An often-acknowledged characteristic of the late twentieth century has been the expansion of 'democracy' as the dominant ideology around which societies are structured (Diamond, 1996a; 1996b; 1997; Freedom House, 2001). Whether described as a ‘third wave’ (Huntington, 1991) or a ‘rising tide’ of democratic consolidation (Rowen, 1996), it is apparent that democracy has been on an international offensive since the early 1990s. Some authors, such as Diamond and Plattner (1996), conceptualise the contemporary worldwide democratic expansion as being an aspect of ‘globalisation’, especially in reference to the homogenisation of fundamental political ideologies around the globe. Taking this position to a greater extreme, other authors associate the imposition of democratic ideals, especially through American foreign policy, with a form of neo-colonialism (Bello, 2000). Therefore, the endorsement of such a universalist democratic ideology raises debates over the homogenisation of global political systems and associated issues concerning the cost to local cultures.

The source of much of this contention is found in the elusive nature of a definition of ‘democracy’ (Inoguchi, Newman and Keane, 1998). Berejikian and Dryzek (1993: 1-2) are correct when they emphasise that
democratic theory is in some disarray. Liberal constitutionalists, pluralists, social democrats, Marxists, communitarians, feminists, libertarians, participatory enthusiasts and others all have their own favoured forms of democracy.

Confusion often arises due to the number of forms democracy can take, between the extremes of which there exist a multitude of variations. A

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contentious debate concerns the impact that cultural constructs have upon the formation of democratic institutions (Dupont, 1996). One fundamental characteristic of a democracy is that it is a political system that is supported and nurtured by a wider civil society, which, in turn, is heavily bound by cultural values (Dupont, 1996). As such, some writers construct democracy as a culturally bound concept that can only be realised globally through different models that accommodate the specificities of diverse cultures (Baur and Bell, 1999). In direct contrast, however, others promote liberal democratic theory as being universally applicable across all societies and cultures (Ng, 1998).

The purpose of this essay, then, is to examine the construction of competing discourses on democracy by governments and non-government organisations (NGOs) - operating at the international, regional, or local level - in respect to three Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines. This examination is rooted in an initial critique of the academic debates concerning whether or not democracy is a culturally bound ideology. Three definable discourses on democracy, namely liberal discourses, cultural relativist discourses, and syncretic/popular discourses are identified. The study then explores to what extent, if any, these discourses interact amongst governments and NGOs within the Southeast Asian realm, and the underlying dynamics of such interactions.

Following the critique of academic debates regarding models of democracy, three specific questions are considered. Firstly, what are the official government discourses regarding democracy in three Southeast Asian countries, namely Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines? It is important to study such discourses because the state is the ultimate regulatory body in society, putting into practice the democratic, or non-democratic ideology, upon which the regime is based. Indeed, some writers depict the state as the ultimate source of resistance against external homogenising influences, such as universalist conceptualisations of liberal democracy (Hirst and Thompson, 1995). Secondly, what are the NGO discourses on democracy in Southeast Asia at an international, regional, and local level, with regard to Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines? The discourses of such NGOs are of note due to the proposition that genuine democratic consolidation requires a bottom-up movement from within civil society, a characteristic frequently reflected in the actions of NGOs (Escobar, 1995; Hudock, 1999). Finally, it is questioned to what extent are these discourses on democracy influencing each other or competing in the Southeast Asian realm?

Southeast Asia is a useful case study location for the study of discourses on democracy for a number of specific reasons. First, it is a region that has recently experienced major economic growth, which, it has been claimed, is an important pre-condition for democratic consolidation (Huntington, 1991;  

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2 In their most basic form, NGOs are “private organizations that pursue activities to relieve suffering, promote the interests of the poor, protect the environment, provide basic social services, or undertake community development” (World Bank, 2001: online). Often, they have a tradition of being of an anti-establishment orientation (Castree, 2000) and concerned with development within civil society (Hudock, 1999).
Secondly, several arguments have been made, none more prolific than the claims of Singapore’s ex-Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, for the recognition of a distinctly ‘Asian’ species of democracy. The Southeast Asian region has also been accorded extensive media focus in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries for political activism and transformations. Indeed, in the contemporary international system, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines have taken sizeable steps towards the consolidation of some form of ‘democracy’. These political transformations have, at times, been accelerated by a number of broad-based public actions, such as the 1998 Indonesian public demonstrations, the 1992 Thai riots, and the second Filipino ‘People Power’ movement in 2001.

Clearly, there is a significant historical element to how the nations of Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines define democracy today (Schwarz, 1999; Vatikiotis, 1994; 1996; 1998). However, rather than dwelling on such historical analyses which can be found elsewhere, the aim of this study is to take a new innovative approach in examining competing discourses on democracy amongst governments and NGOs currently.

**Debates Regarding Defining Models of Democracy**

*Liberal Democracy*

Liberal democracy has become the dominant manifestation of democracy in the twentieth century (Diamond and Plattner, 1996). Liberal democratic theory is fragmented between ‘normativists’ and ‘realists’. Realists identify democracy with democratic government, or the implementation of free and fair elections (Birch, 1993). However, normativists link democratic government with democratic society, inherently linking it to social equality, supported through secure political and civil liberties (Habermas, 1987; 1975; Rawls, 1971; 1993).

Nevertheless, in its most basic form, liberal democracy is defined as an individualist reading of the political system in which inalienable rights and freedoms help to maintain free and fair competition between political parties (Heywood, 1998). An analysis of a range of literature on the principles and practices of liberal democracy demonstrates that the definition of the United States Department of State (2000: online) encompasses the thoughts of many of these writers, and includes the following as key principles:

- Sovereignty of the people
- Government based on the consent of the governed
- Majority rule
- Minority rights
- Guarantee of basic human rights: freedom of speech, expression, and the press/religion/assembly and association, plus the right of equal protection of the law, plus the right of due process and fair trial
Democratic Discourses

- Free and fair elections
- Equality before the law
- Due process of law
- Constitutional limits on government
- Social, economic, political pluralism
- Values of tolerance, pragmatism, co-operation and compromise.

