Reviews


Ken’ichi Goto is a noted Waseda University professor of international relations, with a specialisation in Southeast Asia and in particular Indonesia, and is author of a number of related books. In this book there has also been considerable editorial input, along with a very useful introduction, from another noted Southeast Asian specialist, Paul Kratoska, Chief Editor of the *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*. The book is therefore very solid and detailed in its scholarship, and is well researched and referenced – though somewhat inconveniently there is no Bibliography to provide a ready list of these sources.

The thrust of the book is that although there are still those in Japan – notably in recent years those associated with the Society for Textbook Reform – who maintain that the nation’s incursions in Asia during the 1930s and early 40s were in the noble cause of liberating Asia from the yoke of Western imperial powers, and despite the fact Japan’s occupation of certain nations did indeed help stimulate nationalism and independence, in fact the noble cause was basically mere window-dressing, and Japan’s real motives were more materialistic and selfish. Goto writes, on his final page:

[ ]he true purpose of the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia was to control the whole of the region because it was a major source of the raw materials and human resources needed to carry out Japan’s war aims. The liberation of Southeast Asia from Western colonial rule was only a façade used to lend respectability and legitimacy to this effort. Some of the measures taken in Southeast Asia during the occupation incidentally did prove beneficial, but that was only incidental, and due respect must be given to the political skills and social capabilities of the occupied peoples, who used the opportunities created by the Japanese invasion to further their own national interests (291).

It is indeed worth noting that all the nations occupied by Japan did achieve independence shortly after the war. As Goto demonstrates, Indonesia under Sukarno was a particularly good example. Indonesians respected the Japanese during the occupation of their nascent nation (especially its early days), despite frequent harsh treatment, for displacing and humbling the arrogant and much hated Dutch and for offering Asian peoples inspiration and (at least in theory) a new Asian order and prosperity. However, they did not hesitate to turn on
the same Japanese when, during the months immediately following Japan’s surrender in August 1945, the Japanese were ordered by the slow-to-arrive Allies (under Mountbatten, the Supreme Commander in Southeast Asia) to maintain the status quo and not hand over their arms to the Indonesians. This infuriated those Indonesians eager to press ahead with achieving their independence before the Dutch returned. The Japanese – in the proverbial narrow space between a rock and a hard place – were seen by these Indonesians as Allied lackeys and as enemies, and indeed, with some irony, in a number of incidents significant Japanese blood was shed for the Allies’ cause – and moreover to no avail, for the Dutch on their attempted return to resume their rule in April 1946 found they had underestimated the strength of nationalist sentiment. Such underestimations were true of all the colonial powers (248), who by the time of Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933 had between them occupied all Southeast Asian nations with the exception of Thailand (150). There was thus some factual basis for Japanese claims of unhealthy Western domination in Asia.

However, even given a hypothetical scenario of a Japanese victory and the total demise of Western influence, Southeast Asian peoples would have fared no better in terms of real independence, for despite Japanese promises to this effect, and even nominal conferring of ‘independence’ in some cases (e.g. Burma), Goto provides evidence of Japan’s real intentions never to relinquish control fully – as seen for example in its Outline of Guidance for the Greater East Asia Political Strategy document of 31 May 1943, which clearly stated an imperial conference decision to “keep the East Indies and Malaya eternally in Japanese hands” (83). This was Japan’s honne (true intent) as opposed to its tatemae (outward expression). But then again, the Japanese had no monopoly on hypocrisy, for the Allies too were not above misrepresentations, as in the Atlantic Charter that, despite popular beliefs to the contrary, actually made no promises to end colonial rule (58). And Tojo, while serving as Prime Minister, did at least do the rounds of Southeast Asian countries: in fact he was the first prime minister of any nation ever to visit Thailand (which was an ally of Japan but independent) and Indonesia (40).

The book is full of interesting material such as this, some of it well-known, some not so well-known. Structurally it has twelve chapters evenly spread across three parts. The first part, ‘Japan and Southeast Asia, 1930s-1945’, discusses the build-up to Japan’s war and the war years themselves. There is detailed discussion on the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, the Greater East Asian Conference, and so forth. Part One also includes among other useful material a particularly interesting discussion of Tojo’s personal relations with leading figures from a number of Southeast Asian nations. Personality and personal relations are all too often overlooked by scholars in favour of cold and clinical material, but they are vital factors in political interactions and indeed help shape world events. In all probability, either because of or despite Goto’s balanced approach (which he maintains throughout the book), many readers will feel some sympathy for Tojo, who has been particularly maligned by Allied propaganda and of course ‘took the
rap’ for Hirohito (my comments not Goto’s). He certainly impressed Burma’s Ba Maw, who had little liking for the Japanese forces (which he saw as ‘one ogre replacing another’, the other being the British), but had great personal respect for Tojo the man, and moreover remarked that other Asian leaders felt similar respect for Tojo (94).

The second part, ‘Japan and Indonesia’, is devoted to Goto’s country of special interest, and in a sense represents a vignette in a broader gallery. It includes discussion of talented young Indonesians studying in Japan and their influence upon returning home, the difficulties experienced by Japanese caught in the earlier-mentioned dilemma immediately after the surrender, and the interesting story of Ichiaki Tatsuo, aka Abdul Rahman, one of several hundred Japanese who for various reasons chose after the war to fight alongside the Indonesians for independence. He became particularly famous and “ultimately chose a heroic death as an Indonesian freedom fighter” (197).

The third part, ‘Japan and Postwar Southeast Asia’, chronicles the process of decolonisation, and also considers current perceptions of Japan’s wartime occupation from the perspective of various nationals and the Japanese themselves. As mentioned earlier, Goto is critical of the Textbook Reform Society and its opinions, and takes a basically balanced view of Japan’s wartime actions.

Goto does acknowledge at various points in the book various abuses of local populations by Japanese occupiers in Southeast Asia, uses terms such as “Japan’s cruel wartime domination” (290), and inter alia raises the topic of Southeast Asian comfort women (in addition to the better-known case of Korean comfort women). Yet he provides no systematic or dedicated discussion of these abuses. Though one hesitates to attempt to measure abuse, it is probably true to say that the atrocities perpetrated on the populations of Southeast Asia were not generally of the severity of those inflicted on the Chinese and Koreans (though the Chinese population of Malaya suffered particularly badly). However, serious abuses did take place – the deaths of thousands of local forced labourers on the Burma Railroad alongside the PoWs being just one example (which I do not recall being mentioned once in the book). I personally think this omission is a significant flaw, for if readers are to take a balanced view of events, we do need to know in some detail about these unfortunate matters that constitute considerable weight on one side of the scales.

A probable key factor here is that, as stated in the Acknowledgements, the book is in fact a collection of essays. However skilful the editing, this still inevitably produces unevennesses in the form of repetitions and omissions, as well as a serious risk of impaired flow and advancement of argument. Unfortunately Goto’s book does not escape these infelicities, with for example too much space given over in my view to Indonesia relative to other nations (though Goto does include discussion of these other nations). Likewise the book badly needs illustrations, including maps: apart from a few useful tables, there is merely one small and seriously inadequate map in the front matter.
Nevertheless, I am left in admiration of Goto’s scholarship, which has enriched my own knowledge of wartime Southeast Asia considerably, not only for his own insights but also in the matter of his introduction of a large number of Japanese scholars writing only in Japanese (of which we English speakers typically know only a fraction). This is certainly a book that deserves a place on the shelves of those with an interest in this broad and complex topic.

