changes have not been adequately reflected in the structure of the rural land tenure system. The institutional ambiguities of the system do not adequately protect land leaser rights to circulate, mortgage and invest in land. Investors prefer urban land leases, which are simpler and for a longer duration of time, than to deal with the many hands of the collective. These impediments perpetuate the fragmented and inefficient system of rural farming by preventing the creation of larger farms. Finally, the inability of rural land leasers to realise market value for land prevents the flow of capital into rural areas and proper compensation for urbanising rural residents.

**Conclusion**

China is moving into a new stage of rural development evidenced by the increasing commercialisation of agriculture. As central government search for methods to revitalise rural areas and to modernise agriculture, local experimentation is proceeding rapidly. The socialist system of land tenure established in the late 1950s wrestled ownership, use and management rights from rural residents and placed all three rights within the collective. In the 1980s collectives began to contract out use and management rights to the household with limited collective oversight. As urbanisation has increased, a market for these contracts has formed but with little protection of lease rights. Use and management rights still lag far behind protections in urban areas obstructing long term investment and development in rural areas.
China has reached a critical stage in the development of the rural land market. In order to ensure foreign and domestic investment in rural China and to secure the rights of rural residents, the state needs to progress its efforts to integrate urban and rural institutions. The current ambiguity of the rural land tenure system should be clarified by aligning the state and collective land tenure systems. This would provide rural residents with the same security of property lease as urban residents and go some way to encouraging rural residents, urban companies and foreign companies to invest in the modernisation of Chinese agriculture.

References


Environment and sustainability
Roads for economic development: an analysis of urban transport policies of New Zealand and Pakistan

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Abstract
Research suggests that investments in urban roads have been justified in terms of easing congestion, saving time and energy, increasing safety, improving social and environmental outcomes, and enhancing economic development. Investments in urban roads may have many advantages as they may expand services and improve mobility and, if sustained over time, may contribute to economic development. However, many critics argue that continuing investments in roads results in additional traffic, and ultimately increases congestion and parking problems, which have adverse effects on economic development. These arguments challenge the conventional arguments about the economic benefits of road investments in urban areas.

This paper aims to identify the policy objectives and key arguments regarding road investment in New Zealand and Pakistan. Analysis of the policy objectives behind road investment in Pakistan and New Zealand shows similar assumptions of economic benefits associated with government investment in urban roads in developed and developing countries, despite concerns in the scholarly literature about the overestimation of benefits and underestimation of costs of such investment. The paper concludes by highlighting the potential for the ‘planning fallacy’ to be found in transport policy in both developed and developing countries.

Introduction
Policy design and political conditions play a decisive role in determining economic development (Berechman, 2002). The term ‘policy’, as defined by Bridgman and Davis (2004), is an authoritative response to a public issue or problem. This infers that the word ‘policy’ means a set of principles and/or rules meant for guiding decisions and achieving optimal rational results. Peters (1993, cited in Shaw and Eichbaum, 2008) treats ‘policy’ as a sum of government activities having influence on citizens’ lives. Contreras (1999) notes that the term ‘economic development’ has been used by economists, politicians and others.
throughout the 20th century. Anand and Sen (2000) argue that economic growth, in addition to increasing private incomes, also increases additional resources which can then be used for improving social services, thus improving people’s living standards.

According to Banister and Berechman (2001), better political conditions are a necessary prerequisite for economic development to take place. In the case of transport policy design, over-optimism and misrepresentation of facts can result in inaccuracy and flawed implementation of projects (see, for example, Flyvbjerg (2008)). Adey (2010) regards ‘mobility’ as being directly related to political decision-making with societal relations and power as part of the backdrop. This highlights the need to bring power into policy and planning research. Flyvbjerg (2002) advocates ‘phronetic planning research’ drawing on studies of power by authors such as Machiavelli and Foucault. Phronetic planning research, in simple words, raises four basic questions:

(i) Where are we going with planning?
(ii) Who gains and who loses from this power mechanism?
(iii) Is such development desirable?
(iv) What should be done?

This paper aims to identify the policy objectives and key arguments regarding recent road investments in New Zealand and Pakistan.

**Transport policy and economic development**

Policy-making is defined as the commitment of investment through public resources (Shaw and Eichbaum (2008)). Shaw and Eichbaum (2008) argue that public policy is normative in nature which means it embodies a vision of the way things ‘should be’. They further note that this element of ‘should be’ is largely influenced by those who engage in the policy process such as politicians, interest groups and individuals: all these actors have views about what should be done. The implications of this ‘should be’ element for economic development become more complex when coupled with what Flyvbjerg (2008) calls, ‘optimism bias’ and ‘strategic misrepresentation’.

Chohan et al. (2011) suggest four sets of factors relating transport investment to economic development. The authors argue that these factors, as outlined in Table 1 below, need to be reflected under a transport policy for economic development to take place.
Table 1 Theorised links between transport investments and economic development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic development links</th>
<th>Social development links</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Improved efficiency</td>
<td>• Eroding public spaces/ social &amp; recreational services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Travel time saving</td>
<td>• Safety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Congestion relief</td>
<td>• Displacement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Accessibility</td>
<td>• Housing affordability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Decreased cost</td>
<td>• Consumer preferences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Individual travel and</td>
<td>• Health impacts</td>
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<tr>
<td>freight travel</td>
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<td>o Production costs</td>
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<tr>
<td>o Public service costs</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Jobs creation and jobs/housing balance</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Attraction for private investment and skilled labour</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Impacts on local and regional economy</td>
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<tr>
<th>Environmental development links</th>
<th>Spatial planning links</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Pollution impacts</td>
<td>• Urban and suburban development</td>
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<td>• Green space impacts</td>
<td>• Land development</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Transport network development</td>
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</table>

Source: Chohan et al. (2011, p.9)

They further note that this complexity increases when placed against new funding priorities and mechanisms. These funding priorities and mechanisms are set by the government in the form of transport policy.

**New Zealand land transport policy**

Figure 1 below outlines the policy and planning framework guiding investment in land transport in New Zealand. The overarching policy document is the Government Policy Statement (GPS). The 2008-2011 National Government outlined its goals for land transport policy in the May 2009 GPS. According to the 2009 GPS,¹

The government’s priority is for land transport investment to support national economic growth and productivity. The GPS (Government Policy Statement) will ensure the use of land transport does by

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¹ The focus of the analysis in this paper is the 2009 GPS. This has recently been reviewed and will be updated by the 2012 GPS.
directing investment into high quality infrastructure projects and transport services that encourage the efficient movement of freight and people (NZ Government (2009 p.10).

In the foreword to the GPS, the Minister of Transport highlights the link between transport investment and economic growth and productivity:

I am confident the GPS provides the right signals to ensure that the land transport network makes a positive contribution to New Zealand’s economic well-being and assists in achieving the priority of economic growth and productivity. Through well-targeted investment we can support New Zealanders during these difficult economic times and lay the foundation for a rapid recovery when the global economy grows again (cited in New Zealand Government, 2009, p.2).

The GPS states that well-targeted transport investment will result in improved employment and productivity and lay the ground for robust future economic growth. Congestion is seen as having a negative impact on growth. Therefore, investment in state highways is justified on the grounds of congestion relief and safety:

Unless investment in State highways is addressed, congestion will continue to negatively impact on economic growth and productivity. Investment in State highways will also make some of our busiest roads safer (New Zealand Government, (2009 p.10).

According to the NZ Government (2009, p.10):

Well-targeted land transport investment will keep people in employment, improve productivity and lay groundwork for robust economic growth in future.

The Land Transport Management Act requires the GPS to contribute to the objective of achieving an affordable, integrated, safe, responsive and sustainable land transport system and also each of the following factors:

(i) Assisting economic development.
(ii) Assisting safety and personal security.
(iii) Improving access and mobility.
(iv) Protecting and promoting public health.
(v) Ensuring environmental sustainability.

However, the 2009 GPS does not mention the term ‘economic development’ in the entire document. Although it talks about reduction in deaths and injuries from road accidents, it does not mention how public health will be addressed. Table 2 below contrasts the Land Transport Management Act 2003 which refers to economic development and sustainability with the 2009 GPS, which places more emphasis on economic growth and productivity.

**Figure 1** New Zealand land transport policy and planning framework

Source: New Zealand Government (2009 p.6)
Table 2 Comparison of Land Transport Management Act 2003 and GPS 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land Transport Management Act 2003</th>
<th>GPS 2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Requires the GPS to contribute in achieving affordable, integrated, safe, responsive and sustainable land transport system. Also requires the GPS to contribute to the following objectives:</td>
<td>Short to medium-term impacts:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) Assisting economic development.</td>
<td>(i) Economic growth and productivity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Assisting access and personal security.</td>
<td>(ii) Reduction is deaths and injuries from road crashes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) Improving access and mobility.</td>
<td>(iii) A secure transport network.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iv) Protecting and promoting public health.</td>
<td>(iv) Better accessibility to markets and employment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(v) Ensuring environmental sustainability</td>
<td>(v) Reduction in environmental effects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(vi) Positive health outcomes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: New Zealand Government (2009), NZ Land Transport Management Act 2003

The GPS (New Zealand (2009, p.13) provides funding ranges for various activity classes. For the purpose of analysis, this study has taken up average funding range figures to analyse year-wise funding trends for four most relevant classes as shown by Figure 2 below. Figure 2 shows that the government’s main priority is to invest heavily in ‘new and improved infrastructure for State highways’ in next five years. Surprisingly, the investment trend in this activity class goes much higher than $1000 million by the year 2014-15. Other three class activities also show rising trends but they remain slightly above $200 million by 2014-15 as shown by Figure 2 below.

Figure 2 Annual funding (in $ millions) by the NZ government for four transport activity classes

Source: The author’s (based on average figures taken from New Zealand Government (2009))
Pakistan land transport policy

Pakistan has a centrally administered system of governance in which the federal government plays a pivotal role in formulating and implementing policies (see, for example, Imran 2010). Transport policy-making in Pakistan is carried out both at federal and provincial levels. According to the World Bank (2007, p.1), ‘The transport system in Pakistan generates high economic losses from a mismatch between supply and demand for transport services and supporting infrastructure’.

It is estimated (see, for example, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) (2006) that Pakistan’s future transport demand will grow by three times the present demand by 2025, in accordance with the targets set by Planning Commission (2005). At the federal level, the Planning Commission of Pakistan is the top policy-making body in Pakistan and is entrusted with economic planning, development and reforms. It is recognised (see, for example, JICA (2006) that most transport policy documents in Pakistan are informed by the guidelines and vision established by the Planning Commission. Table 3 below compares various factors identified by the federal government of Pakistan with those identified by Chohan et al. (2011) in Table 1 above. ADB (2008) suggests that reduced transport impact on Pakistan’s economy is not due to lack of planning, rather to the inability of responsible government bodies to develop a comprehensive transport policy through coordinated efforts.

At the provincial level, the Punjab Urban Unit (2008) identifies some issues confronted by the Punjab transport sector. Cites are viewed as engines of growth and as places of exchange and flow where the role of society is to accumulate, redistribute and concentrate capital (Planning & Development Board (2010b). Another document (Planning & Development Board 2010a) outlines the vision, objectives, new initiatives and strategic interventions of the Punjab Government in relation to provincial transport policy.

Table 3 Comparison of Pakistan and NZ Planning Commission (2007) and theoretical links

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy document</th>
<th>Main issues discussed</th>
<th>Closest common factors in comparison to theoretical links</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Planning Commission (2007), Government of Pakistan</td>
<td>An efficient transport system is defined as one that towards economic growth through: (i) Lowering domestic production costs thoroughly timely delivery of raw materials. (ii) Enhancing economies of</td>
<td>• Travel cost of individual and freight. • Production cost • Impacts on local and regional economy. • Jobs creation and</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ADB = Asian Development Bank; JICA = Japan International Cooperation Agency; NZ = New Zealand.
Government of the Punjab (2010) shows an allocation of Rs\(^2\) 32885 million for road projects in the Punjab for the year 2010-11. Figure 3 below shows projected funding increases.

**Figure 3** Annual roads construction funding (Rs in million) trend in the Punjab Province, Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Roads</th>
<th>Urban development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010-11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2011-12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012-13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The author’s (based on average figures/data from Government of the Punjab (2010))

**Discussion**

Having discussed relevant transport policy documents both in New Zealand and Pakistan, we now return to the four basic questions of phronetic planning research methodology. The New

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\(^2\) 32,885 million Pakistani Rupees = 476.8 million New Zealand Dollars based on exchange rate of 1 NZD = 69 PKR as at Nov 2011.
Zealand transport policy documents do not distinguish between ‘economic development’ and ‘economic growth’. Table 2 shows that the Land Transport Management Act 2003 requires the GPS to assist economic development but the whole thrust of the 2009 GPS is on achieving economic growth and productivity. The term ‘economic development’ is not used in the document. Rather, it would seem that the terms ‘economic development’ and ‘economic growth and productivity’ are used synonymously. As noted above, the 2009 GPS has two key goals: reducing congestion and improving safety. While congestion is seen by the government as having adverse effects on economic growth and productivity, in fact, the implications of congestion relief for economic growth are contested. While some researchers consider that congestion is detrimental to economic growth, others consider congestion to be an indicator of prosperity.

In the case of Pakistan, we do not find any tangible transport policy mechanism that could be followed both at federal and provincial levels. The demand and policy for building more roads derive their strength from the guidelines set by the Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan. The Planning Commission (2005) envisages Pakistan to be an industrialised country by the year 2025 which, arguably, is not only over-ambitious but unrealistic as well, keeping in view the country’s ongoing deteriorating economic performance coupled with political instability. Such a statement may qualify for what Flyvbjerg (2008) refers to as ‘over-optimism’ and ‘misrepresentation’ to gain political mileage. Pakistan does not have a separate Ministry of Transport both at federal and provincial levels and the transport sector is dealt with in conjunction with other federal and provincial subjects. This factor is also reflective of the government’s lack of transport vision.

**Concluding remarks**

While New Zealand’s land transport legislation and policy framework provides a clear set of institutional arrangements for governing transport there are tensions between national interest and local/regional priorities. The GPS is a vehicle for political priorities to displace technical and theoretical justifications for transport projects. These political assertions are likely to result in underestimation of costs, risks and completion times of transport projects and overestimation of the benefits. This scenario brings the New Zealand transport policies under the ambit and influence of what is known as the theory of ‘planning fallacy’, a situation in

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3 See, for example, Eicher and Turnovosky (1998), Weisbrod (2008), DeSerpa (1971) and Mohring et al. (1987).
4 See, for example, Downs (2004).
which policymakers underestimate the costs, risks and completion times associated with the planned actions as well as overestimate benefits.

While transport policy-making in Pakistan lacks the clear government policy guidance and framework for co-ordination of national and regional/local planning that is found in New Zealand, in Pakistan, as in New Zealand, a similar politically-driven agenda of pursuit of economic development through investment in roads is evident. This comparison of Pakistan and New Zealand indicates that, in both developed and developing countries, transport investment is seen as having a similar role. However, as the theoretical literature indicates, there is a need to critically examine the assumed linkages between investment in roads and economic benefits. Without a more critical examination, there is a risk that these benefits are overstated and the costs underestimated.

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Women and sustainable urban transport in Pakistan: key points from the literature

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Abstract
Transport is one of the key issues in society. It is important as it directly affects the lives of all men and women. Women in developing countries are generally the marginalised segment of the society, including when it comes to transport. Their mobility is restricted due to the strong patriarchal norms and ‘gender-blind’ nature of transport policy and planning. This restricted mobility serves as a hindrance for their social and economic well-being in the society. By reviewing the key points from the literature on women and transport, it becomes evident that there is a dearth of academic studies being undertaken regarding gender relationships and transport systems in society. The present article highlights the need for a study of women’s mobility, gendered social norms, and transport systems in developing countries, particularly Pakistan.

Introduction
The relationship between transport and people’s lives has long been established in academic debates (for example see, Banister, 2002; Hamilton and Jenkins, 2000; Kenworthy, 2011; Low and Gleeson, 2003; Porter, 2011;Too and Earl, 2010). Generally, these authors agree that people’s development has a positive correlation with mobility. This speaks to the importance of effective and efficient transport system. Although important, transport has remained something of a ‘Cinderella’ within the development studies discourse and has not been given due attention because it has been considered as a ‘technical’ field, left mostly to engineers, planners, environmentalists and economists (Simon, 1996, 1). As a result, the technical and eco-environmental concerns have taken much attention in transport studies and planning, while social aspects were largely sidelined if not ignored (Rajé, 2007). This is quite serious a situation, as socially blind transport policy may have a negative impact on the society: it can prevent or restrict people from accessing different services and activities. The problems of restricted mobility impact differently on different groups of people, such as
disabled, elderly, families with children, poor people, and women (Social Exclusion Unit, 2003).

Women are one group whose mobility is restricted in developing countries such as Pakistan. In urban areas of Pakistan, the transport system produces more worries for women commuters than men (Dawn, 2011). The state of the transport system in Pakistan is very poor overall, keeping in view the current transport policy and institutional structure of Pakistan (Imran, 2010). This transport system is not taking into account the real transport needs of the marginal groups, or ‘80% of the population’ (Friedmann, 2007, 995), rather facilitating the well-off people who have the resources to own private vehicles. Women face particular issues regarding transport, including the burden of being harassed. As Asdar Ali (2010) reports with reference to the city of Karachi, Pakistan, ‘poor women in particular may be subject to harassment in the narrow alleys of industrial townships, in long waits at the bus stops of the unpredictable public transport system’ (p. 315). The situation is not different in other cities of Pakistan as well. Public transport in Islamabad and Rawalpindi (twin cities) largely consists of minibuses or vans which have a capacity of 18 passengers and only two seats (front seats) are reserved for women (Majeed, 2011). It is argued that transport is reflective of the broader societal structure of the gendered relationships (Law, 2002). This argument is studied, keeping in view the structural, social and spatial dimensions of gendered relationships in cities of Pakistan. Here, the key points in the literature on ‘gender and transport’ have been reviewed and analysed and a case has been built to study women and transport in Pakistan.

**Key Points in Literature on Women and Transport**

Women’s limited access to transport serves as a constraint to their ability to access health care, education and other social services. It is important to understand and respond to their transport-related needs for their betterment (Riverson et al., 2006). Early studies by Rosenbloom (1978) and Giuliano (1979) have made a significant contribution in the body of literature on ‘women and transport’. Both these studies were pivotal not only because they have raised concerns regarding women’s travel and mobility, but also these pioneer studies emphasised the different travel needs of women and men. Similarly, Hamilton and Jenkins’ (1989) study was also important and pioneer as it highlighted the ‘gender-blind’ nature of transport policy in the past. Levy (1992) also pointed out that traditional transport planning has not taken into consideration the needs of different social and income groups. As a result,
low-income groups, especially low income-women, are excluded from the transport system in the urban areas as this system does not fulfil their travel needs.

One of the detailed examinations of the women and transport nexus has been carried out by Fernando and Porter (2002). Their study ‘Balancing the Load’ was an important one in the spectrum of women and transport. This study was managed by the International Forum for Rural Transport and Development (IFRTD) and it gathered case studies from 15 countries across Africa and Asia. The case studies looked into the uneven access of men and women to transport and also the impact of transport provision projects on the lives of women. The study highlighted the need for incorporating gender issues into the transport related projects and to make transport ‘gender sensitive’. This study has elaborated some of the key issues of women in the transport system, yet this was a continuation of the studies conducted on women’s travel patterns in the rural areas during the 1980s and 1990s, mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa, and financed by the World Bank (for example see, Ahmed, 2000; Barwell and Calvo, 1989; Barwell, 1996; Doran, 1996; Howe and Bryceson, 1993; Calvo, 1994). Although these studies were useful in highlighting the need for incorporating a gender dimension into the transport system, these were predominantly from the perspective of bridging women’s needs with regards to their access to emergency health care and reducing their travel burden (Riverson et al., 2005).

Porter (2011) also highlights that in many rural areas across Sub-Saharan Africa, females have severe constraints on their mobility which reduce their chances of accessing education, health care and markets. These constraints are partly due to the poor infrastructure and transport services, but largely due to the social and patriarchal values pertaining to women’s mobility. Although women are largely involved in the off-farm market related activities and have to travel short distances to nearby towns, they are supposed to come back early and not travel without asking the males in the families, otherwise they are labelled as ‘bad (uncaring) wives’ (p. 68) and might be beaten. Female students also have problems, as they are fearful of going to school alone on foot because there are chances of sexual harassment. This issue was also highlighted by Porter and Hampshire (2011) in the African context where they studied the pattern of girls and boys going to school. They found out that girls’ mobility was restricted when compared to boys, because of the fear of sexual harassment on the way to school as well as collecting water and fuel wood from the woods.

On very similar lines, many studies have been carried out trying to see the impact of transport policy on women’s mobility. For example, Mahapa and Mashiri (2001) evaluate the impact of a road development project in Tshitwe village in Northern Province of South
Africa. This project was meant to increase the economic, education and social opportunities of rural people by providing them better infrastructure for transport. On the contrary, Mahapa and Mashiri (2001) found out that this ‘sophisticated’ and ‘high tech’ road development project did not benefit rural people at large and women in particular. This project did not cater for the travel patterns of women, which is generally to collect water, firewood and going to work in the subsistence farm. They maintain that there is a heightened need for the reorientation of the transport projects to be sensitive to the needs of women and other excluded groups.

Hamilton and Jenkins (2000) also present the progress made on the project ‘gender audit for public transport’, commissioned by the Mobility Unit of the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions. A Gender Audit in public transport is a tool which could outline the travel pattern of men and women and can help design strategies for inclusion of women in public transport. The authors argue that women have distinct travel needs, which are not being recognised by transport corporations. Women have to manage multiple roles including care of children and adults, besides coping with paid and unpaid work. Their situation gets exaggerated when there is infrequent or unreliable public transport, on which they traditionally have relied heavily for daily travel. In response to this, women are switching to cars, which is alarming in authors’ eyes, as this will reinforce the social exclusion and add to environmental issues. It is also not viable commercially, as women are the prime users of public transport and it will be a disaster for the public bus operators to keep women excluded.

In a related article, Schintler (2001) outlines that the transport planning and engineering practices in the United States and other developed countries have not remained ‘gender neutral’ and in fact these are insensitive to the changing needs and roles of women in the society. For example, according to her, the workforce participation of women has increased to 122% since 1969 which is in contrast to male workforce participation which increased by only 47%. This, coupled with the concerns for personal safety, their roles as primary caretakers in the households, and dispersal of population, results in varied lengths and frequencies of travel as well as an increased motorisation trend in women. Similarly, Næss (2008) argues that the urban form or structure has an influence on the daily travel patterns of men and women. In the Copenhagen region, women’s accessibility was equal to men in the inner districts but was unequal in suburban areas.

In a very useful discussion on gender and mobility with reference to the New Zealand city of Dunedin, Law (2002) stresses the need for a comprehensive conceptualisation of
gender and its relationship with daily travel. She emphasises that most of the work of feminist geographers and historians is based on the assumption that daily mobility practices in a society are shaped by gender relations. She highlights the need to go beyond this simple construction and presents three different ways of viewing gender. Firstly, ‘gender as a pattern of social relations’ with the implication of gendered access to resources and distinct patterns of behaviour based on this. Secondly, ‘gender as a cultural system of meaning’ highlights the cultural meaning attached to different objects, spaces and activities, which are based on gender. Thirdly, ‘gender as a component of personal identity’ leads to a ‘sense that individuals develop of themselves, and the way that they incorporate mobility skills into that embodied subjectivity’ (p. 443). She stresses that the transport pattern is not only based on the gender relations of the society, but at the same time constitutes the gender relations.

There are very few studies that have seen gender related issues in transport sector in the urban areas in developing countries. These studies have been conducted predominantly from the perspective of the World Bank or other development institutions (for example; Paul-Majumder and Shefali, 1997; Shefali, 2000; Kudat, et al., 1996; Gomez, 2000; Astrop, 1996). All these studies have a concern that women have obstacles in accessing the different transport means that men don’t have. Mostly, women have less access to motorised means of transport, they seldom use bicycles or other intermediate transport means, and they rely on public transport or walking. Srinivasan (2005) tries to find out the influence of relative location (residence) on the travel pattern of low income women, generally located away from the job or business centres in Chennai, India. She found out that better public transport in the central and southern zones help men and women to get to their jobs even though they were not located close to their work, which was not the case for the northern zones. This implies that people can travel quite a long distance when the quality of public transport is good. But she laments that the travel behaviour and needs of the low-income group especially the women, are not taken into account in transport planning. This is important as Chennai has invested Rs. 7 billion in rail network to improve the transit-based accessibility of different zones, but has not been patronised by the low-income families because the fares are higher than the buses and the railway stations are poorly linked with the bus or taxi networks, which even make it harder for the middle income families to use this service.

From a psychological perspective, Odufuwa (2008) had studied the gender differentials of mobility stress coping mechanism in the city of Lagos, Nigeria. The travel-related sources of stress included: long waits at bus stops, prolonged travel time, and uncomfortable and expensive modes of transport. The study revealed that mobility stress and
transport related insecurity was higher among women, compared to men, which implied that women had ‘less access to and utilisation of comfortable services transport, and are therefore more transport-insecure than their male counterparts’ (p. 132). In the same Nigerian context, Asiyanbola (2007) elaborated the effects of urban transport infrastructure and intra-urban travel on the psychological well-being of women and men. According to her, gender differences were found: women had more negative effects of distressed infrastructure and travel compared to men. Both these studies showed the negative psychological effects of travel and recommended that transport and urban planning should include women’s concerns into their policies and should cater for the special needs of women in order to make the travel a pleasant experience for them.

Conclusion
From the above literature review, it becomes evident that there is a dearth of studies on the issue of gender and transport in which gender has been taken as a symbolic concept, which covers the societal structure and associated values and norms and how these values impinge on the transport pattern of women in the urban areas. Women in urban areas of Pakistan are discrimination based on the patriarchal norms of society. They are also not considered as a viable group in the society at large: starting from the home, to the whole levels of their upbringing, they are discriminated from the early age, for example if only one child can attend a good school, a boy will be chosen above a girl.

Boys are considered as a future earning and support source for the parents in the old age and hence are to be invested in as far as education or other privileges are considered. Girls are considered to belong to ‘other’ family as they are to leave the parents’ house after marriage and are not to be invested in, rather are to be protected. One the one hand, these norms persist in society, but on the other hand these values are also changing especially in the urban areas with the rise in literacy, information flow from private media, and the economic needs of people. Asdar Ali (2010) reports in the context of Pakistan that ‘in recent years, because of economic pressures and the dissolution of extended families in urban areas, many more women are also working for wages than in the past; women are leaving domestic spaces to work in the expanding service sector’ (p. 315). In this context, there is hardly any academic study upon the nexus of social change in gender relationships on the one hand and negotiation of these changing relationships in the transport system.
References


Noise pollution from high-speed and conventional railways in Japan

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A modern railway system is essential for Japan’s economy. Yet there are a number of negative aspects, particularly in the environmental area, with noise and vibration being prominent amongst these. This paper will examine the causes of the problems and the countermeasures introduced in mitigation.

Conventional trains
There are two fundamental types of noise associated with railways, rolling noise at lower speeds and aerodynamic noise at high speeds. The rolling noise is produced because neither the wheels nor the rails are perfectly smooth, and when the wheels run over the track their action leads to vibration and noise (Kalivoda 2001: 150). The vibrations are transmitted through the wheel, lengthwise along the rails, and transversely via the sleepers. Noise is produced that is transmitted laterally away from the tracks. The noise is broad-band, with higher frequencies becoming more important as speed increases.

Conventional trains have tended to use cast-iron brake blocks with significant roughness, with wavelengths of about 40~80mm. At train speeds of 100 kph, this causes track vibrations with the track radiating most sound. In other words, both the wheels and the track are important in producing noise and vibration. Low frequency noise and vibration can be felt physically e.g. when standing near a passing heavy freight train. At higher frequencies, rooms in buildings adjacent to the tracks may vibrate, with these vibrations possibly being quite substantial.

With typical track construction, the rails rest on top of sleepers, which themselves rest on ballast material. This ballast can absorb some of the noise produced by the trains. Less common, but increasingly used, are slab tracks which do not have any ballast. These have become more popular because, although more expensive to install, they have lower maintenance costs. A negative point is that the lack of ballast results in a noisier track (by a factor of 2~4 dB); partly this is due to the absence of acoustic absorption by the ballast, and partly because the slab track has softer rail fasteners. The noise can be reduced somewhat,
though, by using a stiffer support and smaller rail. Also, high-speed trains now use disc brakes, which are much quieter than the conventional block brakes.

**High-speed shinkansen trains**
The high-speed Japanese shinkansen trains run on elevated tracks, which can be noisy and involve visual pollution (the tracks can appear rather ugly when cutting across swathes of open countryside). However, the elevation helps avoid the problem of trans-Rayleigh booms, which may be encountered if high-speed trains run across soft ground, as was experienced in Sweden (Krylov 2001: 251). These booms are somewhat analogous to the sonic booms produced by supersonic aircraft.

In 1975 trial runs were performed on the extension of the Sanyo shinkansen from Okayama to Hakata in Kyushu, a section of track noteworthy for its numerous tunnels. Local residents complained bitterly about explosive sounds and window rattling near long tunnels with slab tracks (Maeda 2001:187-189). At first the experts were totally baffled as to the cause of the problem, and the only short-term solution they had was to run the trains at conventional speeds over those sections of track, although this negated the advantages of having high-speed trains.

The explanation turned out to be as follows. The trains enter the tunnels at high speed, exerting pressure on the air in front. This air has no place to go except forward in the direction the train is running. Consequently the micropressure waves build up in front of the train, with the air being more and more compressed. Finally, at the end of the tunnel the pressure is released and this results in an explosive noise emanating from the tunnel exit.

Various countermeasures at the tunnels were later introduced. One was the construction of tunnel ‘hoods’ at the entrance to the tunnels with side openings to help dissipate the initial pressure waves; these are often about 50 metres in length. Another countermeasure was the building of small side branches in the tunnels so that some of the air would be forced sideways into these branches, where the energy could be partially dissipated as heat. (These are known technically as Helmholtz resonators.) In addition, where two tunnels were adjacent to each other, a shelter was installed with slits to allow air to escape.

Countermeasures were also introduced for the trains themselves. Firstly, the cross-sectional area of the train was reduced. Secondly, there was optimization of the train nose (better design, lighter materials etc.). (The reason for the variety of train noses seen today is that the critical noise-creating areas are along the sides of the trains rather than the noses.)
Pantographs are a further significant source of noise, and although the specific designs may vary, all shinkansen pantographs have shields to try to minimize the noise. The noise is caused both by contact between the pantograph and the overhead wires and also by air friction with the pantograph and its shields (Hood 2006: 173).

The construction of noise barriers alongside the track can be quite effective in decreasing the amount of noise that radiates to the surrounding area. Most of these tend to be made of concrete, and while effective, can result in a boring journey for any passenger sitting on the lower deck of a double-decker shinkansen because their view would consist solely of blank concrete.

Spring 2011 saw the unveiling of the latest design of shinkansen, named “Fastech 360”, which was introduced on the Tohoku shinkansen route. The “Fastech” stood for “fast technology” and the 360 was supposed to denote the maximum speed at which the train would operate i.e. 360 kph. Unfortunately, the top speed proved to be impractical for a couple of reasons, resulting in the actual maximum operating speed being 320 kph (Japan Times 2007). Firstly, the train required too long a distance to come to a complete stop from the maximum speed, despite the innovation of using what appear to be “cat’s ears”, whereby flaps are raised vertically from the train’s top surface so as to operate rather like an aircraft’s flaps for braking. The second reason was that noise levels still exceeded the levels permitted, even though several noise-reducing techniques had been added. The noise-reducing techniques included a low-angled pantograph to reduce aerodynamic noise (and the reduction to the use of just one pantograph); smooth fittings between the various coaches; and wheel shrouds to prevent the radiation of noise from the train (Nikkei Business 2005; Endo 2005; East Japan Railway Company 2005).

Noise regulations and legal cases
When the Japanese shinkansen commenced operation in 1964, there were no regulations concerning noise and vibration. This is not to say that everyone was happy with the situation; indeed, many complaints were received. It was not until 1975, though, that action was taken, with regulations being introduced for shinkansen trains only (i.e. not for conventional trains). The regulations that were brought in stipulated that the maximum noise levels should be 75 decibels for industrial areas and 70 decibels for residential areas. It was also possible for sections of track to be re-classified. On occasion, this has worked out rather strangely, as pointed out by Hood (2006: 175). If new housing is constructed near the shinkansen tracks, the area may be re-classified as being residential rather than, say, industrial. It seems slightly
odd that the railway operator is thus penalized with stricter requirements regarding noise whereas the construction was carried out in the full knowledge that there was an existing rail track.

There were a number of protests about the noise from shinkansen trains, with the most noteworthy case being that of the protests that occurred in the Nagoya region. Each day 218 trains passed along the line at an average of four-minute intervals at speeds of over 200 kph. Noise levels exceeded 90 phons, and vibration was also a problem. The plaintiffs alleged that this caused interference with various aspects of everyday life such as conversations, phone calls, TV reception, and sleep disturbance, as well as causing general psychological harm. Initial negotiations with JNR (Japan National Railways, the fore-runner of today’s JR companies) and the ministries failed to find a solution; court action began in 1974. The railway unions supported the protests and slowed trains down to 110 kph in the disputed areas, although this still failed to bring noise down to the levels demanded (Yoshimi et al 1999:327-330).

At the start of shinkansen operations in 1964, noise countermeasures were inadequate, and there were virtually no countermeasures for vibration. Later, noise barriers were built, reducing noise levels by about 10 phons. However, reduction to an environmental standard of 70 phons was regarded as being almost impossible.

The judgement was handed down in 1980, and some compensation was paid for past suffering. However, the shinkansen was seen as having an essential social role: it was viewed as safe, economically important, and fast. To reduce noise further would require trains to run at slower speeds, therefore reducing the value of their social role. The social role was seen as being a big priority. An appeal was launched, but in 1985 the court upheld the earlier verdict.

Regarding conventional trains, there was a major case in Yokohama in 1964 when Minato Kita and Kanagawa wards planned a new freight line through residential districts (Yoshimi et al 1999: 331). A residents’ opposition alliance was formed in 1966, and was very vocal. Nevertheless, construction went ahead and the line was completed in 1979, and the following year an out-of-court settlement was reached. JNR agreed that noise in residential areas would be less than 55 phons and vibration less than 0.3 mm per second.