These principles are also encompassed in the Warsaw Declaration (2000), the product of a World Forum on Democracy, in 2000. This was organised by the NGOs ‘Stefan Batory Foundation’ and ‘Freedom House’, as well as the governments of the convening group, Poland, Chile, Czech Republic, India, Mali, Republic of Korea, and the United States of America (Community of Democracies, 2000). The Declaration signifies one of the most extensive attempts to install liberal multiparty democratic systems across the globe, and was signed by each of the case study countries, namely Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines. Both the Warsaw Declaration (2000) and the United States Department of State (2000) outline a ‘normative’ version of liberal democracy.

Cultural Relativist Rejection of Universalist Liberal Discourses

Despite such support for a liberal definition of democracy, Schmitter and Karl (1996) stress the importance of acknowledging that no one definition of democracy exists, and caution against identifying too closely with American liberal discourses, such as that outlined above. This is reinforced by Diamond and Plattner (1996) who argue that democratic diversity, such as that which exists in Southeast Asia, must be acknowledged.

Therefore, opposing the universalist reading of liberal democracy are those who argue for the incorporation of local diversity, such as Hann (1996) and Tester (1992). With regard to the countries within the region of Southeast Asia, and wider Asia, the distinct nature of civil society gives some support to the construction of democratic theories that are locally specific. This view is taken up by cultural relativists such as Curew (1993), who rejects the view of Ng (1998) that democracy is a generic universal concept that can be applied to all societies.

Linz (1996a; 1996b) and Lijphart (1996) also argue that cultural differences help to create a diverse number of unique social and political organisations that can be labelled as being democratic, even though they do not comply with liberal definitions. As democracy is transplanted, some suggest that it evolves in a variety of forms depending upon the nature of localised features, such as culture and history (Curtis, 1998; Walzer, 1983).

‘Asian Values’ Democracy

The diverse rhetoric concerning the structure of distinctly Asian regimes,
based on specific values, offers resistance to the proposition of Western liberal
democracy as a universal norm (Bell, Brown, Jayasuriya and Jones, 1995).
The ‘Asian Values’ debate challenges the very basis of Western democratic
thought and its promotion of liberal democracy as the universal endpoint to
which all societies should strive. Cultural relativists are active in the application
of culturally bound definitions of democracy to the Asian context, emphasising
the impact that cultural values characteristic of the region’s countries have in
the evolution of regionally specific governing structures (Baur and Bell, 1999;
Patton, 1996).

The most notable proponent of the ‘Asian Values’ argument was Lee
Kuan Yew, a former Prime Minister of Singapore, who mobilised
Confucianism to legitimise the control exercised by his political party, the
‘People’s Action Party’ (Bello, 1998a). The species of democracy endorsed by
the People’s Action Party rejected the “Western emphasis on individual rights,
electoral competition, the free press, free assembly, and checks and balances”
in favour of consensus, order, hierarchy, mutual respect, and the centrality of
the family (Bello, 1998d: online). These values have been mirrored in speeches
made by the political elites of China, Viet Nam, Japan, and Malaysia (Bello,
1998b; see also Chan, 1998; Emmerson, 1995a; 1995b; Fukuyama, 1998).

Table 1. A summary of ‘Asian Values’ and their political-economic
outcomes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Asian Values:</th>
<th>Political-economic outcomes:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Respect for authority (of the family, state, etc.)</td>
<td>• Social order and political stability are valued over the rights of the individual and liberal democracy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Intense family networks, ties, commitments.</td>
<td>• Respect for collective social norms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Respect for the interests of both the individual and the wider community.</td>
<td>• The value of democracy is measured by the extent to which it secures other social goods (e.g. order and economic growth).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Reverence for education.</td>
<td>• Government based on consensus building and trust amongst the political elite. Achieved through good governance’ (order, economic growth, and moral soundness).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• An ethic of hard work.</td>
<td>• Government focus on economic growth, stability, and social harmony.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Frugality.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Team work and co-operation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Sources: adapted from Hitchcock, 1992: 2; Subramanian, 2000: online).

The authors and politicians who adhere to this school of thought, known as the
‘Singapore School’, identify a set of predominantly Confucian-oriented
principles, which are somewhat ironically complimented with traces of a
Protestant work ethic, as an inherently distinguishing feature of Asian cultures.
(Subramanian, 2000). As indicated in Table 1, these principles are perceived to have had distinct political-economic outcomes.

Egalitarian principles are not as prominent in Asian democratic discourses as in those of the West. As displayed above, Confucian beliefs give momentum to the corporate style and hierarchical nature common in Asian societies (Sen, 1999). Alagappa (1996) uses the same argument regarding the impact that duties to one’s ancestors and future generations has on personal freedom. The high regard for state authority also stifles pluralism (Bell and Jayasuriya, 1995). Therefore, instead of having to accommodate a multitude of competing interest groups, the Asian state is thought to encompass the principle of consensus. Bell and Jayasuriya (1995: 9) highlight this when arguing that

a liberal democratic political system, informed and justified by the ideals of equality and freedom as well as by a recognition and accommodation of ‘the fact of pluralism’, is a culturally distinct, historically contingent artefact, not readily transferable to East and Southeast Asian societies with different traditions, needs, and conceptions of human flourishing.

Hence, the general consensus of the ‘Singapore School’ is that, in the Asian context, communal goals of order and economic growth outweigh the importance ascribed to individual rights. This is noted in the successful models of Asian development provided by the ‘Asian Tigers’, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea, which have adopted selected capitalist principles, while rejecting the liberal individualistic ‘baggage’ that they carry in Western societies (Subramanian, 2000).