Reviewed by KEN HENSHALL,
University of Canterbury


Daniel Botsman’s Punishment and Power in the Making of Modern Japan is, as Harry Harootunian notes, a “scholarly tour de force.” Japanese historians who are drawn to Michel Foucault’s histories and inspired by his illustration of a shift in certain key discourses through historical time would undoubtedly be aware of Botsman’s article “Punishment and Power in Tokugawa Japan” published in the journal East Asian History thirteen years ago. There have, of course, been works written in Japanese in the interim by Japanese scholars such as Tsukada Takashi and Yasumaru Yoshio on the subjects of power and punishment in the Tokugawa period (many of which Botsman cites), but it has been a long wait for those eagerly anticipating an English monograph on the topic. And the wait has been well worth it.

Botsman has drawn together excellent sources – both secondary and primary – weaving an exciting narrative of punishment and incarceration that extends beyond convenient historical periodisations and geographical contexts. It is written in lucid language that carefully reminds the reader of the big picture, whether it be imperialism, modernity, comparative historical perspective, the nature of the Tokugawa state, orientalism, or the essence of punishment and governance. As with any history, it is certainly possible to point to ground left untilled by the author, or even to contest the nature of some of the author’s interpretations. Space at the end of this review will be afforded to a few such issues. But in no way should these points be permitted to detract from the importance of this volume to the study of Tokugawa/Post-Tokugawa history. The breadth and the reach of the arguments contained in this monograph are such that a proper review demands a blow-by-blow account of each chapter, introducing what this reader considers to be the significant points.

The Introduction to Punishment contains one of the most concise and informative literature reviews on the ‘big question’ of how the Tokugawa period has and should be seen in relation to the rest of Japanese history, as
well as to other modernities. It is here that Botsman introduces some of his influences (Foucault, Harry Harootunian, David Howell, Takashi Fujitani), and the antagonist - ‘progress’ - is lined up and targeted for heavy fire. The aim of the book, the reader is informed, is to uncover and comprehend the “complex set of strategies for ordering society and exercising power” in the Tokugawa period. Historians are unable to undertake this exercise if they are simply content to reiterate the discourses of progress or modernisation. It is this intent to uncover the realities of the Tokugawa past and its most suitable interpretative framework that leads Botsman across a wide range of primary and secondary texts in the subsequent chapters.

Chapter one discusses the nature of punishment in the Tokugawa period, particularly in light of the mainstream narrative that punishment in Tokugawa Japan actually became lighter as the period progressed, suggesting that modernity in a sense was being independently arrived at before the coming of the West. Botsman is quick to reject this interpretation, unequivocally stating that we may see in some Meiji texts the idea that a revision of the barbaric nature of Tokugawa punishments into more civilised systems of punishment was necessary, since Tokugawa systems of punishment even at the end of the Tokugawa period were considered just as brutal by Japanese as they were by Western nations. Botsman does not seem to reject the idea of positive change for the better altogether, however. The chapter then goes on to discuss how punishment in the Tokugawa period was for the most part concerned with preserving signs to the population about the punishment accorded to disobedient and unruly behaviour. Particular punishments had, according to Botsman, particular logics, and he provides an interesting discussion of how he believes these logics to have worked.

Chapter two discusses the idea that those in power ruled through systems of punishment, but that it was equally important to rule in a way that reinforced its benevolent nature. This was done, in part, by not enforcing law to its full extent and through acts like offering pardons. Botsman then discusses how the ruling authorities did not publicly deal with punishments themselves, but delegated this authority to an order of social outcasts. According to Botsman, this act drew upon historically determined popular fears, and hatred of, pollution (kegare), an act that spared the authorities association with the less pleasant aspects of rule. In this chapter, Botsman draws upon the notions of social status as developed predominantly by the Japanese historian Tsukada Takashi. He singles out Herman Ooms’ understanding of outcast status and state racism in a reasonably sustained attack in a footnote, a point that will no doubt be central to future debates of the premodern aspects of the Buraku problem.

Chapter three introduces the reader to the nature of the Tokugawa status system. It begins with the internal structure of the Kodenmachō jailhouse and the internal status distinctions that were made within this institution. The chapter then moves through discussions of the eta leader Danzaemon and his related institution, as well as discussions of hinin status and the status of the blind. The chapter makes many important points, but the
key one seems to be that status during the Tokugawa period was layered and existed in pockets, and that it was this system of status that was characteristic of premodern Japan. This chapter covers some of the ground included by Botsman in his earlier article, but with enough new material and perspective to make it take on a considerably different shape.

Chapter four maps the emergence of the stockade (yoseba), which is commonly argued (too simplistically according to Botsman) to be the proto-history of the modern penitentiary. By tracing discourses surrounding the relationship between punishment and incarceration during the 18th and 19th centuries, Botsman is able to demonstrate how there was not a simple transition at all. He demonstrates that evidence supports a case that, while some intellectuals attempted to push for a greater role for incarceration in the Tokugawa judiciary system, this idea was firmly rejected until the rule of Matsudaira Sadanobu, when at last it was unsuccessfully implemented. Botsman demonstrates that in the 19th century, there was no such thing as a simple trajectory of development but rather dynamism culminating in a concerted effort by Mizuno Tadakuni through the influence of arguments by Nakai Riken to push for incarceration as a desirable form of punishment. Pivotal in Botsman’s arguments here is the idea that these attempts at building places of incarceration were not motivated by ideas of rational, humane treatment, but rather by the need for the maintenance of social and political order. Ironically, this was caused in some cases by the implementation of more ‘humane’ punishments such as banishment in earlier periods that led to a later decline in the social and political order.

In Chapter five, Botsman moves into the Bakumatsu period in Japan, dealing with the encroachment of Western powers on Japanese soil, and the challenges of the West on Japanese sovereignty, nation-building, as well as the relationship between mid-19th century notions of civilisation and the impact that had on practices of punishment. The chapter begins with an extensive introduction of the history of the idea of the modern penitentiary in England, Europe, and the United States, discussing the possibility of an impact of 18th century Western penitentiary discourse on Japanese thinkers. While the idea is not completely rejected, Botsman demonstrates how an influential text written by the Chinese scholar Wei Yuan, which introduced American penitentiaries, became a text that late Tokugawa Japanese scholars drew on when attempting to rethink the Tokugawa prison. Botsman notes that amongst the visions of these scholars – and some like those of Yamada Hōkoku are truly remarkable – a link was not made between the efforts to build stockades in the 18th century and their visions for a modern system of incarceration. This chapter then provides one of the most succinct and readable histories of the 19th century Western encroachment of Japan, as well as the relationship between punishment and extra-territoriality and its relationship to Western notions of civilisation.

Chapters six and seven provide the reader with the most detailed English language account to date of the birth of the modern Japanese prison from the late Tokugawa period to the end of the 19th century. Chapter six
focuses on the birth of the prison in Japan and discusses the subsequent development of the prison, contextualising this history within the setting of the Meiji Restoration, extra-territoriality, civilisation, nation building, imperialism, and orientalism. Particularly striking to this reader were discussions about the basis British colonial prisons provided for early Japanese reformers. Chapter seven then provides a detailed account of the subtle changes that occurred within the early decades of the Meiji period, highlighting the influential thinkers and activists involved in the development of ideas of punishment and the prison. Above all, Botsman’s ability to tie in the history of nation-building, penal labour, the Meiji government, and the famous Japanese conglomerates such as Mitsui into the one narrative are impressive. In both chapters, as with the rest of the book, Botsman refuses to accept straightforward narratives of development or change, instead choosing to weave a complex narrative of discontinuities and disjunction that attempt to preserve (if only by the barest of threads) links to that which follows.