In other court cases (in Osaka in 1988 and Nagano in 1994) judgements stated that in order to stop train operations there would have to be a very significant breaking of legal limits. In other words, the social role of existing routes was seen to be of major importance.

Another landmark case occurred with the Odakyu commuter line in Tokyo (Yoshimi et al 1999: 332-333). A total of 224 people claimed compensation for noise and vibration
between Shinjuku and Seijo Gakuen stations. Nearly 800 trains passed each day and ran from 5am in the morning to 1am the next morning. The complaints went to the committee associated with the Prime Minister’s office who ruled on matters relating to pollution, and they decided that the people who were suffering greatly from the noise (defined as >70 dB, or a peak level for sleep of >85 dB) should receive the sum of 3,000 yen per month. The ruling was the first on noise pollution involving railways other than shinkansen services (Japan Times 1998). The plaintiffs were not happy, and filed a series of lawsuits.

In September 2010 Odakyu were ordered to pay nearly 11 million yen to 42 people who live near the tracks. This is noteworthy in that it was the first time a court had ordered a railway company to pay compensation in a collective lawsuit over noise caused by an existing line. It was also the first time that tolerable noise limits were stipulated by a court for an existing railway, with limits set for daytime (7 am – 10 pm) at 65dB, and at night at 60dB.

It can thus be concluded that railway noise is now being more seriously considered by the court, although the residents’ position is still relatively weak as priority is given to the importance of the railways’ social role.

**Subway lines**

In certain urban mass transit systems, subway trains may adopt rubber tyres, e.g. Sapporo in Hokkaido. The use of the rubber makes the trains much quieter, which invites the question of whether rubber is a suitable material for use with all trains. However, although the additional flexibility of rubber would reduce excitation of the wheel and rail, rubber is not necessarily a quiet material (Thompson 2009: 4-5). Thompson compares the noise at 85 kph of a 40 ton lorry (the noise being dominated by tyre noise) and a 100-tonne tank wagon on a freight train. Both would operate at about the same noise level. However, the tank wagon carries about 2 to 3 times the load and a rubber-tyred wagon would therefore need 2 to 3 times as many wheels.

Modern train braking systems (using disc brakes) tend to be much quieter (by up to 10 dB). The use of porous road surfaces would reduce lorry noise, but on balance the noise from trains would be much quieter. In addition, with steel wheels on steel tracks, the rolling resistance (and therefore energy use) is much less than for rubber tyres. Although rubber-tyred trains may run on very smooth track (such as can be the case with mass transit systems) they would not be practical for conventional tracks.
Conclusion
From the beginning, noise from trains in Japan has not been given a high priority. This has now changed with the shinkansen, where noise requirements are the strictest in the world for high-speed trains. Engineers are attempting to have the shinkansen operating at ever-increasing speeds; this means that the noise levels would be continuously increasing unless adequate mitigating measures can be developed. Although the Fastech is now operating at only 320 kph, further noise improvements will probably allow faster operation in the future.

In the case of conventional railways, noise issues are indeed being given a higher priority than in the past, but the situation of residents remains weak, and there are unlikely to be major changes. The use of rubber tyres seems practical only in the case of subway systems, and not general tracks.

References
Global/local links and connections
The right stuff: Ross Intermediate School's trip to India

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Introduction
In November 2010, eight students from Palmerston North’s Ross Intermediate School landed in Kolkata, India. This was the beginning of a two-week trip that had been in the planning for almost two years. In this paper, I describe some findings of research carried out on the excursion. I begin with some background to and a description of the excursion, and outline the research.

Background to the excursion
At the beginning of the 2009, year 7 students and their parents were invited to an ‘India trip’ information meeting. Of the 50 to 60 parents and students who attended there was sufficient interest to begin planning a cultural excursion for October 2010. Parents were not required to make a commitment until the next year, but from that initial meeting the 15 interested students began their weekly school-based India-trip preparation sessions.

More than a year into the preparation for the trip, in March 2010, terrorist threats were directed at the Commonwealth Games, to be held in New Delhi at the same time as the planned school trip. As a result, the School’s Board of Trustees postponed the trip, and then rescheduled it for late November—well after the Games would be over. By this time the student numbers had dropped to just eight so it was decided that the planned student-and teacher-only trip would be opened up to parents. In the end, the group comprised two teachers, three parents, a grandparent, and eight students. They set off for India on 26 November 2010.

The trip
After landing in Kolkata they spent the next four days visiting markets, monuments, a modern shopping mall, Mother Teresa’s tomb, they went on a guided tour of West Bengal’s Government buildings, and had time at a mid-range private Anglo-Indian school. They then flew to Jaipur to visit palaces, forts, and spend an afternoon at a Government school. While in Jaipur they also managed, at the last minute, to organise tickets to the New Zealand versus
India cricket test match (thanks to NZ Cricket). Next was a train trip to Agra to visit the Taj Mahal, amongst other world heritage listed monuments. The final destination was Mumbai, via Delhi. Here they went to markets, a national park, Elephanta Island, and visited an elite ‘Kangaroo Kids’ school. The three visits to very different schools gave the students an insight into a range of Indian school life.

Overall the two-week trip was extremely successful. There were no accidents, nor was there any real illness. They ate local food throughout—including Indian versions of McDonalds and KFC. The students (and adults) were in good spirits right through, not appearing to be overly homesick or to suffer unduly from culture shock at any stage.

The research
I approached the principal about the feasibility of carrying out research with the trip. He was enthusiastic, seeing it as an add-on to the trip. I had, by this time, searched for research-based articles or reports of similar school trips, and found nothing comparable.¹ This surprised me given the number of overseas school trips that occur and convinced me of the merit of getting a project together.

I developed the research with three distinct groups, and three phases: the groups were the students, their parents, and accompanying staff; the phases included pre-trip expectations (of the students, the parents and the teachers), observations and reflections during the trip, and post-trip reflections. I carried out focus group and individual interviews in all three research phases, and added to the second, the India phase; the hallmark anthropological research method of participant-observation.

Findings
In the last part of the paper I will look at achievements of the trip, but first I look at a key perception that emerged. All involved with the trip commented that it had comprised the ‘right’ ingredients, over a range of attributes. They identified specific requirements that had been met in this trip to India, which would not necessarily have been required for trips to other destinations. From the students’ perspective this was expressed in terms of who could manage such a trip. They felt that only the ‘right’ sort of person would cope with, let alone enjoy, such an experience, as I elaborate upon shortly. From the parents’ perspective, it was thought that the combination of involvement of the right staff, and the right student

¹ The research I did find that had some connection with school cultural excursions included: Byram & Feng, 2006; Furnham, 2004; Lareau, 2003; Zhou, Jindal-Snape, Topping, & Todman, 2008.
preparation had led to the trip’s success. The teacher interviews focussed on the trip being the right combination of preparation, timing, planning and personnel.

The right stuff – from the student’s perspective
I will look first at the student perspective on this theme, or perceptions, by working chronologically through key interview findings.

Students’ pre-trip concerns:
- Getting sick from eating bad food or water or from rabies or malaria
- Insulting the culture
- Being homesick, and not getting enough sleep
- Have trouble coping with beggars, crowds
- Worried about thieves, getting lost, river ride
- Saying something (in Hindi) and it coming out wrong

Students, pre-trip, were excited about:
- The flights, train trips
- Seeing the Taj Mahal, Fatephur Sikri, Jaipur palace, Bollywood
- Eating local food
- Shopping, and riding elephants

Trip observations
From what I observed the students managed well in all respects. Food was never a problem—they were prepared for the change of diet; they were responsible and courteous when we visited schools and tourist attractions; they asked informed questions of our guides, and actively took care of each other. They managed, with no complaint, some quite difficult travel experiences, such as very early morning train connections, heavy bags that they had to manage themselves, a no questions asked, instant evacuation from the Jaipur cricket ground, as well as being hassled at times by street vendors. They seemed to form a close-knit group quite quickly through their shared experiences. That they managed well and enjoyed the trip was demonstrated by their post-trip interview reflections, which I now turn to.

Post-trip summary of reflections from students:
They loved it and definitely want to go back sometime.

A highlight was having the chance to get to know other people on the trip.

Favourite places included Taj Mahal, and Calcutta for the experience of ‘difference’.

Given how much they had enjoyed the experience I was surprised at their response when I asked (in two separate focus groups) about whether they would advise other students to take part in a trip to India, if it were offered. They were in agreement, commenting that they would be careful about whom they would recommend such a trip to: ‘You have to be the right sort of person to cope with and enjoy a trip like that.’ When asked to elaborate they said, ‘You can’t be too fussy about dirt or cleanliness, need to be adventurous, and need to be able to cope with beggars, stray dogs, and crowds.’ In terms of this comment, when I asked if they felt that they had the ‘right’ dispositions for such an excursion they were unanimous in saying that they had, giving examples of what they had coped with. From their comments as well as my own observations I suggest that they were a group of students who did manage to take everything in their stride. They experienced little of the culture shock that is often reported as part of a first trip to India, and other places which are quite different from one’s usual cultural setting. The fact that they managed the new cultural setting so well indicates, I suggest, that they had been extremely well prepared for the experience. The principal who accompanied the trip also alludes to this in this post-trip interview:

What they got out of it is hard to put into words. It was seeing them embrace it all. They saw what we saw, and handled it remarkably sensitively. They had an understanding of the social context so they didn’t laugh at things that they might have here. The big lead-in gave them some tools (Principal Wayne Codyre, February 2011).

The accompanying parents also remarked on the students’ preparedness: for example, two days into the trip one speculated on the reason the students were coping well with Kolkata: ‘Their preparation has been awesome—and that’s helped the adults as well’ and another added that ‘the kids are adjusting better than the adults’.
Their preparation
In their 21 months of school-based lessons they had acquired some Hindi language skills, learnt to cook and appreciate Indian cuisine, and were educated about cultural and religious practices, especially those relating to Hinduism and Islam. They also learnt some Indian history, particularly of the regions and monuments they would be visiting. They were advised about what they could expect to see and experience, and were even prepared for the international flights—which for most was also a new experience.

The students didn’t ever comment on the fact that their lessons were more than just fun or interesting; that they might have been responsible for their positive experience of India. Rather, they tended to ‘naturalise’ their experience. In reflecting on the way they had managed so well, and in judging that others may not, they assumed that they had, naturally or innately, the right disposition for this experience: one that enabled them to manage well in a completely different cultural environment.

To some extent the students were probably correct in their assessment of their personal qualities and abilities: their parents would not have put their children forward for the excursion if they didn’t think they could manage it. Without the preparation, however, it’s unlikely that their experience would have been as rewarding or as relatively trouble-free as it was. Their preparation meant that there was very little they saw that they hadn’t anticipated seeing—they were prepared for signs of extreme poverty, pollution, congestion, different languages being spoken, and evidence of different religions and cultural values.

The right stuff—from the parents’ perspective
I look now, briefly, at parent perceptions of the trip being comprised of ‘the right stuff’. First looking at themes that came from pre-trip interviews about why their children were involved in the excursion:

A summary of pre-trip comments from parents:

- Want their children to experience as much as possible so take up any opportunities that come their way.
- Sending their child because it’s such a good opportunity to go somewhere they wouldn’t go with their family.
- It was the opportunity to have an ‘authentic’ experience.
• Would only send children if it has real educational benefits (history, language, culture taught as part of the experience)—that is, not just for a holiday.
• Going with a regional expert so it’s a great opportunity.

The regional expert was the trip’s lead teacher, an Anglo-Indian from India who is an Indo-phile familiar with the culture, and importantly, the language. His enthusiasm for the trip was contagious—it had certainly affected the students. This was particularly important in the context of a trip to India, especially since all parents had to deal with some form and degree of negativity from others about their child’s involvement with the trip. All of the parents spoke about friends and wider family who brought up the need for caution, at least.

These are selected quotes from interviews, beginning with some I recorded before the trip:
• ‘Some friends are saying, “I’m not sure I’d let my children go there”.’
• ‘Parents of other Ross students I know are too scared to send their children to India.’
• In answer to my question exploring the reasons for this: ‘It’s partly about the money but it’s just not for everyone.’

After the trip I heard more:
• ‘There were people I couldn’t tell until she’d left because I knew they wouldn’t approve, and I didn’t want to be talked out of it.’
• ‘My parents had said “Why India?” in a pretty negative way. They thought we were mad—because of the destination but also the cost.’
• ‘If he could have, he would have stopped [named student] going.’

Negativity about travelling to India seemed to be based on stereotypes of India as overcrowded, polluted, a place where extreme poverty is obvious, and a place where travellers invariably got sick. The fact that a number of students dropped out of the trip was very likely linked to these prevailing attitudes, combined with and heightened by the terrorist threats.

As well as the Indian-born teacher, the principal accompanied the excursion. He had no previous experience of travelling in India (in fact in an interview he expressed some anxieties about how he would cope with the experience) but he is popular and trusted by
students and parents. So although there was likely to be some apprehension around whether or not a ‘good’ parent would send their child to India, the ‘right’ staff meant that this group of parents did.

The last group of research participants was the teachers. The ‘right stuff’ from their point of view was all encompassing: the students who turned out to be ‘made of the right stuff’ (or were turned into the right stuff?), the parents who added positively to the trip, the right decisions about how it would be organised, and the preparation the students had received.

Achievements of the trip
I had thought of this trip as an opportunity to increase students’ knowledge and appreciation of India, and I hoped that a positive experience would have a wider impact, for example, of dissipating some of the prevailing negativity.

When I carried out post-trip interviews with parents the first comments in response to my question about what their son or daughter got from the trip was answered in terms of how much their child had matured and become more independent and self-sufficient. They also responded to my question with comments such as these:

- ‘She has a new appreciation that there are other ways of doing things and other things are more important in other places e.g. air conditioning!’
- ‘They got ‘bone knowledge’ from the trip, rather than just being told about things. It’ll stick better.’

Overall parents felt:
- Unanimously that it had been really worthwhile.
- They would recommend other parents take up the opportunity for this sort of educational experience—as long as it was set up properly.

So while the students did learn about an Asian country, both through the trip and their preparation, it seems that other important rewards were their sense of themselves in their world, and their gains in social confidence. In terms of ‘Asia awareness’ the fact that the trip was a success will, I’m hopeful, mean that people in the wider community may alter their views, even a little, about India both as a country in itself, and as a destination, not just for
adventure seekers, but also for those who like the idea of travelling to a culturally different country. Finally, as we know, our Prime Minister visited India last week (June, 2011) and signed a $3 billion free-trade deal with the subcontinent—so it seems Ross Intermediate were spot-on in choosing India as their excursion destination.

**References:**
Museums: old collections, new responsibilities. Asian collections for 21st century New Zealanders

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The Govett-Brewster Art Gallery, New Plymouth hosts a number of artists’ residencies each year. Recent participants have included several contemporary artists from Asia whose work engages politically with displacement and dissent. By charting the evolution of their work, it is possible to see how the artists deal with transexperience—where memories and references to homelands are reconfigured in new sites while simultaneously engaging with that cultural environment.

In general, exhibitions of contemporary art are authored by curators working in a closed relationship with artists, far from public view and without public intervention. It is this process of control as much as the perception that art is constructed for the cognescenti not for the masses that reinforce notions of elitism and social exclusion. While social inclusion is mandated ethically, in policies and legally, many art museums struggle to modify structural, aesthetic and academic standards which, traditionally, inform institutional and professional practices. Thus, concerns continue that art museums, can only be effective agents for social inclusion if there is a paradigmatic shift in their purpose, role and working practices (Sandell, 2003a; 45; Sandell, 2003; Fleming, 2003).

This paper attempts to open space within existing discourses of social inclusion to consider the role of artists in shifting art museum practices. By selecting contemporary artists from Asia whose practices include social collaboration to realise creative work that also engages politically with displacement and dissent, I place contemporary visual arts at the centre of dialogue on social inclusion (Bishop, 2006). Furthermore, by focussing on transnational artists I wish to suggest how current notions of diaspora are further complicated. The term diaspora has stretched in use and meaning. In an effort to overcome

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1 Social exclusion is explained empirically see, for example, Bourdieu and Darbel, 1991; Statistics New Zealand, 2003; Abasa, 2003; Codes of ethics see ICOM, 2006; Museums Aotearoa, 2003. For legal provisions see the UN Declaration of Human Rights; the Local Government Act (NZ), 2002 provides for cultural well-being. See Tlili, 2008 for how museums mediate government policies in the UK.
problems of territorialism and groupism Brubaker suggests that we think of diaspora—not as a bounded entity—but rather as a stance—as a ‘category of practice’. He suggests that this enables strong normative change. Not so much describing the world but remaking it (Brubaker, 2005). I begin the discussion with a brief introduction to the site of the installations, before exploring the contributions of artists Song Dong, Yin Xiuzhen, Alfredo and Isabel Aquilizan.

The Govett-Brewster Art Gallery in New Plymouth, founded in 1970, remains the only public art museum in New Zealand specifically focussed on the display, expression and interpretation of the art and ideas of today (Govett-Brewster, 2011). Its collection is renowned for conceptual and abstract work; its varied exhibition programme supports new media, installation and the avant-garde and it hosts artists’ residencies. In partnership with the Len Lye Foundation and the New Zealand Film Archive, the Gallery also maintains the Len Lye Collection and archive.\(^2\) It is one of the few New Zealand cultural organisations that has a twenty-year history of exhibiting contemporary visual art from the Asia region. The first installations reference the work of Beijing-based Song Dong and Yin Xiuzhen who were the last artists to participate in the Govett-Brewster’s year-long project, China in four seasons, July 2009-2010, a project developed to mark the Gallery’s 40\(^{th}\) Anniversary.

Song Dong’s work embraces performance, video installation, calligraphy, sculpture, and site-specific projects. His strength lies in a restrained capacity to invoke opposites. ‘I am interested’ he says, ‘in how the two sides of the East/West contradiction become one.’(Vergne, 2003). Song relocates our experience of art between modernity and tradition; Taoist philosophy and Western conceptual art traditions originating in the 1960s that privilege the process of construction over the finished product. For Song, these activities, indeed of most human endeavour, is self-expression. Because of this, the audience is at times tangential (Vergne, 2003).

Water Diary (1995-present) is one example. This diary, written with water on stone, has become an integral part of Song’s life, a way to release his emotions in absolute privacy, without trace. Although he has photographed this daily ritual for exhibition purposes, it is always a personal experience inspired by the memory of his own modestly lived childhood.

\(^2\) Len Lye (1901-1980) a New Zealand-born filmmaker, kinetic sculptor, painter and poet, is an internationally recognised figure noted for his distinctive contributions to the moving image.
In order to not waste precious paper and ink, Song’s father encouraged him to use water on a stone to practice his calligraphy (Vergne, 2003; Song Dong, 2004).³

Whatever topic Song approaches, his critique always manages to walk the thin line between the politic and the poetic (Vergne, 2003); the aesthetic and the anthropological (Flores in Kee, 2011:379). *Jump* (1999), a performance during which he jumped aimlessly in front of the Forbidden City in Beijing, in the middle of the absolutely indifferent crowd, reveals the importance he places on both cerebral and physical experiences. *Jump*, could find its roots in a traditional Chinese proverb: ‘Jump … no reason not to jump … no reason to jump.’ It crystallizes a sense of tradition, calls into play strategies from a history of avant-garde performance work, emphasises an aspect of the urban Chinese ‘everyday,’ and questions the status and visibility of art and culture in the world today (Vergne, 2003).

Soon after his father’s death, with the old Beijing *hutong* and the family home marked for demolition, Song persuaded his grieving mother to turn the entire contents of her home into an art installation. For 50 years the family’s imperative for survival was the Chinese concept of *wu jin qi yong* (waste not); so nothing was discarded. The assembled materials, sorted typologically, form a labyrinth of memory and experience (Song, 2005). Within the exhibition space, Song’s mother talked with museum visitors, behaviour quite at odds with her customary wariness of strangers. For Song, the private and the public is connected, then enacted as ritual in an exhibitionary context. ‘People have many selves, and perform many roles in society or in the family. If these multiple roles can emerge in the type of art I call ‘life’, then that is significant.’ (Song, 2005:77). After his mother died, Song continued with *Waste Not*. In a recent interview, holding a battered shoe that his grandfather, father, mother and he himself had worn, he said, ‘I once thought of this as stuff. I now think of it differently. It is love. And it is all that remains’.

*My daughter is my four seasons*, the work undertaken for the Govett-Brewster, is a collaboration between Song and his daughter, Song ErRui, and is a continuation of formative work the artist has undertaken with his family; first with this father (*Touching my Father*, 1998) and then with his mother (*Waste Not*, 2005)

In preparation for his three week residency in New Plymouth, the artist undertook research in the historical garden city of Suzhou. The city traces back to the Spring and Autumn Periods (770BC–476 BC) and is celebrated for its elegant gardens that flourished in the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing Dynasties (1644–1911) (Campbell, 2007).

³ See also his other works that deal with place, record and erasure such as the ground calligraphy project *Writing Time with Water* (1995-2007), Throwing a Stone: Text (1994-2006), *Eating the City Project* (2006).
One component of the exhibition is a pavilion, an aspect of Chinese garden design that offers simultaneous views of four landscapes. Inside the pavilion Song and his daughter cooked over three days creating four miniature landscapes. Each seasonal landscape was translated to video to be viewed on screens through circular apertures like the pavilion windows. The four videos: Spring, Summer, Autumn, Winter, reference both garden architecture and the visual language of traditional Chinese landscape painting. ‘Song Dong describes this as ‘borrowing’ landscape and is interested in how humanity both crafts and devours the landscape’ (Devenport, 2010). The work plays with human perceptions of nature and culture. The interior of the pavilion—the artist, his daughter and their landscape food—become the focus, reversing traditional interior-exterior positionality and expectations.

It is not clear whether Song Dong was aware of the Kuming Garden in Pukekura Park, New Plymouth before his arrival in the city. The garden, established in 2005, is a result of a sister city relationship. What is particularly interesting, when considered in terms of the diasporic imagination, is the transference of the idiom, its dependence on indigenous New Zealand flora and the hybridisation of both (Beattie, 2007).

Inspired by the quickly changing environment of her native Beijing, Yin Xiuzhen investigates the effects of globalisation in works such as Portable Cities (2002-2004). She collects discarded personal items of clothing from the community, and ‘re-purposes them’ by sewing them into recognisable model cities, housed and transported in suitcases (Pan, 2010). Yin says of her suitcase works, ‘they are a tangible symbol of the moving spirit of contemporary life. People have moved from living in a static environment to becoming souls in a constantly shifting transience […] The suitcase becomes the life support container of modern living […] the holder of the continuous construction of a human entity’ (Yin in Chang, 2003).

Yin’s works are often participatory, with local people from the site of installation donating some of their own materials, ideas, or stories. Collecting used items such as fabrics, worn clothing, shoes and yarn from various people in the communities she works in, Yin recycles and reformulates these objects into her pieces. Creating numerous installations in the Beijing environment and in Beijing galleries, Yin has made works that have incorporated inhabitants’ shoes, tiles from destroyed homes that made way for high-rise buildings, and water from a polluted river. By washing blocks of frozen polluted water with clean water in her outdoor project Washing the River (1985), Yin highlights the problems of China’s sudden urbanisation in its many forms.
While Beijing has been the focus of inspiration for much of her work, documenting the process of deconstruction and reconstruction, Yin has created work worldwide, examining cultural changes in different locations. In New Plymouth, she drew on support from 384 community participants to knit a 10.18 metre scarf, made from discarded yarn: the width of 88 stitches, portend of fortune and good luck (Ross, 2010). The scarf was auctioned at the exhibition opening with funds donated to the Taranaki Safe Families Trust (Taranaki, 2010). Alongside this, her bright, tightly coiled 1000 scarf installation, *The Unbearable Warmth*, spoke of the pressures of China’s one-child policy.

In a significant change of scale, Yin used a worn shipping container to construct *Black Hole* in the form of a massive round signature-cut diamond. Lit from within, the sculpture was initially installed on the New Plymouth foreshore adjacent to Len Lye’s *Wind Wand*. Conceptually, the work concerns light, purity, progress, trade and desire (Devenport, 2010) while also referencing the themes of displacement, dislocation and commodity fetishism within the dynamics and specificities of place. Weighed to scale, the diamond would be 6.5 million carats. ‘By placing the sculpture on the dramatic foreshore of New Plymouth, Yin Xiuzhen suggests that this perfectly-formed object has been washed to shore from another land along the oceanic corridors of trade’ (Devenport, 2010).

Finally, I turn to the work of Filipino artists Alfredo and Isabel Aquilizan who completed *Passage (The Eighth Fleet)*, 2011 at Govett-Brewster early this year. Their work takes on the themes of transition, displacement, upheaval and dispersal and is grounded in personal experiences of family migration. These themes have been articulated in a series of installations known as *Project Be-longing. In Transit*, commenced in 2006. Their practice is collaborative, making use of the accumulation and rearrangement of physical objects and narratives. Existing communities are invited to engage in the production of the artwork. In New Plymouth, for example, dozens of people, including students, built boats from cardboard. These were then incorporated into a monumental, up-turned ship suspended from the gallery’s ceiling. This work built upon and re-organised social connection and referenced historical antecedents, the artists as well as New Zealanders’ heritage. Thus, *The Eighth Voyage*, speaks to the original waka and arrival of Māori in New Zealand from Hawaiki, and to the subsequent migration, arrival and settlement of others.

While the ephemeral nature of found materials, glue and staples emphasised the challenges of long distance travel and relocation—the inverted hull became a potent symbol
of survival and shelter at journey’s end. What then can be said about notions of diaspora and social inclusion from the work of these artists?

Song Dong’s work hovers between home and public life as he articulates ‘an aesthetic and poetic language of contemporary vulnerability’ (Devenport 2010). He collects, orders and displays the quotidian: ‘Art is Life. Life is Art’, he says (Song, 2010).

Whatever the results of Yin’s long search for communality, one thing is certain, writes Pan Qin (2010): ‘throughout her career, she has been able to draw inspiration from mundane objects and to express concepts that deeply connect to Chinese tradition but also respond to profound changes in social reality.’ Her works are centred in the community, both drawing from it and drawing the community into it. On the one hand, her inclusiveness remakes the world of the art gallery while reminding us that full access to the emotional life and identity of others is always limited.

The work of the Aquilizans is foremost an attempt to communicate and create new connections in an uncertain future, while maintaining the internal connections of their shared past and familial bonds.

All four artists move through time and space, live in multiple locations and have various homes, making frequent, meaningful and deliberate displacements. Moreover the public museum accepts and accommodates the uncertainties that come with installation and conceptual art. Not the least of these uncertainties is the constant state of chaos as complex works are created on site in short time and often within the public gaze and with community involvement. The public museum also accepts and negotiates the consequences of such projects which are often temporal and defy accepted acquisition criteria. For these works which speak of transition, displacement and re-ordering of fabrics can never enter the permanent collection. They are quite simply materially too unwieldy, too fragile and too cumbersome to store.

Contemplating the inherent tensions in such installation work then reveals clearly that at least in some public museums there is already a paradigmatic shift in the purpose and role of museums and concomitant changes in working practices are occurring. The closed and authoritative curatorial process is becoming one of negotiation and flux and one in which the community is much more often a central participant, and sometime collaborator. Even the communities’ more traditional role as observer has changed. The community is imbricated within the social and political fabric of these installations.
In New Zealand, these challenges to the status quo in museum practices come by way of a small group of artists who originate from Asia—a region of dynamic change and artistic vitality without centre and without periphery.

References


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Ways of seeing: local collection—global connections

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Abstract
The Thomson Collection of masks, half of them from Asia, was bequeathed in 1997 to Te Manawa. How can these masks be ‘read’ so that understanding is embedded within their provenance, roles within those contexts and their own particular social lives? This paper reflects on the parallel research processes from two disciplinary perspectives which connected biographies, geographies and institutions. The masks serve as a portal to various worlds, not least to provide the means for deeper engagement with the multicultural communities of Aotearoa New Zealand.

How did a mask of an old man used in village festivals in Kurashiki, Japan come to be housed in Te Manawa in Palmerston North? How can this mask be ‘read’ so that our understanding of this object is embedded within its provenance, its role within that context and its own particular social life? To answer these questions, two academics, Susan Abasa, an art historian and museum studies lecturer and Sita Venkateswar, a social anthropology lecturer, undertook two parallel investigations.

This essay is an account of the two separate research pathways that these two academics followed and what they uncovered about the mask, enabling them to locate its origins in Kurashiki, situated between Yokohama and Hiroshima, and follow an itinerary that led to its final destination at Te Manawa. It is constructed in two parts, narrating how Sita Venkateswar and then Susan Abasa went about seeking the answers to the questions posed above. Hence, this account is as much a story of the mask and its journey to Te Manawa as it is about specific disciplinary sensibilities and the modes of sleuthing that they engender. Finally, the conclusion reflects on the potential of collections such as the one that the Japanese mask is a part of, to provide the means for deeper engagement with the multicultural communities of Aotearoa New Zealand.

Sita’s quest

Things are not just objects, but are also subjects of a context [...] each
object bears penumbral meaning beyond the immediately visible. These concern the histories indexed by the object and what they were claimed to connote about the places they came from (Pandya 2009:120-138).

This quote from Vishvajit Pandya’s recent book on the material histories of the Andaman Islanders frames my point of entry into the process of engagement with the Japanese mask. As an anthropologist, my concern is to focus on the mask as an object with its own biography and to ‘engage’ with it using ‘all my senses’ (Edwards, Gosden and Phillips (2006:2). This will enable me to apprehend the mask rather like a prism, in which each facet refracts a different level of understanding to enable me to situate it holistically within the context of its origin. My visit to Te Manawa to look for the information available there regarding the mask led to this vivid description of the mask in the Vernon catalogue which is rendered here:

Carved and painted wooden mask of an old man. Rectangular in shape, flaring out wider at the bottom. It is painted a glossy pale pink in colour, with eyebrows and beard made of tufts of yellowish horsehair (5 for each eyebrow, 24 for the beard). The eyes have eyeholes with brassy metal inlay surrounds. The forehead has 3 V shaped ‘wrinkles’ in the middle, picked out in red. The nose is pronounced with flaring nostrils and large nose holes. The cheeks are also pronounced with the mouth a thin maroon line. The chin area has a flattened ridge running around the bottom of the mask and up to the cheeks. Brown painted hair over the ears. The ears are oval with brown painted centres. The back is painted black and has four Japanese symbols carved on the centre upper section. With a thick brown/green suspension cord attached.

Particularly noteworthy in this description are the exaggerated shape of the face and the tufts of horsehair for the eyebrows and beard. My own ‘sensory’ immersion into the mask to apprehend it more intimately elicits:
Marked ridges between eyebrows and between nose and brow, highlighted by red lines. A prominent beak-like nose, a heavy, florid face, with a shape rather reminiscent of a cartoon character. The skilfully etched red lines effectively accomplish the grimace of old age wrought by wrinkles and life.

I then go on to muse:

Which facet of old age does this mask evoke, wisdom, senility, intolerance and rigidity, is the mask used to elicit ridicule or fear? The horsehair sprouting from the eyebrows and chin visually effective from afar but somewhat absurd when within hands reach. The size of the face suggests a large, heavy man unshriveled by the onset of age, powerful, not someone using faltering steps to get around.

To perceive the symbolisms immanent in the mask and to understand more about the context of its use during festivals I scanned a range of online and other reference sources. Interestingly, even as I learned much about Noh masks, Gyodo Sagara funerary masks, Namahage New Year masks, Kyogen, Somen and Samurai masks, and the contexts of their uses in rites of renewal, I could eliminate what this mask was not but what it definitively was. But, when I cast my net further afield and researched East Asian forms of masked theatre performed along the silk route and the eclectic forms that developed temporally and cross-culturally, I discovered the syncretic form of masked dance drama that took the name of Gigaku in Japan in which the dramatis personae included comic old men. Could this fiercely scowling old man with his bristling eyebrows be part of the comic cast of a festival performance? My preliminary engagement with the mask did register the heavy, florid face, with its shape reminiscent of a cartoon character and mused on the possibility of any connections between masked theatre and Manga characters. But perhaps it is this combination of fierceness and frailty, the shifts between the ludic and the profound that create penumbral meanings which offer some clues regarding the basis of its journey to New Zealand.
Susan’s story
This photograph was the centre-piece of the title panel for the exhibition Masks from the collection of Professor Keith Thomson held at the Manawatu Museum in early 1996. It shows Keith in a three-quarter portrait, formally clad in a dark suit, white shirt and precisely knotted tie. He is posed full face, smiling, with his body turned slightly away from the viewer. Lighting, set to shadow the right, falls prominently on a Japanese mask of an old man which is cradled on his lap. The image is formal and traditional, referencing the publicity shots of principal actors so often found in theatre programmes. The caption reads, ‘My interest is in the use of masks for theatrical and ritual purposes’.

Masks were central to Keith’s public and private persona. He spoke often about his fascination with them and would entertain visitors with stories about their acquisition and their use. At home he held the world on his wall. There, the masks were displayed symmetrically, with an eye for balance and form rather than classification or typology. To the outsider, the arrangement may have seemed static or even self-conscious. For Keith, it was anything but that: the masks were vibrant, evocative, animated by his knowledge of the maker, its origins and use. More than half of the mask collection originates from Korea, Japan and China.

The performative aspects of masks appealed to him greatly. In his student days at the University of Canterbury he worked with Dame Ngaio Marsh. On her advice, he relinquished the prospect of a professional theatre career but remained an inveterate life-long actor, director and manager.

The first three masks, all with ethnographic associations, were acquired during a sabbatical from the University of Adelaide in 1960-61. He had just stepped down from a three-year term as Chairman of the University’s Theatre Guild which had operated since 1938. He felt drawn to the masks—‘in themselves [they] were exciting, beautiful objects. … [they] were the things which revealed a side of me in terms of my environment’—but he did not immediately recognise that these were to become the foundation for his collections of objects and art.