Universalist response to ‘Asian Values’

Not surprisingly, arguments that openly attack the effectiveness of liberal democracy have come under direct criticism by a multitude of authors (Emmerson, 1995a; 1995b; Fukuyama, 1992; Hongladaron, 1995; Sen, 1999). The most common critique is that these ‘Asian Values’ have been mobilised in an attempt to legitimise inherently authoritarian regimes. As Aung San Suu Kyi indicates “there is nothing new in…governments seeking to justify…authoritarian rule by denouncing democratic principles as alien” while also maintaining the “sole right to decide what…conforms to indigenous cultural norms” (cited in Friedman, 1999: 63; see also Aung San Suu Kyi, 1991). This view is reinforced by Dupont (1996) who identifies regime legitimisation as the darker side of the ‘Asian Values’ rhetoric.

Other criticisms include the failure of Asian cultural relativists to capture the heterogeneous nature of the Asian world (Antlöv and Ngo, 2000; Emmerson, 1995a; 1995b; Ganesan, 1997; Sato, 1997; Schmiegelow, 1997). Also, the Confucian concept of ‘good governance’ is deemed by some authors
to be a subjective construction which has been corrupted by political elites to legitimate ‘soft-authoritarian’ regimes (Dupont, 1996; Kim, 1997). A criticism is also levelled at the degree to which many traditional Asian belief systems actually contain the seeds of key liberal democratic principles rather than following the Asian Values stance (Dae Jung, 1994).³

Universalists also criticise the use of a static definition of culture by proponents of ‘Asian Values’ democracy (Dae Jung, 1994). Identifying culture as a dynamic identity that is heavily influenced by wider technological, environmental and political changes points the universalists to the belief that ‘Asian Values’ democracies will gradually reach an evolutionary endpoint of liberal democracy (Fukuyama, 1992). However, as others have noticed, this point of critique reinvigorates a theory of teleological evolution based on Eurocentrism (Subramaniam, 2000).

Reconciliatory approaches to the ‘Asian values’ debate

Contrasting with the above criticisms is an alternative view offered by Yasuaki (1999), Bauer and Bell (1999), and Subramaniam (2000), who are amongst authors beginning to outline a syncretic approach. Such an approach recognises that the challenges of modernisation have some universal implications which, even so, can be addressed in a manner that reflects the unique cultural characteristics within a society. Indeed, “Asian societies can adopt certain ‘political moralities’ that might have had a longer evolution in the West but nevertheless can be shaped to suit the values and cultures of Asia” (Subramanian, 2000: online). The syncretist approach argues that apart from the most fundamental minimum standards, such as freedom from torture, slavery, and arbitrary killings, societies should be free to develop their own response to specific human rights that may not totally reflect the Western liberal species of democracy (Mahbubani, 1999).

An example of a similar way through the impasse between the extreme positions of liberal universalists and Asian Values relativists is that offered by Walden Bello’s more participatory species of democracy (Bello, 1998b; 1998c; 1998d). Bello (1998c: online) identifies that “a central element of the reinvigoration of the democratic enterprise is innovation and experimentation in direct democracy, eliminating more and more intermediaries between the citizen and the exercise of decision-making”.

Having now briefly outlined the three major definable discourses on democracy, namely liberal discourses, cultural relativist discourses, and syncretic/popular discourses, I turn next to use these to interpret the official government discourses regarding democracy in three Southeast Asian countries, namely Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines. It should be

³ These include the ancient Chinese philosophy which professed that the “will of the people is the will of heaven” and the Confucian belief “that remonstration against an erring monarch was a paramount duty” (Dae Jung, 1994: online).
stressed again that the aim of this next section is not to compare reality with government rhetoric, but to focus on competing discourses on democracy.⁴

**Official Government Discourses⁵**

**Indonesia**

To examine the Indonesian government’s discourses on democracy, the 1945 Constitution, with its subsequent amendments (1999 and 2000), and the rhetoric of the recently appointed President Megawati Sukarnoputri, were primary sources.

**1945 Constitution and Amendments**

In the Indonesian context it is important to note that the Constitution is not the primary political-legal set of principles to which society and the structures that govern it aspire. Underpinning the Constitution, the concept of ‘Pancasila’ encompasses the fundamental morals and philosophical principles that guide Indonesian life (Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs, 1997: online). These principles are incorporated into the preamble of the Indonesian Constitution (1945: Preamble) and include:

- Belief in the one, supreme God
- Just and civilised humanity
- The unity of Indonesia
- Democracy which is guided by the inner wisdom arising out of deliberation amongst representatives
- Social justice for the whole of the people of Indonesia.

Of obvious relevance here, is the principle of a democracy that is “guided” (ibid.). This form of governance is defined in terms of fostering deliberations (musyawarah) in order to arrive at a consensus (mufakat). In terms of a basic description of the political form of the governing system, the Indonesian Constitution (1945: Article 1 (1)) proposes that “the State of Indonesia shall be a unitary state which has the form of a Republic”. In this sense it is seen that

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⁴ For a more detailed analysis of these competing discourses see Charteris (2001).
⁵ Latent textual analysis, an “assessment of implicit themes within a text”, which “may include ideologies, beliefs, or stereotypes”, was applied to the official government discourses of Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines (Hay, 2000: 190; see also Forbes, 2000). These discourses were examined through three forms of text: international documents; the national constitutions; and speeches of the current political leaders. Latent textual analysis was also applied to the case study NGOs, which included two organisations that operate internationally and a further two that operate at the Asian regional level. Also, six local NGOs were selected, two operating specifically in each of the three case studies countries, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines.
sovereignty is to be held “in the hands of the People and shall be exercised in full by the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat”, a combination of the upper and lower houses of representatives (ibid.: Article 1 (2)).