In his conclusion, Botsman makes many intriguing points. For example, he notes the irony that by the point in time that the unequal treaties were repealed, many of the more crude abuses of the new prison system had disappeared, inferring that the Japanese prison was more civilised in Western terms than the Western prisons themselves. Equally interestingly, Botsman relates the way arguments of civilisation acted as double-edged swords for both early 20\textsuperscript{th} century liberals as well as supporters of the colonial administration. Botsman’s tying in of modern forms of punishment and power into discussions of the colonies and the treatment of colonial subjects in Korea and Taiwan in relation to the idea of ordering is also thought-provoking, opening up many future avenues for exploration. Botsman, however, seems to push for a much larger conclusion: the simple explanation of the present through the past is harmful and we need to be firmly aware of the way discourses of modernity themselves intervene with a proper understanding of the historical subject.

One potential source of discomfort for some readers may be the highly analogous nature between discourse and practice in Botsman’s narrative. In fact, the two entities seem so tightly bound together that at some points they simply blur into each other, meaning that little distinction is made between what was spoken and practiced. Botsman’s narrative floats between the world of the intellectual and discourse and the world of politics and practice, mapping out the ideas of things and the way things came into being without ever really discussing the specific contexts and processes by which ideas and discourses are informed by and effect practice. The broader patterns are certainly contextualised, but on a basic empirical level, there is sometimes a lack of foregrounding of the characters who are doing the thinking and discussing, as well as a centring of the characters who are implementing policies and legislation. It would in places be helpful to have more discussion of these individuals and their contexts, beliefs, possible motivations, and limitations. There is also a more significant level to this problem. Botsman, at least for this reader, appears at his most convincing when it is evident that a particular idea
did not become practice, but less persuasive when he claims that it did. Botsman is gifted at illustrating discourses and mapping out discontinuities between discourses, but is often silent about the origins of these discourses and the inevitable contiguous element in them. To take just one example, why is it that the intellectual discourses of punishment by incarceration emerge in the 18th century? On what basis are these ideas predicated? What is the relationship between those that were initially rejected and then accepted at a later date albeit in a modified form?

Ultimately, one gains the impression that some discourses have been singled out by Botsman and privileged within his historical narrative not only because by doing so he can provide the best possible historical interpretation of the facts, but also because by doing so he can demonstrate the impossibility of explaining the Japanese past within the framework of a universal process of modernity and development. Are the changes in discourse that Botsman illustrates, however, sufficient to dispel this idea, and to promote a notion of the development of a Japanese nation that is influenced in the mid-19th century by Western discourses? I am not in disagreement with the politics behind a move to question simplistic interpretative frameworks based on linear time development and ‘commonsense’ causality and to attempt to rewrite discontinuity and complexity back into early-modern/modern historical narratives. However, in all projects that attempt such an enterprise, there is still the large problem that the ideas of the nation in the 19th century have “roots” in the late Tokugawa period (as Botsman acknowledges on p.119 etc), and such continuities or developments can be traced and will continue to be mapped by scholars. Moreover, there is a large body of evidence that testifies to the similarities in the development of both the idea/practice of the nation throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, hinting that there may still be a strong case for the notion of coeval modernity rather than the simplistic model of modernisation that was developed in the early postwar period.

The fact that Punishment forces its readers to enter into discussions of such deeply important methodological and historiographical issues is testimony to its scope and vision. It breaks new ground in Japanese history in both content and method, and all students of the past, regardless of area and discipline, have something to gain from a close reading of this book.

Reviewed by TIMOTHY AMOS,
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Clearly, given the period in question in Ruoff’s work, the controversial figure of Emperor Hirohito (r.1926-89) looms large. There have of course been
numerous works on Hirohito, of which those by Herbert Bix and Stephen Large in particular come to mind, but by contrast Ruoff’s work focuses rather on the imperial institution per se, and considerable coverage is given as well to the early years of Akihito’s reign. Ruoff’s coverage of Hirohito is objective and fair, though he does not avoid controversial issues such as war responsibility and is not afraid to be critical where this is clearly called for. It is generally an extremely well researched work, using numerous sources both Japanese and English, plus primary material obtained by interviews and correspondence. It is also thorough, giving consideration to a range of aspects. In his conclusion Ruoff comments on areas of research that still need to be carried out, which is very useful and also shows his ‘meta’ awareness of the topic.

If there is one area of weakness, I personally feel it is, unfortunately, in his first chapter, which I hope does not dissuade the reader. This is on the monarchy from a putative ‘660BC’ to 1945, and is admirably intended to provide background and context for the postwar monarchy. However, it is disappointingly skimpy. Only two of the 26 pages are dedicated to pre-Meiji emperors, and there are vital omissions such as the role of the Kojiki in legitimising the Yamato dynasty through claimed divinity. (He mentions the Kojiki, but not this major point.) There are also a few infelicitous points, such as his remark (18) that the issue of the dual dynasties in the 14th century was resolved by “compromise”, which is a misleadingly superficial assessment of what really happened (betrayal). The extent of assumed powerlessness of the emperor in historical times is also misleading, running counter for example to Adolphson’s recent work (2000).

Coverage of the emperor between the start of Meiji and the end of the Pacific War, which comprises the bulk of this first chapter, is better, but still has infelicities such as failure to discuss what was almost certainly the murder of Emperor Kōmei at the time of the Restoration – surely a point relevant to how the imperial institution has been viewed/treated! Another ‘lost opportunity’ is Ruoff’s failure to discuss exactly why Emperor Meiji withdrew from public life in the latter part of his reign. The ambiguous powers of the emperor in the Meiji Constitution would also benefit from more discussion, as would the prewar difference of opinion over the emperor’s role between Minobe Tatsukichi and Uesugi Shinkichi (the latter not being mentioned). And, to my mind quite astonishingly, the notorious Kokutai no Hongi of 1937 is treated only more or less in passing, despite it representing a pinnacle of imperial demand upon subject in stressing that it is not only a subject’s duty to give their life for the emperor, but that such sacrifice is the very meaning of life itself. This major latter point is not discussed. The rest of the book is excellent, and the weak Chapter One is not representative. Curiously, in his very good 16-page introduction, in which among other things he discusses his chapters in some detail, Ruoff starts with Chapter Two and only refers to Chapter One in the final paragraph, as though it was some sort of afterthought. Actually, I wonder if this is not indeed the case.
Chapter Two discusses the postwar mortalised emperor’s public role as symbol of the people, and especially how this has been received by the public and by various political wings. He also discusses early views on constitutional revision. Ruoff further discusses why an assumption among some Japanese that the emperor’s postwar role has simply returned to its traditional role, as opposed to its role in Meiji and prewar Japan, is untenable. Differences, other than the obvious change in divine status, include the key fact that the postwar emperor is able to be criticised, along with the fact that the emperor is based on the sovereign will of the people. Further, there are actually more continuities with Meiji than pre-Meiji, and, importantly, as Ruoff points out, the concept of the traditional role of the emperor is often flawed as it fails to take into account the fact that many so-called ‘traditions’ are actually modern inventions, especially those associated with Shintō such as the rites of the Great Food Offering.