Thomson returned to Palmerston North from Adelaide in 1961, initially to take up the position of Principal of Palmerston North University College (associated with the then Victoria University College of New Zealand). When that college was amalgamated with the Massey Agriculture College to form Massey University in 1964, he was appointed professor of Geography and Dean of Social Sciences. This was just the fifth Chair in Geography in New Zealand.
As a geographer, Thomson divided his time between New Zealand and Australia and was one of the founding members of the Institute of Australian Geographers, participating in the International Geographical Congress and in regional affairs of UNESCO. From the mid-1960s he was also involved with museums and galleries at a local level here in Palmerston North and nationally, as Chairman of the National Art Gallery. This work, together with his life-long interest in drama, became his great passion. As a senior academic, he was a regular ‘international voyager’. Travel was meticulously planned and often brought the public and private aspects of his life together. Certainly, his mask collection grew as a result of his travels.

The pattern and pace of Keith’s mask collecting can be traced with greater certainty through the official leave reports he prepared. Those from 1969 and 1980, in particular, reveal some consistent patterns and shed light on the acquisition of several Japanese masks, including the one on which we focus in this paper.

In July and August 1969 Thomson made the first of many visits to the University of Hiroshima to meet with colleagues in the Department of Geography and to undertake fieldwork in northern Kyushu in Hiroshima Prefecture, looking at land use patterns in the region. The field work had been assisted by the Rev. Paul Sekiya, Massey’s first professor of Japanese, a personal friend to Thomson who, over several years, presented him with gifts of masks or advised him about other acquisitions. Following his attendance at the 15th International Geographical Union Congress held in Tokyo, Thomson returned to the University of Hiroshima in mid-1980.

**Conclusion**

This essay and the research that it engendered sought to answer some queries regarding how a Japanese mask became a part of Te Manawa’s collections. It provides a glimpse of different disciplinary pathways and the ways of knowing that emerge from them. We attempt to situate the mask within its socio-cultural context and to understand more about its role within that environment. There are a number of questions that still remain unanswered, for instance, we do not know anything about the maker of the mask, or the timber used to craft it.

There are other considerations too. As we write this essay, Japan is still imperilled by the ongoing effects of nuclear contamination from the Fukushima power plant. Historically, Japan was the first country to confront the long-term hazards of radiation and learn to live with the consequences. A serendipitous trail of connotations and connections lead us to Hiroshima, the target of the first atomic bomb, to Prof. Keith Thomson’s links with the
university there and the origins of the mask in the nearby village of Kurashiki. How did the devastation that followed from the violence of that first blast impact on Kurashiki and its masking rituals and traditions? While far removed from its origins, can this mask, now in the safety of its stately repose within the museum, continue its ritual and performative purposes for those in peril and later, for those living in safety? Our knowledge and understanding of objects cannot be divorced from the socio-political conjunctures that entangle people and objects. In this regard, we want to briefly remark on how this Japanese mask and others in the Keith Thomson mask collection can open the doors to wider community participation in Te Manawa’s collections. We can consider the possibility of Community Curating for collections such as these, and the ways in which the diverse, multi-cultural origins of the members of the Palmerston North community can contribute to enriching our socio-cultural and political understanding of objects and collections from other parts of the world.

References
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Te Manawa and Manawatu Chinese community projects: toward a ‘learning history’

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**Introduction**

The origins of this paper lie in the author’s earlier research into lessons of cross-cultural communication obtained during the development of a series of local museum exhibitions.\(^1\) *Origins*, the title of the series, was organised by Te Manawa Museums Trust in Palmerston North, New Zealand, and various migrant community groups between 1998 and 2003, with each project showcasing a particular local ethnic community using artefacts, photography and personal stories.

In the 1990s, the time in which the *Origins* series was birthed, museums in New Zealand played an important part in forging collaborative partnerships in their respective communities. Te Manawa’s then Social History Curator, Fiona Cameron, expressed it in the following way:

> Access, whatever the definition, provides a means of letting communities find their way into museums, to establish a sense of ownership and relevance, a level of comfort and confidence. In another sense it allows institutions the opportunity to connect with groups in the community […] Access gives institutions the potential to widen its audiences…\(^2\)

The small number of museums which at that time forged new community partnerships were, in effect, responding to a new multicultural dynamic that was emerging as a result of changes to New Zealand immigration laws.\(^3\) In the case of Palmerston North city, the location of Te Manawa museum, the City Council had built an effective partnership with the Ethnic Council of Manawatu, established in 1994, which, besides acting as an umbrella support

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1. Rasmussen, Tony and Stuart McAdam.  
2. Cameron, Fiona, p.16.  
organisation to many of the migrant communities in the city, started a successful annual Festival of Cultures.

**Background**

This paper considers some of the issues surrounding one of the exhibitions developed as part of the Origins series. *Ni Hao: Being Chinese in Manawatu*, developed in partnership with the Manawatu Chinese community, ran from December 5 1998 to 1 August 1999. The exhibition was significant for having acted as a catalyst for a number of ongoing projects between the museum and the Chinese community in Palmerston North. As well, access to material curated as part of the exhibition—oral histories and three publications—have, in the intervening years, been a key resource on the history of the local Chinese community. And finally, the documentation of the exhibition process has proved to be a valuable source of information exploring issues resulting from the exhibition.

**Using the learning history concept**

To help reflect on the exhibition as a learning experience, the concept of the learning history has been applied. A learning history is a document consisting of a set of themes that emerge out of reflective conversations conducted among those involved in a particular organisational experience or task. The concept was developed within the corporate sector where it was believed that: ‘Managers act collaboratively, but they lack the time to make sense collaboratively of their actions. Instead, they are continually pressed to skip directly into more action.’

The concept of the learning history gained currency in the 1990s, riding the wave of learning organisation theory. Although this essay does not permit a thorough exploration of the learning history model, it is helpful to understand the key components as outlined by Roth and Kleiner. The six steps in producing the history are: planning, reflective interviews, distillation, writing, validation and dissemination. Recently the learning history model was used by cross-cultural management theorist Nigel Holden, who applied it to assessing the role of cross-cultural work teams in several corporations. Holden noted the value of the learning history thus:

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4 Roth & Kleiner, p.47.
Its purpose is not to provide ex post facto management wisdom, but to create a specific source of knowledge which, if judiciously analysed, can provide insights into the tacit aspects of [an organisation’s] behaviour. It is above all else a sense-making document.\(^5\)

What is the link to this essay? Simply that Holden takes the learning history model and uses it to analyse complexities surrounding the exchange of knowledge in cross-cultural situations in the workplace. It therefore provides cultural organisations like Te Manawa with a tool with which they can assess the effectiveness of projects that have a strong cross-cultural emphasis. However, such collaborations are seldom documented, one excellent example being that of a major New Zealand Indian community exhibition development process documented by Gibson and Wood.\(^6\)

**Toward a learning history: the Manawatu Chinese community and Te Manawa**

What follows is an attempt to construct a learning history, a sense-making document, based on experiences taken from the *Ni Hao: Being Chinese in Manawatu* exhibition. In keeping with the philosophy of the learning history, it is not intended to describe the exhibition, but instead provides context to the two major sources of information used for the learning history: the reflective comments of the curator’s concluding report, and notes taken from the de-briefing session run with museum staff.

Founded in 1938, the Chinese Association of Manawatu is the longest running Chinese organisation in Manawatu. Small numbers of Chinese market gardeners and fruiters were established in Manawatu in the early years of the twentieth century, and in the late 1930s several families combined to form an association as a way of providing support for the Chinese war effort against the Japanese.\(^7\) Major activities in which Manawatu Chinese have been involved have included organising annual cultural events and participating in sporting fixtures with other Chinese associations around New Zealand. With the rising numbers of Chinese immigrants to New Zealand since the 1990s, the Manawatu association has admitted recent migrants to its membership. Association members have also been active in the wider community. Some served on the Poll Tax Advisory Group, which led to a formal apology to

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\(^5\) Holden, p.94.  
\(^7\) Thackery, p. 7.
Chinese New Zealanders by the Government in 2002. Members have also served on the committee of the Ethnic Council of Manawatu and Te Manawa Museums Trust board.

Te Manawa started out as the Manawatu Museum in 1971. In 1993 it combined with the recently formed Science Centre to become the Science Centre & Manawatu Museum Te Whare Pupuri Taonga o Manawatu. In 2001, Te Manawa Museums Trust was formed, combining with the Manawatu Art Gallery. Today, this combination of art, science and social history exhibitions, makes it unique among New Zealand Museums. Its Social History collection currently stands at around 45,000 objects, including a section called Foreign Ethnology, within which a small collection of Chinese artefacts is organised, and includes textiles, photographs, statuettes, and various personal belongings. Many of these items have been donated by local Chinese families.

**Series background**

Since the larger *Ni Hao* exhibition, ongoing collaboration with the Manawatu Chinese community has included a small exhibition coinciding with the Association’s 70th anniversary celebrations in 2008, followed by a request by the Association for Te Manawa to host a travelling exhibition called *A Barbarous Measure: The Poll Tax and Chinese New Zealanders*. At the same time this exhibition was opened, the Association launched its official history publication. Te Manawa’s willingness to host this exhibition was an important demonstration of partnership with Manawatu Chinese Association.

When the concept for the *Origins* series was approved by the museum’s management team in 1998, a working group was organised to determine the parameters of the series. This team, calling themselves the Ethnic Communities Project Team, established the following parameters by which they would work with community groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Museum roles</strong></th>
<th><strong>Community roles</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provide venue</td>
<td>Advise on topics and issues to explore</td>
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<tr>
<td>Design and install exhibition</td>
<td>Provide appropriate information</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meet all associated costs</td>
<td>Provide objects and supporting information</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Have input into the design</td>
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The *Ni Hao* exhibition was the third in the *Origins* series, having been preceded by the *Viva Chile!* (the Chilean community) and *Slainte* (Irish community) exhibitions. *Ni Hao* was different in that an external curator was appointed to develop the concept for the exhibition. Thanks to the support of a grant from the Asia 2000 Foundation, the project was able to cover the costs of much of the content for the exhibition, including oral histories and photography undertaken with the Chinese community.

### Exhibition scope

The curator’s role began by scoping the project and deciding on the best approach to take for delivering the exhibition in the time available. The benchmark the curator set was to engage the Chinese community in a meaningful way.

I do feel there were two conflicting agendas at work within SCAM [Science Centre and Museum] between which I was torn— one was to do a ‘quick and dirty’ show on a very small budget, while demonstrating some different approaches to curating, and the other was to engage the community in a meaningful way so as to create a new and valuable relationship between them and SCAM.\(^9\)

The initial offer to the Chinese Association to partner in an exhibition would have important implications for the way the project developed.

If we had approached as many ‘new’ Chinese as ‘old’ the show would have developed I feel much faster and differently, but politically we were bound to begin with and base the show in the ‘old’ Chinese community network because they are still the most significant and respected members in the region.\(^10\)

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\(^9\) Bayly, p.2.  
\(^10\) Bayly, p.5.
Failure to develop a rigorous scope meant that there was a lack of decision-making around the number of interviews to be included in the exhibition.

It is clear in hindsight that the number of interviews, and the depth of some of them, went further than was necessary for the scope of the exhibition. However the number and choice of interview subjects was discussed with everyone at several meetings, community, project team and management meetings, and no great concerns were raised about them then.\(^{11}\)

**Project management**
The decision to appoint an external curator had important implications further on. Time taken to select the candidate and bring them onto the project team meant that critical delays occurred before the project could get underway. This was also the case when it came to appointing a project manager from among the museum staff.

We spent a lot of time in the early stages waiting for a lead from the Project Manager, who was largely unavailable. There was [also] a lack of clarity about our respective roles in some areas.\(^{12}\)

Comments from the curator also suggest that the scope of the project became over-ambitious for the resources that were able to be allocated, and that the brief for the project kept changing. This was exacerbated by changes in project team staff, including the appointment of a new designer and a change in project manager before the exhibition opened.

**Community networking**
At the same time it was necessary to begin the task of building rapport with the Chinese community. This was something that the curator needed to drive but which the project manager felt they should have control of.

\(^{11}\) Bayly, p.5.
\(^{12}\) Bayly, p.3.
At that stage I felt I would have made more progress networking as an individual with the community, independent of the pre-existing Origins exhibition process. The community meetings were always hurriedly organised at short notice and I felt did not reach enough people in the community...\textsuperscript{13}

Having to function within the wider project team rather than working as an individual was a sore point for the curator, who time spent having to satisfy administrative requirements for the museum that took her away from the essential task of working more closely with the community. This would determine the extent to which she could engage with local Chinese.

We know now that the community itself did not network even amongst its own normally included members as we had hoped, so reaching all parts of the diverse groups in Palmerston North proved an unrealistic aim and in the process the Taiwanese were unfortunately overlooked.\textsuperscript{14}

The inability to network resulted in pressures to obtain content to display in the exhibition.

The community was quite slow to respond to the process we were inviting them to engage in—I had to chase them after the first meeting for a commitment to continue—although they did gradually warm to it and came up with ‘the goods’...\textsuperscript{15}

\textbf{Exhibition outcome}

Following the opening of the exhibition, an exhibition de-briefing session was held to discuss the project. Many points were raised, the following being a summary of these.

\textsuperscript{13} Bayly, p.4.
\textsuperscript{14} Bayly, p.4.
\textsuperscript{15} Bayly, p.4.
‘Worked well…’
- Heard lots of good comments
- Lots of Chinese visitors
- Visitors engaging with content
- Inclusion of activities
- Has a Chinese feel (eg. colour)
- Not overloaded with objects
- Brings communities together

‘Worked not so well…’
- Chinese did not network
- Difficulties in negotiating loans
- Meeting at the Chinese Association premises—did this exclude some?
- Exclusion of some groups
- Lack of project management
- Clarity of team roles
- Oral histories were time consuming

Conclusion
The curator concluded:

As a whole I feel the exhibition achieved what we set out to do. I am disappointed we did not have more of the really fine objects and treasures that are out there, but for various reasons (some cultural, some personal) many people were reluctant to loan them.  

This paper has sought to introduce the concept of the learning history to the process of analysing museum exhibition practices. By recording and reviewing issues that arise within the exhibition process, especially where community partnerships are involved, it is hoped that cultural organisations in New Zealand can make significant inroads into improving their product for the benefit of the users. As Rose notes:

Interculturalism promotes communication and collaboration among different groups through the provision of accessible civic spaces and facilities, hybrid entrepreneurial ventures and events. Inter-cultural tensions are less traversed.

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16 Bayly, p.6.
17 Rose, p.142.
References
Japanese Argentine tango dancers: cross-cultural experiences

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Japan has a long history of good diplomatic and economic relationships with many of the Latin American countries (Matsushita, 1998). Since the early 1990s there has been a sharp increase in the number of Latin Americans of Japanese descent immigrating and living in Japan (Kashiwazaki, 2002). Contemporaneously, Japan has experienced a wealth of Latin culture including Argentine tango. Today, as part of a Latin boom, many Japanese in metropolitan areas enjoy going to tango classes and *milongas*, tango dance parties, where tango dancers from Argentina congregate. In those venues, the ordinary Japanese people have opportunities to see how Argentines greet, talk and dance. In other words, the Japanese people, unintentionally, have a cross-cultural experience through engaging in a hobby, Argentine tango. In this paper, I examine whether acculturation occurs among the Japanese tango dancers through this experience. It has been claimed that cross-cultural contact and acculturation occur for a number of reasons, including colonisation, military invasion, migration, and sojourning (Berry, 2005). Involvement in a cultural activity of a different country may be one of them.

Many South Americans have been immersed in the tango as part of social events (Larrain, 2000). Latino children learn by dancing with family members at parties (Nakagawa, 1998), and later, they probably dance with feelings for their partners. They usually dance close, chest to chest and cheek to cheek. This proximity is nothing unusual for them because interpersonal distance is very close in their countries (Marcus and Slansky, 1994). The tango culture is part of the Latin society. On the other hand, the Japanese people do not hug and kiss when they greet, nor is pair-dancing common at parties. The interpersonal distance is quite large (Marcus and Slansky, 1994). Also the Japanese people are not used to showing their affections openly in public due to the influence of Confucian ethics (Takahashi, 2002). Moreover, most Japanese dancers have encountered the tango in adulthood, studying diligently in the classroom setting. Thus, the tango culture is very different from the non-tango Japanese society. My research questions in the present study are: is the tango an exotic experience of the ‘other’ for the Japanese dancers? Does the experience of the tango make the Japanese dancers reflect on the self? Can acculturation occur through the tango experience? In order to investigate these, I use both quantitative and qualitative methods.
Using a web survey randomly presenting one hundred words on the computer screen individually, I ask participants to rate the importance of each word for their tango. The cultural backgrounds of the participants are either Latin or Japanese. The survey is carried out in Spanish or Japanese respectively. This is to investigate whether they feel and relate to the tango in a manner depending on their backgrounds. I analyse the results applying independent t-tests. P-value is set at 0.05. The results indicate that there are a number of words showing significant differences between the two cultural groups. In Japan, the tango has a history of nearly 100 years. The dance style has been kept as authentic as possible for many years, particularly since the 1990s when Japanese dancers and Argentine dancers began to exchange visits, because the Japanese people usually remain extremely faithful to the original model (Hosokawa, 1999). Despite this long history and authenticity of the tango, it seems that the Japanese and Latino dancers’ perceptions of the tango differ significantly.

The Japanese dancers rate the words, *Comfortable, Enchanting, Euphoric, Spiritual, Sophisticated, and Individualistic*, significantly more highly than did the Latino dancers. Arguably because they wish to escape some aspects of everyday life, in which they find their routine boring, stressful or too restricted. The Japanese national statistics show that more than six million people worked for sixty hours or more per week during years 2000 and 2004 (Iwasaki, 2006). Considerable stressors exist in the competitive schools and workplaces (Christopher, 1984). In addition, Confucian ethics, which emphasize hierarchy and loyalty, are still deeply embedded in the Japanese people (Chu, Hayashi and Akuto, 1995) in spite of the modernisation of the society. The following words are also regarded by the Japanese dancers as significantly more important than by the Latino dancers: *Alert, Integrated, Loving, Relationship and Trusting*. This may indicate that they value good relationships with the members of the group to which they belong. It is traditional that one should not stand out, but be integrated within the group to which one belongs (Takahashi, 2002). They consider that they have to take care not to harm the relationship, and must love and trust the members in order to stay in the group.

In contrast, the Latino group rated the word *Confidence*, significantly more highly than did the Japanese group. This fits the image of assertive tango dancers both male and female (Levant, 2003). Also, they must be proud of the tango that originated in their land. Since October 2009, the tango has been recognized by the United Nations as part of the world’s intangible cultural heritage (UN News, 2009). Argentina, once one of the richest ten countries (Lewis, 2002), collapsed in the financial meltdown and was forced to face the
humiliation of poverty. The tango may be one of the remaining aspects of their culture of which they can be proud.

The Japanese tango dancers rate many words as important and the Latinos fewer. These results suggest that, for the Japanese dancers, the social practices in the tango are new and different. Therefore, they see a value in those things that they have not previously experienced, and in those with which they are familiar but that are not part of the tango. In contrast, the Latinos probably do not see anything that is especially valuable in the familiar tango world. In relation to my first two questions, it seems that the tango is an exotic experience of the ‘other’ for the Japanese dancers, and that the experience of the tango makes the Japanese dancers reflect on the self.

Further investigation of the above questions and the examination of my third question (can acculturation occur through the tango experience?) utilises the data from semi-structured interview sessions with forty-three Japanese tango dancers, twenty-two males and twenty-one females. Ages range from those in their twenties to those in their eighties, and their tango experience spans from one year to more than ten years.

In relation to the first research question (exotic experience of the ‘other’), the responses of the Japanese tango dancers suggest that their perceptions of the tango are mostly positive. Some example comments are as follows:

Tango is the dance of passion, dance of sentiment.
Tango *abrazo*, embrace, is beautiful.
It’s presenting a beautiful man-woman relationship.
In the tango environment, I can hug, kiss and talk freely.
I can express feelings openly.
There is nothing wrong with expressing femininity.
It is a feeling of liberation.
It is a surreal experience.
It is an escape from everyday life.

There are only two negative comments, which are:

Latinos’ behaviour is effusive, over the top.
Some men have ulterior motives.
In relation to the second question (reflect on the self), positive comments are limited, and are rather general, as follows:

- It is important to maintain a good relationship with other people.
- Being considerate is good in any situation.
- We can see an image of a demure Japanese woman in the tango.
- The Japanese people can relate to the tango easily because they have a melancholy sentiment.

On the other hand, there is considerable criticism of the behaviour of Japanese tango dancers in general, such as:

- People are distanced; they feel awkward when they come very close to each other.
- People usually only dance with those they know, within the group.
- Japanese are shy, and too reserved.
- Japanese men do not have good manners such as ladies first, and they don’t escort ladies to their seats.
- Japanese women are too strong.
- The Japanese people lack good communication.
- They dance with no emotions.
- It seems they cannot enjoy the music.
- Some people just show off their steps on the floor.

Regarding the third question (acculturation), many have expressed, in different words, that the tango can be a catalyst to an identity change. For example:

- I became cheerful.
- I can make friends much more easily.
- I’ve learned to open up my heart.
- I’m no longer afraid of expressing my feelings.
- I can now talk to people of the opposite sex more naturally.

However, I need to add that there are some people who comment that although in the tango environment, they do what Latinos do, they have not changed fundamentally. In the
study on identity conflict, Ward (2008) found that identity conflict is stronger when the two
cultures differ remarkably. It appears that the Japanese tango dancers in the current context
do not experience the conflict, because they have a freedom to move back and forth between
the Japanese culture and the Latin culture. Berry et al (1987) identifies that volition of contact
is one of the fundamental and pivotal factors for smooth acculturation.

Overall, I observed the following tendencies: appreciation of the other culture,
criticism of the self culture, desire to be like the other, revaluation of the self, and integration
of the other into the self, all of which suggest that the Japanese dancers experience
acculturation through the hobby, Argentine tango. It has been argued in the literature that
acculturation often entails cultural conflict and acculturative stress, and that it may incur
negative consequence (Ward, 2008). However, in the case of the Japanese people learning the
Argentine tango, it is an ideal situation for acculturation for the following reasons: two
cultures meet without conflicts, the Japanese dancers are willing to accept the other culture,
the Argentine dancers welcome the Japanese dancers, the Japanese dancers are rewarded with
pleasant dancing experiences, and they can enjoy being in the tango culture and in the
Japanese culture at their choice.

Acculturation has long been discussed in the contexts of indigenous people as a result
of colonisation, refugees, and migrants and sojourners. Recently, acculturation research has
been extended to tourists. Ward (2008) claims that studying tourists’ acculturation is an
opportunity to test and extend the acculturation theories, as tourism is the most common
setting for first hand intercultural contact. This study indicates that people who engage in a
heavily-cultural hobby in their homeland may also experience acculturation.

Needless to say, the degree of acculturation of individuals who share a common
cultural heritage varies (Berry, 2009). The influential factors for individual differences are
social cognition, cultural competence, social identity and social stigma (Padilla and Perez,
2003). Social cognition, mental processes that guide social interactions (Padilla and Perez,
2003), may be affected by one’s goal (Fiske, 1993). In the case of the Japanese tango
dancers, their goals vary. Some dance the tango because it is a good physical exercise, some
enjoy the atmosphere, for some, it is to be close to the opposite sex, some want to become
good dancers, some want to experience Latin culture, and some want to know the heart and
soul of the tango. Cultural competence is the capability to cope with a new culture (Padilla
and Perez, 2003). It is affected by past acculturation experience, personality, age and
language competence. Some of the Japanese tango dancers have lived in a Latin country
while others have never gone overseas, some are extroverted and some are more reserved,
and the age range is quite large, so is their Spanish language competence. Social identity is an identity as a member of a group (Padilla and Perez 2003). The Japanese dancers all have self identity as Japanese, but some feel strongly about it and want to maintain a good relationship with other members to be a ‘good’ Japanese person. On the other hand, some want to be different from others, and avoid being a ‘typical’ Japanese person. Social stigma is an awareness of inferiority (Padilla and Perez, 2003). Some people praise the Latino behaviours very highly and criticise the Japanese behaviour harshly. Not many, but a few people have re-evaluated the Japanese culture while acknowledging some good aspects of the Latin culture.

I present two cases in order to examine individual differences. The first case is a male dancer in his seventies who has been dancing nearly fifty years. He dances the tango because he loves the music, the dance and socialisation. He thinks the Japanese people are well-mannered, and is proud to be Japanese. He expresses his view on the tango as follows:

I dance to socialise with people, and to meet new people. I know that the tango is a dance of sentimientos. But it appears, in Japan, not many people put emotions in their dancing. Instead, we tend to place an emphasis on rules of steps. It could be because many dancers of my generation used to dance ballroom. Some people say we are not supposed to talk during dancing, but I think it’s not a bad thing since dancing is socialising. I think we can have our own tango dance, which suits the Japanese people. For instance, the Japanese people tend to feel embarrassed about dancing too close. I think we should dance in a way we feel comfortable because the whole purpose of dancing is to enjoy ourselves. We don’t have to do everything as they do. I hug and kiss people when I come to milongas because I know those people, but I don’t do it to everyone.

The second case is a female dancer who is in her forties. She has been dancing for four years. She dances the tango to be a woman. She learns the tango from an Argentine teacher who often talks about the people and the way they live in his country. She thinks the Japanese people are too shy, and she believes that the Japanese people should open up their hearts in order to improve their relationship with others. She commented:
I feel I’m a woman when I dance the tango. In everyday life, we don’t have much opportunity where we can dress up. I think it’s really a good thing to express femininity. I think Japanese guys are shy. They hesitate to ask people whom they don’t know for a dance. And women are too shy to try to catch their eye contact. Their abrazo (embrace) is not good. It’s very different from the one that I get from my Argentine teacher. Japanese guys hold us either too tight or too loose. I learn tango and flamenco. Through the contacts with Latin people, I think I’ve changed. A Latino once told me to write ‘distruto mi vida (I enjoy my life).’ I’ve become more open. I don’t care about people as much as I did. I don’t feign innocence any more. I’m no longer afraid of expressing my feelings. I’m no longer as inhibited by social expectations.

What the above dancers told me may be only a snapshot of one stage of the acculturation process. Acculturation is a continuous process (Berry, 2005), not an output of cultural contacts. If assessed at a different time, the patterns of the individual differences may show a different picture. Nevertheless, at present, we can safely conclude that acculturation has occurred minimally in the first case, but much more in the second case.

In conclusion, the survey and interview data suggest that, for the Japanese tango dancers, the tango is an exotic experience of the other, and the experience also makes them examine the self. The desire to be closer to the other helps the Japanese dancers to absorb the Latin culture, and for some, it leads to an identity change. In summary, through the cultural activity, the Japanese dancers experience acculturation. The extent of acculturation is, however, influenced by social cognition, cultural competence, social identity and social stigma. It seems that it is also dependent on the quantity and quality of contacts and experiences with the people from the other culture. Overall, the findings suggest that cross-cultural experiences through a hobby may provide the best conditions for smooth acculturation.

References


Narratives, legacies and historical representation
Identity discourse and collective memory: an examination into Lin Ruiming's research approach on Lai He

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If re-bridging the ruptures inside Taiwan literature between the Japanese period and the postwar period was a priority for the re-construction of Taiwan literature, the academic field only saw the footsteps of individual exploration in the second half of the 1970s and 1980s. Lin Ruiming (1950-) started doing research on Lai He (1894-1943) in 1983 and this bore fruit decade later with the publication of the two hundred thousand word tome *Taiwan Literature and the Spirit of the Times – Lai He: A Research Anthology* (台灣文學與時代精神—賴和研究論集), considered the first influential study on a single literary figure from Taiwan. Not only had Lin Ruiming’s pioneering study on Lai He laid a substantial foundation for later campaign for the institutionalisation of Taiwan literature, it also created the academic research trend of ‘Lai He Studies’.

Lin Ruiming’s realisation of his previous plan to use Lai He as the subject of his academic research in the early 1980s challenged the existing canonical discourse of the academic field. In particular, in the area of Chinese and history studies where Lin Ruiming was involved, Chinese ideology was generally considered the orthodoxy, while studies regarding historical figures of local Taiwan were deemed as inferior. This paper explores Lin Ruiming’s approach from the perspective of collective memory, to examine the symbolic meaning of Lin Ruiming’s research into Lai He in relation to the creation of various dimensions of Taiwanese identity.

With regard to the link between the concept of collective memory and identity discourse where the relation of ideology and power is involved, Hsiau A-chih provides an adequate explanation in his investigation into Taiwanese intellectuals of the ‘returning to reality’ generation of the 1970s in Taiwan:

> Collective memory has been one of the symbolic sources of assuring identity, mobilizing support and contesting power. […] Collective memory, in fact, was the consequence of signification and
symbolization of the past, through the process of representation. […] Only when the process of representation was made, could people generate a connection possessing specific meaning with historical events that they had never experienced.¹

In the late 1970s, due to his enthusiasm about the history of Taiwan literature, Lin Ruiming committed to writing the biography of Yang Kui, took part in editing The Collected Works of Taiwan Literature prior to the Restoration (光復前台灣文學全集)², and then decided to study ‘the father of Taiwanese New literature’ Lai He in 1979 when he was in his military service, whereby the research project was foreshadowed as The Road of Lai He (賴和的路). In his diary A Lieutenant’s Two Worlds (少尉的兩個世界) Lin explicitly conveyed this attempt:

[I] need to actively look for historical resources of Taiwan literature.³

[…] Taiwan needs its own volume of literary history to sum up the previous generation, and construct the cultural rift.⁴

Clearly, these efforts were made with an aim to re-establish Taiwan literature of the Japanese period. For Lin Ruiming, through the engagement with such a non-mainstream cultural practice, he gained an insight into the meaning of a new discourse in which the history of Taiwan literature should be traced back to the Japanese period. In other words, he became aware of the need to establish a sense of continuity with the past of Taiwan through a more systematic means. As such, I argue that Lin’s commitment to studying Lai He in the early 1980s implied that he was involved in engaging with what American psychologist Barry Schwartz had emphasised as the historical continuity of collective memory, as well as the influence of the past on the contemporary context.

Indeed, the idea of the historical continuity of Taiwan literature was of significance for some of those who were involved in the research of Taiwan literature in the 1980s. The

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⁴ Ibid., p. 336.
reason lies in the fact that it related to the destruction of a cliché of belief in which the chronology of the Republican era of Mainland China (1912-1949) was assumed to be the only valid time-line for China including Taiwan, and the re-construction of a new historical context where the rupture inside Taiwan literature between the Japanese period and the post-war period of Taiwan was to be reconnected. Above all, the new historical context played an important role in building the theoretical framework of the cultural aspect of Taiwanese nationalism.

As to the question of why there was a need for recovering the lost memory of Taiwan, Halbwachs’ sociological perspective of collective memory approximately explained the difficult situation that Taiwan faced in the early post-war period:

[…] if part of the past is forgotten, it is because of the disappearance of the groups which sponsored the corresponding memories. As one group succeeds another, it brings with it new memories which build on or replace the old.5

Indeed, shortly after the KMT government’s takeover of Taiwan in the early post-war period, full-scale de-Japanisation and Sinicisation strategies, including a national language policy, were implemented and the effect was certainly destructive. As a result, not only was the tradition of Taiwanese New Literature discontinued, but the creative careers of many Taiwanese writers and the general population who mostly wrote and read in Japanese were also hampered. Some writers, such as Long Yingzong and Zhang Wenhuan turned inward and became pessimistic. They eventually stopped writing and focused on other careers.

Moreover, in Li Ruiming’s view, ‘The father of Taiwanese New Literature’ Lai He needed to be the focus of research because his literary and social activities were associated with the origin and rise of the Taiwanese New Literature Movement which played a significant role in the history of the Japanese colonial period of Taiwan. Such a representative figure accordingly appealed to Lin Ruiming when his project to establish a new historical context of Taiwan started to gather momentum. It is certain that the reclaiming of Lai He was essential in the process of reconstructing Taiwanese collective memory, and to some extent Lin Ruiming’s attempt echoed what Eliade, Shils and Schwartz had agreed:

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The events that most nations remember and commemorate are often associated with their origin, a time regarded as sacred because it establishes basic values and institutions. […] Origin, rise and fall are remembered and commemorated because they are believed to conspicuously affect the subsequent experience of a people, and because knowledge of these events is deemed essential to making its current situation historically intelligible.⁶

However, when Lin Ruiming’s unselfish motive was put in the social context of the early 1980s, in particular, when the debates on the question of political unification or independence (or known as the debate of ‘Taiwanese knots vs. Chinese knots’) took place in the literary arena in 1983, it encountered challenges from what had developed in the cultural field regarding the issue of collective memory regarding Lai He. In a sense, it was likely that Lin Ruiming would inevitably become involved in developing a new discourse where factors such as Mead’s idea of ‘the use value of the past’ and Durkheim’s emphasis on ‘whether the past fits with reality’ were considered. In discussing the question of how collective memory was understood, George Herbert Meads emphasises the utility of the past, while Emile Durkheim stresses the importance of its objective fit with reality.⁷ In my view, some cultural activities being presented in light of KMT’s decision to reverse Lai He’s previous verdict as a leftist, manifested the interwoven phenomenon. In the following I analyse related issues in terms of the reversal of the official discourse on Lai in early 1984.

The main cultural event which manifested the changes was KMT’s decision to reverse the previous verdict on Lai He. As a result of continuous calls and vigorous advocacy from the local elite of Zhanghua (彰化) and key members of the literary and social commentary journal Xiachao (夏潮), the Ministry of Internal Affairs officially announced the decision to reverse the mishandled case of Lai He on Jan 22, 1984. On February 12, a meeting co-organised by Zhonghua Wenyi (中華文藝), Xiachao, Wenzu Jie (文學界), Taiwan Wenyi (台灣文藝) and Wenji (文季), was held in Taipei to celebrate the belated justice of Lai He. On April 25 when the ninetieth anniversary of Lai He’s birth was celebrated, the Preparatory Committee of Lai He’s ninetieth anniversary published a memorial anthology in which eight commemorative articles were included along with fifteen written speeches from the February

⁷ Ibid., p. 160.
meeting and a time-line of Lai He’s biography. Contributors to those commemorative articles were from diverse fields, including the Zhanghua mayor of the time Huang Shicheng, local literary writer and commentator Li Dugong, and key members of Zhonghua Wenyi and Xiachao.

Clearly, the reversal of Lai He’s previous verdict and the KMT government’s order to have Lai He’s spirit tablet replaced in the Martyr’s Shrine had resulted in a sudden interest in Lai He from the public. It showed almost certainly that the collective memory with regard to Lai He in the early 1980s was drawn not only to that which was appropriate, but also to that which was useful in terms of the discourse of national identity.