Of importance to the democratic propositions made in the Indonesian Constitution (1945) is the protection of civic rights. The Second Amendment to the 1945 Constitution includes the addition of a substantial section guaranteeing a number of human rights. These include the provision that “all citizens are equal before the law” (Indonesian Constitution, 1945, Second Amendment, Article 27 (1)), freedom in the “practice of one’s religion of choice” (ibid.: Article 28E (1)), and the right “to associate, to assemble, and to express opinions” (ibid.: Article 28F).6

In considering the underlying democratic principles endorsed in the above official government documents, it is apparent that the focus on individual rights and liberties mirrors the claims made by proponents of liberal democracy. As demonstrated below, this stance is reflected in the rhetoric of Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri.

*President Megawati Sukarnoputri*

The rhetoric of the fifth Indonesian President, Megawati Sukarnoputri reinforces the liberal discourse on democracy constructed in the 1945 Constitution and its successive amendments. In her ‘State-of-the-Nation Address’, Sukarnoputri declared her belief in the principles encapsulated in the Preamble of the Indonesian Constitution (1945):

The founding fathers of our nation described the Unitary Republic of Indonesia as a ‘free, united, sovereign, just and prosperous’ nation. I believe that the values contained in this simple formula which we are so familiar with is crystal clear with no need for involved explanation.

The task given to the government of the Republic of Indonesia is also clear, simple and straightforward, that is ‘to protect all the people of Indonesia and the country of Indonesia, to promote public welfare, to educate the people and to participate in the implementation of a world order, based on freedom, eternal peace and social justice’ (ibid.: online).

In the same address Sukarnoputri also made reference to the importance of liberal principles in constructing a democratic nation. She noted that we can also benefit from various ideas, especially those related to the promotion and fulfillment of civil rights and political rights as well as social, economic and cultural rights in our respect for

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6 However, the freedom to associate and assemble is to be regulated by law as under Article 28 of the amended 1945 Indonesian Constitution.
human rights in the framework of the United Nations’ system (ibid.: online).

More specifically, Sukarnoputri has publicly placed much emphasis on reducing the corruption that characterised the post-independence Indonesian state, stating that “the central importance to the international community, as well as to [Indonesian] citizens, of eliminating collusion, corruption and nepotism (KKN)” (Sukarnoputri, 2001b: online). It could also be suggested, although this is still open for debate, that Sukarnoputri mobilised democratic discourse through her attempts to displace the former President, Abdurrahman Wahid, on accounts of excessive corruption and incompetence (CNN, 23/7/2001). In summary, it is clear that President Sukarnoputri has emphasised the importance of liberal principles, such as reduced corruption and enhanced civil rights, for the realisation of an improved Indonesian democracy. While complimenting the principles endorsed in the 1945 Constitution and the Warsaw Declaration (2000), similarities can also be recognised with the points emphasised by the leaders of the Philippines and Thailand, discussed next.

Thailand

While the Thai Constitution (1997) is more recent than the 1945 Indonesian Constitution, important similarities in relation to discourses on democracy exist. In addition, a strong continuity with the rhetoric of the current Thai Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra is evident.

1997 Constitution

Thailand’s Constitution (1997), relative to that of Indonesia, is a complex document outlining an extensive set of principles and conditions. It begins with a broad set of “general provisions” that outline the official democratic nature of the political system (Thai Constitution, 1997: Chapter 1).

- Thailand adopts a democratic regime of government with the King as Head of the State.
- The sovereign power belongs to the Thai people. The King as Head of the State shall exercise such power through the National Assembly, the Council of Ministers, and the Courts in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.
- The human dignity, right and liberty of the people shall be protected.
- The Thai people, irrespective of their origins, sexes or religions, shall enjoy equal protection under this Constitution (ibid. emphasis added).

As outlined above, Thailand is described as a “democratic regime” (ibid.: Chapter 1(2)) within which sovereign power is attributed to the citizenry and supported by the protection of a number of civil rights. In addition to the
general principles provided by the Thai Constitution (1997) in ‘Chapter Two’, a more extensive description of civil liberties is provided in ‘Chapter Three’, “Rights and Liberties of the Thai People” (ibid.). A wide range of human rights are protected, including equality before the law, protection against discrimination on a number of characteristics, the right of privacy, access to public education, and the freedoms of speech, association, assembly, and participation in the political process (ibid.: Chapter 3).

These rights and liberties are afforded on the condition that they are not exercised in opposition to what is termed “good morals” (ibid.: Chapter 3(37,38). This condition is problematic as no definition of the concept “good morals” is provided. Hence, in practice, these rights can be restricted depending upon whether or not they are in accordance with a subjective and undefined set of morals.

Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra

Like both the Philippines and Indonesian case studies, the Thai government has experienced a recent change in power. On 9 February 2001, the 23rd Thai Prime Minister assumed office. Soon after winning the premiership, Thaksin Shinawatra presented a fundamental set of revised national policies to the National Assembly. This ‘Policy of the Government’ helps convey the contemporary official position concerning the democratic nature of governance (Shinawatra, 2001). In this, Shinawatra identifies that:

- it is the policy of the Government to promote the country’s political development towards participatory democracy in order to give the people the opportunity for greater self-government and protection of their rights. In addition, the Government is committed to improving efficiency, creating greater transparency and eliminating corruption in public administration and services, with a view to enhancing social justice and national development at present and in the future (Shinawatra, 2001: online).

With this in mind, a series of political reforms are proposed, including the use of public hearings to make popular changes to the constitution, the implementation of human rights principles, and the fostering of an environment suitable for the development of pluralism. Reinforcing such moves is the proposed national campaign against corruption (ibid.).