Chapter Three discusses the continuity to the present of ministerial briefings of the emperor, and the awkward question of to what extent the emperor can get involved in politics and likewise to what extent he can be himself. At various places here (eg 93) and elsewhere in the book Ruoff makes the important point that, while the emperor may be a symbol, he is not an inanimate and static symbol such as a flag, but a living dynamic symbol with his own preferences and personality and, of course, human capacity to change. Necessarily, this in turn relates to his ability to influence events and policies – and in Hirohito’s case even, perhaps, MacArthur. Hirohito’s refusal to abdicate is certainly an important manifestation of his own personal beliefs.

Chapter Four discusses war responsibility and more on the emperor’s public role. The two are linked because Akihito has been far more apologetic than his father, but while these apologies have satisfied and indeed delighted some, they have angered others in Japan who feel, regardless of the need to apologise (which is still contested), it is in any case not proper for the emperor to do this on alleged behalf of the people as it comprises his role as an apolitical symbol. In other words, who exactly has authority to act as head of state? Many are of the view that in such matters it is the role of the prime minister on behalf of the cabinet, and not the emperor.

The chapter also discusses the recasting of Hirohito as a pacifist by SCAP and others, which Ruoff likens to Hans Christian Andersen’s ‘new clothes for the emperor’. His view on Hirohito’s war responsibility – which I myself, along with Bix and many others, see as very considerable – is that Hirohito does indeed bear responsibility, though not solely. He writes:

It is neither fair nor historically correct to make Hirohito the scapegoat for the war, for the emperor was far from being a powerful leader along the lines of Hitler. Nonetheless, Hirohito’s responsibility for the war was immense in comparison to that of the average Japanese. [The imperial apologist] Togashi’s portrayal of a resolutely pacifist emperor appears laughable when read in tandem with Hirohito’s deep interest in matters of war. On those
occasions when Emperor Hirohito expressed reservations about Japan’s entering into a conflict with other nations, his foremost concern was whether Japan could win (132).

Well said.

I do feel though that Ruoff missed another opportunity for expanded discussion when moving on to Akihito’s more apologetic reign, especially given the author’s concern with symbols. The reign-name is Heisei, comprising the kanji usually taken – including by most Japanese – to mean simply ‘peace’ and ‘become’ (though the official English translation is ‘Peace and Harmony’). However, in fact ‘sei/become’ has a fuller meaning of ‘developing to its full extent’. That is, the precisely correct translation is ‘Achieving Full Peace’ (my italics). This clearly indicates that those responsible for the new reign-name were fully aware that Hirohito could never be associated with full peace, and that the responsibility for bringing this about was the prime feature of the new reign of Akihito. I feel this has bearing on Akihito’s acts of apology, which I see as an ex officio obligation for him.

Anyway, moving on to Chapter Five, this covers in detail two particular events – restoration of the reign-name system and of Foundation Day (initially both banned by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers [SCAP]) – which show that cultural symbols of the monarchy are not always brought about by politicking, but are supported and respected by the population at large. I imagine, however, that many readers will share my view that with its 44 pages this chapter is rather too long and detailed, and risks burying its key points.

The final chapter, Chapter Six, examines the reign of Akihito from 1989 to 1995. Much of it addresses Akihito’s grooming for the position, and presents very interesting biographical data. (Ruoff makes the point in his conclusion that there is a need for a full book-length biography of Akihito.) Also addressed is how the monarchy attempts to establish an ongoing rapport with the public – the people whom the monarchy symbolises – and in this regard comparisons are inevitably made with the British monarchy, though fortunately the Japanese monarchy has not made itself such an object of scandal and ridicule and seems far more genuinely supported. Of course, in Japan as elsewhere, the more ‘normal’ the monarchy tries to become, the more conservatives tend to react negatively, but as Ruoff points out, notwithstanding the perception of timeless tradition, in actuality monarchies in any age really need to move with the times.

In sum, with the exception of the first chapter I found this to be an excellent book, and I highly recommend it, not only to Japanologists but also political scientists.

Reviewed by KEN HENSHALL, University of Canterbury

This volume contains some of Professor Anthony Reid’s updated articles stretching over forty years of research on aspects of Acehnese and wider Sumatran histories. Reid begins by noting that: “Sumatra is a vast and understudied island, which still awaits its historian” (xiii). That may be, but Reid has made a massive contribution over the years to an examination of aspects of Sumatra’s history – from both colonial and local sources – and this volume is a compendium of a number of his most important essays. Aceh, as the book’s title suggests, gets more attention that the rest of this large Indonesian island.

Sumatra, although larger in physical size than Java, has often not been afforded its proper place in history. Sumatra’s location astride the Malacca Strait has given it a key historical role in global trade. The name itself is derived from Samudra, the Sanskrit word for ocean, which is testament to the island’s importance within the Indian Ocean. Reid also notes that Sumatra gave Indonesia its language (derived from the ethnic Malays of parts of coastal east Sumatra), its majority religion (Islam), and much of its literature. From the 1920s to the 1960s Sumatra’s wealth exceeded Java’s, only being eclipsed by Java during that island’s industrialisation (22). Despite its size (twice the size of the British isles) and importance, Reid notes that Sumatra never developed the political, linguistic and cultural unification that developed in much of Java (2). Sumatra remained a “frontier”, with a series of autonomous clusters, separated in the interior by Sumatra’s rugged typography. Later Japanese and Dutch attempts to foster a Sumatran identity, as distinct from a wider Indonesian identity, were to fail as a result (18).

Inhabitants of the island of Sumatra never developed a collective identity as Sumatrans. Failing to embrace the federal project promoted by the Netherlands, they were instead largely enthusiastic about being involved in the formation of the Republic of Indonesia. Reid notes that references to Sumatra, by the “Sumatrans”, only became common in the twentieth century (27). For the most part urban centres such as Pasai, Banda Aceh, Medan, Padang and Palembang, amongst others at different times, have exercised independent spheres of influence in their respective areas. Even Indonesia’s immediate post-revolutionary attempts to cleave Sumatra into just three provinces – north, central and south – was too full of “contradictions” to hold, including a rebellion in Aceh, and the Republic of Indonesia retreated to older administrative units maintained by the Dutch East Indies (with the exception of North Sumatra which combined two older provinces) (39-40). It is also the case that historical and anthropological studies of aspects of Sumatra have not been able to view communities in isolation from neighbouring islands (40). It hardly makes sense to examine Riau, for example, without substantial reference to Johor.
Much of this volume, as noted, is weighted towards aspects of Aceh’s history. Some key articles that Reid has published over the years on this historic state appear here, including, Aceh’s international relationships, the use of entertainment and pageantry, the Dutch decision to invade Aceh in 1873, the rivalry between aristocratic and religious elites, and the decision by Acehnese elites to use Japan to hasten the removal of the Dutch. Much of this material forms an excellent backdrop to understanding the modern problem of Aceh; culminating in the final chapter: “Conflicting Histories: Aceh and Indonesia”. In this chapter Reid brings his skill as a historian to bear on the antecedents of the modern conflict in Aceh after Free Aceh Movement (GAM) leader Hasan di Tiro proclaimed Acehnese independence in 1976. Reid notes that Aceh stands “alone” in Indonesia as not only being a late addition to the Dutch East Indies, but of having four centuries of emerging statehood prior to its bloody colonial absorption. This coincides with the observations of other scholars that a number of separatist movements in Southeast Asia can point to the memory of an earlier independent polity (Patani and Sulu for example). Reid judges, in the case of Aceh, that Hasan di Tiro’s version of historical events, in particular his view of Indonesia’s thorough exploitation of Aceh, has spread through the province “like wildfire” and is unlikely to abate (p. 350). Reid sees the slow but sure erosion of the “Indonesian idea” in Aceh and notes a number of lost opportunities for resolution of the conflict (354). One fears that while the post-tsunami environment in Aceh has drawn the two protagonists back to the negotiating table, that this too will prove to be yet another wasted opportunity.