To be more specific, I argue that those who participated in celebrating the belated justice of Lai He and contributed their commemorative articles were involved in retrieving a collective memory which was politically appropriate. In general, those who contributed their commemorative articles maintained a similar tone of praising Lai He’s loyal, patriotic and anti-Japanese spirit. This was clearly a politically correct approach and was consistent with the norm of the dominant Chinese nationalism. It is thus worthwhile to note that those who led the discourse were mostly key members of Zhonghua Wenyi and Xiachao rather than others from local literary circles. Such a phenomenon also revealed that in the early 1980s, it was an intellectual group with pro-Chinese nationalism ideology that took the more advantageous position in interpreting Lai He’s literature and re-establishing the collective memory about Lai He.

Therefore, they were also likely to engage in a discourse where the use value of Lai He’s literature and his anti-Japanese spirit were concerned. A salient example that exposed the approach was the idea suggested by mainlander scholar Zheng Xuejia and echoed by Wei Tiancong to rebuild Lai He’s tombstone, so that the original reign tile of Japanese Emperor ‘Showa’ (昭和) that included the years of Lai He’s birth and death could be replaced as ‘Minguo’ (民國) of the Republic of China.8

Nevertheless, a socially constructed aspect is in all ways inescapable when doing research on Lin Ruiming’s discourse. As Hsiau A-chih observed, in the years following the Gaoxiong Incident, literary intellectuals in Taiwan responded in a timely fashion to the call from those who engaged in the campaign of political and social reform, which was aimed at

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establishing Taiwanese subjectivity. As a result, a nativist literary discourse came into being in local literary circles. In this regard, Lin Ruiming’s accomplishment of his previous plan to study Lai in the 1980s, to a certain extent, can also be interpreted as a socially constructed result as Halbwachs suggests:

If, as we believe, collective memory is essentially a reconstruction of the past, if it adapts the image of ancient facts to the beliefs and spiritual needs of the present, then a knowledge of the origin of these facts must be secondary, if not altogether useless, for the reality of the past is not in the past.

In this regard, I argue that, by seeking to show how the present situation affects one’s perception of the past, as well as by attempting to understand the use and the adequacy of historical knowledge in interpreting the past, Lin was committed to bringing the first gleams of bentu discourse into the academic field by adopting a destructive strategy. In a sense, Lin Ruiming’s opening discourse of his research on Lai He where a destructive attempt was employed, indicated that he was undergoing the task of implanting the discourse being developed into the local literary field to the academic field where a literary discourse based on the concept of Taiwanese subjectivity was considered impossible for the first half of the 1980s.

References

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Japanese colonial Taiwan: ‘collaborative literature’ and strategies of intervention

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The psychopathology underpinning colonized states was a familiar feature in Japan’s colonial regimes. In Taiwan the Japanese colonial rule (1895-1945) challenged the local identity and threatened the very foundations of the local integrity. The ‘manichean delirium’ mirroring the alienation stemmed from the assimilation policy that was a cornerstone of the regime. Japan’s belief in its cultural and moral superiority and the traditional credos of divine creation underpinned dōka, or gradual assimilation that stressed the affinities of culture and race (dōbun dōshu). The policy advanced with the view that the Taiwanese were not quite Japanese, but were capable of becoming Japanese through transformative change. Ultimately, dōka was consistent with Taiwan’s inferior position that reinforced the racial divide at the level of local society. The distortions that trace the disjuncture informed the fiction—the subject of this discussion—that was produced at the height of the Pacific war (1942-1944).

During the war the policy of gradual assimilation gave way to Japanisation that furthered in more immediate ways Japan’s imperialist goals. The ‘national language movement’ (kokugo undō, guoyu yundong) that promoted the exclusive use of Japanese accelerated the formative processes of identification. The policy reconstituted the ethnic and cultural differences of the colonial population. Imperialisation (kōminka undō, huangminhua yundong), in turn, mounted a programmatic Japanisation that produced a subject that expressed loyalty to Japan. The policy engendered a ‘double’ that adopted a Japanese lifestyle and spoke and acted like the Japanese. Finally, kōmin bungaku (huangmin wenxue) prescribed writing in support of the war and enforced compliance by the educated elite. The literary policy demanded works in support of the war, that is, wartime production and the expansion into the southern Pacific. The policy presented a dilemma for writers some of whom stopped writing altogether while others devised tactics with which to navigate the decree. Others still wrote so-called ‘collaborative’ (kōmin) works that complied with the requirements. This discussion centres on two writers, Lü Heruo (1914-1951) and Yang Kui (1905-1985), who responded in different ways to the requirements of the decree. On the surface, Lü Heruo’s kōmin works exhibit pro-Japanese support. At the same time, they made
use of a smokescreen that sidestepped the full implications. Yang Kui, on the other hand, authored a kōmin piece that mindlessly complied with the decree. Yang’s pro-Japanese sentiment reflects his acculturation that compromised both his identity and his authorial stance.

Ultimately, the ‘collaborative’ works provide a platform for understanding the patterns of identification with assimilation. One may ask, just what was the short-term impact on the colonized self? Alternatively, what was the long-term ramification of Japanisation? Finally, how should complicity be viewed given the nature of the regime? The questions relate to the role played by colonialism in processes of identification. Finally, colonialism accounts for Taiwan’s hybridity and its present-day affinity with neighbouring Japan.

**The strategies of negotiation of Lü Heruo**

Lü Heruo established himself as a writer during the lead-up to the Pacific war. “Oxcart” (Niuchê, 1935), Lü’s first and signature piece, deals with the systems of surveillance of the Japanese colonial police. The surveillance network mapped out a system of visibility that enhanced the powers of the police: a panoptic lens channels the omnipresent eye through the figure of the police. In the story, the power behind the lens fixates on a self-employed worker who falls victim to the police. ‘Oxcart’ exemplifies colonial texts in which the tropes of visibility/invisibility draw attention to processes whereby power is assigned, identity is produced, and the subject negotiates a position within the multiply coded social space. The spectatorship constitutes a marker of the power and control of colonial regimes (O’Brien, 1999: 2).

The hallmark of Lü’s work is the ‘backward’ or feudal aspects of the benighted tradition—the cultural critique that unveils the androcentric practices of the Chinese tradition. The critique positioned the works outside the parameters of Japan’s immediate wartime concerns, thereby evading censorship. ‘Long life, Riches and Sons’ (Cai zi shou, 1942) narrates how Yumei, a landlord’s second wife, suffers abuse and descends into insanity after giving birth to a girl.¹ The gothic tropes of horror and death are subversive in the manner of postcolonial texts: Gina Wisker notes that the hidden spirits of the past and the unveiling of the hidden violence that accompanies these pasts confer postcolonial landscapes with the ability to rupture norms (2007: 147). The complex abjection of the past is a further feature of the recuperation of histories based on patriarchal norms. The limits of death/life boundaries—

¹ The abuse that Yumei suffers is due to the patrilineal tradition that puts a priority on sons.
zombies and duppies—move between horror and speculative endings and posit ‘alternative ways of being and living’ (Ibid. 148). These ways contain opportunities for imagining society other than what it is, not to mention how it may be when the norms undergo change.

More important is the dilemma posed by the kōmin decree as the war got underway. Lü’s ‘Clear Autumn’ (Qingqiu, 1944) pivots around the imperial decree in the injunction to go south—the policy in which young men were recruited to Southeast Asia to further the expansionist goals. The story presents an unclear ideological stance with respect to the decree. Instead, it reveals that the south brings opportunities for young men eager to get ahead. The protagonist Xie Yaoxun is envious of those in his immediate environment who decide to go south. He himself decides not to go, although not for reasons of conscience, but rather, for his tendency to yield to a course of action that offers the easiest way out. As the oldest son, moreover, Yaoxun is caught up in familial expectations with respect to xiao (filial piety).

Yaoxun is a medical doctor who has returned to the Taiwan countryside after three years practising medicine in Japan. Although unsure about his prospects, he eventually falls into a routine of everyday country life. One day he receives a letter from his younger brother—a company employee who informs him that the company in which he works will transfer to Malaysia. Apparently, his brother will also avail himself of the opportunity to transfer south. Yaoxun becomes lost in bitter thoughts, musing that while his sibling will assume a position at the vanguard of the modern times his own plans include living a suffocating life in the backward countryside. He sinks into a depression, refusing to open a clinic or to find himself a wife. His problems deepen when the corrupt local medical profession obstructs his application for a license. With his future in doubt, he succumbs to the characteristic alienation of the abject colonial self—self-doubt, shame, regret, loneliness, nostalgia and a sense of being trapped. Ultimately, he confesses to a total lack of meaning and even hatred for his life (Lü, 1944: 224, 222).

One evening, Yaoxun attends a banquet in honour of the volunteer recruits. At that point, the way suddenly becomes clear: he secures a clinic and an opportunity opens up for him to work as a pediatrician. He notes that, ironically, these things now make it very difficult for him not to practise medicine. In a total about-face, he vows to develop his skills, have confidence in himself and discharge his professional duties to the best of his abilities. More important, he pledges to fulfil his filial duties where his parents are concerned. Yaoxun has weathered his crisis, and the story closes with the young man admiring the blooming
chrysanthemums and the cumulus clouds banked up against the autumn sky. Once more, he reiterates his decision to be a filial son.

In ‘Clear Autumn’ the modernist mode lays bare the abject configuration of the colonized self. More important is the psychological transformation that reverses the unhappy state. Kristeva comments that abjection derives from an object that is already lost. But the mourning for the loss enables an alchemy that transforms death into life as well as a new significance (1982: 5, 15). In other words, a re-birth takes place that enables the self to live on. In short, the exploration of the self acts as a smokescreen that channels the reader’s attention toward these subjective concerns. On the surface, ‘Clear Autumn’ complied with the decree; at the same time, the strategy ruptured the colonial discourse and enabled the expression of these concerns.

The cultural impasse of Yang Kui

The ‘uncrushable rose’ sums up the life and image of Yang Kui, whose life spanned eighty years of colonial and neo-colonial rule. During his long life the writer encountered not only censorship but also political interference. Yang’s intellectual development commenced with his sojourn as a young man to the metropolitan centre. In the 1920s many young Taiwanese travelled overseas to Japan, drawn by a quest for intellectual enlightenment and the relative freedoms (Peng, 2006: 212). Far removed from the complexities of the colonial life, they basked in the cosmopolitanism and the ebb and flow of the new thought—Wilsonian self-determination, socialism, Darwinism, anarchism and the proletarian culture movement, which was one strand in the Marxist-inspired movements that struggled against imperialism. Where Yang’s works are concerned the formative experience is transcribed as a liberation ideal and the transnational unity against the operation of capital (Yee, 2007: 267).

Yang’s complex ideology pivots around a view of the common good that goes beyond nationalism. The tendency to put humanity ahead of national interests suggests internationalism, or a cosmopolitan thought. Kendall defines cosmopolitanism as the propensity to see differences as ‘an opportunity for connection rather than as a pretext for separation’ (2009: 1). Of equal importance are the ethics, the supranational structures, and a view of otherness and cultural difference as something desirable (Ibid. 99, 105). Yang’s ability to differentiate between the mass of the Japanese people and Japanese imperialism signifies his transcendence of essential identity politics. In his works one finds ethical

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2 During his lifetime Yang Kui was arrested a total of twelve times.
categories—‘good’ versus ‘bad’ Japanese and ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ Taiwanese—that supersede the usual markers of cultural and national identity. The categories point to the absence of the grand narrative of narrow nationalism. In short, the border crossing, or acculturation, opens up space for the production of cultural difference that challenges nationalistic hierarchies.

Yang Kui is best known for ‘Paperboy’ (Songbaofu, 1934), a semi-autobiographical novella that interweaves anti-colonial thought with the liberation of the internationally oppressed. The protagonist is a teenage boy who travels from his village in southern Taiwan to find work in Tokyo—a city struggling with unemployment during the time of the Depression. The second half of ‘Paperboy’ comprises a flashback, which reveals how the Japanese Sugar Cartel in Yang’s village destroys the livelihood of the villagers, including Yang’s family. The transnational ideal renders the novella a comment on capital practices that take place worldwide. Ultimately, the first-person narrator could be a worker of any ethnicity, who is caught up in an inhospitable environment that could also be anywhere.

In Yang Kui’s kômin work the internationalism goes further in that it precludes an exit strategy from the acculturation. ‘Increased production—the story of the old buffoon’ (Zôsan no kage ni—nonki na jîsan no hanashi, Zengchang zhi beihou—laochoujiaode gushi, 1944) is a laudatory piece of reportage written on a commission from the government’s Information Office. The praise for the Japanese national spirit reflects the heightened value given to the other at the expense of national concerns. As a ‘collaborative’ work it affirms—consciously or otherwise—Japan’s wartime goals.

‘Increased Production’ unfolds with the inspection of a coal mine by a government reporter. The reporter is awed by the complex operations and finds the machinery incomprehensible. More important is the fortitude of the workers who persevere under the hell-like conditions. During the tour, he is introduced to the ‘old buffoon’—an elderly Japanese man who embodies altruism and is the motivating spirit behind the workers. ‘Increased Production’ draws to a close by reaffirming the need for increased production and paying tribute to the ‘seeds of the beautiful Japanese spirit’ (Riben jingshen zhi mengya) (Yang, 1944: 205). The statement reproduces the altruism of yamato-damashii, the Bushido ideal of valour that was written into the wartime propaganda at the height of the war. The pro-Japan sentiment that inscribes a rupture proceeded seamlessly from the acculturation and cosmopolitan thought.

‘Increased Production’ resulted from the rupture to the colonial self that took place with Japanisation. The splitting of the colonial space of consciousness and society is
symptomatic of alienation within identity and emerges with collaborations of political and psychic violence (Bhabha, 1993: 116). Leo Ching refers to the ‘ambivalent sameness’ of the colonial double that comes into being when the interior of the self is invaded by otherness at the moment of ‘becoming Japanese’ (2001: 124). In Yang’s case the rupture to the colonial self was aggravated by the limits of cosmopolitan thought and the lack of an exit strategy from the assimilation.

Belatedly, Yang Kui became aware of the concessions mirrored in his work. With hindsight he carried out revisions that betray his anxiety. The anxiety was no doubt compounded by the unusual circumstances—the censorship, the political interference and the transition from Japanese rule to the Kuomintang regime. A further factor is the counter-discourse of nativism that dates to the 1970s. Finally, there are the translations that date to before and after the war: Yang’s work was translated from Japanese into Chinese with no clear indication upon which Japanese version the Chinese translation was based. Ultimately, when Yang became alert to his concessions he attempted to ‘reinforce a stance’ (Yee, 1995: 122). When questioned, he replied that he had the ‘right’ to revise his work with the maturation of his thought (Wang, 1985-1988: 281). One could conclude that the revisions pose an intervention—albeit clumsy—into Japanisation. Even so, they are so extensive that they alter the nature of his work and rendering an assessment impossible. More important, there is the psychopathology of the split colonial self. At the end of the day, one may ask whether the author was in fact a collaborator given the nature of Japanisation? Alternatively, is the transgression understandable given the policies of the regime? At the very least, Yang’s work allows insight into the colonial assimilation—the difference of ethnicity and the formative processes of cultural and national identity. In short, the formative development of Taiwan’s hybrid identity is reflected in the Japanese strand—and in the works of both authors—that left a distinct mark in the local configurations.

References

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3 The revisions, which take the form of the inclusion or deletion of rhetoric, comprise adjustments to the pro- or anti-Japanese sentiment.
4 The Kuomintang (Nationalist) government withdrew to Taiwan with its defeat in the Chinese civil war.
5 Yang undertook the majority of the revisions during the nativist movement (xiangtu wenshu yundong) that was opposed to Taiwan’s neo-colonial status during the Cold War.


Memoirs of the cultural revolution and Rea Yang’s Spider Eaters

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Since 1990, an increasing number of memoirs by Chinese women immigrants to the West have become bestsellers in the global paperback market. Wild Swans by Jung Chang, for example, was published in 1991 and has gone through fourteen printings. It was on the bestseller list for 63 weeks and has been translated into many languages. This has since been followed by other such memoirs, such as A Leaf in the Bitter Wind (1997), Red Azalea (1993), Daughters of the Red Land (1995) and, more recently, Feather in the Storm: a Childhood Lost in Chaos (2006). These publications became one of the most important venues for Western readers to get to know China. They are frequently among the ‘must read list’ of persons wishing to know China either for business or personal reasons. What’s more, they are often assigned as references for high school students in their social studies or world history classes or as required textbooks for college students. Why have such books written by Chinese immigrant writers been accepted by Western culture and achieved commercial success?

Vivian Gornick, critic and memoirist, acknowledges the amazing momentum the genre has gained in her The Situation and the Story: ‘Thirty years ago people who thought they had a story to tell sat down to write a novel. Today, they sit down to write a memoir’ (89). The first explanation of the popularity of the memoirs she identifies is the influence of globalisation: ‘Everyone senses the world is becoming more and more connected, interests in other parts of the world and people’s lives there grow. Reading memoirs is certainly a way to peek through the language and cultural barriers’ (90).

Since the early 1980s, the U.S. literary scene has experienced a phenomenon that was often dubbed as ‘memoir craze,’ which produced enormously popular and acclaimed works such as Frank McCourt’s Angela’s Ashes: A Memoir and Mar Karr’s The Liar’s Club: A Memoir. In her book The Real Story: A Guide to Nonfiction Reading Interests, Sarah Statz Cords denotes that ‘Memoirs, like biographies, explore people’s experiences and often all-too-human foibles and interactions with the world, in the immediate first-person voice; likewise, they tell stories and often fascinating ones at that. These two factors are the secret of their widespread appeal’ (240).
Meanwhile, Augusta Rohrbach, who teaches expository writing at Harvard University, suggests an additional source for the current popularity of memoir. In the epilogue of Truth Stranger than Fiction: Race, Realism, and the U.S. Literary Marketplace, Rohrbach argues that the memoir craze is an outgrowth of an earlier popular literary form: realism. According to Augusta, in many ways, today’s memoirists follow the leads of earlier realists: by making their stories heart-wrenchingly real, they capture a readership that exceeds their immediate demographic. Many readers and reviewers of the Cultural Revolution memoirs certainly feel the validity of this viewpoint. For example, in John S. Service’s foreword for To the Storm: the Odyssey of a Revolutionary Chinese Woman, co-authored by Yue Daiyun and Carolyn Wakeman, he remarks that ‘Yue Daiyun’s story related to a particular time and place, China during the past four decades. But out of her terrifying experience, she has given us an example and a testament of the indomitable human spirit that has meaning beyond time and place’ (xiv). What are the representations and imageries of China in these memoirs? Since the phenomenal popularity of such memoirs started with Jung Chang’s publication of Wild Swans, it is useful to start with her memory of the image of China. In Wild Swans, Jung Chang writes that:

Mao had managed to turn the people into the ultimate weapon of dictatorship. That was why under him there was no real equivalent of the KGB in China. There was no need. In bringing out and nourishing the worst in people, Mao had created a moral wasteland and a land of hatred (Chang 496).

And in Life and Death in Shanghai, Nien Cheng writes:

Writing about the death of my daughter and my own painful experience during the Cultural Revolution was traumatic. Often I had to put the manuscript away and take up other occupations to regain my peace of mind. But I persisted in my effort. I felt a compulsion to speak out and let those who have the good fortune to live in freedom know what my life was like in Communist China (Cheng 538).

Gao Anhua in To the Edge of the Sky says:
I was flying to a land where there was no State Security Bureau, no ‘unseen eyes’ ever ready to betray the unwary, a land where I would no longer be frightened of political victimization or of what I might say, or even of what I might think (Gao 398).

Memoirs like *Life and Death in Shanghai* and *Wild Swans* construct and disseminate stories of individual resistance against a communist and inhumane regime. Although the formats of resistance are different, they share some important convictions in common: they, as victims of dichotomy and iron control, have lost faith in the Chinese Communist Party and in fact, they saw the Party so detrimental that the only way out was to flee to the West, where they wished to recover what had been denied and prohibited in their motherland.

Richard King, director of the Centre for Asian-Pacific Initiatives at the University of Victoria, New Zealand, summarises the plots of these Cultural Revolution Memoirs. King says briskly that ‘Typically, the authors of these memoirs recall a life of relative tranquility disrupted by the Cultural Revolution; then describe Red Guard excesses and the persecution of their families followed by years of banishment from the cities to state farms and cadre schools; then they conclude with political rehabilitation and the decision to leave China, often with the help of a Western partner’ (281).

Such are some specific examples of popular memoirs of the Cultural Revolution, in which the memory of being a victim prevailed in their stories. Although these summaries capture the main plots of the genre, there is another type of narrative strategy, which is sometimes counted as counter-narrative on reflective memoirs. In contrast, most popular memoirs like *Wild Swans* recount personal and family members’ ordeals in the Cultural Revolution, and their struggle to escape to the West, and often conclude with expressions of appreciation of the newly found freedom in their adopted land. In addition, these memoirs frequently link the Cultural Revolution era with post-Mao political developments. These popular memoirs fail to convey the complexity and diversity of these turbulent decades.

The writers of the counter-narratives grew up in the Cultural Revolution and came to the West for advanced studies. Their reflective memoirs aim to rectify the dominant imageries of the Cultural Revolution era. These counter-narratives give attention to the areas that are largely neglected in the popular memoirs, such as undisrupted daily lives, the apolitical populations, the positive political initiatives and changes coming out of the disaster of the Cultural Revolution, the expressions of loss and loneliness and reflective recollection.
of coming of age in the Cultural Revolution. These memoirs challenge the ‘total negation’ conclusion and the ‘victim-victimiser’ dichotomy.

Though sharing similar experiences with memoirists such as Jung Chang and Anhua Gao, they are concerned about the way in which their generation was portrayed and perceived in the West. Believing the popular memoirs fail to convey the complexity and diversity of the decades that serve as both backdrop and target of the popular Cultural Revolution memoirs, they choose to offer alternative representations of China by telling their own stories in ways that they believe are more reflective.

Take Rea Yang’s *Spider Eaters*, for example. Yang Rea was born in 1950 in Mainland China and migrated to the United States of America in 1981. *Spider Eater* records the life of a female Red Guard story from 1950 to 1980, covering her life from her early years as the daughter of Chinese diplomats in Switzerland, to her girlhood at an elite middle school in Beijing, to her adolescent experience as a Red Guard and later as a labourer on a pig farm in the remote wilderness of northern China. She writes about her life as an ‘educated youth’ in Cold Spring, a village in Northern China:

> Looking back on it, I think Cold Spring was like a mountain cave in which we tried to cultivate ourselves. Tormented our bodies to purify our minds. Encouraged ourselves with a splendid prospect of a paradise on earth (Yang 318).

Contrast to Jung Chang’s portrayal of the rustication years as wasted life and pointless toiling, Rea Yang’s memory of her days in Northern China is much more fulfilling and upbeat. Rea Yang’s memory of the Movement stands out against the mainstream portrayal of the movement as banishment to the countryside where the former Red Guards suffered meaningless hardship and wasted away their youth. As Yang puts it,

> In some memoirs or literary works, Zhiqing are portrayed as victims of corrupt local officials, and the period in the countryside is seen as a waste of time in their lives. I have always felt a deep sense of gratitude and nostalgia toward the people in my village, a place I devoted a full eight years of my youth and from which I have also gained much in return (Yang 208).
Rea Yang described her experience in the Cultural Revolution as ‘eating spiders’:

I and my peers are the ones who ate spiders. The spiders tasted bad. They were poisonous. Nevertheless, in my case, they became a bitter medicine. The Chinese say, ‘Bitter medicine cures illness.’ The spiders I ate made my head cooler and my eyes brighter (284-5).

Rae Yang shares with readers the lessons she and her friends learned from their roles both as victimisers and as victims in the Cultural Revolution. The lessons have taught Rae Yang to ‘cherish freedom and value human dignity’. As Ban Wang writes of the relationship between history and memory:

It is not a matter of choosing one over another. Rather, the point is to put the two components of temporality together and set them in dynamic motion. Thus, we have a critical historical consciousness, which, caught in modern acceleration, is also capable of self-critique from the vantage point of its ‘other’ and past: the milieu of memory (5).

What interests us here is not the general fact itself, but the empathic way it is presented to us. It comes to us as the remembered experience of the Red Guard with her massive regret. It comes in a sombre remembrance of emotion, desire, fantasy, trauma, and hope, and in the subjectivity of a fictional imagination. This sombre remembrance aided by the fictional imagination will not make history, but it may help nourish a new historical consciousness. I think that speaks of why Rea Yang’s autobiographical fiction, which represents an alternative image of the Cultural Revolution era, should be cherished.

In conclusion, in contrast, Rea Yang grew up in the Cultural Revolution and came to North America for advanced studies. Her reflective memoir Spider Eaters offers alternative imageries of the Cultural Revolution era and gives attention to the areas that are largely neglected in the popular memoirs, such as undisrupted daily lives, the apolitical populations, the positive political initiatives and changes coming out of the disaster of the Cultural Revolution, the expressions of loss and loneliness, and reflective recollection of coming of age in the Cultural Revolution. Spider Eaters challenges the ‘total negation’ conclusion and the ‘victim-victimiser’ dichotomy. It does not deny the bitterness and suffering of the
turbulent decade, but offer a more reflective memory of the Cultural Revolution and an alternative imagery of the Cultural Revolution era.

References

The legacy of Qiu Jin (1875-1907): a variety of forms and voices of remembrance

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Abstract
This year marks one hundred years since the 1911 Revolution transformed China from an imperial regime to a fledging nation and then a republic. The woman revolutionary Qiu Jin who was active in the years leading up to the 1911 Revolution personifies and gives a human face to the events that redefined China in cultural, social, and political terms. Qiu Jin has inevitably been cast into a nationalist role, even though she was a sister, mother, friend, and neighbour. Because of the timing of her death she was made part of the Sun Yatsen propaganda machine before she had a chance of becoming anything else. Her name is now an inextricable part of the canon of 1911 revolutionary history. Our interest in Qiu Jin in this paper is because she leads into discussions about the nature of archives related to the Revolution. A variety of forms can be turned to in order to examine the human side of the 1911 Revolution and its legacy.

Introduction: the 1911 Revolution and its commemoration
For Chinese, a major event in the defining of the nation is the 1911 Xinhai Revolution 辛亥革命 (hereafter ‘1911 Revolution’). This year marks the 100 year anniversary of the 1911 Revolution when a local insurgency in Wuchang, the capital of Hubei Province, on October 10, 1911 mutinied against local officials. A series of small uprisings followed which cumulatively led to the Qing government capitulating. Three centuries of Manchu rule ended, and the establishment of the republic of China began.

As a means for ending the imperial system, the revolution was a success. But in terms of achieving its aims of sovereignty, social and cultural development and economic prosperity, these were not immediately realised. Nevertheless, these issues have fuelled the discussions and debates that remain critical in the foundations of what it is to be Chinese, even now. For many Chinese, the name of the woman revolutionary Qiu Jin秋瑾, (1875-1907), who was executed for her role in planning an uprising in 1907, resonates with the 1911 Revolution because she was active in the years leading up to the event, and she embodies many of the progressive values associated with it.
The Chinese government, like those of other nations that aim to achieve total power over the population, controls the histories and the preservation and presentation of cultural artefacts of the major events, such as the 1911 Revolution, that have assisted in the formation of the nation. One of the factors that permit this control is the presentation of an orthodox, linear and uninterrupted history, and a continuous, uniform memory of that history.

The late Qing woman Qiu Jin is one of the key figures who represent the ways in which the 1911 Revolution is remembered. This woman presents an interesting opportunity to look at the variety of forms of remembering in China and the changing status of these forms. There is rich and diverse material on her and, as the paper will show, we can make geographically diverse investigations through looking at her memory in both China and Taiwan. Official texts and memorial architecture are available for the historian to examine, and we can now also look at personal, family writings which have increasingly come into print since the 1980s. These unorthodox voices that narrate the Qiu Jin story raise the question of who has the right to speak for the Revolution and its commemorations. The use of personal histories, official records, and public monuments provides an entry into this question.

In order to examine the variety of voices telling the story of Qiu Jin and the success or failure of the Chinese authorities’ strong desire for total control of memory, this paper looks at the following aspects of the commemoration of Qiu Jin: her architectural memory in Hangzhou, and that of her daughter Qiu [Wang] Canzhi 秋[王]燦芝(Xiaoxia 小俠 ‘Young Warrior’, 1904-1967) in Taipei,¹ and three accounts of the Qiu-Wang family genealogy written in the wenshi ziliao 文史資料 (‘historical literature’) form.²

Memorial architecture for Qiu Jin and Qiu Canzhi

Qiu Jin’s memorial at Longjing

The Chinese public are familiar with memorial sites for Qiu Jin at West Lake, where her 1981 statue and the reconstructed Wind and Rain Pavilion 風雨亭 are part of what has recently become a kind of ‘theme park’ for Hangzhou historical figures. Existing studies on these familiar sites include Guo Yanli 郭延礼, 1983; Hamilton, 2003; Hu Ying, 2007. The symbolism inherent in her memorial sites at West Lake is repeated in Shaoxing where her

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¹ Qiu Canzhi changed her name from Wang to Qiu in order to continue her mother’s name.
² The work of writing and producing wenshi ziliao began in 1959 under the leadership of Zhou Enlai. This form of literature can be taken as oral history. Some caution has to be exercised when consulting these materials, as the facts can be distorted, but there is a large element of self-checking since they are published locally for a local readership who are likely to be the harshest critics.
monuments gather added meaning because of the historic and cultural flavour of that place. Despite the fact that these memorials for Qiu Jin at West Lake and in Shaoxing are reassuring sights to Chinese, they have gone through periods of disappearance, destruction, decay, and rebuilding in keeping with the various cycles of political movements. Nevertheless, these memorial sites are now littered with references to sacrifice and patriotism. A memorial site for the 1911 Revolution on the outskirts of Hangzhou gives out different and conflicting signals about how Qiu Jin is remembered.

The Hangzhou Xinhai geming lieshi muzang 杭州辛亥革命烈士墓葬群 / 浙江辛亥革命烈士墓群 (Hangzhou Xinhai geming lieshi muqun /Zhejiang Xinhai geming lieshi muqun Hangzhou/Zhejiang 1911 revolutionary martyrs shrine) site was created on the Longjing road at Tianzhu shan 天竺山 in 1981 by the Zhejiang authorities, in the year that the seventieth anniversary of the 1911 Revolution was celebrated. The graves contained in this site were originally at Gushan 孤山 (Solitary Island) on West Lake, but were moved to the present site after the Cultural Revolution, for reasons not stated in records seen thus far. The site contains several grave mounds, and a tall stele was added in 1991 with Sun Yatsen’s words Guo hun bu si 國魂不死 ‘National soul lives forever’ inscribed upon it. The timing of the erection of the stele coincided with the eightieth anniversary of the Revolution. A substantial museum, largely hidden from view by overgrown trees and bamboos, contains artefacts and displays related to the 1911 Revolution. A group of enormous, white stone statues stands in front of the grave mounds. Although the statuary includes Qiu Jin in a prominent position at the front, she is not named on the engraved introductory plaque at the entrance to the site. The brochure that accompanies the site and the substantial museum also does not include the name of Qiu Jin, although she clearly has an important presence here. Her physical and spiritual likenesses are represented in the strongest terms. She holds a sword, which is a recurring motif in her written works and in her photographs and statues. Qiu Jin stands in front of the other giants of figures and slightly distanced from them. This distancing could be read as a mark of respect or may be related to gendered factors, although another woman, also unnamed, is included in one of the groupings of men.

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3 This is the former site of a temple: see http://baike.baidu.com/view/2532743, downloaded 29/7/2011.
Conclusions drawn from preliminary research on this memorial site suggest that although Qiu Jin is clearly associated with the 1911 Revolution, in the case of this substantial site of remembrance in Zhejiang province there seems to be a reluctance to state the fact. This site will be the subject of future research.

**Gravesite for Qiu Jin’s daughter Qiu [Wang] Canzhi**

Research on Qiu Jin’s daughter, Qiu Canzhi, presents an opportunity to compare memorial architecture on both sides of the Taiwan Straits for women—and from the same family—who were connected to the 1911 Revolution. Qiu Jin does have a presence on Taiwan, but this was not the subject of the present research. Although Qiu Canzhi was not brought up by her mother, and was only a baby when her mother died, her connections to the 1911 Revolution are undeniable.

After going to live in exile on Taiwan in 1950, Qiu Canzhi spent more than fifteen years editing, publishing and preserving her mother’s written works. It could be argued that the writings and literature produced in mass printings that are attributed to, or about, Qiu Jin would not be available to the world without the efforts of her daughter to publish them. We can also deduce that the literature of the 1911 Revolution would be much poorer without the presence of material on Qiu Jin. The preservation and publication of these archives are partly due to Canzhi’s efforts. Nevertheless, much more precise bibliographic work needs to be carried out on the various editions of Qiu Jin’s written legacy.

It is interesting to see how Canzhi fared during her life of exile in Taiwan. But very little appears in the biographical sources about this woman. What has been traced thus far is the circumstances of her death and burial. She died in Taipei on 18 December 1967. Announcements of her death were carried in the major newspapers in the days following her death, including the *Jingji ribao* and the *Zhongyang ribao*. Reports in the papers state that more than three hundred people attended the service. Madame Chiang Kai-shek, sent her condolences, if not actually being in attendance at the service.

Qiu Canzhi’s grave came into public view once again more than fifty years after her death. The Taiwanese government arranged for her daughter Wang Yanhua 王焱華 to visit the island as part of the Taiwanese 2011 celebrations and to perform grave-sweeping rituals. The arrangements were made by the Qiaoweihui 僑委會(Overseas Compatriots Affairs Commission) and the Xingzheng yuan 行政院(Executive Yuan). The ostensible purpose of Yanhua’s trip was to perform family rituals but there were also other official duties involved.
Photographs in newspapers record the visit to the cemetery and present a view that largely focuses on Yanhua offering incense at her mother’s grave. Only a small section of the headstone is revealed in the published photograph in *The Taipei Times*.4

In reality, a visit to the grave in July 2011 has revealed that the grave shows signs of decades of neglect. The stump of a tree, and its roots, spread over one corner of the headstone. The empty plot next to the site contains piles of rubbish and litter. The walls surrounding the grave are crumbling and broken and the path leading up to the gravesite is in dire need of repair.