It can be seen that Shinawatra’s comments are not directly consistent with the Thai Constitution. Shinawatra’s (2001) focus on ideas of pluralism and the protection of civil liberties indicates a liberal species of democracy. There are also remarks made in the above quote that are embedded in a more participatory conceptualisation of democracy that focuses on public forums in

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7 Discrimination is prohibited “on the grounds of difference in origin, race, language, sex, age, physical or health condition, personal status, economic or social standing, religious belief, education or constitutionally political view” (Thai Constitution, 1997: Article 3(30)).
the formation of fundamental government policy. Nevertheless, if examining the overall government discourse on democracy, thereby combining Shinawatra’s comments with the undertones of the Thai Constitution (1997), participatory ideals are not especially prominent.

Philippines

In comparison to the Thai government discourse on democracy, the democratic principles identified in both the Philippines Constitution (1986), and the rhetoric of President Macapagal-Arroyo, display a greater consistency. In both instances there are strong parallels with discourses that stress the universality of liberal democracy.

1986 Constitution

The 1986 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines is a complex document. The principles outlined in ‘Article Two: Declaration of principles and state policies’ describe the official position regarding the democratic nature of the Filipino system of governance (Philippines Constitution, 1986). Key sections within this Article include:

- The Philippines is a democratic and republican state.
- Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.
- Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military…
- The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people.
- The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.
- The state shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.
- The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.
- The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption (ibid.: Article 2, emphasis added).

The primary characteristic made clear by the above sections is that the Filipino regime attempts to follow the republican governance model of the United States of America. This is a normative liberal democratic model in which issues of social justice and general welfare are discussed even though no definitions are provided.

Also, the 1986 Constitution provides for the guaranteed suffrage of citizens over the age of 18 years. It is stated that “no literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage”
It is further guaranteed that the “security and sanctity of the ballot” shall be pursued through the electoral systems (ibid.: Article 5 (2)).

Stemming from the issue of suffrage is the broader subject of human rights, extensively accounted for under ‘Article Three’ (ibid.). This article provides for rights such as the “equal protection of the laws” across the citizenry (ibid.: Article 5(1)), “protection of privacy” (ibid.: Article 3(3)), and the guaranteed “freedom of speech, of expression, or of press, or the right of the people peacefully to assemble and petition the government” (ibid.: Article 3(4)). These rights, and a number of others, are key principles of both the Warsaw Declaration (2000) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), demonstrating that the Philippines Constitution (1986) endorses ideas of liberal democracy.

**President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo**

On 20 January 2001 Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was sworn in as the 14th President of the Philippines after the second peaceful ‘People Power’ revolution (Kaibigan ni Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, 2001: online). An analysis of her public addresses demonstrates that she is a strong supporter of liberal democratic governance. In an address at the Warsaw Conference (2000), Macapagal-Arroyo, then Philippines’ Vice-President, emphasised the fact that the Philippines “established Asia’s first democracy” and portrayed the ‘People Power’ revolution of 1986 as an example of how to “oust a dictatorship” (Macapagal-Arroyo, 2000: online).

Indeed, Macapagal-Arroyo has extolled the virtues of the two ‘People Power’ revolutions as being a vital component in the evolution of the democratic nature of Filipino governance (Macapagal-Arroyo, 2001a; 2001b). In expressing her support for the two ‘People Power’ movements, President Macapagal-Arroyo has emphasised the need for the protection of civil liberties inherent in the 1986 Constitution, such as the freedom of assembly and protest.

**Comparative Analysis**

Table 2 highlights a range of specific concepts concerning liberal discourses on democracy and whether these were mirrored in the national constitutions and the rhetoric of the Heads of State of the case study countries. It is clear that each case study country’s constitution constructed a set of principles that broadly paralleled the components of a liberal democracy. These liberal definitions of democracy were also apparent in the rhetoric of the respective Heads of State. The recently appointed President Megawati Sukarnoputri has reflected the 1999 and 2000 amendments to the Indonesian Constitution (1945) in speeches on the themes of anti-corruption and the consolidation of civilian control over the military. The mobilisation of liberal discourses on democracy was also apparent in the rhetoric of Filipino President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. The governments of all three case study nations have clearly constructed normative notions of liberal democracy as the fundamental ideology behind their regimes. This conclusion is enhanced by the absence of any reference to ‘Asian Values’ democracy in any of the official government texts analysed. In addition, having signed the Warsaw Declaration (2000), each of these case study countries has further shown a will to endorse a liberal species of democracy. Nevertheless, for each case study this is a relatively recent move, contrasting with the repressive and often militarised governments that have characterised all these countries at some stage during the middle of the twentieth century.

Table 2 Liberal democracy concepts in national constitutions and rhetoric of the Heads of State of the case study countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Liberal Discourses on Democracy</th>
<th>Government Discourses in Constitutions and Heads of State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific concepts</td>
<td>1945 Const*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sovereignty resides in the public</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority rule</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free and fair multi-party elections</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitutional limits on government</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guarantee of basic human rights and civil liberties</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free and independent judiciary</td>
<td>Yes (1999 2000 amend.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality before the law</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little state influence on the economy - economic pluralism</td>
<td>No mention</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Democratic Discourses of NGOs

In addition to researching democratic discourses that have emerged from the Thai, Indonesian and Philippines governments, this study also analysed, in a similar fashion, the discourses established by NGOs that focus on democratic reforms and consolidation in the Southeast Asian realm.

International NGOs

The two international NGOs examined were the ‘National Democratic Institute’ and ‘Freedom House’. Both have strong American connections, whilst monitoring and aiming to help consolidate democratic development in a variety of countries. The analysis of the democratic discourses of such international NGOs is relevant because, in an increasingly globalised world, these organisations provide an important path for the transfer of ideas, principles, and values, amongst cultures and societies.