This volume, essentially a compendium of aspects of Sumatran history, is a valuable publication in that it puts a good deal of Reid’s valuable historical research over several decades into one place. For those seeking to understand something of Aceh’s modern conflict, the final chapter of the book will be particularly valuable.

Reviewed by ANTHONY L. SMITH,
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The value and need for comparative research is widely acknowledged. In practice, however, systematic and successful comparative enterprises are few and far between. The six essays in this volume offer some preliminary thoughts towards comparative research on the Chinese and Indian diasporas. Four of the essays were originally presented in February, 2000 at a forum organized at the University of Hong Kong, which was the initial program of a larger China-India Project designed to facilitate academic, social and economic
relations between the two regions. On their own, most of the essays offer learned insights into the broad patterns and the state of knowledge on each of these diasporas. They come together, however, as an unfocused volume that demonstrates a lack of common direction on the questions, methods, and units that could frame a comparison. The problem is not that the diasporas themselves are too distinct and incomparable. All except one of the essays shows great facility in producing stimulating generalizations and themes for comparison. Rather, in the words of the editor, the main difficulty is that “the academic fences which hinder interdisciplinary debate need to be crossed” (v). But the differences in conceptual emphasis are not insuperable, and several connections and questions for a fruitful comparative venture can still discovered among these essays.

Ravindra Jain and Brij Lal both focus on the Indian Diaspora. Jain’s essay, subtitled “A Global Perspective from India,” emphasizes how power structures have constituted diasporic Indian experiences and the understanding of those experiences by scholars and participants. He frames his understanding within a set of abstract and binary macro-concepts: elementary opposed to complex structures of migration (roughly, indentured opposed to more extensively networked flows); civilizational culture opposed to pluralistic settlement societies; and the long durée opposed to specific historical and national experiences. Jain’s analyses of how the categories overlap are often more helpful than the categories themselves. This overlapping space comes to the forefront of Lal’s essay, “People In-Between.” Focusing on the experiences of indentured laborers in different destinations, Lal warns against essentializing the Indian diaspora and emphasizes that identities are “multiply inflected and continuously reproduced” (71). This warning is aimed not only at scholars, but also towards the mutual misunderstandings and contradictory memories by Indians abroad and in India.

Multiplicity is also the primary theme of Chan Kwok Bun’s essay on Chinese in Singapore, Hong Kong and Thailand. For Chan, everything social is varied and heterogeneous: identities, ethnicities, communities, and the forms of difference between them. Identities shift not only between nations and groups, but also between contexts, over time, and even as presented by same individual as he moves between social contexts. This landscape of endless multiplicity nearly amounts to a rejection of the possibility of comparative analysis. Not only does it insist that every example is unique, but it also has the effect of equating all peoples and social contexts as universally capable of infinite adaptation. It is hard to find a place for the trends and patterns that would provide focus for a comparative analysis.

In contrast, Wang Gungwu’s essay, “Cultural Centres for Chinese Overseas,” is very comfortable with broad generalizations about how “most Chinese abroad” thought and felt. Wang traces how the geographical locuses for the formulation of overseas Chinese identities shifted over time from hometown-based networks in the late nineteenth century, to Shanghai in the early twentieth century, to the nation as a whole or a deterritorialized Chinese culture in the middle of the century, to Hong Kong more recently. The focus
on the Chinese diaspora as a single entity rather than in its component parts allows Wang to more easily construct a narrative of change over time.

On first reading, the arguments of Wang and Chan appear contradictory. But they have the potential to complement each other quite well. Chan frames his discussion of the Chinese in Thailand with a model of five elements of Chinese ethnic formation: intra-ethnic differences within the Chinese community; intra-ethnic differences among the Thais; the effect of global culture and capital flows including the transnational Chinese economy; forms of political socialization; and specific local histories at the sub-national level. This model is not well developed in the paper, but it has the potential to retain an emphasis on a multiplicity of identities without sacrificing analytic attention to the broader patterns that shape those identities. Wang’s discussion of transnational cultural formations – especially if the assertions about “most Chinese” are revised – could easily fit into a model like this as an important global cultural flow that interacts with other processes of identity formation.

Rajeswary Brown’s essay, “The Capital Structure Puzzle,” fits least comfortably into this collection. Rather than the broad themes of the other essays, it focuses on a single case study of how the Hong Leong group used the stock market to develop a sophisticated multi-national enterprise without sacrificing patriarchal control. It addresses specific debates generated by the literature on overseas Chinese business networks and uses technical finance terms that may be unfamiliar to a lay reader. In many ways, however, this essay offers the greatest, albeit missed opportunity for framing a comparative project. Debates about, and the role of culture, ethnic bonds, the global economy, institutional factors and the distinctive “Chineseness” (if any) of these business networks are very well developed. They could provide specific questions and methods for a comparative research agenda, and debates surrounding the exceptionalism and historicity of Chinese networks would benefit greatly from a comparative perspective.

Sucheta Mazumdar’s essay on Chinese and Indian migration is subtitled, “A Prospectus for Comparative Research.” Much of it is actually a critique of orientalist and civilization models that have essentialized Chinese and Indians as stagnant and unmigratory peoples. This strategy highlights the fact that many apparent differences between diasporas are more a product of historically produced forms of knowledge than of migratory practices themselves. She argues that flows of Asian migration were not so different from European flows, and that all must be understood within the context of a “matrix of local negotiations … and global capital flows” (164). By emphasizing that no differences or similarities should be taken for granted, Mazumdar addresses the uneasiness implicit in some of the essays that a comparative project will contribute to the reification of distinct diasporas and the erasure of intra-group differences. A comparison placed in a framework of the processes and interactions of global history, as suggested by Mazumdar, can avoid an excessive reliance on essentializing abstractions such as unhistoricized culture or universal economic rationality (to take examples that have informed the extremes of the Chinese business network debates).
Instead, it focuses on specific formations and practices of migration as part of larger historical patterns of difference and interconnection. A better understanding of the specifics will, in return, inform our understanding of global processes. A framework that can articulate the relationship of local and global processes rather than set them in opposition to each other can reduce some of the intellectual barriers against comparison.

Reviewed by ADAM MCKEOWN, Columbia University


Fred Wakeman has done perhaps more than any other scholar to expose the dark, seedy side of Republican era Chinese society. Professor Wakeman, who is the Haas Professor of Asian Studies in the Department of History at the University of California, Berkeley and the former President of the American Historical Association, has spent the last two decades probing the criminals, racketeers, hooligans, assassins, drug- and gun-runners and social misfits who operated on the margins of Republican China, and often thrived in the political and social chaos of the era. His previous works on the Shanghai underworld, Policing Shanghai, 1927-1937 (1995) and The Shanghai Badlands: Wartime Terrorism and Urban Crime, 1937-1941 (1996), greatly expanded our understanding of how this colourful and corrupt city operated. With the publication of this new study, Wakeman takes us out into the countryside and into the Kuomintang capitals of Nanjing and Chongqing to analyse the central role of the Chinese Secret Service and its leader, the shrewd but elusive Dai Li, played in the growth, maintenance and limits of Kuomintang power.