These details of Qiu Canzhi’s grave contrast with the public services of commemoration in Taipei in 2011 at which Wang Yanhua was a central guest. Events over four days in late March and early April included television appearances, attendance at a memorial service at the Zhong lieci (Martyr’s Memorial) north of Taipei, the visit to her mother’s grave, a visit to the National Palace Museum, and an evening dinner-reception with Taiwan’s President Ma Yingjiu. These events were all reported in various official media.5

From the Taiwan grave and events it is clear that these are rich resources for the study of the memory of Qiu Jin, but we also see a repeat of the contradictions surrounding the commemoration of women connected to the 1911 Revolution. Although Qiu Jin and her legacy have an undeniable presence on Taiwan, there are parallels in her daughter’s gravesite which suggest a combination of admiration, neglect and ambivalence.

**Textual evidence of competing claims to Qiu Jin’s legacy.**
The next section of the paper briefly introduces three texts that have historical value for providing alternative voices of the history of Qiu Jin. Qiu Canzhi and her writings, as well as those of other predominantly female descendants, provide a different view of the Qiu Jin legacy than that of orthodox accounts of her role as a patriotic model.

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4 *The Taipei Times* reported on the visit, March 29 2011.
5 Details of the visit of Wang Yanhua are from the following sources: Ms. Francy Chang, Executive Officer at The Republic of China Centenary Foundation; “News” section (Min 100/03/30) of the website of the Office of the President of Taiwan www.president.gov.tw/
Qiu Canzhi’s ‘A brief history’

The first unofficial account of the Qiu Jin legacy discussed is by Qiu Canzhi whose autobiographical article ‘A brief history of my family and my life’ first appeared in print in a Shanghai journal ‘sometime before the Japanese War’ and was re-published in 1984 by the Shaoxing historical society. One of the aims of this article seems to be to discredit her brother and his descendants.

Qiu Canzhi’s essay reflects the bitter tone of some of mother’s own writings: she lashes out at her family upbringing which included living with foster parents after her mother was executed; the favouring of her brother by the paternal grandparents; how she and her brother were accused of having a traitor as a mother—but this antagonism was particularly directed towards Canzhi because she carried on the female line; and her brother’s kowtowing to Zhang Jingyao 張敬堯 (1881-1933) the notorious warlord. Her autobiography begins with these cutting observations:

The custom in my country for families to be despotic and to favour males and denigrate females has been in practice for several thousand years. Until today it has not changed. It is similar to an evil snake or wild beast, and I do not know how many women compatriots have been lost to it!

Canzhi continues in this vein to describe her own family situation (‘I am from a despotic family, and I am under the power of evil forces’). She then presents a rolcall of names of people who helped her at various stages. These details are very informative for seeing the nexus of relationships and how association with these people may have affected Canzhi’s status in history.

Wang Yulin’s ‘Explaining a few of the circumstances…’

The second article considered in the paper is written by Wang Yulin, the daughter of Qiu Jin’s son Wang Yuande. There is clearly a division in family relationships between Qiu Jin’s daughter and son, which is reflected in these articles. Wang Yulin wrote her essay

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‘Explaining a few of the circumstances relating to the descendants of Qiu Jin’ in order to discredit a ‘cousin’. The row erupted into print in 1986 and centred on who had the right to be invited to memorial celebrations in Hangzhou for the 70th anniversary of the 1911 Revolution. In effect, this article sums up the writer’s concerns about who has the right to claim legitimate descent from Qiu Jin, but it also points to the larger picture of control of memory.

Local historian Chen Dehan

The story of who has the right to claim descent from Qiu Jin was taken up by a local Hangzhou historian, Chen Dehan, who wrote an article titled ‘Qiu Jin’s husband’s family: An investigation of the Wang family of Hunan’ for a volume of articles published in 1985 to commemorate the 1911 Revolution. The form of the articles in this memorial volume is again the wenshi ziliao. The article begins by establishing the identity of Wang Jiaqi, the very person discredited by Qiu Jin’s ‘granddaughter’ (see above). The writer of this article joined the clamour of voices striving to validate the Qiu Jin archives even though they are at times at odds with the official versions of her history.

Conclusions and future work

The paper points to the multiple forms of memory available to the historian. Uncovering the several layers of memory of Qiu Jin introduces an element in the histories of the 1911 Revolution that are different from orthodox accounts and raises questions for further empirical research and theoretical considerations. We have seen that despite the desire of the Chinese government for total control of the collective memory of the nation, there are discrepancies in the histories of this woman, who is celebrated as one of the main heroes of the 1911 Revolution. A close look at her memorials and their supporting documents reveals oversights in naming and in the maintenance of graves and monuments. The paper has also revealed disputes in family and local histories about whom had a legitimate claim to her

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memory. These accounts in no way discredit Qiu Jin’s name, but are a useful point of departure for seeing how historical records can be distorted.

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The revision of history textbooks often attracts domestic and international public scrutiny, particularly among those groups who share a common and often controversial past. Criticism of history education by historical revisionists, and counter-criticism, has been marked in Japan and Russia. Japan has attracted the attention of East Asian neighbours for its alleged attempts to conceal Japan’s wartime past. Russia, another neighbour of Japan, has been under local and international fire for President Vladimir Putin’s efforts to revive Russian identity and nationalism through a revised history education.

This paper compares and contrasts the descriptions of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05, in the state authorised history textbooks issued in Russia and Japan over the last fifteen years. This war was the first direct military conflict between the two nations. Its importance lies in the manifestation of Western diplomatic interests vested in Russia and Japan. Japan needed the contested regions of Manchuria and Korea as a foothold for its imperial ambitions; Russia wanted these territories to safeguard its sea access.

Japan’s victory was celebrated as the first victory of an Asian power against a Western power. However, as the historian Sandra Wilson observes, historians outside of Japan seem to recognise the war’s legacy more so than those inside it.¹ In Russia the defeat is said to have precipitated the state of revolt that resulted in the First Russian Revolution of 1905.

The relations between Japan and Russia have received less attention than the relations of Japan with China and Korea, and of Russia with East European states and the former Soviet republics. However, the two nations’ diplomatic ties were frozen owing to unresolved

disputes over the Kurile Islands (or Hoppô Ryôdô). The Russo-Japan War of 1904–05 is significant as it laid the foundation for tense binational relations. This study seeks to illuminate the mutual representations of the war and to offer an understanding of these ambivalent relations.²

In these 44 history textbooks, 22 Japanese middle-school textbooks and 22 Russian high school textbooks are analysed. The textbooks were authorised by the state and published between 1997 and 2010.³ The year 1997 is significant in two ways for Japan. First, it was the first textbook certification round after the fiftieth anniversary of Japan’s defeat in the Pacific War. Secondly, the year saw the founding of Atarashii Rekishi o Tsukurukai, which comprised of historians and public figures who aimed to revive patriotism in Japanese youth through history education. The textbooks underwent subsequent screening and approval processes by the Ministry of Education in 2002 and 2007.

The period between the late 1990s and 2010 witnessed the transition of the Russian textbooks publication ethos from the interregnum to tightened control by Moscow. Between the early 1990s and mid-1990s, some authors attempted to present hitherto suppressed alternative historical visions and pedagogy. However, in the early 2000s, Premier Putin imposed a version of history that would restore patriotism amongst youth.

This study aims to demonstrate the commonalities and diversity in the narrative strategies in the textbooks of Russia and Japan. It then shows points of comparison and contrast. Christopher Barnard’s application of functional grammar to the analysis of Japanese textbooks has demonstrated that attention to narrative strategies is highly important, as the narrative constructions can render particular historical interpretations and implicit assumptions as natural or neutral, therefore bolstering them as an ideology beyond questioning and challenge.⁴ Such research methodology allows us to go beyond mere verification of the accuracy of textbook narratives, and to depict the ideology presented in the

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² As they are called in Russia, or Hoppô Ryôdô in Japan (‘Northern territories’). The activities by the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research, Braunschweig, Germany, to improve diplomatic relations through the improvement of textbooks, are worth mentioning here. See, for instance, Pingel, UNESCO Guidebook on Textbook Research and Textbook Revision (Hannover: Verlag Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 1999).

³ Using the textbooks whose target ages coincide proved to be challenging. But, we chose the student years in which the largest number of the students were exposed to the state-authorised textbook narratives of the Russo-Japanese War. The Russian curriculum covers the Russo-Japan War only partially in Year 9 (intermediate school), but mostly in the last two years, the 10th and 11th years of schooling (high school). This age group is slightly higher than that of Japan. History is compulsory in Years 7 and 8, but it is optional at high school in Russia. However, those who do not continue to high school usually attend vocational schools where the same history textbooks are distributed as with the high schools.

narratives. This study follows the chronological progression based on three stages of the War: the lead-up to, the period during, and the end of the War.

Barnard has identified two ideologies presented in Japanese textbook descriptions of the events of the Pacific War. The first is the ideology of irresponsibility that is characterised as the narrative constructions that obscure or absolve the responsibilities of individuals and authorities in historical events. The second is the ideology of face protection. The function of this ideology is to soften the damage to self-images. For instance, the humiliating aspects that may affect the positive self-image can be mitigated in the narrative. It entails emphasising the redeeming features in the event of defeat or in the historical actors involved.5

In academia, Japanese and Russian historians generally agree that the immediate cause of the War was the rivalry over the Korean Peninsula and Manchuria between Japan and Russia.6 Negotiations between Japan and Russia were held in 1903 and 1904, but compromise was not reached, and this further cultivated mutual mistrust. In February 1904 Japan broke off its diplomatic ties with Russia and declared war.7

Russia lost every battle to Japan in this war. But Japan suffered great casualties and financial costs. The Japanese losses in the Russo-Japanese War were much higher than in the Sino-Japanese War ten years earlier. Meanwhile, the Tsarist regime grew anxious that the war would arouse public dissent, and the war did result in the First Russian revolution of 1905-07. The Portsmouth Treaty in 1905, presided over by the American President Theodore Roosevelt, concluded the war. Among other things, the Japanese secured its hold over Korea. However, the absence of any reparations award from Russia angered the Japanese public, they felt betrayed by the Japanese government as they were left without any compensation for the constraints caused by inflation and the tax increases needed to fund the war effort.8

The narration of the beginning of the war has certain similarities in Russian and Japanese textbooks. Both sets of textbooks similarly describe the intensifying rivalry between Japan and Russia in the imperial race and the desire to expand their territories. However, as further analysis reveals, the Russian textbooks focus on presenting Japan as an aggressor and Russia as a victim of the developing geopolitical struggle in the Far East.

5 Ibid. 49, 128-129.
Soroko-Tsupa’s textbook states: ‘Japan attacked Russian fleet in Port Arthur and Chemul’po (Korea) without declaration of war.’ The combination of ‘attacked’ and ‘without declaration of war’ seems to impregnate the text with animosity towards the Japanese. The textbook unequivocally identifies Japan as the opportunistic aggressor, and the Russian fleet as the hapless victim. Yet, it is unclear about the motive and the processes behind the Japanese attack. The 2004 edition of Ostrovskii’s textbook follows Soroko-Tsupa:

The historical fact is that Japan became the aggressor. Nearly a week before the Japanese attack on Russia, the Russian government sent an official note to the Japanese government that demonstrated Russian preparedness for a major compromise, suggesting only that Japan must not use Korea for its strategic interests.10

The role of Japan as the aggressor is emphatic, as it presented as a seemingly inviolable ‘historic fact’. The Japanese government is narrated as unreasonable and even contemptuous towards the Russian request to compromise. The responsibility for the war is shifted towards Japan; Japan is presented as an aggressor that attacked an unprepared Russia.

The Japanese textbooks, on the other hand, accentuate popular support and even popular demand for the war, and by doing so shift war responsibility from the Japanese state to the Japanese people. The 1997 edition of the textbook by Shimizu Shoin tell us:

Within Japan, voices calling for war with Russia began to emerge. Although Christian Uchimura Kanzô and Socialist Kôtoku Shûsui maintained a pacifist (anti-war) argument, public opinion inside the nation leaned towards the pro-war camp. In 1904 Japan declared war on Russia, and the Russo-Japanese War began.11

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10 Ostrovskii, Istorriya Rossii, XX vek, 11 klass [The History of Russia, the 20th century, Year 11] (Moscow: Drofa, 2004), 16.
11Mayuzumi and others, Nihon no rekishi to sekai: Chûgakkô rekishi [Japan's History and the World: Middle School History] (Tokyo: Shimizu Shoin, 1997), 214. Japanese textbooks are compiled by teams comprising numerous authors. For the sake of convenience the main text refers to the Japanese textbooks by the publishers’ names.
The text tells us the pro-war supporters prevailed over the pacifists. Public sentiment is described as ‘leaning toward’ pro-war. Such narrative strategies demonstrate that both Russian and Japanese textbooks obscure their own national responsibility for the war. Russian textbooks apportion blame squarely on the Japanese and the Tsarist regime, which prepares the reader for the Russian defeat and shifts responsibility for the loss from Russian state. The Japanese textbooks seem to rely on impersonal constructions, suggesting that war was inevitable. Russian textbooks also focus on states as main historical players while excluding human agency and thus obscuring questions of responsibility.

A point of difference between Russian and Japanese textbooks appears in the ways in which Japan and Russia fought during the war. The 1997 edition of the Nihon Shoseki textbook relates:

In 1905 the Japanese military occupied Lushun, and won battles around Mukden. The Navy emphatically defeated the Russian Baltic fleet at the Battle of Tsushima. But Japan’s military expenditure was nearly ten times as much as that of the Sino-Japanese War; nearly 460,000 casualties resulted. Weapons and ammunition ran short. The capacity of troops and finances weakened. It became difficult to carry on with the war.\textsuperscript{12}

By contrast, Russian textbooks tried to accentuate the heroic characteristics of Russian seamen and soldiers. Danilov’s textbook narrates:

From the complete and devastating defeat Russia was rescued by the heroism and courage of the Russian soldiers and seamen. The legendary ‘Varyag’ battleship and ‘Koreets’ ship, that took part in an unequal battle with the Japanese fleet near the Korean city Chemulpo, became a legend, and not only of Russian history. Russian heroes, even the prisoners of war, were paid homage even by their captures.

\textsuperscript{12}Kodama and others, \textit{Chûgaku shakai: Rekishi teki bunya} [Middle School Social Studies: History] (Tokyo: Nihon Shoseki, 1997), 211.
who admired their bravery and faithfulness to their military obligation.\footnote{Danilov, Istoriya Rossii. 1900-1945, 11 klass. [The History of Russia. 1900-1945, Year 11] (Moscow: Prosveshenie, 2009), 25.}

Japanese textbooks tend to mute the act of atrocities during the war. The concealing of human brutality helps to protect the ‘faces’ of those responsible for those acts. In Japanese textbooks, a face-protecting ideology is employed in mollifying the aggressive nature of the Japanese state. In Russian textbooks, a face-protecting ideology is employed differently. Russian textbooks tend to focus on Russian soldiers’ bravery and work to emphasise Russian successes in killing many Japanese troops. Russian textbooks protect the state’s face by praising the soldiers’ efforts against the Japanese, thus mitigating the shame of losing to Japan and even more crucially of being the first Western nation to lose to an Asian nation.

In discussing the domestic conditions during the war, the Japanese textbooks dedicate much space to the hardships that ordinary people endured. Such a focus is absent in Russian textbooks. Commonly, neither set of textbooks discusses the hardships and suffering of the people in Korea and China.

The conclusion of the war is narrated differently in the Russian and Japanese textbooks. The Japanese textbooks mention two outcomes of the war: the domestic response and Japan’s international standing. Regarding the former, the textbooks exhibit small variations. Tôkyô Shoseki’s 1997 edition exemplify the narrative trend:

\begin{quote}
Compared with the enormity of sacrifice for the war, Japan was unable to gain reparations. Japan managed to gain small territories and concessions. The people in Japan attacked the government fiercely. In Tokyo it evolved into a mass movement that entailed rioting.\footnote{Tanabe and others, Shimpen atarashî shakai: Rekishi [Middle School Social Studies: History], 219.}
\end{quote}

The passage contrasts the size of war casualties and the paucity of the gains for the Japanese state. Using the phrase ‘the people in Japan’ gives the impression of a faceless crowd. To assume that not everyone in Japan took part in the riots may require some analytical reading. While the angry response and the riot have happened, the presentation seems to intimate that the public used violence as an immediate political expression. Reading between the lines, however, the text seems to endorse the ideology of face protection. The
textbooks suggest that the Russo-Japanese War did not bring an emphatic victory for the Japanese, but a pyrrhic one. The focus on the adverse results of the war seems to buttress what the historian James Joseph Orr finds in the post-1960s Japanese educational aspiration to cultivate a peaceful-loving youth. On the contrary, in stressing the futility of war these editions suggest that the War brought forth more adverse consequences than beneficial ones. The mention of rioting as a narrative strategy serves as the pathos-filled denouement to the narrative of the Russo-Japanese War. It also reminds readers that the war brought more trouble to the Japanese state and, by implication, the Japanese people. The didactic message to the young readers seems to be that war should be avoided for its adverse effects on the welfare of the Japanese public. This message overlooks the suffering and casualties of war.

The concluding remarks from the Russian textbooks reveal an important didactic message that stress the need for a state led by strong leadership needed to win a war. In Danilov’s words:

Finally, Russia was not prepared for the war ideologically. Kuropatkin wrote: “The Japanese army was very patriotic, it received the support of the whole nation, every person in the army knew the importance of this war”. However, the Russian nation was not united by a commitment to victory […]. The losses caused by poor leadership led to disappointment and regrets. Such sentiments became the catalyst for the revolution of 1905-1907.

Danilov praises the Japanese army for its patriotic sentiments. He emphasises the importance of national support to achieve victory. By contrast, the inability of the Russian nation to unite at the time of war resulted not only in total Russian defeat, but it also led to the First Russian revolution. The Russian textbooks construct the message that Japan won the war because it had a modern military apparatus with adequate political and economic foundations, something that the Tsarist regime lacked. By giving tribute to the Japanese state the authors reinforce the central idea that a strong state can single-handedly bring the nation to victory. Used in conjunction with the ideology of irresponsibility, the main didactic

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16 Danilov, Istoriya Rossi. 1900-1945, 11 klass. [The History of Russia. 1900-1945, Year 11], 26. Alexei N. Kuropatkin was Russian Imperial Minister of War at the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War. He was often blamed for many Russian drawbacks in this War. After the War he published a number of books in his own defense.
message young Russian readers obtain from learning about the Russo-Japanese war is that they should always support the state.

In conclusion, the analysis of the descriptions of the Russo-Japanese war from its outbreak to conclusion in 44 Russian and Japanese history textbooks reveals two overarching ideologies present throughout the textbooks: the ideology of irresponsibility and that of face-protecting. These ideologies do not mean that Russian and Japanese textbooks fabricate history. The textbooks are factually accurate. The Russian and Japanese textbooks also feature similar historical events. What makes them different is the didactic messages to the young readers within both countries. If unchecked, these messages can leave an imprint on the ways the Russian and Japanese youths view twentieth-century history, their roles as citizens and the citizens of the ‘other’ nation.

The analysis of the narrative strategies and descriptions of the Russo-Japanese War reveals no empathy for each other. The ideology of irresponsibility and the ideology of face-protection are expressed most differently in Japanese and Russian textbooks. However, these ideologies serve a similar purpose. The lesson the textbooks promote is that support for the state is paramount irrespective of the circumstances. In both countries, this lesson seems to be take priority over learning aimed at developing students’ intellectual and critical faculties in historical enquiry.

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Lee Myung-bak, Cheonan, and the New Cold War

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Recently there has been increasing talk of a ‘New Cold War’, focused perhaps on Northeast Asia. However, because of the involvement of major powers, principally the United States and China, it is one with global implications.\(^1\) The old Cold War in Northeast Asia may be considered to have ended when, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, both Russia (1991) and China (1992) established diplomatic relations with the Republic of Korea.\(^2\) The ROK and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)\(^3\) both joined the United Nations on the same day, 17 September 1991. However, the old Cold War never quite died away; Neither the United States nor Japan were willing to establish diplomatic relations with the DPRK, though both have, at times, promised that they will. Indeed, the Agreed Framework between the US and the DPRK in 1994 specifically pledged that ‘the U.S. and the DPRK will upgrade bilateral relations to the Ambassadorial level’\(^4\). Unfortunately the US did not fulfil any of the major commitments of the Agreed Framework, which was finally abrogated by the Bush administration in 1992 on the grounds that the DPRK had a clandestine heavy enriched uranium (HEU) weapons programme.\(^5\) In addition, though relations between the two Koreas have fluctuated over that period—and there have been two summits, to which we will return—there is still no formal ‘diplomatic relationship’ between them. Since they both regard themselves as part of a temporarily divided Korea, a formal relationship would not be the same as one between separate nation states. Nevertheless there are plenty of ways, such as having liaison offices in each other’s capital, whereby a *de facto* normal diplomatic relationship could be achieved.

The New Cold War may be considered to have two interrelated components: The global focus on the attempts of the United States to maintain hegemony, to counter the rise of China and, to a lesser but still important extent, the resurgence of Russia; then there is the

\(^1\) This paper draws on my recent book Tim Beal, *Crisis in Korea: America, China, and the risk of war* (London: Pluto, 2011).  
\(^2\) South Korea, hereafter ROK.  
\(^3\) North Korea, hereafter DPRK.  
\(^5\) Jonathan D. Pollack, "The United States, North Korea, and the end of the Agreed Framework," *Naval War College Review* LVI, no. 3 (2003). Nearly ten years later there is still no indication that such a programme exists.
regional component covering the Korean peninsula, China, and Japan. This paper will focus on Korea and specifically ROK President Lee Myung-bak and his utilisation of the Cheonan incident to advance his policy vis-à-vis the DPRK.

The high point in Inter-Korea relations in recent years was the summit between ROK President Roh Moo-hyun and DPRK in October 2007. That built on the previous, historic first summit between Kim Jong II and Kim Dae-jung in June 2000. The Roh-Kim summit made various commitments to promote ‘peace and prosperity’ on the peninsula including the establishment of ‘The West Sea Special Zone for Peace and Cooperation’. This was to:

Encompass […] Haeju area and its adjoining waters, and actively seek the designation of a common fishery zone and peace zone, construction of a special economic zone, and utilisation of the Haeju port, direct passage of civilian vessels to Haeju, and joint utilisation of the Han River estuary.

The West Sea is a particularly important area because it has been the major scene of confrontation and conflict between the two Koreas. It is a major crab fishing area, coveted by fishermen from North and South (and increasingly from China). More importantly, it has a disputed boundary. At the time of the Korean War Armistice in 1953 the United States, which had superiority at sea as well as the air, occupied islands off the south-western coast of the DPRK. In order to prevent, it was said, Syngman Rhee from reigniting the fighting the US unilaterally established a North Limit line (NLL) beyond which the ROK was not supposed to venture. It has since been revealed that US officials, including Henry Kissinger, subsequently accepted that the NLL was illegal, and was an unnecessary provocation against the DPRK, but by that time control had been handed over to the ROK government. However, it is significant to note in respect of the New Cold War that whereas in the 1970s

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the US tried to restrain the ROK over the NLL, by 2010 it was supporting its intransigence. This was to have important consequences.

**Figure 1** Crucible of crisis - the West Sea and the NLL

Roh’s terms of office soon ended and he was succeeded in February 2008 by the conservative Lee Myung-bak. Roh’s peaceful Northern policy was reversed and inter-Korean relations rapidly deteriorated. In particular, Lee declared that there would be no compromise over the NLL. By 2010 the West Sea became not a zone for peace and cooperation, but one of violent confrontation, culminating in an artillery exchange, the first since the Korean War, called the Yeonpyeong Incident. This resulted in the deaths of four South Koreans on a military base on Yeonpyeong Island and an unknown number of North Koreans on the mainland. The groundwork for the artillery exchange at Yeonpyeong (spelt Yonphyong in the North) was laid by the Cheonan Incident of March that year, and its investigation.

On 26 March 2010 the ROK Patrol Combat Corvette (PCC) *Cheonan* sank in ‘mysterious circumstances’ near Baengnyeong Island, adjacent to the NLL, with 46 casualties. Lee Myung-bak set up an investigation team which purported to be impartial. It described itself thus:

*The Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group (JIG) conducted its investigation with 25 experts from 10 top Korean expert agencies, 22*

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military experts, 3 experts recommended by the National Assembly, and 24 foreign experts constituting 4 support teams from the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of Sweden.\textsuperscript{12}

Although it was called a Civilian-Military team it was, in fact, run out of the Ministry of Defence, which issued all its statements, including the final report. One of the civilians, Shin Sang-cheol, an opposition member of the National Assembly with experience in shipbuilding, was expelled when he challenged the official verdict and was put under investigation.\textsuperscript{13} The international aspect was also bogus. Neither China nor Russia were invited to join the JIG, and the DPRK request to send investigators was rejected.

In the two months prior to the release of the official interim JIG report on 20 May the South Korea press was full of rumours and stories, but most of them assumed that the Cheonan had been sunk by DPRK submarine using a Chinese torpedo or a German one.\textsuperscript{14} Evidence of a German torpedo would have been very troublesome because whereas the ROK and US Navies use German torpedoes, the DPRK does not, and it would have been very difficult to acquire one. That did not stop the military spin doctors: ‘It’s possible that North Korea may have used a German torpedo to disguise its attack, knowing that South Korea uses German torpedoes’, the official said.\textsuperscript{15}

However, there were problems with the assertion of DPRK culpability because there appeared to be no incriminating evidence. Things got to such a pass that officials began suggesting that they did not need evidence directly linking the DPRK with the sinking.\textsuperscript{16} Despite these brave words, there was clearly need for a ‘smoking gun’ that could make the allegation stick. Time was running out because it had been decided to release the report in time to influence the forthcoming local and gubernatorial elections.\textsuperscript{17} In the event the government was disappointed and suffered a resounding defeat, partly because of public scepticism over its investigation.\textsuperscript{18} But the government was as yet not to know that and so the

\textsuperscript{13} Ben Richardson and Saeromi Shin, "South Korea Faces Domestic Skeptics Over Evidence Against North," \textit{Bloomberg Businessweek}, 29 May 2010; S C Shin, "Letter to Hillary Clinton, U.S. Secretary of state: There was no Explosion. There was No Torpedo. ,” 26 May 2010.
\textsuperscript{15} “Cheonan probe finds RDX, alloy used in torpedoes,” \textit{JoongAng Ilbo}, 8 May 2010.
\textsuperscript{17} Hae-in Shin, “N.K. emerges as key election issue,” \textit{Korea Herald}, 20 May 2010.
\textsuperscript{18} Chi-dong Lee, "Main opposition heading for stunning victory in local elections,” \textit{Yonhap}, 3 June 2010; Cheong-mo Yoo, “Election defeat casts gloom over Lee administration, ruling party,” \textit{Yonhap}, 3 June 2010.
search for incriminating evidence was considered vital. At the last moment it appeared that the day was saved:

Investigators have found at the 11th hour found a desperately needed smoking gun linking North Korea to the sinking of the Navy Corvette Cheonan, a government official claimed Tuesday [18th May]. Investigators apparently discovered a propeller from the torpedo that likely sank the ship in relatively good condition in waters where it sank and the serial number handwritten on it is North Korean.19

This gave the government what it wanted and the JIG report of 20 May was adamant:

Based on all such relevant facts and classified analysis, we have reached the clear conclusion that ROKS ‘Cheonan’ was sunk as the result of an external underwater explosion caused by a torpedo made in North Korea. The evidence points overwhelmingly to the conclusion that the torpedo was fired by a North Korean submarine. There is no other plausible explanation.20

However public scepticism continued to mount.21 One of the ways in which Lee Myung-bak attempted to tackle this was to pressure the Russians to send a team to look at the evidence assembled by the JIG. Russia has a large debt to the ROK, which is a far more important trading partner than the DPRK, so was not in a position to refuse. Presumably, Lee thought the Russians would accept the JIG verdict. He was wrong. A Russian team came to Seoul in June 2010 and from the time of its departure there were stories that its investigation had been inconclusive.22 It seems that this was a smokescreen, to save face all around. The Russian government never published its report because it would have embarrassed both Lee, and Barack Obama, who had endorsed the ROK verdict.23 However, the Russian findings were leaked to the Seoul daily Hankyoreh. The Russian experts were adamant that the

19 “Serial Number of Torpedo Traced to N.Korea,” Chosun Ilbo, 19 May 2010.
torpedo remnant produced by the ROK had not sunk the Cheonan. Moreover, the corrosion suggested that it had been under water for six months, not two. In other words, the evidence had been fabricated.

The false incrimination of the DPRK in what had been a potentially humiliating and politically damaging accident for the ROK government was more than just a cover-up. It was part of a programme to raise tension with the DPRK in hope of an incident which would precipitate a crisis and lead the way to a takeover of the North. The US government supported it because, amongst other reasons, it was consistent with their strategy of increasing confrontation with China. It was a key component in what is developing swiftly and perilously as a New Cold War.

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Religion, politics and identity
A 2003 statement by the Federation of Islamic Associations of New Zealand (FIANZ), an umbrella organisation uniting the various regional associations, declared Muslims living here to be ‘an integral part of the nation’. This is a reasonable aspiration, though the need to assert it indicates an understandable degree of defensiveness. The Muslim community in New Zealand is the subject of a recent book by Erich Kolig, *New Zealand’s Muslims and Multiculturalism*, and this paper offers reflections on some issues raised by the book. In particular, I want to explore some constraints on the integration of Muslims into New Zealand society. As Kolig notes, ‘Muslims occupy, and have failed so far to leave, that no man’s land between being appreciated as a valued minority, embedded in unquestioned citizenship, and being a suspected and resented group festering in hostile surroundings’ (261-62). Moreover, ‘while the peaceful and relatively harmonious conditions prevailing at this time between the Muslim minority and the wider society can be called exemplary, they are not amenable to projection into the future’ (1-2; cf. 6).

Kolig sees occasional evidence of ‘Islamophobia’ in New Zealand largely as a response to the actions of an unrepresentative but militant minority overseas, which inspires ‘fear of a dangerous potential inherent in “Islam”’ that he considers ‘in New Zealand’s case, unfounded’ (86). Of course, discrimination or violence against Muslims is unjustified and unacceptable, but it is not quite as groundless as Kolig implies. As he observes, ‘It is an unfortunate truism that Muslim immigrants are considered problematic wherever they form sizeable minorities in Western societies’ (86). Other countries with Muslim minorities have seen with horror and bewilderment that violent *jihādī* can emerge from apparently well-integrated families, and even from non-Muslim backgrounds. Tragedies like the London bombings of 2005 show that a militant version of their religion can attract disillusioned and poorly adjusted young Muslims in the West, though sometimes it is only after the event that the extent of their disaffection is recognised. Some Muslims in the West have stretched the

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limits of free expression in angry street demonstrations with book-burning and calls for beheading the alleged enemies of Islam (4). There are obvious reasons why the Hindu and Buddhist communities in New Zealand raise fewer concerns than does the much smaller Muslim one.

Islam raises issues of social integration more acutely than do other religions because it is understood by Muslims as a whole way of life encompassing law, government, and economics rather than simply beliefs, rituals, and ethics (146). The full application of the divine law, the sharī‘ah, remains the ideal for most Muslims, and especially Muslim reformers, even though historically the sharī‘ah has not usually been applied fully even in Muslim-majority countries.

It is probably only a matter of time before some Muslims in New Zealand ask for the implementation sharī‘ah law in certain areas of life though this has not yet occurred (cf. 223). In some respects, it already is applied, notably in abattoirs where the slaughter of sheep and cattle is usually conducted by Muslims so that halāl meat can be exported to Islamic countries. Non-Muslims tend to be wary of sharī‘ah law because of the prescribed hudūd punishments, flogging or caning, amputation, and stoning, that are applied in some countries. It is highly unlikely, however, that Muslims in New Zealand would want these introduced and quite inconceivable that any such demand would be fulfilled (cf. 222). The Australian Federation of Islamic Councils, however, recently provoked a vigorous debate by calling for the right to apply sharī‘ah matrimonial and inheritance law among Muslims. These are among the areas most regularly applied in Islamic countries, not least because they concern private life and cost governments little to enforce.

New Zealand religious bodies already have their own rules that contradict statute law without detracting from the jurisdiction of the state. The Catholic Church and some others, for example, do not permit divorce and remarriage though the Church has no authority to prevent Catholics from obtaining a civil divorce and remarrying before a non-Catholic celebrant. That this may create problems for divorced Catholics vis-à-vis their own Church is not a concern of society at large. However, if Muslims asked the state to recognise marriages or divorces approved by a religious authority but contrary to statute law, they would certainly provoke a hostile reaction. There are already accredited Muslim marriage celebrants, who presumably offer their services only to couples who fulfil sharī‘ah requirements.

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If Muslims were to seek more than this, one would want to know precisely which rulings would be considered applicable, especially in regard to women. Some interpretations of the *sharī‘ah* permit a man to have up to four wives (based on Q 4:3). There are five main schools of Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*), and according to the Ja‘farī school, which prevails among Shi‘īs, a girl as young as nine can marry. More usually, the growth of pubic hair, the onset of menstruation, or pregnancy [sic] are said to indicate marriageability. A husband can divorce his wife without her consent by invoking a simple formula, but it is much more difficult for a wife to obtain a divorce that her husband opposes. A disobedient wife is not entitled to maintenance. A daughter receives only half the inheritance of her brother (Q 4:11), and one man’s legal testimony has the same value as that of two women (so they can remind each other, based on Q 2:282).

No country that prides itself on promoting the rights of women as New Zealand does could give carte blanche to a religious minority whose laws would undermine those rights. If a *sharī‘ah* jurisdiction within New Zealand would only enforce laws compatible with New Zealand law, it would seem to be redundant except as a means of promoting a separate communal identity, which would not be helpful for the integration of the Muslim community.