National Democratic Institute

The ‘National Democratic Institute’ (NDI) is an international NGO established in 1984, with predominantly American members, from writers to election officials. This NGO defines democracy in terms of both the mechanics by which representative bodies - through whom the views of wider society are expressed – are chosen, and the social institutions that ensure the accountability of such a body. These views are expressed on the NDI website which states that,

> democracy requires working democratic structures: legislatures that represent the people and oversee the executive; elections in which the voters actually choose their leaders; judiciaries, steeped in the law, that are independent of outside influences; a system of checks and balances within society; and institutions and leaders that are accountable to the public (NDI, 2001: online).

Hence, the NDI conceptualises a liberal species of democracy that is argued to be applicable throughout the world’s broad spectrum of culturally diverse states.

Freedom House

At a superficial level, ‘Freedom House’ (FH) claims to maintain “a culture-bound view of democracy” that acknowledges the “varying forms of

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NGOs were chosen with a membership dominated by researchers and intellectuals. Preliminary analysis found that these tended to discuss the broader issues of democratic theory and provide a more expansive set of ideas, philosophies, and interpretations from which to sample, than NGOs which focused on specific issues.
In FH’s text, an electoral democracy is concerned with the mechanics of forming a governing body that is identified as ‘representative’ of the wider civil body (FH, 2001). In contrast, a liberal democracy incorporates electoral principles, while also being “free and respectful of basic human rights and rule of law” in relation to political rights and civil liberties (FH, 2001: online).

The analyses of the NDI and FH discourses on democracy highlight that both organisations identified a liberal representative multiparty democracy as being the ultimate democratic aspiration. An essential part of this ‘democratic endpoint’ was deemed by both NGOs to be the establishment of fair and free elections in the creation of electoral democracy. The focus now turns to the discourses on democracy mobilised by regional Asian NGOs, to see whether these follow or contrast those of the international NGOs.

Regional Asian NGOs

Asian-based regional NGOs provide a means for the transfer of ideas, principles, and values amongst cultures. However, they differ from international NGOs such as the NDI and FH, in that they are based in, and are principally concerned with, the Asian context. Both the ‘Alliance for Reform and Democracy in Asia’ (ARDA) and ‘Focus on the Global South’ (FOCUS) are regional NGOs that monitor and aim to help consolidate democratic development in a variety of Asian countries.

Focus on the Global South

Based in Thailand since its formation in 1995, ‘Focus on the Global South’ (FOCUS) is an ‘academic’ NGO concerned primarily with the Asian region and what it considers to be the flaws in dominant Western development theories. FOCUS recognises the impacts of cultural differences and depicts democracy in Southeast Asia as an “Asian enterprise, one whose wellsprings are found not only in the European enlightenment but also in Asian cultures, most of which have rich traditions that stress participation and equity” (Bello, 1998d: online). This NGO rejects the holistic adoption of democratic principles, as they must be “creatively adapted to an ethnically and culturally diverse region” (ibid.: online). Instead, it suggests an “experimentation in direct democracy, eliminating more and more intermediaries between the citizen and the exercise of decision-making” (ibid.: online). More precisely, “democracy must be identified with cultural and political autonomy,
decentralised government, and pluralism in the expression of national identity” *(ibid.)*. FOCUS therefore mobilises a syncretic discourse on democracy, which places a greater emphasis upon popular values than the liberal discourse on democracy mobilised by the second regional NGO discussed next.

**Alliance for Reform and Democracy in Asia**

The fundamental democratic principle endorsed by the recently established ‘Alliance for Reform and Democracy in Asia’ (ARDA) is that “power emanates from the people” and therefore should be “exercised on behalf and reflecting the will of the people” *(ARDA, 2001)*. It is believed that this will is “best expressed through credible, peaceful, and democratic elections” *(ibid.)*. In the ‘Ulaanbaatar Declaration on Good Governance’ *(UDGG)* - the result of a democratic conference convened by ARDA - it is clear that this NGO defines democracy using principles similar to those established by the United States Department of State *(2000)*, outlined earlier. Hence, ARDA supports a liberal species of democracy, universally applicable across all cultures and societies.

To summarise the position adopted by ARDA, the focus on representation, acceptability, and transparency, in combination with the rejection of ‘Asian Values’ democracy, portrays a universalist notion of liberal democracy. This contrasts with the views highlighted in an analysis of the FOCUS NGO. Inherent in the democratic discourse of FOCUS was the rejection of the legitimacy of applying universal principles of democracy to specific countries. It was argued that the altering of democratic theory so as to incorporate Asian cultural values was important. Thus instead of endorsing liberal democracy as the evolutionary endpoint, a more popular or participatory style of democracy was advocated.

**Local Country NGOs**

Local NGOs are important in an analysis of discourses on democracy because they often have a deeper understanding of the specificities of the respective countries in which they are based. This section briefly analyses two local NGOs from each of the case study countries, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, in terms of their discourses on democracy (see Charteris, 2001, for a more detailed analysis of these NGOs).

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9 These rights include “opportunities for citizens to change a government with which they are dissatisfied through regular elections; access for citizens to elected officials, civil servants and government information; fundamental freedoms of speech, expression, assembly, association and the media that are assertively safeguarded by governmental, judicial and nongovernmental institutions; and a political culture that cherishes democratic processes and democratic freedoms above personal gain or perpetuation of power by a single party or established elite” *(UDGG, 2001)*.
**Indonesian NGOs: Watch Indonesia**

‘Watch Indonesia’ (WI) is an Indonesian NGO established in 1991 with the assistance of Portuguese and German nationals. In terms of defining democracy, an e-mail interview with a staff member of WI indicated that there was some doubt that a “common definition of democracy” within the NGO existed (confidential pers. comm., 09/06/2001). Instead, it was suggested that less developed countries must “find their own interpretation of that term instead of sticking to any Western concept or theory” (*ibid.*).