Dai Li’s story, in many ways, is equally the story of tension and social unrest that accompanied China’s tumultuous process of modernisation. In the skilful hands of Professor Wakeman, Dai Li’s fascinating life richly illustrates many of the important themes of Republican China – such as the strength of traditional patterns of political patronage and the adoption of modern methods of social and political control. Altogether, this makes a significant contribution to our understanding of this important period in Chinese history.

Born in the rural and isolated Jiangshan district of southwestern Zhejiang province and educated like his contemporary Mao Zedong in the new vocational education system that replaced the examination system, a scrappy yet determined Dai Li “lived off the land” (daliu) for a number of years before obtaining an underworld introduction into the Whampoa Military Academy headed by Chiang Kai-shek. Through years of unquestioning loyalty to Chiang, Dai Li ensconced himself within Chiang’s inner circle and became one of his most trusted advisors. Dai Li was given charge of a Secret
Service empire — officially referred to as the Military Investigation and Statistics Bureau of the Military Affairs Commission (Jun tong for short) — that included at its height a network of over 325,000 agents working across most provinces of China.

Wakeman highlights the tension that existed within the Jun tong between the modern techniques of espionage (kidnapping, torture, assassination, truth serum, fingerprinting, wire-tapping, polygraph, and other forms of electronic eavesdropping) and more traditional patterns of patronage and control, such as loyalty, blood brotherhoods, collective discipline and native-place ties. Dai Li’s slavish loyalty to Chiang Kai-shek, his traditional leadership style and reputation for cruelty led him to be widely known in the West as ‘China’s Himmler’, while the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continue to refer to him as the ‘Generalissimo’s dagger’ or ‘Chiang’s butcher’. Dai certainly killed or had killed a vast number of people — communists, warlords, troublemakers, and even 2000 of his own men, who were posthumously honoured as ‘martyrs’ to the Kuomintang cause. Dai Li, at least in his own self-perception, was a strange hybrid between the Confucian master strategist Zhuge Liang presented in the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, the evil and insidious Dr. Fu Manchu as introduced to the West through the eyes of novelists Sax Rohmer, and the modern wizardry and gadgetry of Ian Fleming’s James Bond. His life and methods bridged Confucian and modern China, reflecting in many ways the process of social transformation that permeated the Republican era.

With a number of different political and military factions locked in a struggle for power, the successes and failures of Dai Li’s Jun tong had important and far-reaching ramifications. The escape of the entire CCP Central Committee from Shanghai to Jiangxi in 1931 was arguably the spy organisation’s single biggest failure; yet its capture of Comintern agent, Yakov Rudnik, helped to cut the Communists off from Moscow, and provided the breathing room Mao Zedong needed to wrestle control of the Party and develop his own brand of Chinese communism. While the Americans failed to take seriously a Jun tong claim that they had broken Japan’s secret diplomatic codes and intercepted talk of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbour, the start of the Pacific War did bring the American and Chinese secret service agencies closer together. With the establishment of the so-called Sino-American Cooperative Organization (SACO) in 1943, the Americans helped to train and arm nearly 50,000 Kuomintang operatives, an activity that certainly prolonged the civil war between the Communists and the Nationalists following the defeat of the Japanese.

Wakeman marshals an impressive array of archival and secondary source material – with his references stretching to nearly 200 pages - to trace the methods, successes and failures of Dai Li’s Secret Service. The importance of his archival research notwithstanding, the key to unlocking Dai Li’s story is the wealth of memoirs – the wealth of re-printed primary and secondary source material that has been published on Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service over the last couple of decades. Anyone who has made use of
the profusion of historical materials coming out of China today understands full well the often incomplete and highly politicised nature of these documents – especially memoirs. But Wakeman does a masterful job in cross-checking and counter-balancing his information to reveal a rich and rewarding picture of China’s spymaster and his world. This is particularly the case with the memories of former employees in the Chinese Secret Service, where Wakeman carefully balances those accounts published on the mainland (where Dai Li has few fans) and those published on Taiwan (where some continue to argue that the Kuomintang would not have lost the civil war with the Communist if Dai Li had not been killed in a plane crash in 1946).

In typical Wakeman fashion, his analysis and contributions to existing scholarship are sprinkled throughout this nearly 400-page text. In addition to the rich depiction he provides of Dai Li and the Secret Service, Wakeman makes a number of important contributions to our knowledge of Republican China. He reinforces and enriches our picture of the mechanism Chiang Kai-shek employed to maintain and strengthen his personal control. Chiang set in place a series of checks and balances within his inner circle of advisors, playing off, at times, Dai Li’s Juntong with other factions, such as the C.C. Clique and the Soong family, in order to ensure that none of these groups were able to challenge his leadership.

Building on the work of Lloyd Eastman and William Kirby, the book greatly enhances our understanding of fascist thought and methods of social mobilisation during the 1930s and ‘40s in China. Wakeman unravels the intricate web of secret and public front organisations that were at the centre of what he has called elsewhere ‘Confucian Fascism’ – a unique blend of modern fascism and Confucian personalism. In particular, he demonstrates the central role of the ultra-secret Society for Vigorous Practice of the Three People’s Principles (Sanminzhuyi lixingshe) and its complex relationship with two of the better known front organisations for Chinese fascism, the Renaissance Society (Fuxingshe) and the Blue Shirts Society (Lanyishe). Yet, it is perhaps on the nature and impact of the Sino-American Cooperative Organization (SACO) that this study makes its greatest contribution. Drawing on the archives of the American Office of Strategic Service (OSS) and one of its principal agents in China, Naval Captain Milton E. Miles, Wakeman traces the establishment and activities of this joint venture between US Naval intelligence and Dai Li’s Juntong. Between 1943 and 1945, SACO brought 25,000 American naval officers to China to train Juntong operatives in modern techniques of spying and other covert activities. Founded on a rather na"ive assumption that these trainees and their imported weapons and technology would help to disrupt and spy on Japanese activities behind enemy lines, SACO proved more successful in consolidating Chiang’s power and that of his chief disciple Dai Li than it did in bringing an early end to the war.

Despite the fluidity of Wakeman’s prose, his narrative can prove difficult to follow at times. He jumps freely between one topic and time frame and another, and in this sense sometimes contributes to the confusion that surrounds the clandestine organisations and individuals he is studying. For
example, there are times when he uses the term Blue Shirts when he appears to be talking about the Lixingshe, and at other times he uses the Fuxingshe when he appears to be taking about the Lixingshe. Despite his insistence that these three organisations were distinct, the overlapping and intertwined nature of their memberships and activities seems to erode their distinctiveness. Yet, the fine editing, numerous subheadings, and comprehensive index provides a mine of information for scholars interested in the art of espionage well beyond China. For those interested in Republican China, Wakeman’s latest book is required, and engaging, reading.

Reviewed by JAMES LEIBOLD, 
La Trobe University


On the Move contributes to the study of the rural-to-urban migration that has been one of the most visible effects of the economic reforms in China. Previous scholarship in this area has mostly focused on the economic and political effects of migration. This book instead follows up on the work of Dorothy Solinger and Li Zhang. It concentrates on the migrants themselves and their perspectives from both ethnographic and anthropological points of view. On the Move looks at how migrant women in China experience mobility not only as separation from their home village and subsequent isolation in the urban environment, but also as an opportunity for change, improvement, and redefinition of their roles within family and society. One interesting feature of the book is the inclusion of the migrant women’s own voices, which appear as seven autobiographical stories which had been contributed to the journal Nongjianii Baishitong (Rural Women Knowing All).