Another challenge to social integration is that Westerners and Muslims have not found a way to discuss religious differences without causing offence. Kolig notes (112) that when Professor Abdullah Saeed of Melbourne addressed the Dunedin Abrahamic Interfaith Group and the University Chaplaincy in September 2007, he avoided controversial issues. Such an approach, I fear, encourages a false sense of agreement among different religions and inhibits genuine understanding. Kolig describes Pope Benedict XVI’s September 2006 Regensburg reference to the militancy of Islam and its Prophet as a ‘gaffe’ (174). New Zealand Muslims, however, distribute literature (often with a Saudi *imprimatur*) that is no more accommodating to Jewish or Christian sensibilities than was Benedict’s reference to Islam: ‘With the coming of the Prophet Muhammad matters were put in their proper perspective. The pure Judaism of Moses was reinstated, and Christianity was cleansed of Paulinism. Both were recast in their original imperishable mould of Islam. ‘A Saudi-sponsored Qur’ān translation by al-Hilāli and Khān offered gratis in New Zealand includes

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4 Bakhtiar, pp. 499-546, especially pp. 504-05.
5 Bakhtiar, p. 477.
6 Ali Muhsin, *Let the Bible Speak*. Islamic Da‘wah and Guidance Center: Damman, Saudi Arabia [originally written in 1995 but subsequently re-formatted and reprinted], p. 64.
footnotes identifying those who have earned God’s anger (in the first *sūrah*) as the Jews and those who have gone astray as the Christians.\(^7\)

It is one of the blessings of an open society that Muslims and non-Muslims alike can express their views with considerable latitude. Muslims who protested against Pope Benedict’s Regensburg speech and against the publication of the Danish cartoons seem not to recognise that the freedom they have in New Zealand to express their religious views is precisely the same freedom that others have to criticise Islam and even its Prophet.

After a detailed discussion of the Muhammad cartoons published by the Danish *Jyllands Posten* in September 2005, and subsequently around the world including several Fairfax newspapers in New Zealand, Kolig offers a balanced conclusion. The media need to be more aware of Muslim sensibilities, while Muslims living in the West need ‘to learn to accept or at least tolerate relevant Western values and viewpoints.’ Presumably, the Western media did not appreciate that publishing caricatures of Muhammad would be considered far more offensive to Muslims than, say, publishing caricatures of Jesus would be to Christians (who perforce have become more inured to the ridicule of secularists). It is open to both sides to reduce the distance between them by persuasion rather than force or threat (173-74).

Muslims in New Zealand seem to accept this. The remarkable feature of the anti-cartoon response here was its restraint, including that of the 500-700 Muslims who demonstrated in Queen Street on Sunday 5 February 2006, especially when contrasted with the calls to violence overseas (213-14).

There are some issues raised by the controversy that have not been given their due attention. Kolig argues that one cartoon in particular, depicting the Prophet wearing as his turban a bomb with a lit fuse, was ‘extremely sacrilegious’ and ‘could hardly be surpassed by anything more insulting’, for it ‘drew Islam per se into the orbit of extremism’ (161). Sayeqa Islam, a Victoria University of Wellington law and criminology student, argued at the time that ‘To depict Muhammad as a suicide bomber is to suggest Islam condones suicide bombers and that all Muslims aspire to being suicide bombers. It is to say Islam is, per se, murderous, vengeful, callous and cold-blooded.’\(^8\) Now, how could such a notion have arisen? It was Muslims, not cartoonists, who first linked Islam and its Prophet with terrorism. Non-Muslims would not have concocted the anachronistic image of Muhammad as a suicide bomber had


\(^8\) ‘Muslim cartoons should not have been published here’, *New Zealand Herald*, 6 February 2006.
not Usāmah bin Lādin and his associates justified their acts of terror by reference to the Qur‘ān and the exemplary tradition (the *sunnah*) of the Prophet as the hijackers’ ‘spiritual manual’ indicates:

> When you board the plane: The very moment you put in your foot, and even before you really enter it, proceed with the prayer and the prayers, and consider that it is a raid on the path (of God) as the Prophet has said, ‘Marching out in the morning and returning in the evening on the path of God is better than this world and what is in it’... 

To judge from the Islamic response around the world, Muslims generally were at least as upset by the cartoonists’ depiction of Muhammad-the-terrorist as by the terrorists’ actions in the name of the Prophet (which for some were even a cause for celebration). Opposition to the cartoons was in large part conditioned by a long-standing ban on images of the Prophet, though not all forms of Islam have fully endorsed this prohibition. At the same time, I would suggest, the outcry reflected the widespread denial among Muslims that their Prophet or what many claim to be a ‘religion of peace’ had anything to do with recent terrorism. Some of Kolig’s interlocutors were inclined to blame Mossad or the CIA, a shift in responsibility that seems to be as popular among Muslims as among anti-government conspiracy theorists in the USA (252).

Kolig also describes as ‘no less offensive’ a cartoon of ragged suicide bombers being turned away from the gates of heaven because paradise had run out of virgins (161). Rather controversially, he argues that this ‘primitive’ expectation is not shared by ‘a majority of Muslims’ who anticipate ‘spiritual rewards ... rather than sexual or sensual pleasures’ (162). Kolig supports this contention by quoting, from a New Zealand Muslim newsletter, a series of *hadīths* describing paradise that include reference to ‘a beautiful wife’ though not to houris or virgins (163), but this is merely an argument from silence using selective evidence. It is the view of the 9/11 hijackers (and others of similar persuasion) who were being satirized, and, according their pre-flight instructions, ‘The paradise virgins are calling you, saying, “O

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friend of God, come”, wearing their nicest clothing.”¹¹ It would be a humourless world in which such a view were immune to satire.

Denial of Muslim responsibility for 9/11 and other atrocities, as well as the belief that the perpetrators would be rewarded in paradise, should be subject to criticism in a free society. In an Anglo-Saxon context (but, evidently not a Danish one, to judge from the bland nature of the cartoons), satirical cartoons are an accepted form of social and political comment. Among Muslims, an important message was drowned out by the noise provoked by the medium. I would suggest that adaptation to life in New Zealand or any other Western country requires acceptance of free speech, including the right to ridicule religion.

Muslims face barriers to integration because their religion and its law are linked to terrorism, brutal punishments, and the poor treatment of women. New Zealand Muslims, I suggest, need to distance themselves from terrorism not by denying its links with their religion–this has been unconvincing–but by acknowledging the diversity of Islam and how they represent a tolerant and peaceful version of it. If they really want people to understand them, I would encourage Muslims to be open about what they actually believe, including their beliefs about how Judaism and Christianity as understood by their respective adherents were ‘corrected’ by Muhammad. Clearly this requires difficult balancing, but there are other religious groups in New Zealand who profess beliefs that most consider dubious but largely harmless. At the same time, Muslims will need to be rather more thick-skinned about the inevitable aspersions and criticisms their beliefs and practices attract. Non-Muslims also need to recognise the diversity of Islam. At least as far as official pronouncements indicate, New Zealand Muslims abhor terrorism and would not want to apply the full rigours of the sharī‘ah or even, hopefully, seek anything less than full equality for women.

¹¹ Kippenberg and Seidensticker, p. 16.
Institutions and faith: building Christian community in South Korea

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This paper discusses one aspect of my ongoing fieldwork with a transnational Christian church in South Korea and the United States, which is being undertaken towards the completion of a PhD in Anthropology at the University of Otago. I will focus on the role of legal and economic friction\(^1\) (Tsing 2005) in negotiating the ascendancy of new church members in the Korean congregation within the broader framework of the church.

Central to my study is a succession of property transactions surrounding the sale of the original church-owned land in a central district of Seoul and the congregation’s subsequent shift into a newly-acquired property in the same district several years later. This followed reinvestment protocols established by the Korean courts in response to legal challenges regarding the rightful ownership of the financial assets of the congregation following the original sale. Ownership questions came up because the original sale was marred by a multi-million dollar case of fraud involving the illegal existence of two contracts for the same transaction. In effect, the contract given to the church headquarters showed the expected, pre-approved payment price of 8 billion won (approximately $8 million US), while the ‘official’ contract delivered to the negotiator in charge of the deal showed 10.3 billion won. The discrepant 2.3 billion won disappeared.\(^2\)

This provoked a devastating crisis of authority for the congregation. The remaining proceeds of the sale—8 billion won—became entangled in a prolonged legal battle between one group claiming representation of the ‘local’ congregation on one side, and church headquarters on the other side. Examination of this event and its aftermath provide a telling window into the way that interactions between the Church’s core and periphery are shaped. First, such a stark example brings forward the structure of 'command' in the church, forcing a re-articulation of the church 'mission' towards its members in a way that is not normally

\(^1\) This follows Anna Tsing’s work defining the co-production of globalised cultures through ‘friction: the awkward, unequal, unstable and creative qualities of interconnection across difference.’ Tsing, Anna, *Friction*, Princeton University Press, 2005.

\(^2\) It is not entirely accurate to say that the money ‘disappeared,’ as the numbered bank account of a recipient has been identified by investigators. However, as the money was deposited and then withdrawn before the investigation started, and no further trail of the funds has been publicly identified, for the interests of this study I believe that the term is sufficient.
visible. Second, it shows how external factors, like national laws, empower and constrain the relationships between constituent actors. Thus, my project encompasses a reflection upon how differing notions of community, religion, and institutional models of leadership and participation make and unmake one another in the global arena.

The Church in Korea
The church at the center of this study is an international Christian denomination headquartered in the Midwestern United States. An ambitious course of international expansion began during the early 1950s due in large part to a raft of members returned to the US from military service abroad during the Second World War. Driven by the more global view of those members, the church envisioned a strategy for which further missionary work could be undertaken. Dozens of new congregations were planted around the world, today encompassing a quarter of a million members in 50 countries worldwide.

As part of its strategy to expand missionary activities, the church took advantage of the relative stability of the long-running ceasefire negotiations in the midst of the Korean War to establish a medical mission in Seoul in 1952. It later expanded the purview of the medical mission from basic humanitarian relief to include evangelism through the introduction of American missionaries. When the JP board (required for incorporation under Korean law) was first established to represent the interests of church holdings in Korea, financial administrators based in the US insisted on being named to the board despite being prohibited from doing so by their residency status. The questionable ethics of this act was deemed necessary in the US in order to protect the financial assets of the global church. This tension between Korean and American law is the legacy that persists in Korea to the present day.

Declining membership, soaring value
From 1985, growth rates of all religious groups in Korea began to decline. Simultaneously, church headquarters was also grappling with a decline in membership concentrated among the financial base of the church. This accompanied other financial difficulties for the denomination such as (on the negative side) a slump in church investment values caused by a declining stock market, and (on the positive side), the fruits of earlier global missionary efforts – an explosion of international congregations in primarily economically depressed regions who depended heavily (sometimes solely) on the American church to keep them
operational. The net effects over time of these factors were increasingly smaller operating budgets, and a deep disquiet regarding the long-term financial viability of the organisation.

In Korea, the shrinking congregation was finding it increasingly difficult to manage the physical assets of the congregation. While the condition of their buildings deteriorated however, the value of the land that they were situated on went up and up. The decision was made, in consultations between headquarters and the local congregation, to sell the Seoul property and reinvest a portion of the funds in a smaller property, with the remainder of the funds placed into an endowment to support the maintenance of the church in Korea as well as other East Asian nations. Predetermined legal processes for the sale were not followed, as discussed in the introduction; however no financial benefit to church members was discovered.

A tale of four properties

With the original church property in Seoul gone, the congregation needed a new place to worship (and, in the case of the foreign administrators, live) until a new property could be found. A storefront space occupying the entire first floor of a building virtually neighbouring the original property was rented (and extensively renovated) for the chapel and offices, while a large, family-style apartment was occupied in a new building down the road to live in (commonly referred to as ‘the villa,’ after the name of the building), both under a standard Korean rental agreement called *chonsei* (total rent). In a *chonsei* agreement, the tenant pays a significant up-front deposit (up to 80% of the value of the property), which the landlord invests in compensation for foregoing monthly rent. At the termination of the contract, the principle deposit is returned to the tenant.3

Though by far the most common type of residential rental agreement in Seoul,4 there remain some risks to tenants within the *chonsei* agreement. Of primary concern is the fact that there is no legal obligation of the landlord to deposit the *chonsei* into an escrow account, meaning that the principal default risk falls on the tenant. Because a very large proportion of properties are built by mega-development companies with holdings throughout the country, this is an extremely uncommon occurrence. And yet, this is precisely what happened to the church when the owners of the Villa (a small, independent construction

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4 Although only about 30% of all households nationwide live in chonsei units, in the more-expensive Seoul housing market the percentage is almost 44% - greater than the percentage of owner-occupied households. Ambrose and Kim, p. 56.
firm) went bankrupt, leading to foreclosure of the property. The other primary concern of *chonsei* tenants is that the landlord retains a call option on the contract property (useful in case of rapidly escalating property values which may greatly increase their investment potential), meaning that they can ‘buy-out’ the tenant before the end of the contract period by returning the initial *chonsei* investment along with a pre-determined penalty. Again, this is a very rare occurrence, and one which generally doesn’t factor into people’s decisions to rent particular spaces. And it was this second issue which happened on the storefront chapel space, approximately a year after default on the Villa occurred.

As a tenant in the villa at the time of foreclosure, the church became a proprietary creditor of the property. This meant that the church had the option of purchasing the property outright, allowing it a means of recovering its *chonsei* investment through the subsequent sale of the property on their own terms. If the church chose not to exercise this option, then it would essentially forfeit its investment as the banks would sell off the property for as little as possible to recover their own investment, leaving whatever was left to pay out the other creditors. Considering the sizeable nature of the *chonsei* investment, the decision was made to buy and resell the space as quickly as possible. The resident foreign administrator at the time, on a business trip to the US, left the church’s official ‘chop’ (legal seal) with the Korean office manager of the congregation, admitting that he knew, even with his at-that-time limited experience in the country, how it could – and in fact was – used to legally represent the church in any transactions requiring the approval of the leaders of the church regardless of their involvement in the deal. This was in fact a variation of the situation that had allowed the two contracts to be perpetrated on the original property sale.

When an excellent offer was made on the property with a specific, narrow timeframe for completion, the woman used the chop and completed the sale without going through all appropriate channels within the church hierarchy (including failing to consult with the church lawyers in Seoul). Court action was threatened by headquarters (against the foreign administrator and the Korean office manager), but any wrongdoing in the case was determined to be unintentional, and as the church received only benefit from the sale, no action was taken against either of them. The episode did serve to highlight operational differences between the constituent groups however, with both Headquarters and the Korean church members acting on what they felt to be the best interests of the congregation, but in antithetical ways.
All of these dealings only deepened the distrust of church headquarters for the congregation in Korea. Following the conclusion of the investigation into the wrongdoing surrounding the original property sale, the church was given (by the courts) five years in which to reinvest in property in Korea before unspecified action would be taken against their assets in the country. This period ended in June 2008. A suitable property (called the ‘Art Building’) was found early in the allocated period, however getting approval from financial experts at headquarters to pursue the sale was held up by extensive consultations within the headquarters bureaucracy. At $3.1 million US, it would have been the second most expensive building in the entire worldwide church.

The chief financial officers at headquarters favoured taking as much of the church’s money out of Korea as they could get, calculating that the 40% of the total assets which lawyers estimated they could get out before the Korean government froze the remainder, still represented one of the largest blocks of money available to church headquarters at the time. The chief administrators of the church, however, strongly disagreed with this position and fought to keep the money in Korea. Although this battle was ostensibly kept away from Korean members of the congregation, local members were nonetheless aware of a current of opinion favouring ‘deinvestment’ in Korea, and spoke openly about their mistrust of headquarters in their affairs. Unlike in the US, where large property deals routinely take a significant amount of time to process, turnover times in Korea are extremely short. By the time a decision was made approving an offer on the Art Building, it was no longer on the market. This deepened the rift between the US and Korean members of the church.

This pattern repeated itself through several other potential property acquisitions, until the church was nearing the 5-year reinvestment deadline imposed by the courts. Now it was 2008, and the election of a new President, Lee Myung Bak, had caused a speculative boom which caused property prices in the areas surrounding the original church (an area that congregation members vowed not to leave) to soar⁵. A section of land believed suitable for the needs of the church was found about six blocks away from the original property. No other viable sites had been identified. Estimates were that acquisition and development of the property would cost around $6 million US – double what the disputed Art Building would have cost 4 years prior. Against fierce opposition from several of the financial

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⁵ Lee Myung Bak was elected on a vow to ‘turn the economy around’ using a ‘7-4-7’ plan he would double the average national household income to $40 000 per year and make Korea the 7th largest economy in the world by 2017. The resulting speculative boom in property prices around Seoul caused the value of one ‘pyeong’ — 3.1 square meters — to explode in the area in which the church was searching for a suitable investment.
officers at headquarters, approval was given for the purchase. After a series of setbacks, the deal was closed in the evening of December 22, 2008.

Unity and diversity
A key problem throughout the construction process, and which continues today, is the serious concern among foreign administrators regarding the ‘commitment’ of the new Korean members to the ‘core values’ of the church. They point instead to a variety of other factors in drawing new members into the organisation such as money and improved social status.6 While there is an ongoing recognition that diversity is a primary strength of the church, it is also seen as crippling the socialisation of new members in other cultures who don’t really understand what ‘sets us apart’ from other churches.

Meanwhile, as Korean members of the congregation grow in their understanding and beliefs, they begin to exert their own opinions regarding church structures more, and to ask more (difficult) questions of their authority figures. Thus, the problem of membership legitimacy arises between the constituent groups: who are ‘legitimate’ members, and according to whose definitions? Each group is grappling in its own way to understand the essential elements of belief in the church, and how practices can or must reflect those.

Although there are many examples which illustrate this, the series of property transactions I have chosen to focus on in this paper highlight the relation between spiritual, financial and legal management of the church, specifically how they are wound harmoniously and unwound discordantly.

References
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6 The Sri Lankan national church president said during his address at the Asia Leaders Conference that a major concern he faces is that ‘voluntary workers are not sincere, because they come for basic support given them rather than out of dedication to the church.’


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God, land and development: the Sarawak 2011 State Election in the Ba’ Kelalan constituency

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Abstract
The Lun Bawangs make up the majority ethnic group in the Ba’ Kelalan constituency, a remote area in the state of Sarawak, Malaysia, followed by their “cultural cousin” the Kelabit. In the 2011 Sarawak State Election, the Lun Bawang once again voted against the national coalition, or Barisan Nasional (BN), that has ruled Sarawak since independence. The Lun Bawang’s persistent support to a non-BN candidate started in 2004 after a by-election was conducted in Ba’ Kelalan following the death of its BN state assemblyman Judson Sakai. In the by-election, a BN candidate Nelson Balang won, but most of the Lun Bawang votes went to the independent candidate Baru Bian. One year later, in the 2006 Sarawak State Election, the Lun Bawang renewed their vehement support of Baru Bian who stood under the opposition Sarawak National Action Party (SNAP). At the absence of a strong Lun Bawang support, the BN relied on the Kelabit and a handful of hardcore Lun Bawang BN sympathisers to ensure its victory in 2004 and 2006. While most of the rural voters voted for the BN in the 2011 election, the dissenting Lun Bawang doubled their support to Baru Bian who now stood under the Peninsular-based opposition party Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) and elevated him as the new state assemblyman for Ba’ Kelalan. This article argues that Baru’s victory in Ba’ Kelalan was due to his success in using religion to influence the Lun Bawang and his popularity as a Native Customary Rights (NCR) land lawyer. By choosing Baru as their new state assemblyman, the Lun Bawang “rejected” the “politics of development” propounded by the BN. This article analyses the role of religion and the dynamics of rural politics in Sarawak.
19th New Zealand Asian Studies Society Conference

Introduction

Background of the 2011 Sarawak State Election

The 2011 Sarawak State Election was among one of the most contested in Malaysia’s electoral history. The election was called amid the growing dissatisfaction among some quarters in Sarawak toward Sarawak’s Chief Minister Abdul Taib Mahmud’s leadership. Taib has been Sarawak’s Chief Minister for more than 20 years. Apart from the allegations of political dominance, Taib has also been accused of amassing his wealth by distributing the state’s economic resources to his close aides and family members. The 2011 Sarawak State Election also saw the PKR’s (Parti Keadilan Rakyat) and DAP’s (Democratic Action Party) foray into Sarawak politics.

As expected, the BN returned to power with a two thirds majority. The PKR only managed to win 2 seats while the DAP won 12. A deeper look at the popular votes obtained in each constituency revealed an improvement in the opposition’s performance (Welsh 2011). The BN’s control of the rural areas remained intact while the opposition had made significant inroads in the urban areas. While most of the rural voters voted for the BN, the voters in Ba’Kelalan and Krian voted for the opposition. The case study in Ba’Kelalan is interesting as the opposition candidate Baru Bian of PKR contested the election for the third time since 2006. As expected, Baru managed to win the Ba’Kelalan seat defeating the BN candidate with a majority vote of 428. This current analysis of the dynamics of rural politics in Sarawak uses Ba’Kelalan as a case study. The preliminary findings show that the voters in Ba’Kelalan had clearly rejected the politics of development promoted by the Sarawak BN (see Jitab and Ritchie 1992 for more on the politics of development in Sarawak). By rejecting the politics of development, the Lun Bawang wanted to show that as a closely-knit, religiously devoted, and progressively independent society, they were able to chart their own destiny even without depending on the BN. A closer look at the data also shows that the Lun Bawang voters voted against the BN as a protest toward the attitude of BN leaders who neglected the Lun Bawang areas in terms of development.

Dynamics of electoral politics in the Ba’Kelalan constituency

Ba’Kelalan is among one of the isolated rural areas in Sarawak. It can only be reached via logging roads or small aircraft. In terms of population, the Lun Bawangs make up the majority ethnic group followed by the Kelabits who populate the highland of Bario (Table 1). The Ba’Kelalan seat has been traditionally a BN stronghold. The former BN state
Th New Zealand Asian Studies Society Conference

assemblyman for Ba’Kelalan, Judson Sakai, had been holding the seat since it was created. After his untimely death, his political secretary Nelson Balang Rinning took over after winning it in a by-election in 2004. In 2006, Ba’Kelalan was once again contested by the same contenders: Balang Rining of BN and Baru Bian of SNAP (Sarawak’s main opposition party).

**Table 1** Population in Ba'Kelalan according to ethnic groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic group</th>
<th>Number of population (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malay/Melanau</td>
<td>3.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>3.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iban</td>
<td>4.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bidayuh</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orang Ulu (Lun Bawang and Kelabit)</td>
<td>88.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Star, 28 April 2006

Balang won the seat with a majority of 475 votes, more than a 60 percent decrease from his previous gain in the 2004 by-election. Under Balang, however, Ba’Kelalan did not receive much development. His leadership was also questioned by some Lun Bawangs who wanted a more credible and educated leader (Puyok 2005, p. 64-79). Baru capitalised on Balang’s leadership weaknesses to win Ba’Kelalan. His almost four-year electoral groundwork paid off as he managed to organise much better campaign machinery than the BN candidate in the 2011 election.

In the 2011 election, Balang opted not to contest and allowed the relatively young Lun Bawang lawyer Willie Liau to replace him. A party insider, however, said that the reason for Balang’s exclusion in the election is his rift with senior Sarawak BN leader Awang Tengah Ali Hassan over the disbursement of development funds in Ba’Kelalan (pers. comm., May 14, 2011). Another source also said that Balang urged the Lun Bawang to support Baru as the BN had dropped him (pers. comm., August 14, 2011). For Baru, the BN’s strategy in fielding a newcomer was an advantage for him. Another party insider said that unlike before, Baru had a well organised campaign team this time and he had full backing from PKR Chief Anwar Ibrahim. Anwar’s presence during nomination for the Ba’Kelalan seat had also increased Baru’s chances of winning. The fact that Anwar was willing to lend his support to Baru despite having to travel deep into Ba’Kelalan, showed his confidence that Baru was the kind of leader whom he could trust to lead PKR in Sarawak.
God, land or development?
As previously mentioned, Baru once again used his religious credentials to woo the Lun Bawang voters. Baru was a former SIB church elder in Kuching and is occasionally invited to deliver sermons at his church. The Lun Bawang in Ba’Kelalan are largely Christian, having been introduced to Christianity by Australian missionaries in the 1930s. The formation of the Borneo Evangelical Mission (BEM) paved the way for the establishment of SIB (Sidang Injil Borneo) whose early members included the Lun Bawang, Kelabit and other tribes in Sarawak. In fact, the first president of the SIB was a Lun Bawang by the name of Racha Umong. More than 90 percent of the Lun Bawang in Ba’Kelalan are Christian and are closely tied to the SIB church.

The role of SIB church in the villages is important. The pastor who heads the church is an influential figure whose words are taken seriously by the village dwellers. Most of the SIB churches have councils of elders to oversee the daily running of the churches. Even though the SIB prevents its leaders from taking an active role in politics, their views and opinions are important and could influence political decision-making. The recent issue on the stamping of the Bible was hotly debated in Sarawak. It made its way to Ba’Kelalan and managed to influence some segments of the Lun Bawang community. This group of people believed that the 10-point resolution to solve the Bible issue is no more than a political gimmick to pacify the Christian community in Sarawak. They believed that a long-term solution to address the plights of Christians in Malaysia is preferable.

Some of the pastors were also showing their open support for Baru. A villager in Lawas said that a pastor urged his congregation to pray so that the opposition candidate Baru Bian would win the election (pers. comm., May 15, 2011). Prayer rallies were also conducted to ensure that a “new” government is installed in Sarawak. Lun Bawang and Kelabit voters were also receiving short instant messenger texts urging them to vote for the opposition. Some of the messages sent are (quoted verbatim):

Today the Council of Churches Malaysia has rejected the government’s 10-point solution on the Alkitab. Vote against BN is a vote for Jesus. BN is an anti-Christ agent. Christians are being discriminated and rights in constitution denied. Don’t vote for BN. If you are a true Christian send this message to all other Christians
Another message reads:


Translation:

Shallom, important news: the government’s 10-point solution to end the Bible row will not end the conflict between Christian and Muslims. This is due to the fact that: 1. The distribution of Bibles is still prohibited under the Internal Security Act 1960 because it is deemed a threat to national interest and security 2. Christians are still prohibited from using the word Allah to describe their God as this could confuse Muslims who use the same name to call their God 3. The importation of Christian publications is generally prohibited and controlled by the government. The 10-point solution is not more than a political gimmick to fish for votes in the upcoming state election.

The religious fervour shown by Baru’s supporters did not happen during campaigning alone. Even after his victory, Lun Bawangs continued to receive instant messages, such as this one (quoted in Lun Bawang language):
Shallom, do macho idi do aco Easter kuan tau amung. Ui (bagi pihak) kemenangan N70 Ba’Kelalan mala mula terima kasih nengcu sembayang tau selaba’ ini [...] rapet ku tau petachu sembayang kuan neh (YB Baru Bian) pale’ visi neh kuan pupu tau tercapai. Tq. Tuhan neparuan [sic].

Translation:

Greetings, good afternoon and happy Easter to us all. I, on behalf of the N70 Ba’Kelalan winning team wish to say thank you to you all for your prayers all this while [...] hopefully we all will continue to pray for him (YB Baru Bian) so that his vision for our people will be achieved. God bless.

A thanksgiving dinner was also held for Lun Bawang religious leaders in Miri, Sarawak (pers. comm., May 13, 2011). In the dinner, Baru thanked them all for their support and prayers. While Baru did not give any specific reference to PKR and Anwar, the meeting was a strong indication of the support he received from the religious Lun Bawang group. Apart from banking on his religious credentials and close association with the SIB church, Baru continued with his campaign to return NCR lands to the Lun Bawang. Baru argued that the Lun Bawangs are deliberately alienated and that their NCR lands are misused by certain quarters for their personal gains. Baru believed that the Lun Bawang do not get a better deal when their NCR lands are cultivated for palm oil plantations.

The BN candidate, Willie Liau, focused his campaign on “Satu Malaysia, Rakyat Didahulukan, Pencapaian Diutamakan” (One Malaysia, People First, Performance Now). As usual, the BN promised to bring more developments to Ba’Kelalan, especially the road linking the remote area to Lawas. Being a newcomer in politics, Willie appeared to be unable to match Baru’s popularity. Even though the BN’s campaign machinery was financially sound, Baru appeared to be undaunted as he also received a substantial financial backing from PKR. Unlike before, where he had to walk from village to village and depend on well wishers to lend their four-wheel-drive vehicles, Baru was flown to the campaign areas using a specially chartered helicopter (pers. comm., May 15, 2011). Willie also had to campaign
without the support of key BN leaders such as Balang and Awang Tengah who were contesting the neighbouring Bukit Sari constituency. Balang, in particular, was nowhere to be seen during campaigning for the BN as he was believed to be secretly campaigning on behalf of Baru (pers. comm., May 14, 2011).

Analysing the election results
It was a close fight between Baru and Willie. However, a majority of the Lun Bawang had made their choice and for the first time in history, Ba’Kelalan fell into the opposition’s hands. Baru’s win in Ba’Kelalan also ensured the PKR’s inroad in Sarawak politics. A closer look at the election results show that Baru managed to obtained a majority in 12 polling stations as compared to the BN 11 (Table 2).

Table 2 Results according to candidate, party and votes polled

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area/polling station</th>
<th>Candidate/Party/Votes Polled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Baru Bian (PKR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bario</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semadah</td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beriwan</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maligan</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trusan</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pa’Lungan</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dano</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remudu</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lellang</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sukang</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lupeng</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ba’Kelalan</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temarop</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suang</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talis</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lapadan</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tengoa</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuma</td>
<td>406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pengaleh</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siang</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pangi</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batu Tiga</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postal Vote</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 2505 2032
As the table above demonstrates, Baru obtained the most votes in his hometown in Long Semadoh (344) while Willie obtained the highest number of votes in Bario (240 votes). Overall, the voting pattern is almost similar the election of 2006: the Lun Bawang voters voted for the opposition while the Kelabit (particularly from Bario) voted BN. There are three main factors that contributed to Baru’s victory.

First, Baru was successful in using his religious credentials to gain Lun Bawang voters. His close association with the SIB and his religious fervour managed to attract many Lun Bawang to support him. A considerable number of Lun Bawang pastors also covertly supported Baru. Even though Baru and his religious group was heavily criticised for choosing to go against the “government chosen by the people”, they reasoned that the Bible verses calling the people to support the government of the day must be understood within its context.\(^1\) As they viewed it, the government of the day (the Sarawak government under Abdul Taib Mahmud) has neglected its duty, therefore it is the right of Christians to speak up against injustice and misuse of power. This message was conveyed by Baru on his personal website. One message which was particularly appealing among Christian voters was delivered through a Bible verses. It read: ‘For God did not give us the spirit of TIMIDITY but a spirit of POWER, of love and of self-discipline. So do not be ashamed to testify about Our LORD or ashamed of me his prisoner. But join with me in suffering for the Gospel, by the power of God’ (2 Timothy 1:7-8).

Second, the BN’s lack of preparedness and poor choice of candidate contributed to its loss. Being a newcomer, Willie was clearly unable to give a strong challenge to Baru who is an influential figure in Ba’Kelalan for his handling of the NCR land cases.

Third, the Lun Bawang’s rejection to the BN’s politics of development was a result of its failure in fulfilling the Lun Bawang development needs (pers. comm., May 16, 2011). By supporting the opposition, the Lun Bawang also wanted to show that they are capable of developing themselves even without the help of the BN. Apart from the Kelabit, the Lun Bawang have a large number of professionals based on population ratio. Most of the professionals are supporters to the opposition, and have been campaigning against the government. They believe that the BN has neglected the Lun Bawang, especially when it comes to fair distribution of development funds and NCR lands (email correspondence with a Lun Bawang professional, June 1, 2011).

\(^1\) See Romans 13: 3.
Conclusion

The Lun Bawang voted against the BN and chose an opposition leader to represent them. A micro-analysis of the dynamics of local politics is important in order to understand this scenario. The analysis of Ba’Kelalan shows that religion played a vital role in the election. Some Lun Bawang reacted actively to the religious issues faced by the nation. This was used effectively by the opposition candidate Baru to consolidate his ground support. The results in Ba’Kelalan also show that the Lun Bawang are willing to sacrifice their loyalty to the BN for the sake of “ubah” (change) propounded by the opposition. Their voting pattern also revealed their dissatisfaction toward the BN leaders’ lack of commitment in developing Ba’Kelalan.

References

Reconnection and reconstruction: influencing overseas Chinese identity

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Encouraging affinity with the motherland is one method of building patriotism and sentiment amongst diasporas. In light of China’s rise as a global economic, cultural and political power in recent years, the Chinese government has pursued a long-term strategy with the overseas Chinese (hereafter referred to as the OC) in seeking their loyalty and support for its national interest. This paper tracks how and why the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has continually developed and enhanced OC affairs (also referred to as qiaowu). Specifically, this research examines specially organised tourism and youth programmes that maximise firsthand participatory experience in reconnecting with China.

Over the last decade, the PRC has accelerated and intensified qiaowu efforts with key target groups: OC youth, new xinqiao PRC migrants, and PRC students. PRC methods of reconnection with the OC have become much more sophisticated, utilizing modern technologies and techniques adapted specifically for their cultural and economic development. Reconnection and reconstruction of the OC identity both play a significant role in propagating the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) version of Chinese identity amongst the OC, and seek to build support for, and to legitimize the regime, while isolating or sidelining any challengers.

Most of these methods place importance on the notion of luoye guigen (literally ‘falling leaves return to their roots’). Encouraging affinity with the motherland has been an extremely successful method of building patriotism and sentiment amongst the OC, particularly in light of China’s rise as a global economic, cultural and political power.

Active reconnection: tours and root seeking

Personal tours and visits are key methods for reconnection with the OC. China has gone from strength to strength, by targeting a wider range of OC and providing specific groups (huaren and xinqiao, as well as non-Han minorities) with specially tailored activities. Although more than 50 years have passed since Beijing first invited select groups of the OC to the PRC as visitors, the basic premise has not changed significantly. The core aspects and purpose of tours as tools of investigation and influence remain the same, as do the themes. They
continue to emphasize cultural and economic opportunity, ethnographic connections, and to challenge potential threats to the CCP and China’s national integrity.

For many years, thousands of OC root-seekers have made their way to Guangzhou or Fujian for cultural reconnection.¹ In exceeding the context of conventional tourism, root-seeking (xungen) tours serve to complete one’s identity by providing an authentic and fulfilling experience.² Tours are historically and personally significant in that the participants actually engage in ritualistic exchange. Activities include visiting the qiaoxiang villages and houses in which their forefathers came from, rebuilding ancestral halls, restoring graves, and re-establishing bonds with local government authorities (such as receiving honorary positions).