**Indonesian Foundation for Strengthening Community Participation, Initiative and Partnership**

The second Indonesian NGO case study, the ‘Indonesian Foundation for Strengthening Community Participation, Initiative and Partnership’ (YAPPIKA), was established in 1991 as an umbrella association comprising a large number of organisations concerned with local democratic development. An analysis of the YAPPIKA homepage revealed that much emphasis is placed on the “creation of a democratic civil society through the upholding of human rights and the people’s sovereignty” (YAPPIKA, 2001: online). The creation of “pluralism”, “community justice”, “self-reliance”, and “equity” is also recognised as being of importance to the realisation of democracy (*ibid.* online). YAPPIKA’s discourse on democracy therefore mirrors broader normative definitions of liberal democracy, thus demonstrating clear contrasts with WI’s cultural relativist discourse.

**Philippine NGOs: Bagong Alyansang Makabayan**

Moving to the Philippines, the first local NGO analysed, ‘Bagong Alyansang Makabayan’ (Bayan), is a ‘grass roots’ organisation, established in 1985. Bayan (2001: online) argues that “the power of the people rests on building their organised strength, founded on the basic alliance of workers and peasants” and that this power is a fundamental aspect of democracy. In this popular view of democracy, it is thought that such “power shall serve as the foundation for building a people’s democratic state and upholding their economic, cultural, political and civil rights” (*ibid.* online). Special mention is also made of the “participation of women, principally women workers and peasant women, in a women’s movement which is integral to the entire national democratic struggle” (*ibid.* online).

**Institute for Popular Democracy**

The second Philippines case study, the ‘Institute for Popular Democracy’ (IPD), is involved in ‘The Democracy Project’, a project aiming to “transform formal democracy into substantive democracy” (FOCUS, 2001: online) with a
focus on reducing corruption in favour of “increased transparency and accountability in government” (IPD, 2001: online). The IPD identifies and rejects “intellectual biases in Western discourse on democracy that affect the way we look at politics in countries of the South” (Rocamora, 2000: online). These biases include the focus on liberal democracy over a more popular or participatory variety, “the equation of democracy with capitalism”, and the negligence of external influences in constructing locally specific democratic discourses (ibid.: online). In comparing the IPD’s syncretic/popular notion of democracy, and the liberalism inherent in the Bayan texts, these local NGO discourses on democracy in the Philippines are clearly quite contrasting.

**Thai NGOs: Campaign for Popular Democracy**

Shifting the focus to the Thai NGOs, the ‘Campaign for Popular Democracy’ (CPD) was established in 1991 and consists of a broadly ‘intellectual’ membership, which encourages social activism. The CPD endorses a political system in which public influence dominates. This is demonstrated in the primary motive for its establishment, “to lead the struggle against the military regime and for a people-orientated constitution” (CPD, 2001: online). Further advancing the idea of a popular (participatory) democracy, was the CPD’s demands to establish the 1997 Thai Constitution through open processes in which the public actively participated (Wancharoen, 2001).

**Assembly of the Poor**

The final local NGO case study is of the Thai NGO, ‘Assembly of the Poor’ (AP), established in 1995 with a diverse membership. The AP is a coalition of ‘grass roots’ activists, including students and locals directly affected by specific government projects. The AP has very strong links with the CPD discussed above, especially with regard to protesting against controversial government projects (AP, 2001). With this in mind, it is argued that the AP constructs a discourse of democracy not dissimilar to that of the CPD. A point of difference between the two NGOs is that the AP focuses on the participation of the poor “in decision making involving development projects that will affect them” (AP, 2001: online).

The above analysis of local NGOs’ discourses on democracy in Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines, illustrated quite diverse stances regarding whether a liberal or syncretic/popular species of democracy was to be endorsed. Proponents of liberalism included the Indonesian YAPPIKA and Filipino Bayan, whereas the Filipino IPD and the Thai CPD constructed popular conceptualisations of democracy. In contrast again, a radical cultural relativist position was inherent in the discourse of WI.
Comparative Analysis

In the analysis of the case study NGOs in terms of their specific discourses on democracy, it is clear, as indicated in Table 3, that both international NGOs, ‘Freedom House’ and the ‘National Democratic Institute’, took universalist stances in endorsing normative notions of liberal democracy, emphasising the importance of democratic government reinforced by a democratic society. This was based on the recognition of individual liberties, as an endpoint for the socio-political evolution of all regimes. Neither recognised that specific countries might add a cultural interpretation to their democratic discourse, nor did they endorse a specific ‘Asian Values’ form of democracy.

Table 3  The discourses on democracy the ten case study NGOs reflected most strongly.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level at which the NGO operated</th>
<th>Liberal discourses on democracy</th>
<th>Syncretic/popular discourses on democracy</th>
<th>Cultural relativist discourses on democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>National Democratic Institute (NDI)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Freedom House (FH)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>Alliance for Reform and Democracy in Asia (ARDA)</td>
<td>Focus on the Global South (FOCUS)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Indonesian Foundation for Strengthening Community Participation, Initiative and Partnership (YAPPIKA)</td>
<td>Institute for Popular Democracy (IPD)</td>
<td>Watch Indonesia (WI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Bagong Alyansang MakaBayan</em> (Bayan)</td>
<td>Campaign for Popular Democracy (CPD)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Assembly of the Poor (AP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A similar discourse on democracy was reiterated by the Asian regional NGO, the Alliance for Democracy and Reform in Asia (ARDA). ARDA specifically rejected the use of the ‘Asian Values’ argument to justify the maintenance of corrupt authoritarian regimes. While also rejecting the use of ‘Asian Values’ to justify authoritarianism, the discourse on democracy provided by the second
regional NGO, ‘Focus on the Global South’ (FOCUS), differed to that of ARDA. A prominent spokesperson for FOCUS, Walden Bello, is a proponent for more participatory conceptualisations of democracy in the Asian region, as discussed earlier. FOCUS endorses the more conciliatory syncretist approach, which rejects the notion of ‘Asian Values’, as put forward by Singaporean Lee Kuan Yew, whilst simultaneously acknowledging that democratic principles must be adapted to suit the diverse cultures found within Asia.