After providing historical and geopolitical background on migration in China and contextualizing the gender perspective chosen by the contributors, Part One begins an exploration of women migrants’ identities by examining the lives of dagongmei (working sisters) who take up jobs that range from domestic service to bar hostess (and/or sexual worker). Arianne Gaetano shows how these women are actively seeking to escape the social stereotype of “filial rural daughter”, and are learning how to become “modern urban women.” Making an even more provocative statement about agency, Tiantan Zheng looks at how bar hostesses in the city of Dalian manage to advance their social status by exploiting the sexual stereotypes which are generally attributed to rural women. Wanning Sun’s chapter concludes the book’s first section and expands on the identity of dagongmei by looking at their representations in both official media and the commercial press.
Part Two deals with marriage. Louise Beynon’s essay looks at how migrants’ experience of urban life both empowers women and makes it harder for them to find a partner and build a family, both in the city or if they decide to return to their home village. Lin Tan and Susan Short’s study considers the struggles of migrants who marry in the city and face discrimination from both their husband’s family and the urban environment.

Part Three is one of the most original contributions of this work in the analysis of the rural-to urban migration because it brings attention back to the village. The three chapters included in this section examine the effect women’s migration has had on the villages they have left. Cindy Fan specifically considers migrant women’s economic contributions, social networking activities, and the influence of their more independent social behaviours. The other two chapters explore how returning women are perceived by other villagers; how their lives actually changed (the study by Lou, Zheng, Connelly and Roberts); and how the women who never left — the “stayers” — have been affected by migration (the essay by Rachel Murphy).

*On the Move* is an extremely well-researched book which addresses a very complex topic from a variety of perspectives, yet retains a clear and cohesive structure. Each essay stands on its own as a case study of a particular aspect of women’s migration in China. It also refers to the other essays by developing some of the same themes and discussing some of the same issues (e.g., marriage’s effect on mobility, connections with the home village, and the negative and positive effects of their newly-made move to the city). By looking at different geographical realities and providing a great amount of quantitative and qualitative data, the essays improve our understanding of women migrants’ situation in China and show that there is indeed something more beyond the image of the exploited victims who work for little money and suffer all sorts of discrimination. Following a development that has now been established in migration studies, the book calls attention to the migrants’ *agency.* The chapters all point out how women actively deploy successful strategies to face the challenges of both their new urban identities and the social and moral pressures of their home villages. By looking at how their identity is negotiated both in the urban context and in their home village, the contributors – while acknowledging the struggles and the difficulties involved in their migrant condition – also emphasize women’s active roles in shaping their own lives despite the objective economic limitations and social pressures. The book carefully balances the emphasis on agency with accurate descriptions of the women’s struggles. Although these women do succeed in gaining some control over their lives, their agency remains constrained within the limits of low-paid or morally disgraceful jobs and therefore it often ends up reinforcing their position as being socially and morally inferior.

*Reviewed by PAOLA VOCI,*
*University of Otago*

Hong Kong, like other countries, is grappling with problems of health sector structure, service coverage, and evolving patient demands and disease patterns. Such pressures are universal, as are questions about the long-term sustainability of the required financial resources. This book about Hong Kong’s health care system grounds the reviews and changes of the past two decades in the historical legacy of piecemeal development since the British first occupied the area during the Opium War in 1841. The need to reform an archaic administration rather than cost containment has been the main motivation for change. The authors’ aim is to provide an accessible book, for a wide variety of readers, which details both this evolution and the changes but without espousing a particular model of health care as the way to proceed.

Chapter one provides an overview of the health sector in Hong Kong. The key issues are that in Hong Kong private practitioners dominate the delivery of primary care while secondary and public providers dominate tertiary care. This situation accentuates the division between primary and secondary care. Nevertheless, despite the relatively low financial outlay, compared with other developed countries, of around 5 per cent of GDP, basic health indicators for Hong Kong residents are high and have improved since the 1960s. Challenging this picture, as elsewhere, is the rising incidence of non-communicable disease and the implications for increasing health expenditure.

The theme of chapter two is the piecemeal historical development of the health system which the authors believe was a consequence of lack of planning and coordination in health policy. The origins of current concerns are to be found in Hong Kong’s early development as a British colony. The first part examines the period from 1841 through to the Japanese occupation in December 1941, while the second section discusses the post-war reconstruction and subsequent developments to the mid-1980s. The authors conclude that changing health policy has been difficult, that the Hong Kong government has rarely pushed this through if the community was not supportive, and that policy was at best vague. They also highlight the expanding Chinese population of Hong Kong who both put pressure on existing facilities and had different beliefs and practices from the British colonial authorities.

Most of this book is about the last twenty years. Chapter three examines the events and issues that led to the establishment in 1990 of the Hospital Authority. As in other countries, the expansion of hospital services formed a key part of the gradual development of health services in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Increasing government and public discontent about the performance of the Medical and Health Department led in 1985 to the government calling in independent consultants to review the hospital system. The ensuing ‘Scott Report’ recommended the setting up of
an independent statutory agency. Following lengthy consultation, this eventually - and somewhat surprisingly for Hong Kong – led to major change in the organisation, integration and modernisation of the government, and subvented (government subsidised) hospitals.

While the period 1984-1990 was dominated by the debates about the hospital system, chapter four discusses developments in primary care. The Scott Report took cognisance of the wider health sector, but investigation lay outside its terms of reference. In 1990, the government sponsored a review of the organisation and delivery of primary care in the public sector. Seventy per cent of primary care consultations, however, are carried out by private practitioners and nearly a quarter of these are for traditional Chinese medicine (TCM). A similar percentage of the population use both TCM and biomedicine. In 1999, after review and debate for a decade with little progress, TCM received formal recognition with the creation of a regulatory body which would both register practitioners and monitor standards.

Despite the emphasis on structural changes in reform, health care is about people. Chapter five, while sub-titled ‘Doctors and Patients’, is mostly about the medical profession and medical practice. The authors highlight the unequal relationship between the authority figure of the doctor and patients. The latter appear little interested in their own health or in issues such as patient rights. This relationship distorts the delivery of health care both in terms of volume and quality. The last part of the chapter considers the business of medicine. I found the discussion in this chapter the least satisfactory. Also, from the cited references, I believe it relies too heavily on newspaper sources.

The final two chapters examine attempts to review the financing and structure of the health sector as a whole. Until the 1990s, the need for financial constraint had played little part in the quest for change. A government review in 1993 was followed by another in 1997. The resulting Harvard Report of 1999 proposed a major overhaul of the health sector and was widely criticised. At midnight on 30 June 1997, British administration ended and the territory of Hong Kong became a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People’s Republic of China. The authors discuss problems in the health sector at the time of handover, as well as developments and current issues facing health care providers. The question of Hong Kong’s sovereignty led in the long transitional period to many issues, including health, being postponed until after the transfer of authority. While the Harvard consultancy team’s criticism that the health care system was at least twenty years behind the times may have been exaggerated, indications were that problems, such as an ageing population, increasing medical costs and rising expectations, were emerging that would affect the ability of the existing structure to cope. In December 2000, the government issued its own plans. At the time of writing this ‘exercise in pragmatism’, which aimed to work with existing structures but advocated some changes, was still largely at the planning and consultation stage. The authors finish the chapter by speculating on the future of the health-care system.
In the book’s conclusion, the authors’ draw four themes from their study. First, they argue that Hong Kong is not alone in the pressures it is facing regarding the provision of health services. Second, they stress that each component of the Hong Kong health sector operates with its own internal logic and in virtual isolation from the others. Third, they contend that, other than the idea that no-one should be denied public-funded treatment, there is no clear definition of government health policy. Fourth, they see that health sector change in Hong Kong is rare. Without vision and commitment, history is likely to repeat itself and so continue the cycle of ‘random and protracted development’.