Most of this work is pursued for economic reasons. After 1978, advancing development was at the forefront of the CCP’s agenda.³ Therefore, qiaowu worked to provide information on investment policy and encourage the OC to contribute either financially or technically in China. At the heart of this effort was to use the ancestral village as a platform for building better links with the OC.⁴ Therefore, dedicated offices at the provincial government⁵ and university level⁶ worked to satisfy OC visitors’ and students’ interest in rediscovering their heritage.⁷ In 1980 the CPPCC proposed that “Special Economic Zones” near qiaoxiang areas be established on the eastern coastline to encourage FDI from OC. From discussions with Shantou officials in Guangdong province in 1991, senior propaganda official Zhu Muzhi noted the importance of using the geographic, cultural and historical features of the ancestral village to appeal to OC. In seeking donations for building infrastructure, the OC were not made to feel as if they were being exploited, but to believe that their contributions to the village would ultimately bring them benefit too.⁸ In the 1990s, authorities began to increase their scope, targeting those beyond the traditional areas of emigration, and established fifteen OC business organisations for those originating from

⁴ “Liebian, chongzu, xinsheng, ronghe,” 9, 12-15; “Shenri shehui, tanjiu qiaoqing,” 1-12; Wu, “Qiaowu gongzuoju zhanluexing qianzhanxing”; Wu, “Jiada lidu pushe yinjin haiwai rencai de “luose tongdiao”.”
other provinces and cities. By 2006, under the direction of the qiaolian, over 14000 organisations had emerged to embrace the OC.

This work continues into the contemporary period. The 2004 Blue Book of Research Results Concerning China’s United Front Theory listed the key issue that cadres should focus upon: enhancing the cohesion of Chinese nationality, cultural identity, and hometown sentimentality in order to bring about patriotism and socialism for China amongst the OC, with strengthening the attractiveness of the CPP at the heart of this effort. Moreover, methods have become much more efficient. For example, qiaowu officials carefully monitor the movement of migrants by polling villages, researching special directories maintained by OC groups abroad, and inviting business and community leaders to assist. The OCAO, together with local government authorities under the guidance of relevant CCP Central Committee Departments, work together in promoting the flow of economic benefit to the villages and towns through better information exchange, personal networks and good relationships. Cadres attract OC to invest, initiate and set up public welfare causes, as well as co-ordinating them to meet domestic capabilities and requirements. In this manner, root-seeking has turned into a successful platform for driving local economies.

**OC youth work**

One of the most important targets for reconnection work is the second and third generation youth. As mentioned earlier, PRC OC officials acknowledge that managing the youth today will ease qiaowu efforts for the next generation of the OC. However, the CCP has enjoyed only mixed results in appealing to them, and authorities have adjusted their methodology accordingly.

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10 “Zhongguo qiaolian zuzhi fazhan dao yiwansiqian duoge” (Qiaolian Organisations Reaches Over 14000), Qiaoqing Jianbao, 25 October 2006, 11.
11 Guangdong Institute of Socialism, “ Zhongguo tongyi zhanxian lilun yanjiu chengguo lanpishu” shouci jiang wo yu yanjiu chengguo lie kexin neirong” (Blue Book of Research Results Concerning China’s UF Theory Has Included Our Institute’s Findings as Core Content), 9 September 2005, www.gdsy.com.cn/new7.htm (accessed 3 November 2009).
14 “Dui jiaqiang xinxingshi xia Xinjiangji huaqiao huaren gongzuo de sikao” (Thoughts on Strengthening Xinjiang OC Work In Light of a New Situation), Qiaoqing, no. 14 (6 June 2007): 1-6.
15 “Hanguo huaxiao xiaozhengtuan chenggong laihua yanxiu jiaoliu,” 17.
PRC root-seeking camps for youth first began in 1980 and attracted 158 participants. By 1986, this had grown to 5753 from 32 countries.\textsuperscript{16} In the contemporary period, tens of thousands of OC youth participate in various xungen activities. Often being state-funded programmes, they are not designed to extract profit,\textsuperscript{17} but to influence the OC using persuasive techniques known as youjiao jiehe, yujiao yuyou (integrated play and education). The trend of China’s public diplomacy and outreach efforts is to foster an image of China as a sincere and responsible country that is committed to reform and opening up, that is unified and dynamic, and that upholds equality and friendship. This format has not changed since the earliest tours. Participants are encouraged to learn about China’s opportunities in the hope they will promote its interests and strengthen filial relations amongst themselves and with China.\textsuperscript{18}

Goals listed in the Retrospective of Guangdong Province’s Summer Camps for Youths of Chinese Descent included:\textsuperscript{19}

1. Propagate Chinese culture and strengthen the national consciousness.
2. Deepen knowledge of the motherland and strengthen national recognition.
3. Foster participants’ attachment to their native village and arouse their nostalgic emotions.
4. Intensify co-operation and exchange between Chinese and foreign youths and enhance solidarity and friendship.
5. Advance OC affairs.

Camp organisers employ a work philosophy embracing yiqing dongren, yili furen (persuasion through kindness and sound argument), whereby they study the differences of their targets (such as demographics, situation, habits and interests) and provide activities and locations that evoke feelings of cultural affinity and common cultural heritage while

\textsuperscript{16}“Huayi qingshaonian xia (dong) ling ying” (Overseas Chinese Youth Summer (Winter) Camps) 1990 in Wang, Qiaowu chunqiu, 109.
\textsuperscript{17}State-organised events are almost always partially or fully subsidised. These differ from privately run forums, which have no official connection with the state, nor can they be considered qiaowu. While government leaders may be present at these private forums, they are only invited as guests to lend credibility to the event; furthermore, private forums demand that participants pay their own way entirely, suggesting a purely profit-driven agenda.
\textsuperscript{18}“Huayi qingshaonian xia (dong) ling ying,” 109-110.
\textsuperscript{19}Louie, “Re-territorializing Transnationalism,” 651.
minimising feelings of distance with China.\textsuperscript{20} Given that OC youth are not expected to be proficient in Mandarin, the focus is not so much on classroom learning, but to expose them to firsthand activity and observation in an effort to facilitate accelerated absorption of Chinese identity. For example, martial arts training involve the learning of \textit{wushu} values and skill through intensive practice, movement of body and mental discipline.\textsuperscript{21} Campers perform in a cultural show attended by OC officials, who inspect the fruits of their investment.\textsuperscript{22} Participants also visit military and scientific facilities. After spending many days together in this environment, these youth enjoy a sense of united Chineseness.\textsuperscript{23}

**Analysis of youth work**

PRC efforts to influence young OC have achieved only mixed success. Most participate with an apolitical mindset dominated by social priorities: camps are often viewed as subsidised vacations and an opportunity to find one’s future spouse. Camp activities sometimes did not meet participants’ expectations. For example, instead of learning about their ancestral history, they sat through a seminar on local economic development or viewing the remains of a spaceship. In addition, China’s attempt to reconstruct OC youth identity was often hampered by conflict with \textit{laoqiao} beliefs and assumptions, as well as participants’ inability to speak Mandarin.\textsuperscript{24} In short, OC youth (particularly those of the second and third generation) hold firmly to their foreign nation-state identities with little patriotic PRC sentiment, unlike the portable transnational identities of new Chinese migrants. As a result, the use of biological, cultural and nostalgic links as the basis of forming a PRC-conscious identity was often a failed ritual.\textsuperscript{25}

Over the years, Chinese youth strategies focused upon promoting ideologically based content by reconnecting youth with a distinct version of Chinese identity. Camps seek to advance their trust in China, educate them about the ‘special characteristics’ of CCP leadership and OC policies by dispelling any negative imagery, to guide and influence their

\textsuperscript{20}“Zuohao xinyimin shehui gongzuo zhongzai guli he yindao” (Succeed in New Migrant Society Work Through Encouragement and Guidance), \textit{Qiaozheng}, no. 15 (29 April 2005): 6-11; “Huayi qingshaonian xia (dong) ling ying,” 110-111; \textit{Qiaowu gongzuo gailun}, 70.


\textsuperscript{22}Camps are subsidised by the local provincial OCAO or by a national entity such as the State Council OCAO and the China Association for Overseas Exchanges.

\textsuperscript{23}Louie, “Re-territorializing Transnationalism,” 651.

\textsuperscript{24}The OCAO expected participants to be fluent in Chinese and to specialize in some particular area of culture during the camp. David Tai (NZCA National President), Annual President’s Report 2004, presented at the NZCA Conference (19-20 June 2004), 76.

behaviour, and to raise their patriotic spirit and enthusiasm.\textsuperscript{26} They can then be mobilised, networked and guided along lines of Chinese ethnicity and culture for China’s national interests.\textsuperscript{27} With a better ‘understanding’ of China, OC youth could promote progress with national reunification, disseminate Chinese culture, and serve as a friendly bridge between China and the world.\textsuperscript{28}

**Development of youth work**

In response to these issues, the PRC has returned to the top-down, centralized pro-active approach over the last decade, reflecting the desire to better manage the activities in a context that is free of anything that might detract from CCP objectives. OC tours now emphasize activities that have a tangible pay-off either in terms of knowledge gathering or profitable enterprise.\textsuperscript{29} Camps formerly run by OC organisations with financial and logistical assistance from GOCAO had their funding withdrawn or reduced under a ‘user pays’ scheme. OC officials argue that this not only relieves financial pressure on Chinese authorities, but by paying their own way, they expect that participants have more enthusiasm to learn.\textsuperscript{30}

The proliferation of camps targeted at different types of OC youth shows that there is an effort to succeed with youth work. However, there are some contradictions to this effort. For example, organizers of most state-sponsored events in China now often assume that these youth are able to speak, read and write Chinese.\textsuperscript{31} While laoqiao are invited to attend, all promotional material is in Chinese, indicating these camps are aimed at xinqiao youth who are more likely to deliver the results expected.

The second approach is to target certain groups who are receptive to embracing a PRC-friendly identity, such as elite OC youth, or those interested in arts and culture. For example, root-seeking tours for OC adoptees living with Western parents (and therefore limited exposure to Chinese identity) have the theme “Seeking Roots through Culture,

\textsuperscript{26} “Hudong fazhan zhuqiao xingye” (Mutual Action for Development, Helping OC Developing Industry), *Qiaoqing*, no. 10 (5 April 2005): 2-3.
\textsuperscript{27} “Fahui qiaojie qingnian zuoyong, licu liangan heping yu fazhan” (Make Best Use of OC Youth for Urging Cross-Strait Peace and Development) *Qiaoqing jianbao*, 26 April 2007, 13.
\textsuperscript{28} *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 70.
\textsuperscript{29} Biao, “Promoting Knowledge Exchange Through Diaspora Networks,” 63-63.
\textsuperscript{30} “Zai Mei Zhongguo guer huaxiaxing,” 5-7.
\textsuperscript{31} At a 2006 OC Associations Centenary Celebration of 240 delegates from 26 countries, all the proceedings and speech notes were in Mandarin (with some Cantonese) without English translation. Kai Luey (NZCA President), personal communication with author, 13 December 2006.
Learning through Travel” emphasizing daily family life and practical Chinese arts and crafts.\(^{32}\)

In another attempt to reconnect with OC youth, their career ambitions, opportunities for personal development and interest in foreign languages serve as an attractive platform.\(^{33}\) Qiaoban cadres persuade them to view their ethnicity as an advantage during China’s re-emergence.\(^{34}\) For the laoqiao and huaren groups, building positive feelings for China in terms of economic, cultural and scientific advancement has been successful. OC youth are interested in going to China for work or study. For example, Vice Premier Qian Qichen remarked that “foreigners of Chinese origin” were welcome to share in opportunities brought about by China’s globalisation and modernisation.\(^{35}\)

A significant development is the deliberate focus on younger OC. For example, after the early 2000s, the PRC launched a new initiative targeting those sixteen years and under. This is a pre-emptive attempt to influence OC youth before they have the opportunity to participate in rival tours. These camps remain completely under the control of GOCAO, and consist of a selection of pre-arranged tours that include specific activities based on cultural, education or sightseeing themes. Participants must follow these schedules without deviation and often without parental supervision.

**Capacity building**

For the 21\(^{st}\) century, OC affairs officials assume that the majority of the OC will remain in their host countries for the long term – from luoye guigen (falling leaves return to their roots) to luodi shenggen (growing roots after settling down).\(^{36}\) This view is substantiated by evidence that qiaowu is increasingly used to encourage the OC to help themselves by raising their own status in local government and society. For example, qiaowu cadres pay more attention to providing assistance to the development and subsistence of the OC, serving them well through protecting their legitimate rights, and promoting unity, co-operation and exchange.\(^{37}\)

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\(^{32}\) “Zai Mei Zhongguo guer huaxiaxing,” 5-7.

\(^{33}\) “Jiangmenshi qiaowu gongzuo qixuan qixuan ‘sansxin renshi’ cheng zhongdian” (Jiangmen City OC Work Strive for New Change for ‘Three New Personages’ as Focal Point) Qiaoping jianbao, 21 March 2008, 12.

\(^{34}\) “Zuohao liuhua tongxuehui gongzuo, buduan tuohuang haiwai qiaowu gongzuo de dianyumian,” 14-16.


\(^{37}\) “Overseas Chinese Affairs Officials Told to Work Harder in New Century.”
To reach the heart of OC communities and directly influence them on a global scale, qiaowu officials target leaders of pro-Beijing organisations and select individuals of influence for fully subsidised organisational development work and capacity building in China.38 Qualified candidates (such as top academics and youth, community and business leaders of high calibre, suitable age and experience) are made aware of their China connection39 by attending programmes that promote networking, management and team-building under PRC methods.40 Embassies and the OCAO act as gatekeepers by extending invitations to selected individuals and then vetting applicants in order to prevent undesirable consequences.41 These efforts have received greater attention in recent years. Specific measures include direct connections with Overseas Exchange Association Directors to receive regular guidance through international forums, workshops, surveys and activities. In addition, the Developing Motherland and Benefiting Assisting OC plan (xingguo liqiao zhuqiao) aims to promote interaction amongst old and new OC and China through its website, trade fairs and university courses.42 Both hosts and participants perceive these kinds of events as leading prestigious platforms for managing global OC affairs.43

Such programmes directly influence the development of OC communities so that they are confident and capable of working with Beijing. This is achieved by educating their future leaders about how to manage their associations and how to build capacity in the context of the qiaowu infrastructure and philosophy.44 Like other state-sponsored visits to China, these events have similar goals: to improve networking and unity with other OC groups, and to link them with mainland cultural, industrial, commercial or political counterparts for mutual benefit.45 In this regard, cadres advise participants of the latest qiaowu economic policies, summarized under themes of xingguo liqiao (building China for their benefit), hudong fazhan

39 “Guanyu Fa, He, Ying sanguo huaqiao huaren rongre zhuliu qingkuang de diaoyan baogao,” 14-15.
40 Lu Weixiong (OCAO director), letter to OC leaders, June 26, 2008; “Shenri shehui, taniju qiaoning,” 11.
41 “Guowuyuan qiaoban xinfangtuan fu Ouzhou siguo diaoyan,” 5; Biao, “Promoting Knowledge Exchange Through Diaspora Networks,” 55.
44 “Shenri qiaoshe, tuozhan Feizhou diqu qiaowu gongzuo,” 3-4.
45 “Guanyu Fa, He, Ying sanguo huaqiao huaren rongre zhuliu qingkuang de diaoyan baogao,” 14; “Guangzhoushi rongyu shimin he qingnian catjun jiangwentuan fangsxu” (Guangdong Honorary Citizens and Talented Youth Delegation Visit), Qiaoqing jianbao, 25 October 2006, 11.
(mutual action for development) and zhuqiao xingye (helping them develop industry). These events seek to support OC businesses both in China and abroad as an attractive and co-ordinated product of business development, service and networking for a win-win result. Chinese industry can develop and modernize, while the OC can continue to develop their own industrial talent, benefit financially from their investment, gain trust and understanding of China, and raise their status and integration abroad.

This shows how qiaowu has successfully encouraged and institutionalized certain aspects of the OC relationship in accordance with Beijing’s expectations. China’s effort to redefine the OC and their image is an ongoing effort. By working step-by-step at various levels of organisation, the CCP aims to draw together a diverse grouping of OC. With an obliging target amongst xinqiao and PRC students, these efforts may find fruition quicker than expected; however, there are still other OC groupings that prefer sticking to their old ways and therefore require continued attention.

Conclusion
The aim of qiaowu is to gather support for China and its leaders by getting the OC to identify positively with their motherland. OC reconnection work, whether it involves propaganda efforts, or through xungen tours, seeks to penetrate and influence OC communities and individuals and instil nationalistic, patriotic, or in the least, encourage ethnographic sentiment. Moreover, the CCP’s methods of reconnection with the OC have become much more sophisticated, utilizing modern technologies, adapted for their cultural and economic developments.

After a period of concentrating on attracting the OC for assisting the development of China’s economy and infrastructure between the late 1970s and 1990s, contemporary qiaowu policies for the OC have moved to focusing on both huaren and huaqiao development with a win-win objective in mind: to improve China’s international image by enhancing the status and lifestyle of the OC abroad. To achieve this, their livelihoods must remain stable and prosperous.

This paper demonstrates that although certain segments of the OC diaspora do not respond to qiaowu in the way the CCP may desire, reconnection methods will continue to develop as the OC become increasingly diverse and localized. As such, more resources will be required to deal with their larger numbers, necessitating more funding and active planning.
from qiaowu officials. At the same, there is no shortage of OC groups wishing to reconnect with their ancestral homeland, allowing Beijing an even firmer foothold into the heart of OC communities.
Popular culture and film
Youthful bodies: Chinese youth culture in 1988

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Nineteen eighty-eight was a year of great promise in contemporary Chinese history. After ten years of economic reform and greater opening-up to cultural and other influences from the rest of the world, Chinese youth culture seemed at a transition point with the new music, fashions, and attitudes mixing with local reinventions of indigenous versions of rock music and what was called the search for roots. The body was remarkably prominent in youth cultural phenomena around that year. Bodies were adorned, displayed, enhanced and generally celebrated by young people becoming more aware of the social influence of their tastes and aspirations. Given the physical changes that adolescence involves, the importance of the body for those aged between about 14 and 24 years-old should not be surprising. But in 1988, bodies achieved a striking prominence in several areas of popular culture that this paper will explore.¹

The rise of youth culture in the post-Cultural Revolution era was a product of economic growth, with rising prosperity, increasing choice in leisure time activities, growing access to international cultural circuits, and the emergence of spaces (literal and imaginative) for the assertion of youthful identities. Television, films (both in cinemas and on video cassettes), audio cassette tapes, and magazines helped circulate the new cultural products geared for youthful consumption. The singular prominence of the body in youth culture in 1988 can be seen in a number of phenomena: the popularity of the film *Red Sorghum*; fashion trends, including attention paid to models; break-dancing; body building; nudes in art; personal adverts seeking marriage partners; and the *qigong* (breathing exercises) fever of that year.

¹ This paper is drawn from research for my *Youth Culture in China: From Red Guards to Netizens*, New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming in 2012, particularly Chapter Three: Bodies: Undressed, Fashioned, Admired and Moving.
**Red Sorghum: bodies displayed and enjoyed**

Zhang Yimou’s directing debut, *Red Sorghum* (*Hong gaoliang*, 1987) proved a huge success, particularly among young men in Northern China, upon its release in March 1988. The film’s unprecedented success at the Berlin film festival the previous month gave an international imprimatur to this celebration of living life fully and by one’s natural instincts. The film’s story, of an isolated group of hearty distillers, sedan-chair carriers, and bandits, created a world without rules, where the men spent most of their time stripped to waist and the central hero lusted after and eventually won the heart of the beautiful and feisty heroine. This was a natural life before the fall, a loss of innocence which occurs in the last third of the narrative when Japanese imperial forces occupy the land, a development which punctures the mythical quality of life and love before then. The appeal of the film, and its reach beyond the cinemas, was enhanced by several hit songs on the soundtrack. A kind of invented folk song, these manful chants to life and sex could be heard all over Beijing in the summer of 1988. Conservative commentators roundly condemned the larrikin quality of the film’s characters and their supposed bad influence on young viewers. This seems to have only added to youthful enthusiasm for *Red Sorghum* and what it represented for many young minds.

**Fashion and models**

The rise of jeans and T-shirts as youthful attire was a barometer of youth culture in the 1980s. The significance of such seemingly unexceptional attire was not lost on young people, some of whom affirmed to researchers that these clothes gave them a means to differentiate themselves from adults and to associate with global youth tastes. In addition to jeans, the growing range of clothing available to all Chinese consumers with money to spend gave young women and men an opportunity to present their own identity to their family and peers. Some sartorial gestures towards individuality had been possible even during the ten years of the Cultural Revolution era, though usually with a strong degree of discretion or caution. Rationing of cotton cloth and generally low living standards, however, made differentiation a challenge in those years. Growing prosperity in the 1980s, together with an increasing openness to new ideas and styles, made a blossoming of fashion interest possible in that decade. Relatively affordable clothing like jeans and T-shirts meant the opportunities were widespread among young urbanites. Three years after 1988, the slogan T-shirt craze (in which young people wore shirts adorned most frequently with expressions of weariness or cynicism) marked another stage in the rise of youth culture and the re-emergence of youth identity after the crushing of young protesters in Beijing an elsewhere in June 1989.
Associated with the rise of fashion as a consumer and particularly youthful concern was the attention given to fashion models. These young women (and young men) were seen as symbols of the post-Mao era of openness and consumerism. With perfect (though skinny) bodies and skin, these often expressionless creatures strutted their way down catwalks and into the changing public consciousness of bodily beauty.

**Break-dancing**
The summer of 1988 saw further public displays, amateur and professional, of a dance phenomena that had caught on after the release in China of the 1984 Hollywood film *Breakdance* (a.k.a. *Breakin’*). The story of an unorthodox young dancer in Los Angeles who defies the dance establishment to win a major contest had obvious appeal to China’s youth. The new-style dances on screen promoted instant imitation in public parks (assisted by the by then ubiquitous boom-box cassette tape recorder) and in organised competitions. Tian Zhuangzhuang’s 1988 film *Rock ’n Roll Kids* (*Yaogun qingnian*) put break-dancing in front of the Forbidden City’s Meridian Gate and on the big screen in a story of a young dancer quitting his official troupe to set up as a freelance fashion parade organizer and choreographer. He also has two girlfriends to try to attend to. The apartment that one of these young women lived in alone (itself representing a new life-style aspiration for Chinese) was decorated with posters of Western and Chinese pop stars and actors.

**Body building**
By 1988 several popular magazines devoted to body building could be bought on China’s streets. Their covers frequently featured muscular and beaming foreign (mostly American) bodies almost bursting out of tight, brightly coloured, lycra briefs and tops. This cult of the muscled body took hold among some young Chinese, both male and female, many of whom participated in local and national contests. The publication of photographs of bikini-clad young women flexing their muscles and of mixed couples in similar poses caused quite a stir in 1988. Interviews with contestants identified the urge to individual expression as the main motivation for the emergence of body building. Many young women interviewed noted the sense of personal, not just muscular, empowerment that developing their bodies gave them. As in the case of break-dancing and fashion parades, official organisations tried to direct this body building interest into government-controlled contests and exhibitions.
Nudes in art
In late December 1988 long queues formed outside the National Art Museum of China in
downtown Beijing, which was an unusual development at the venerable 1959 building and in
the depths of winter. Tickets to a new exhibition changed hands at inflated prices, particularly
among the predominantly male art enthusiasts at the venue. The object of such unprecedented
interest was a display of nude oil paintings, a first for China. Popular youth magazines gave
the exhibition considerable coverage, with mainstream commentators ruminating on the
healthiness of the art but wondering about the correctness of the patrons’ interest. In
bookstores across the road and elsewhere artists’ manuals of nude photographs took on a
well-thumbed appearance. This exhibition probably had more impact on the popular
imagination than the more widely noted exhibition of youthful avant-garde art in the same
gallery a few months later. On that occasion, the firing of a pistol by a performance artist led
to the temporary closing of the exhibition.

Personal advertisements
The proliferation of youth-oriented magazines in the late 1980s, many produced by provincial
branches of the Communist Youth League, provided a venue for young people seeking
marriage partners through advertising in the personal advertisements in their pages. In some
magazines cupids with bows and arrows featured as decoration. These ads included specific
physical information about the potential partner, height and even weight, along with age,
occupation, salary, and marital status (whether previously married). Some of these
advertisements included head-and-shoulders photographs of the punter. We should not
assume that these adverts represented an assertion of individual choice in marriage partner,
for they could be endorsed by parents anxious to assist their off-spring. The emphasis on
height, however, marked a new concern with appearance. In the 1990s these kinds of
personal ads became harder to find in the pages of youth-oriented magazines. By the new
century, the Internet became a more effective venue for the effort to find marriage and other
partners.

The qigong craze
Nineteen eighty-eight saw a peak in popular interest in the ancient breathing exercises known
as qigong. Masters of the tradition toured the nation giving displays of their powers. Students
at Peking University, for example, flocked to sessions with a young master from Sichuan
who allegedly could move objects without touching them. Youth magazines featured stories
of similar displays and the enthusiasm of mostly youthful audiences fascinated by these unexplained abilities. Some stories attempted to apply scientific investigation to the claims, usually in efforts to endorse the validity of the qigong applications. In an age when young Chinese seemed to be seduced by foreign styles, this distinctly Chinese tradition had an unusual fascination for many youthful fans.

All these phenomena in 1988 involved youthful bodies enhanced, empowered, celebrated and on display. None of these phenomena can be regarded as completely new, but their prominence and the level of enthusiasm displayed by young people were unprecedented. We should be careful not to accept lazy generalisations about the Cultural Revolution decade that suggest that sexual attraction and body consciousness had been abolished in those years. A glance at the widespread use of stills from the model ballets that made up the central canon of Cultural Revolution culture should demolish that myth. But the degree of body emphasis obvious in 1988 was unprecedented and symptomatic of the rise of Chinese youth culture.

The meanings of these body-related developments shed light on several aspects of life in China in 1988, perhaps the most liberal moment in China in the more than sixty years since 1949. The macho bodies that featured so prominently on screen in Red Sorghum can be regarded as an assertion of strength and virility for the nation. The so-called century of humiliation after the unequal treaties of the mid-nineteenth century had ended: the sick man of Asia was now strong and proud. Red Sorghum offered a kind of national myth of freedom and resistance to foreign invasion. The muscular backs and sexual appetites on display simply underscored a new Chinese self-confidence that the film’s fans aspired to.

The powerful bodies on show in body building and dance contests could also reflect Chinese strength. The popular fascination with qigong (years before Falungong burst into public attention) can be explained in part by the strong Chinese roots to which the breathing exercises and magic displays could make claim. In an age when science and technology defined national status, a distinctly Chinese path to power had a natural appeal to nationalist young people.

Young Chinese bodies in 1988 were also international, participating in global circuits of popular culture inspired by films and music from the United States, Hong Kong, South Korea and Japan. The break-dancing enthusiasm was inspired by one of the limited number of Hollywood films distributed to Chinese cinemas each year. But videotapes, often pirated, brought a whole range of Western and other visual inspiration to young Chinese viewers. The African-American pop music of Breakin’ played alongside a new kind of Chinese rock music drawing in part on the Northwestern stylings of the songs in Red Sorghum. In July 1988 the
Capital Gymnasium was packed with youthful fans, many paying a premium for tickets to a concert of new, Northwest wind, folk-rock music inspired by Zhang Yimou’s film.

In 1988 the young Chinese bodies being celebrated, enhanced and admired also had political implications beyond the nationalist mythology of Red Sorghum. That film presented a half-naked, sexualised, confident Grandfather of the present-day narrator. This figure was in marked contrast another young man, the late army driver Lei Feng. The latter was a seemingly sexless and earnest role model for young people promoted since the 1960s. Lei was often pictured sitting up at night darning the socks of his sleeping platoon mates. This almost feminised image of the loyal soldier was far from the sexualized, macho picture of the carnivalistic Grandfather in the 1988 film hit.

In the following year young people put their bodies on the line in protesting against corruption and for greater autonomy in places such as universities, where most of them were from. The broken bodies of the dead on 4 June 1989 did not mark the end of such concerns.
Air our dirty laundry in public: a study of Jia Zhangke’s hometown trilogy

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Jia Zhangke, born in 1970 in Fenyang, Shanxi Province, is a leader of the Sixth Generation Chinese directors.¹ He won the Golden Prize Award at the Second Hong Kong Independent Short Film & Video Awards for his short film Xiaoshan Returning Home (小山回家) made in 1995 when he was still a student at Beijing Film Academy. His feature film debut Pickpocket (小武, 1997) was highly acclaimed in the international film festival circuit, including winning the Wolfgang Staudite Award and Netpac Award in Berlin’s International Film Festival in 1998. With such success boosting his film career, he has made his hometown trilogy under great expectation: Pickpocket, Platform (站台, 2000) and Unknown Pleasure (任逍遥, 2002). They present the underclass of rural Shanxi province, the director’s hometown. None of them has been officially released in Mainland China, but due to the Chinese piracy industry all of them are available for internet download and pirate DVDs are also available.

However, it is not too hard to imagine that as a director establishing his fame outside Mainland China, he might not enjoy the similar enthusiastic welcome back home. Pickpocket was banned from screening in 1997. In fact, some informants from the Chinese filmmaking community made a secret impeachment against him, accusing him of hindering a ‘normal cultural exchange between China and the rest of the world’.² Consequently, in January 1999, he was contacted by the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television and was officially forbidden to make films within the state system. His trilogy was never legally screened in China. It was not until 2004 that he was able to legally release his film, The World (2004).

¹ In the field of Mainland Chinese cinema, the tradition of generation division began with the definition of the Fifth Generation. The Fifth Generation refers to the filmmakers who graduated from the Beijing Film Academy in 1982. Inferred from such a definition, the Fourth Generation refers to filmmakers who were trained in the late 1950s and early 1960s without opportunities to make films until after the Cultural Revolution in 1976. The Third Generation includes those who started their careers with the new reign of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, and who were particularly active in the 1950s and 1960s. For more detailed information of this generational division, see Zhang, Xudong, Chinese Modernism in the Era of Reforms: Cultural Fever, Avant-garde Fiction, and the New Chinese Cinema (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1997).
A condemned traitor

Zhangke’s persistence in making films without a proper permit from the government and his bold expose of the dark side of China is easily regarded as a rebellious act and he as a shameless traitor who defames and demonises his country. Even the titles of his hometown trilogy, such as Pickpocket and Unknown Pleasure have revealed his unfavourable portrayal of China; Jia bitterly points out, ‘I’ve been frequently accused of making films that show a negative side of China to foreigners.’

His trilogy is marked by backwardness, poverty, depression and despair. His protagonists are the marginal groups of society: pickpockets, prostitutes, coalmine workers, unemployed teenagers. The first film is a story of a pickpocket who ends up being caught by the police. He falls in love with a prostitute, but she suddenly disappears from his life and becomes a mistress to some rich guy. In Platform, an art troupe are eager to join in with the tide of the country’s 1980 reforms that promise them an exciting future, but they find themselves stuck in their tedious life in their small town at the end of the film with nowhere to go. The poor young rural men are exploited as cheap labour, risking their lives to work in the coal-mind for a meagre wage. Unknown Pleasure is a story of two unemployed teenagers wondering around with no particular motive for their lives. Poverty drives them into a desperate attempt to rob a bank, but one is caught red-handed and the other abandons his buddy and runs for his life as soon as he hears the alarm when he is waiting outside the bank. Such films are constantly named ‘underground films’ in the West, and according to Dai Jinhua, they are popular there because they work as the ‘other’, ‘complementing Western liberal intellectuals’ pre-existent prolepsis of the cultural scenery of the 1990s China.’

According to Said, a stereotypical view of Orientalism is ‘[t]he Oriental is irrational, depraved (fallen), childlike, ‘different’; thus the European is rational, virtuous, mature, “normal”’. Jia’s exposé of a backward and corrupt China is easily accused of catering to the taste of foreigners.

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‘Jia chou bu ke wai yang (家丑不可外扬)’ is a popular taboo among the Chinese, which is translated as ‘don’t air your dirty laundry in public’ by Rey Chow. Chow emphasises that this Chinese phrase actually accepts the existence of dirty laundry, but the real taboo is not the dirty laundry itself, but wai yang, the act of showing, brandishing, exhibiting (to the outside). Jia unrestrainedly challenges this taboo and airs the dirty laundry of Chinese society in public, to put them on show to an international audience. From such an aspect, he is accused as a traitor.

The doctor of the soul

However, he is simultaneously hailed as a glorious national hero. The cover of a pirate DVD of Pickpocket highlighted its selling point as ‘the work that establishes Jia Zhangke’s fame in the international film circuit.’ Platform was nominated for the Golden Lion Award in Venice Film Festival in 2000 and won the Netpac Award. Unknown Pleasure was nominated for the Golden Palm Award in the 2002 Cannes Film Festival and Zhangke went on to win the Golden Lion Award for his film Still Life (三峡好人) in the 2006 Venice Film Festival. The director is fully aware of the power of the pirate market and depends on it to display his films to his fellow Chinese. In Unknown Pleasure, one of the male protagonists sells pirate DVDs and one buyer approaches him for a copy of Xiao Wu or Platform. Jia has visited some pirate DVD shops in China and expressed his grotesque excitement at finding his films there, even though he was upset by the piracy.

By showing such dirty laundry to the outside and then bringing the viewer back to inside China, Jia forces the Chinese audience to confront the national shame themselves. Such a gaze to the bottom-line of Chinese society is identified as a national gaze by Rey Chow, who argues that the national gaze’s,

object is more specifically China’s “rural population” living in wretched conditions’, while such a gaze ‘is underwritten not by the discourse of Orientalism … but instead by the oft-repeated and clichéd

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7 Ibid.
This call to save the children is a famous line from Lu Xun who has been recognised as one of the greatest writers of Chinese modern literature history. In his preface to his story collection *Calls to Arms* (呐喊 1923), he recalls his experience as a medical student in Japan, where he was shown a news clip about an open execution of some Chinese spies working for Russia, while the indifferent spectators of such an appalling moment are some unsympathetic soulless Chinese compatriots. This experience drove him to give up his pursuit to be a medical doctor and he devoted himself to the cultural movement to save the souls of his Chinese compatriots.