In comparison to the above findings, Table 3 also illustrates the wide diversity of discourses on democracy apparent in the analysis of local NGOs in Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines. Discourses similar to the popular democratic notions endorsed by FOCUS were reflected by the ‘Institute for Popular Democracy’ (IPD) in the Philippines and both the ‘Campaign for Popular Democracy’ (CPD) and the 'Assembly of the Poor' (AP) in Thailand. In contrast, liberal discourses were apparent in the analysis of the ‘Indonesian Foundation for Strengthening Community Participation, Initiative and Partnership’ (YAPPIKA) in Indonesia and Bayan in the Philippines. The only NGO to adopt an extremely cultural relativist approach, and not impose any externally generated model of democracy upon their country, was the Indonesian based ‘Watch Indonesia’ (WI).

In summary, it is apparent that there is a relationship between the level at which the NGOs operate and the discourses on democracy that they construct. At the international level, both FH and the NDI perceived Western-based normative liberal democracies to be equally applicable to all cultures and societies across the globe. Even though FH stated it recognised a “culture-bound view of democracy”, this was empty rhetoric when compared with the arguments on which its democratic definition was based (FH, 2001: online).

Compared to the international NGOs, the discourses on democracy constructed by regional NGOs were more diverse. Regional NGOs mobilised either liberal definitions of democracy or syncretic/popular definitions. However, the discourses on democracy were even more diverse in the analysis of local NGOs, highlighted in the final row of Table 3. Local NGOs endorsed a selection of the three main discourses, liberalism, extreme cultural relativism, and more conciliatory syncretism in the form of popular definitions of democracy. However, a similarity across all the case study NGOs, regardless of the level at which they operated, was the rejection or non-acknowledgement of Lee Kuan Yew’s version of ‘Asian Values’ democracy. This shows a clear rejection by NGOs of one specific discourse regarding democracy in the Asian sphere.

Conclusion: Dynamics of Discourse Interaction

In addressing the principle aim of this essay, it was found that both similar and competing discourses on democracy have been constructed by governments and non-government organisations (NGOs) – operating at the international, regional, or local level – in three Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia,
Democratic Discourses

Thailand, and the Philippines.

Strong similarities were apparent between the liberal discourses on democracy constructed by the United States Department of State (2000) and the Warsaw Conference (2000), and the international case study NGOs, namely ‘Freedom House’ and the ‘National Democratic Institute’. The consistent discourse constructed encompassed a normative liberal definition of democracy. It does not seem to be too radical to suggest that perhaps the dictates of American foreign policy and the Warsaw Declaration (2000) directly influence discourses on democracy constructed by some states in Southeast Asia, and that these parallels can be conceptualised as an attempt to transfer universalist discourses of liberal democracy upon both the case study states and the international NGOs operating in them.

In contrast, it is interesting to note that the discourses on Asian democracy constructed by Lee Kuan Yew did not receive significant support from international, regional or local case study NGOs. The ‘Singapore School’ s’ repressive democratic ideals fit poorly with the normative liberal discourses on democracy that have filtered down from international NGOs, such as FH and the NDI, to a number of the regional and local NGOs. As described earlier, the liberal discourses apparent in the Warsaw Declaration (2000) and the international case study NGOs were reflected in the discourses of the ARDA (Asian region), YAPPIKA (Indonesia), and Bayan (Philippines) NGOs.

Conversely, there are some regional and local NGOs that have adopted syncretic ideas and constructed discourses on democracy that are more participatory in nature. While recognising the challenges that Southeast Asia faces with regard to democratisation, the FOCUS (Asian region), IPD (Philippines), CPD (Thailand), and AP (Thailand) NGOs have established a reactionary discourse on democracy. Not only do they reject an ‘Asian Values’ based democracy, but they also reject the discourses of liberal democracy. A syncretic/popular definition of democracy is therefore put forward as a solution to the challenge of democratisation, consistent with the cultural specificities of many Asian countries.

Adopting the most extreme position of cultural relativism in this study is the Indonesian NGO, ‘Watch Indonesia’ (WI). Like the syncretic/popular discourses outlined above, WI has reacted against the recent authoritative history of the Indonesian regime, as well as rejecting both Lee Kuan Yew’s version of ‘Asian Values’ democracy, and liberal conceptualisations, to argue that there is a need to respect the rights of Indonesia to forge its own discourses on democracy.

Therefore, it is apparent that Western discourses on democracy, endorsing a normative notion of liberal democracy - argued to be applicable to all states around the globe - have influenced the Indonesian, Thai, and the Philippines governments. However, many non-governmental organisations have resisted such homogenisation by constructing a variety of democratic definitions, which account for cultural specificities. Thus whilst ARDA, YAPPIKA, and Bayan adhere to the discourses of the international NGOs and
the United States of America, others, including FOCUS, CPD, IPD, and AP, have constructed syncretic discourses. It is clear that the formation of discourses on democracy for regional and local NGOs entails more than the ‘top-down’ adoption of external views. Thus, in response to the suggestion that a globalisation of liberal definitions has taken place, as identified by Huntington (1991) and Diamond (1996), this study has shown that in reality in the Southeast Asian realm, this is not the case.
References


Confidential personal communication (9/6/2001) Staff member of ‘Watch Indonesia’.