I found this book clearly written and, as intended, accessible. The complementary expertise of the authors, one of whom is an academic while the other has senior practical experience in Hong Kong of dealing with many of the issues discussed, encourages a broad treatment of their subject. As someone unfamiliar with Hong Kong, however, I would have liked more information about the place itself. The book has an extensive bibliography, but some subdivision in its organisation would better reflect the range of materials consulted.

As an historian, I commend the authors’ appreciation of historical continuities. Robin Gauld’s earlier work on New Zealand’s health reforms expressed a similar view. Such awareness of historical factors is often poorly acknowledged by contemporary health researchers. I do have a concern, however, about how historical information is incorporated into current debates. For example, the idea of universally accessible hospital care belongs to the twentieth century rather than the middle of the nineteenth. The current book also illustrates the negotiation that takes place at every stage of policy development and implementation from the government down to the patient – and vice versa. It appears the authors hope that this does not happen if Hong Kong is to successfully implement its current plans for reform.

Reviewed by SUSAN HEYDON,
University of Otago


Several years have passed since the East Asian crisis began; yet analytical discussion on its causes, effects and prospects for recovery continue to proliferate in the literature. K.S. Jomo’s edited collection of papers focuses on the implications of international financial liberalisation and its role in the crisis.

by examining the specific country experiences of four of the worse-affected East Asian countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and South Korea.

Jomo’s introductory chapter provides a comprehensive discussion of the dynamics in the East Asian economies after the crisis in 1997/1998. He begins by discussing the reforms generally believed to have helped the East Asian economies achieve a V-shaped pattern of recovery (a more quick recovery) instead of a U-shaped recovery as predicted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This speedy recovery has largely been attributed to the standard Keynesian policy prescription of increasing government spending to stimulate economic activity. Jomo also discusses in his introduction other policies along the lines of corporate and financial re-structuring that were initiated by the crisis-hit countries and why there is little evidence of the success of these policies; the challenges that the East Asian economies have had to face as a consequence of the crisis; why the IMF rescue packages for Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand contributed more to the problem rather than providing a solution; and the prospects for the sustainable development of the crisis-hit countries, particularly in view of increasing globalisation. This chapter is effective at whetting the readers’ appetite for the more detailed country-by-country analysis in the succeeding chapters.

Joseph Lim’s “Macroeconomic Implications of the Southeast Asian Crises”, is another very well-written chapter on the different views about the causes of the East Asian crisis and the myths contributing to misconceptions regarding the macroeconomic implications of the crisis for the East Asian economies. Lim provides a very detailed and easy to follow discussion of the root causes of the crisis as well as the factors that deepened and prolonged the crisis. He supports his analysis with comparative data on the countries hardest-hit by the crisis.

C.P. Chandrasekhar, Jayati Ghosh and Simtha Francis’ “Fluid Finance, Systematic Risk and the IMF’s SDRM” does not seem to fit the focus of the book. This chapter hints at the East Asian crisis, but there is no real discussion about the crisis, recovery and sustaining development in East Asian. Instead, it discusses the weak financial systems in developing countries in general, not specifically the East Asian economies.

The next two chapters, Andrew Rosser’s “The Political Economy of Indonesia’s Financial Vulnerability” and Jonathan R. Pincus and Rizal Ramli’s “Deepening or Hollowing Out: Financial Liberalization, Accumulation and Indonesia’s Economic Crisis”, detail the experience of Indonesia. Both chapters point to the liberalisation of Indonesia’s financial sector as an important contributing factor to the country’s crisis. Rosser takes the view that financial liberalisation per se was not the root cause of the crisis in Indonesia, rather, that the crisis was a product of poor political dynamics, i.e., conflicts of interests among Indonesia’s “polito-bureaucrats” and controllers of financial capital, and not simply a product of “misguided models of the world”. Pincus and Ramli’s chapter complements Rosser’s work well. Pincus and Ramli argue that there was too much expected from Indonesia’s financial liberalisation drive, which they document thoroughly in their chapter.
Although initial results of the financial liberalisation, which began in the 1980s, were encouraging (savings and lending increased sharply), these have not been sustained. High interest rates (relative to Malaysia and Thailand), intra-group lending and lack of capital controls among others meant that financial liberalisation did little to encourage investment and capital accumulation.

Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker’s “Aftermath: Structural Change and Policy Innovation” discuss different causes of the Thai crisis including: “Asian capitalism”, cronyism and inefficiencies; inappropriate export orientation that was largely reliant on foreign supplies and expertise; and, technocratic mismanagement, evidenced by what the authors refer to as poorly sequenced financial liberalisation. Phongpaichit and Baker assert that financial liberalisation led to high capital inflows that the Thai economy could not fully absorb (hence, poorly invested), which further led to among other things, an inflated domestic demand, a reduction in exports, excess labour and infrastructure and an increase in speculative stock investments. The authors also discuss the policies adopted by the Thai government, and then provide a comprehensive analysis of these policies in practice.

K.S. Jomo’s “Were Malaysia’s Capital Controls Effective?” critically examines the effectiveness of Malaysia’s capital controls and concludes that the contribution of capital controls to its economic recovery is at best tentative. He argues quite convincingly that capital controls, motivated by political interests, were counter-productive and that potential benefits from these were abused by powerfully-connected business interests. In Chin Kok Fay’s “Malaysia’s Post-Crisis Bank Restructuring”, the analysis centred on Malaysia’s efforts to restore financial stabilisation and the restructuring of the banking system. In this chapter, Fay provides a very detailed discussion of bank restructuring in Malaysia after the crisis. He also shows that government-imposed bank restructuring measures have not effectively addressed weaknesses in the domestic economy. Fay, like Jomo, acknowledges that Malaysia’s efforts to curb capital flight were not particularly successful and that tighter monetary policy worsened deflationary pressures.

Shin Jang-Sup’s “South Korea: The Keynesian Recovery and the Costs of Structural Reform”, reiterates what Jomo stated in his introduction: that the recovery of the East Asian economies is largely a Keynesian recovery rather than due to any structural reform that the economies, in particular South Korea, has pursued. Jang-Sup discusses in detail the IMF prescription for South Korea and rationalises that, instead of alleviating it, the IMF program deepened the crisis in South Korea. The same conclusion is reached in M. Mustafa Erdogdu’s “South Korean State Capacity: From Development to Crisis Management”: that the IMF mis-diagnosed the crisis and prescribed ill-fitting policies. Erdogdu also shows that financial liberalisation in South Korea from the late 1980s through to the mid-1990s was inappropriate and precipitated the Korean crisis.

The different chapters in the book, while discussing specific country experiences, blend well together, with each chapter contributing insightful analyses to the main themes of the book. Three ideas stand out after reading
this book, first, that the IMF worsened the crisis in East Asia; second, that financial liberalisation without adequate supervision also contributed much to the crisis; and lastly, that there is no easy, “one-size-fits-all” solution to the crisis.

Reviewed by ARLENE OZANNE,
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