In *Pickpocket*, there is a similar scene of an unsympathetic audience watching the male protagonist in handcuffs. Jia has emphasised its connection with Lu Xun, ‘like the audience, the crowd are also spectators... Naturally, I also thought of Lu Xun’s conception of the crowd.’ By comparing himself to Lu Xun, Jia identifies himself as a doctor of the soul. Lu Xun is highly acclaimed as a patriotic artist for his concern for the Chinese soul, so Jia should similarly be recognised as a passionate patriotic for his concern of the modern soul of the Chinese people.

However, Jia is different from Lu Xun in the search for a cure of these souls. Lu Xun criticises Chinese tradition and feudal ethics that hinder China from progressing to a stronger nation. He searches for a way to rescue the soul of all Chinese to strengthen their sick nation. His main concern is the soul of the nation, but not the soul of an individual. What Jia sees is a nation on its rise to great power, which has forgotten its people living in the bottom of the society. In his trilogy, China has reconnected with the world and proven its growing international influence, which is in great contrast with the sick nation in Lu Xun’s concern, but its people live in the same predications: the opening up of the country does not open up a new future for its people in the 1980s depicted in *Platform*. In the 1990s depicted in *Pickpocket*, China undergoes crazy reconstruction and speeds up in its way to strengthening its political power, which is proven by Hong Kong’s return. However, when the background

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9 Original quotation is the last sentence of Lu Xun’s novella, “Kuangren riji” (Diary of a Madman): “救救孩子”, in *Luxun quanj* (The Complete Works of Lu Xun), vol. 1 “Fen, Refeng and nahan” (Grave, hot wind and call to arms) (Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe, 2005), 455.

radio announces the exciting news of Hong Kong’s return, the male protagonist is disowned and kicked out of his house by his father. In *Unknown Pleasure*, China moves forward once again in the international community, proven by its entrance to the WTO, and Beijing being selected to host the 2008 Olympic Games, but among the hurrah of his fellow Chinese celebrating such a historical moment, one of the male protagonists is humiliated by a gang lord. The thief in *Pickpocket* re-appears in the film *Unknown Pleasure*, and he is still a thief. It seems that time has stopped and everyone is stuck in their purgatory. The flourishing China depicted in the official media has drifted away from them. To Jia, the further the country goes in its way to prosperity, the further the real life of its people deteriorates. Jia airs the dirty laundry both to the outsiders and to his compatriots so that the ‘dirty laundry problem’ will finally be solved rather than covered up. This brings forth his philanthropical concern for Mainland China’s future. Rey Chow points out, ‘[a]s China becomes globalised at the turn of the twentieth century, the anthropological impulses of the films from the 1980s have given way to a sociological one, and such an approach is above all benevolence-driven-coercion.’

**Lost in translation**

While the dark secret revealed in Zhangke’s trilogy can be picked up by both international audiences and domestic audiences, even though contradictory interpretation would be the result, there are some other elements that might strike the core of the Chinese heart but be completely lost in translation. When Tom Nairn in his *The Break-up of Britain* (1977) talks about British nationalism, he says, ‘[t]he new middle class intelligentsia of nationalism had to invite the masses into history; and the invitation-card had to be written in a language they understand.’ Jia creates his version of popular nationalism by inviting the masses into history, and the invitation-card he writes is in the language of the popular culture. Jia has pointed out that, ‘in such a cold and difficult environment, popular culture provides a place to come home to.’

Jia has constantly deployed popular music and film dialogues as background sound, and such background sound is especially significant to those who have been surrounded by such sound in their everyday lives. There is a scene in *Pickpocket* when Xiaowu stands aimlessly by the street, but the whole scene is accompanied by a dialogue, then gun fight and followed by a theme song from an iconic Hong Kong gangster film *The Killer* (1989) by John

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11 Chow, “*Not One Less*”, 149. Original italics.
13 Berry, 189.
Woo. Another song repeatedly played during the film is a very popular song in the 1990s, *Farewell My Concubine*, by a Mainland Chinese singer Tu Honggang. Even Xiaowu who is too shy to sing in front the girl he loves, whistles this song as he wanders around the empty narrow streets.

*Platform* is a hodgepodge of the popular music of the 1980s. The film title is in fact a rock and roll song of the 1980s. The music it tracks include government-endorsed propaganda songs (*Come Together, Young Friends*), campus songs, which were often about youth and student life and spread widely from primary schools and universities, Hong Kong Canton pop music and Taiwan pop music. Although Hong Kong was still under British governance and no direct communication with Taiwan was possible in the 1980s, the young mainland Chinese were listening to Taiwan’s sweetheart singer Teresa Teng from the radio stations, and dancing to the canton pop song *Genghis Khan* sung by George Lam.

The Chinese film title of *Unknown Pleasure* is also a popular theme song of a Chinese martial arts TV drama *The Return of the Condor Heroes*, which is based on a famous martial art novel by Louis Cha. For people with no personal experience with these songs, they are merely part of the music or sound effect. To make things even worse, the translation of these lyrics could be bizarre. They are easily under-appreciated. However, for people who have lived through them, these are some of the catchy melodies that many Chinese audiences feel like singing along to when they hear them.

As Jia acknowledges, ‘[t]here are also several specific songs that really represent what the Chinese people were going through during a given historical time frame.’ Such popular songs have been played millions of times in music stores, over the radio and television, repeatedly sung in karaoke, and they served as a type of national anthem at the time of their peak popularity.

When Benedict Anderson discusses the function of national anthem, he points out that ‘[n]o matter how banal the words and mediocre the tunes, there is in this singing an experience of simultaneity. At precisely such moments, people wholly unknown to each other utter the same verses to the same melody. The image: unisonance.’ Common knowledge of such catchy sound connects all those who could sing along and invite them into an imagined community.

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14 Ibid, 190.
Conclusion

Instead of struggling to seek a definite answer for the question ‘is Jia a condemned traitor or a passionate patriot?’ it is more appropriate to conclude that he is both. Barthes argues:

To interpret a text is not to give it a (more or less justified, more or less free) meaning, but on the contrary to appreciate what plural constitutes it […] In this ideal text, the networks are many and interact, without any one of them being able to surpass the rest […] it has no beginning; it is reversible; we gain access to it by several entrances, none of which can be authoritatively declared to be the main one…

This dirty laundry easily draws the attention of those who are looking forward to confirming their stereotypical view of a corrupt China with these film images. Jia indeed has not disappointed them, which seems to prove Jia guilty of catering to the taste of the foreign Devil. Simultaneously, Jia invites his fellow Chinese into the history of the unprivileged by popular music, but he refuses to cheat them with a rosy, happy picture, but rather invites them into a house full of dirty laundry. The only way to make sure the house is clean is to throw the dirty laundry into the sun so it can be cleaned.

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She-wolf or prisoner of love? Girl power and dependence in English and Japanese popular music

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In this paper I examine images of dependence and independence in the lyrics of Japanese and Western popular songs performed by female artists. Girl Power, representations of women as assertive, powerful and independent, has constituted an important theme in Western popular music since its appearance in the early 1990s, and I was interested to know whether this theme was also present in Japanese songs. After first explaining my choice of popular song lyrics as a data source, I begin by examining the role of the media and popular culture in constructing and portraying women in Japan and the West. With an understanding of the social context in which the lyrics of Japanese and Western popular songs are created and performed, I then proceed to analyse the lyrics themselves. Beginning with the top 100 singles from major music charts (Oricon Rankings for Japanese songs, Billboard Top 100 for English songs) over a period of two years (2008 and 2009) and selecting as my data sample songs performed by female solo artists and groups, I examine the lyrics closely while considering my two initial hypotheses: firstly, that the Japanese lyrics would contain more images of female dependence than the English lyrics, and secondly, that the English lyrics would contain stronger and more numerous images of female independence than the Japanese lyrics. I grouped my data into the themes ‘dependent images’ and ‘independent images’, and separated it into the following categories:

Dependent images in Japanese and English lyrics

- Woman waiting for, wishing for or missing a man; woman unable to live without a man; woman completed by a man, or incomplete without a man
- Man portrayed as a savior, an angel, or magical
- Woman portrayed as timid, passive, powerless, or not in control of her feelings or destiny
- Woman portrayed as a child
- Woman commenting on, or expressing concern about, her physical appearance or what a man thinks of her

Discussion of dependent images in Japanese lyrics

In all but one category I found considerably more examples of dependent images in the Japanese data than in the English data. My most dramatic finding was in the category ‘Woman commenting on, or expressing concern about, her physical appearance or what a man thinks of her’. I found twenty-one examples in the Japanese data compared with only two in the English data. This emphasis on women’s appearance in Japanese society has received considerable attention by scholars (see Akita, 2005: 46-50; Miller & Bardsley, 2005; Morley, 1999: 37; Darling-Wolf, 2006: 192), and having lived and worked in Japan for over ten years, I can personally attest to the pressure many Japanese women feel regarding their appearance, and the time, money and effort they invest in maintaining it. Examples from my data of this narrow Japanese criterion of beauty include:

To eat or not to eat?
I’m worried about my stomach
To eat or not to eat?
The demon inside of me is laughing (*Lady Go! / Koda Kumi*)

We work on every single cell inside our bodies, wanting to be slim, pretty women (*Don’t say “lazy” / Sakurakou K-On Bu*)

My mood is light but I still need to watch my calories (*One room disco / Perfume*)

Alright! I got a bit thinner, but in victory, you ate
And just that can make you feel so defeated (*Don’t say “lazy” / Sakurakou K-On Bu*)

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1 Japanese lyrics: http://j-lyric.net/artist/a0006b2/l00dbdb.html; English lyrics: http://verduistering.livejournal.com/22236.html.

Discussion of dependent images in English lyrics
This is not to say, however, that there is an absence of examples of dependent themes in the English data. In the category ‘Woman waiting for, wishing for, or missing a man / Woman unable to live without a man / Woman completed by a man or incomplete without a man’, I found twenty-nine examples in the English data, fewer than the forty-five examples I found in the Japanese data, but still a significant number, and one which may possibly be explained by the current social climate in the West, and in particular in the United States, which is currently in the midst of a conservative, pro-family movement whose discourse reinforces traditional gender hierarchy in the home and demonizes feminism for promoting women's individualism and destroying family life (see Adams, 2007: 501-502; McRobbie, 2004: 5). In the category ‘Woman portrayed as timid, passive, powerless, or not in control of her feelings or destiny’, I found twenty-three examples in the English data, fewer than the thirty-nine examples I found in the Japanese data, but significant nonetheless, and possibly related to the ‘Reviving Ophelia’ discourse. Named after Mary Pipher’s 1994 book Reviving Ophelia: Saving the Selves of Adolescent Girls, this discourse adopts Shakespeare’s character Ophelia from Hamlet as the symbol of a crisis of girlhood, presenting girls as vulnerable and passive, and blaming pressure from the media for simultaneously urging them to be independent, assertive, and achievement-oriented while at the same time encouraging them to repress their real selves in order to become feminine, attractive and deferential to men (see Gonick, 2006: 1, Kilbourne, 1999: 130; Banet-Weiser, 2004: 136).

Independent images in Japanese and English lyrics

- Woman portrayed as not needing a man; Woman portrayed as happy on her own; Woman expressing her strength after being hurt by a man
- Man portrayed in a negative manner; Woman refusing to allow herself to be tricked or used by a man; Woman expressing contempt for a man
- Man portrayed as a boy, a plaything, or prey
- Non-standard sexual practices
- Woman expressing her control or influence over a man; Woman giving a man orders; Woman threatening or committing physical violence against a man

• Woman displaying self-confidence or empowerment; Women displaying solidarity with other women
• Comments on women’s roles in society; Observations of society’s expectations of women; Women’s perceptions of their own lives; Observations on the portrayal of women in the media

Discussion of independent images in English lyrics
In all but two categories I found more examples of female independence in the English data than the Japanese data, a finding I believe can be explained with reference to the Girl Power phenomenon and the subsequent explosion of tough female characters in a wide range of popular media in the West. In the category ‘Woman expressing her control or influence over a man; Woman giving a man orders; Woman threatening or committing physical violence against a man’ I found far more examples in the English data (twenty-seven) than the Japanese (eight), including:

Grab your clothes and get gone
You better hurry up before the sprinklers come on (Take a Bow / Rihanna)\(^5\)

I don’t know if I can yell any louder
How many times have I kicked you outta here?
Or said something insulting?
I can be so mean when I wanna be
I am capable of really anything
I can cut you into pieces (Please Don’t Leave Me / Pink)\(^6\)

In the category ‘Comments on women’s roles in society; Observations of society’s expectations of women; Women’s perceptions of their own lives; Observations on the portrayal of women in the media’, the number of examples in the Japanese data (eleven) and the English data (nine) was comparable; however the content differed considerably, with the

\(^5\) http://www.elyricsworld.com/take_a_bow_lyrics_rihanna.html
\(^6\) (http://www.elyricsworld.com/please_don’t_leave_me_lyrics_pink.html)
English examples tending to be very direct. In She-wolf, Shakira comments on society’s expectations of women: ‘A domesticated girl, that's all you ask of me’, and, expressing her feelings of suffocation and her desire to break free of these expectations, responds:

There's a She-Wolf in the closet, open up and set her free, there's a
She-Wolf in the closet, let it out so it can breathe.

Britney Spears’ comments on media’s critical portrayal of her conduct and her body:

I'm Mrs. Lifestyles of the rich and famous
You want a piece of me?
I'm Mrs. Oh my God that Britney's shameless
You want a piece of me?
I'm Mrs. Extra! Extra! This just in
You want a piece of me?
I'm Mrs. She's too big now she's too thin
You want a piece of me? (Piece of Me / Britney Spears)

Perhaps the most descriptive example, however, is Beyoncé’s If I Were a Boy, in which Beyoncé imagines what her life would be like if she were a boy for a day and comments on society’s sexual double standards for men and women:

If I were a boy
Even just for a day
I'd roll out of bed in the morning
And throw on what I wanted and go
Drink beer with the guys
And chase after girls

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7 http://www.elyricsworld.com/she_wolf_lyrics_shakira.html
I'd kick it with who I wanted
And I'd never get confronted for it
Cause they'd stick up for me

If I were a boy
I would turn off my phone
Tell everyone it's broken
So they'd think that I was sleeping alone
I’d put myself first
And make the rules as I go
Cause I know that she’ll be faithful,
Waiting for me to come home, to come home (If I Were a Boy / Beyoncé)  

In the category ‘Man portrayed as a boy, a plaything, or prey’, there was a significant difference between the number of examples in the English data (twelve) and the Japanese data (one). Kilbourne (1999), discussing the portrayal of women in advertising, observes that ‘Women who are ‘powerful’ in advertising are uncommitted, and treat men like sex objects (148). No artist in my study is more representative of this than Lady Gaga, whose lyrics contain numerous images of women using men purely for their own pleasure. In Love Game, Lady Gaga sings ‘I wanna take a ride on your disco stick’, (‘disco stick’ referring to a man’s penis) and ‘Hold me and love me, just wanna touch you for a minute, maybe three seconds is enough for my heart to quit it’, openly announcing her intention to use the man for sex and clearly expressing that for her, love is just a game and that she doesn’t want to become emotionally dependent on him. 

In the category ‘Non-standard sexual practices’, I found no examples in the Japanese data and eight examples in the English data. The examples in the English data are likely representative of “Lesbianism chic” (see Baldwin, 2006: 21). Although none of the women employing the lesbian/bisexual images in their lyrics publicly identify as gay or bisexual, they employ these images as a symbol of women’s sexual liberation:

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9 http://www.elyricsworld.com/if_i_were_a_boy_lyrics_beyonce.html
10 http://www.elyricsworld.com/love_game_lyrics_lady_gaga.html
I kissed a girl and I liked it
The taste of her cherry chapstick,
I kissed a girl just to try it
I hope my boyfriend don't mind it
It felt so wrong, it felt so right
It don't mean I'm in love tonight (I Kissed a Girl / Katy Perry)\(^{11}\)

Love me hate me, say what you want about me
But all of the boys and all of the girls are begging to F-U-C-K me
(If You Seek Amy / Britney Spears)\(^{12}\)

**Discussion of independent images in Japanese lyrics**

This does not mean, however, that there is an absence of strong female images in the Japanese lyrics. In the category ‘Woman displaying self-confidence or empowerment; Women displaying solidarity with other women’ I found more examples of independent images in the Japanese data (fifty-two) than in the English data (forty-nine). Female solidarity in Japan has been addressed by scholars (see Toth, 2008: 111; Darling-Wolf, 2006: 194). Examples from my data include:

Chatting now
Seriously lively never ending girls' talk…
Hopes, desires, passions, we'll wrap them up with a ribbon
We gather material for a new type version, and put it into
A girls-only print club album and a diary written with love

My mood is always going
Up, up, up and up
Laughing just from getting together
(Cagayake! GIRLS [Shine! GIRLS] / Sakurakou K-ON Bu)\(^{13}\)

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\(^{11}\) [http://www.elyricsworld.com/i_kissed_a_girl_lyrics_katy_perry.html](http://www.elyricsworld.com/i_kissed_a_girl_lyrics_katy_perry.html)

\(^{12}\) [http://www.elyricsworld.com/if_you_seek_amy_lyrics_britney_spears.html](http://www.elyricsworld.com/if_you_seek_amy_lyrics_britney_spears.html)

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In the category ‘Comments on women’s roles in society; Observations of society’s expectations of women; Women’s perceptions of their own lives; Observations on the portrayal of women in the media’, I found a similar number of examples in the Japanese data (eleven) and the English data (ten). The presence of these images in the Japanese data, despite their being less direct in nature than the English images in the same category, may suggest that Japanese women are becoming increasingly aware of, and vocal about, their social situation. Many of the images in this category in the Japanese data alluded to society’s expectation that women should be ‘good girls’, and the pressure women felt attempting to fulfill this expectation:

Being a woman every day is so tough (ECSTASY / Koda Kumi)\(^{14}\)

Acting like a “good girl”
Just makes me feel empty
But still I fake a smile without thinking

Is there any girl here
Who’s smiling for real? (Nanchatte renai [Faux love] / Morning Musume)\(^{15}\)

**Concluding remarks**
Darling-Wolf (2006) acknowledges that celebratory accounts of the hybridity of contemporary postmodern cultures make it increasingly unfashionable to suggest that Japanese women face socio-cultural expectations that are particularly difficult to negotiate (194). While I am also conscious of the dangers of perpetuating the Western stereotype of Japanese women as ‘particularly oppressed’, I believe the images of dependence and independence in the lyrics of popular songs represent a valuable insight not only into


\(^{14}\)Japanese lyrics: [http://j-lyric.net/artist/a0006b2/l019a12.html](http://j-lyric.net/artist/a0006b2/l019a12.html) English lyrics: Author’s translation

\(^{15}\)Japanese lyrics: [http://j-lyric.net/artist/a000626/l01a633.html](http://j-lyric.net/artist/a000626/l01a633.html) English lyrics: Author’s translation
women’s social status and roles, but also into their own feelings and perceptions of womanhood. My findings from this study generally concur with my original hypotheses: that the Japanese lyrics would contain more images of female dependence than the English lyrics, and secondly, that the English lyrics would contain stronger and more numerous images of female independence than the Japanese lyrics. However, despite these findings and despite the continued existence of gender inequality and the influence of traditional ideals and beliefs on women’s roles in contemporary Japanese society, I do believe that Japanese women are becoming increasingly aware of and articulate about their situation. In a recent Japanese television commercial for beer entitled ‘Atarashii futari’ (A new couple), featuring a young woman drinking beer while a young man prepares food, the female narrator observes ‘Otokorashisa tte, kawatte kita’ (‘Masculinity is changing’), as the camera focuses on the man. The camera then switches to a scene of the woman fixing a broken chair with a hammer, and the narrator asserts ‘Onnarashisa mo, kawatte yo ne’ (Femininity has changed too, hasn’t it’) (Sapporo Yebisu Silk Beer). It is clear how far Japanese women have come since 1975, when House Incorporated aired a television commercial that stated, ‘I [the boy] do the eating’ and ‘I [the girl] do the cooking’ (Suzuki, 1995: 85).

At the same time, despite Western women’s apparent equality with men, the fact that Beyoncé is still singing songs like If I Were a Boy shows that the struggle for full equality, in popular consciousness if not constitutionally, is not over for women in the West either. In addition to these challenges, women in both Japan and the West are now also faced with society’s expectations for them to simultaneously embody contradictory roles: to be both demure and assertive, both dependent and independent. It will be interesting to see how images of dependence and independence in the lyrics of Japanese and Western popular songs performed by female artists, and in popular culture in general, change over the next decade, as women in both Japan and the West continue to strive for equality.

References


Transacting ‘boy love’ in Nagusamegusa (1418): the soft power of literature in Muromachi Japan.

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The purpose of this paper is to contextualise and deconstruct an intimate nanshoku (‘boy love’) relationship in the Muromachi era travelogue Nagusamegusa between its author, the prominent poet and Zen priest Shōtetsu (1381-1459) aged thirty-eight, and a young boy who remains anonymous. In the summer of 1418 Shōtetsu, wandering in the provinces, meets a boy during a lengthy sojourn at Kiyosu Castle. A passionate affair takes place over about two months. The relationship sours when the boy starts seeing someone else and ends when the boy resumes his journey.

In this paper, particular attention will be paid to analysing the power dynamics of this relationship, the nature of the power wielded, and the mutual benefits accruing. Inexplicably, this relationship has received little scholarly attention to date notwithstanding its importance as the only unambiguously documented love affair in Shōtetsu’s life. It must also claim our attention as the very reason for Nagusamegusa’s genesis, a point to which I will return later.

Nanshoku relationships were common and socially condoned in Shōtetsu’s day, especially in the circles in which he moved as a cleric and artist with close links to the warrior and aristocratic elite. It has been observed that ‘the historical record left by the literate strata of society suggests that most people would have inquired not why a given man had taken male lovers but rather why he had not done so.’¹

In particular, Buddhist monasteries in medieval Japan were hotbeds of nanshoku where such practices were accepted and tolerated.² Nanshoku flourished in the monasteries, some of which were huge. Kōfukuji where Shōtetsu served had at least 4,000 monks in 1211.³ They housed thousands of monks but also many young boys of various ages, called

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²The Buddhist establishment further rationalised these practices by invoking the complicity of the divine. The boy-acyletes in the popular contemporary genre chigo monogatari were revealed as incarnations of Kannon, Jizō or Monjushiri. Dharmachari Jnanavira, 'Homosexuality in the Japanese Buddhist Tradition.' Western Buddhist Review 3: 3, http://www.westernbuddhistreview.com/vol3/homosexuality.html.
chigo, kasshiki or shami according to their roles and responsibilities. Some were placed there as acolytes to commence ecclesiastical careers; some had been deposited there by parents for an education. The youngest could be five years old and it is said that they performed domestic chores and shared the beds of older monks.

The presence of [kasshiki] created numerous problems for Zen monastic legislators. Although shami [novices] had their hair cropped, kasshiki [postulants] wore their hair shoulder-length and modishly. By the Muromachi period, their childish features were being decorated with white powder […] kasshiki were dressed in finely wrought silken robes and vividly colored variegated under-robes […] Rivalries in conspicuous consumption indulged in by wealthy bushi families were carried on within the Zen cloister by their sons […] Gorgeously arrayed youths became the center of admiration in lavish monastic ceremonies […] In some cases the youths became the focus of homosexual affection and rivalry.

Shōtetsu himself would have been completely socialised to such an environment. He had been placed in Kōfukuji temple, Nara, as a server for about six years from about age fourteen. Later, aged about 34, he took the tonsure and entered the great Rinzai Zen temple Tōfukuji. He had ample opportunity to experience or at least observe what Bernard Faure describes as a kind of ‘institutionalized prostitution or rape’.

Male-male transgenerational relationships were also common in the warrior class who had close ties with the Zen monasteries in particular and wished to emulate their ways.

Accepting monk-acolyte sexual relations as proper, and influenced by the erotics expressed in the writings of the Muromachi–period Zen poets, many adult warriors would have been socialised to experience and express a desire for boys.  

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4 Leupp, Male Colors, 38.
5 Collcutt, Five Mountains, 246-247.
7 Leupp, Male Colors, 50.
Factors such as long periods of all-male environments in isolation; glorification of the male physique; intense loyalty, group solidarity and obedience would have encouraged this ethos.  

This warrior background was also integral to Shōtetsu’s social identity as he was the younger son of a minor feudal lord (jūtō) presiding over a small mountain castle in Bitchū province. Although he became a cleric, he continued to associate closely with powerful figures of the military elite. One of his chief mentors was the great general, statesman and literatus Imagawa Ryoshun (1326-c.1417). His stay at Kiyosu Castle was in all likelihood at the invitation of its lord, a forbear of Oda Nobunaga: it had become popular in this era for regional lords to seek an aura of genteel cultivation by inviting renowned artists from the capital to their stronghold. Even Shōtetsu’s close relationship with Ryōshun may not have been purely pedagogical and platonic. Taken under his wing as a boy of about fourteen, coincidentally about the same age of the boy in Nagusamegusa, he was distraught when Ryōshun died. Some scholars suggest that his journey may have been a memorial journey to commemorate Ryōshun’s death one year previously. The boy was probably similarly of warrior background, perhaps a page in the retinue of others travelling on business through Kiyosu to Koshi (present day Echizen and Echigo) on the Japan Sea coast.

Thus, in the light of its historical and social actualities, the male-male aspect of the relationship was not remarkable, although it was considered quite fashionable. So rather than the gender issues in this relationship, it is other facets of the affair which are truly intriguing and invite further discussion. To this I will allocate the remainder of this paper, and comment on the surprising dynamics of a relationship negotiated in the first instance on an exchange of sex and literature. By this phase of his life (the journey took place in 1418), Shōtetsu had acquired a considerable poetic reputation: for example, in 1414 he contributed sixty poems to a sequence of one thousand poems composed at the powerful Hosokawa Mitsumoto’s (1378-1426) residence. At Kiyosu Castle his reputation as a poet and scholar earned him an invitation to lecture on The Tale of Genji:

One day the lord of this residence addressed me, saying ‘Well now, I have been informed that you have studied and know a lot about The

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8 Leupp, Male Colors, 48.
9 Built in 1405.
Tale of Genji […] I would like to hear about the history of this tale. Please would you be able to oblige, even if only just a small part?”

The boy attended these events, and therefore knew Shōtetsu’s impressive literary standing. He himself was interested in renga composition and already a skilled calligrapher. Presumably he was motivated to learn from Shōtetsu for very pragmatic reasons: for the literary skills he could gain (warriors were also expected to be able to turn out decent poems), and the prestige of associating with this master as a student. Shōtetsu in turn had much he wanted to impart: ‘Shōtetsu faced the need to address pupils for whom waka was increasingly an artefact from a different time and of an unfamiliar class.’ His mission was to save the way of poetry from its current slide to unfashiononableness. He saw in the boy a talented, willing student, strikingly similar to himself at the same age. He had ‘heard that the boy with the group of travellers was interested in renga poetry and that his handwriting held much promise.’ He comments, ‘It was unusual to find such a young person so fond of literature.’

At the same time textual evidence exists which suggests that Shōtetsu may also have seen in the boy an aestheticised romanticised ideal, and the potential for a relationship Shōtetsu had hitherto only vicariously experienced in the pages of his beloved Heian classics.

From his first glimpse of the boy, the diction used indicates that Shōtetsu has cast himself and the boy in romantic roles. He discovers the boy through ‘peeping through a crack in the wall (kaimami sureba)’ in the time-honoured manner of Heian romantic heroes. His attention to the boy’s agemaki hairstyle when he first glimpses him is significant in its romantic and erotic associations—as in the old song:

Well, well, my agemaki girl
We were two arm’s lengths apart when we lay down
And then, well, well - we seem to have turned in our sleep
And now, well, well, we are lying side by side

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10 Nagusamegusa, in Shinpen Nihon koten bungaku zenshū, vol. 48, Chūsei nikki kikoshū, ed. K. Nagasaki et al. (Shōgakkan, 1994), 442-3. All subsequent references and quotations from Nagusamegusa are based on this edition, as are textual annotations.
12 Agemaki was a hairstyle favoured by boys and girls in the Heian period. Hair was worn parted down the middle and tied up in round bundles over both ears. It indicated that a boy had not yet passed through the coming-of-age rite (gempuku) after which a different hairstyle was worn.
13 Agemaki (‘Trefoil Knots’) is also the title of the intense chapter in Genji where the Uji sisters are courted.
As Shōtetsu’s affair unfolds, and in all sections referring to it, the narrative is dense with poetic allusion: ‘And indeed as my fondness for him grew deeper and deeper, like the lover in the old poem about ‘the oaks in the meadows of the imperial hunting grounds’, this old wreck of a poet-monk, like the derelict boat of Wakanoura Bay in the poem, and wondering where I had finally come ashore, visited the boy at night by the light of the moon ‘when the watchman nodded off’ or in the rains of early evening ‘who lament one’s lot’. We resented nights when it so happened that we did not sleep together in our summer robes and complained if our time with one another was not long enough. Even though I have not completely abandoned the world for a life of solitude in the woods, unattached as a cloud or the waters of a stream, how can I be so inflamed with this desire? My heart was urging me in two directions at once, as I reflected on the wisdom of the old poem about the crumbling banks of the Tatsuta River, and how difficult it is for waters once sullied to clear.

Likewise evocative of the classical romances Nagesamegusa records many poetry exchanges between the lovers, most notably an extended set on the archetypal romantic theme of Tanabata. But there can be also be little doubt of the physiological needs driving this 38 year old man into the boy’s arms. Perhaps he was grasping at his last shot at love, lucky that it was literary lore and advice that the boy wanted, not fine robes and gifts which were beyond Shōtetsu’s economic means as a monk to give. As the poem below indicates, composed when the boy had to make a brief pilgrimage during his stay, Shōtetsu already considered himself an old man:

Aware that my days ahead
are drawing to an end
yet I pray my body of mine
will last long enough
for your safe return in your travelling robes

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15 He alludes to Shinkokinshū poem 1050, a love poem by Kakinomoto no Hitomaro.
16 Shōtetsu again invokes the tropes of old poems for example by Fujiwara no Tameaki in Shinūishu: ‘Sunken to the depths of Wakanoura Bay/ this old boat/is now being hauled back / into the waves /of everyday life’.
17 Another poetic allusion, this time to Kokinshū poem 632, also found in Ise monogatari, by the great lover Ariwara no Narihira.
18 An allusion to another Kokinshū poem 705 by Narihira, also found in Ise monogatari.
19 Literally, ‘nights when our summer robes do not lie on top of each other’. The expression ‘robes lying on top of one another (koromo o kasanu)’ conventionally signified lovers pledging their love for one another.
20 His wording alludes to Kokinshū poem 615 by Tomonori.
21 Similar sentiments and imagery are found in a poem from Shūishū as well as in The Tale of Genji.
Thus, in these courtly aspects the relationship was quite conventional. However its personal dynamics prove to be somewhat less so. Although we would assume in a transgenerational relationship it would be the older player to make the first move, this is not the case here. Having spied on the boy, Shôtetsu simply returns to his quarters. It is the boy who seeks out Shôtetsu, pesterimg him repeatedly for more knowledge: ‘He would come here with others and to my embarrassment ask endless questions. He was always asking me the meaning of vague waka poems…’ The questions finally escalate into a request for an entire transcription of all poems in The Tale of Genji. Shôtetsu happily obliges. The power balance shifts perceptibly in favour of the boy who seems set to ‘use’ Shôtetsu as much as he can. To make matters worse, the boy also commences a simultaneous relationship with another individual (male or female is not specified): When the boy makes his short pilgrimage, poems from him are scarce, and Shôtetsu is devastated to discover his infidelity:

The boy was seeing another person who lived a little distance away […] they were finding any pretext to exchange vows of love with one another at any time of the day and night […] Vague word of this affair reached my ears […] and I was filled with envy at such unfairness.

I shed tears like dew
at my plight -
who has been in your bed
with you tonight
while I weep and pine for you?

And my anguish did not end there […] I counted up the number of nights which we had spent apart […] I mistrusted the pledges of love we had made to each other the night before. And so […] summer passed and autumn arrived.

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22 Kotozukete. Shôtetsu again uses diction from ‘Agemaki’.
From this point on until the boy’s departure Shōtetsu endures a triangular relationship wracked with jealousy, insecurity and self-loathing:

You reject
for their colour
these aged sleeves dyed charcoal black
I offer to you
herd boy of the heavens

And yet the boy persists in manipulating Shōtetsu’s generous spirit. His departure imminent, the boy comes to him with final questions and three parting requests. Firstly, he seeks explanation about the technique of allusion to *The Tale of Genji* in *waka* poetry. Shōtetsu obliges with many examples. Next he requests Shōtetsu to write out a copy of all the poems in the *Tale of Genji*:

I would like to keep a copy of the poems in *The Tale*, although I realise it will be an unpleasant task in the heat of the next day or two. Please would you be able to take up your brush for me?

Apart from the unseasonably hot weather, Shōtetsu is suffering from asthma and his emotions are in turmoil, yet he is unable to turn down this request:

It was difficult to decline his request. It was unusual to find such a young person so fond of literature […] I wanted to write the poems out for him, and would have offered to do so even without his entreaties.

His act of writing is an inscription of his devotion to the boy:

These brushstrokes record
on the pages
what words cannot express:
I will not forget you;
As a third and final request, the boy asks Shōtetsu to attach a note to his booklet of Genji poems to explain its provenance; it is thanks to this that Nagusamegusa and the record of their affair exist at all.

Shōtetsu at the conclusion emerges emotionally bruised and embittered. He has given all he has to offer, which is literary knowledge, but has been manipulated, cuckolded and abandoned in return. Having committed the events of the summer to paper and confronted his own foolishness he wants nothing more than to put his account ‘in the hand of the fire page, to be destroyed by flames’.

We are fortunate that something held him back. On many levels Nagusamegusa is a valuable and highly instructive document. It provides a more nuanced understanding of Muromachi nanshoku relationships, revealing them to be not purely about sexual exploitation and physical gratification but with strong aesthetic and emotional dimensions. It also furnishes unexpected evidence that ‘victims’ in these relationships were not necessarily the younger partner. The work also reminds us that many currencies exist for negotiating relationships, apart from material gain, and in Shōtetsu’s Muromachi Japan the promise of erudition and literary skill held high value, especially in the prestigious field of waka poetry and knowledge of The Tale of Genji.

23 Probably a variation on Shinkokinshū poem 1507 by Shunzei.