TAIPEI’S ‘BRITISHER’: W. G. GODDARD AND THE PROMOTION OF NATIONALIST CHINA IN THE COLD-WAR COMMONWEALTH

JEREMY E. TAYLOR
University of Sheffield
and National Institute of Chinese Studies

Introduction

This paper explores the career of W. G. Goddard, an Australian-born intellectual who spent much of the 1950s and 1960s serving the Nationalist Chinese regime on Taiwan. While tracing Goddard’s activities as a public speaker and writer during this period, the paper also examines how Goddard interpreted Taiwan through an Antipodean lens in much of his work. More importantly, however, this paper seeks to contribute to wider debates about the relationship between English-speaking intellectuals and Asian governments, the often unclear boundaries between propaganda and scholarship on East Asia during the Cold War, and the ways in which Asianists are remembered or forgotten in the annals of Asian Studies itself.

One of the most interesting developments in Asian Studies over recent years has been an increasing tendency for the field to study its own history. Whilst the role of ‘the Orientalist’ has been deconstructed since the publication of Said’s oft-cited thesis, it is only in more recent times that study of the ‘foreign expert’—a foreign national, usually versed in the language and culture of a particular society, who chooses to serve an Asian government or political movement—has become its own field of study.² The

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1 Jeremy E. Taylor (jeremy.taylor@sheffield.ac.uk) is Lecturer in the School of East Asian Studies, University of Sheffield, UK.
recent publication of memoirs of such Western ‘friends of China’ on both the Left (e.g., Wilfred Burchett) and the Right (e.g., James Lilley) has added to a small but significant literature on the role of ‘foreign experts’ (waiji zhuanjia) and ‘foreign advisors’ (yang guwen) to various governments in China, for instance. Such work has helped initiate scholarly considerations of how these and similar figures have shaped views of China in different parts of the Anglophone world.

In the resulting scholarship, there has been a tendency to split the growing number of rediscovered ‘foreign experts’ and ‘friends’ into two broad categories: heroes and traitors. As Anne-Marie Brady has suggested, such distinctions have little to do with the political affinities of the writers, journalists, diplomats or translators who have worked as mediators between Asian governments and Western audiences. Instead, they are often the result of the complicated relationships these persons maintain with their respective home governments, or the ways in which the roles played by such individuals are valorised by the governments they choose to serve at any given time. ‘Foreign experts’ who either served or helped promote the government of the People’s Republic of China, for instance, are just as likely to be remembered as heroes in one country as they are ‘renegades’ in another. Yet the question remains—why is it that some ‘foreign experts’ in China (and other East Asian societies) are lauded in the annals of Asian Studies, while others are derided or simply forgotten? What makes one ‘friend of China’ worthy of commemoration, and another worthy of forgetting?

In this paper, I shall consider such questions by examining the work and activities of William George Goddard, an Australian-born broadcaster, writer and scholar who spent much of the 1950s and 1960s serving as an intellectual spokesperson for the Nationalist Chinese government of Chiang Kai-shek. Until the 1970s, Goddard was virtually the only Australian to have been engaged in the study of Taiwanese history, doing so at a number of different institutions, and at other times as what, today, would be described as an ‘independent scholar’. Goddard had a considerable influence on the ways in which Taiwan was thought about in many parts of the world (and arguably on how the British Commonwealth was thought about in Taipei), particularly

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during the 1960s, his books having been translated into Chinese, Spanish and other languages. Yet he was only able to do this thanks to a close and partly clandestine relationship with the Nationalist Chinese government in Taipei. It is this relationship which I shall explore below.

Despite all this, Goddard has largely been forgotten by academia since his death in 1986, and his name—whilst appearing occasionally in studies of Taiwan historiography or works relating to Australia-Taiwan relations—is now largely absent from the honour rolls of sinology. In many ways, however, it is precisely Goddard’s absence which makes him an interesting topic of study.

The very nature of Goddard’s work throughout the 1950s and 1960s demanded that he maintain rigid control over his public image, and keep the nature of his relationship with the Nationalist government in Taipei hidden from public view. For those of us interested in understanding Goddard and his work, this creates some obvious difficulties. Goddard’s career as it is detailed in the archives and in his own writings is full of lacunae, and it remains something of a challenge to separate truth from ‘spin’ in what Goddard wrote about himself—testament, perhaps, to Goddard’s skills as a propagandist. Without access to anything resembling a memoir, as the biographers of friends of the ‘other’ China (such as Wilfred Burchett) now have, I have been forced to rely heavily on material held in the files created by the government agencies with which Goddard worked or which showed an interest in his activities. For Burchett’s biographers, the ‘stuff’ in such files is ‘rubbish’ when compared to the version that the man himself put to paper. For the study of Goddard, however, the archives in Taiwan and Australia are incomparably beneficial, though regrettably incomplete—the Government Information Office (the Taipei-based agency which ‘handled’ Goddard and helped see that much of his writing was published) claims to hold no files regarding him, for instance. In Goddard’s case, such gaps are just as relevant as the empirical evidence held in government archives because they point to a career that spanned both public and private spheres, and which was almost deliberately ambiguous. They help paint the picture of a man whose sympathies, beliefs and motives appear to be tempered as much by a genuine interest in the culture and history of Goddard’s chosen China as by pecuniary incentives.

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6 Two recent references to Goddard in English-language scholarship (both brief) are Nicholas Jose, ‘Taiwan Treasure Island: An Introduction’, in Nicholas Jose and Yang Wen-I (eds), ArtTaiwan: The Contemporary Art of Taiwan (Sydney: Museum of Contemporary Art, 1995), 16-17; and Ann Heylen, ‘Writing Taiwanese History: Interpreting the Past in the Global Present’, paper presented at the European Association of Taiwan Studies Conference, Paris, 2006.

7 George Burchett, ‘Preface’ in George Burchett and Nick Shimmin (eds), op cit, xi.

8 Correspondence with the Government Information Office, 2 September 2005.
My purpose in this paper is not to ‘expose’ Goddard; nor is it to valorise or defend him. Instead, I am concerned with examining the ways in which Goddard negotiated his way through a career that constantly brought into question his position in relation to the society he wrote about. Further, and beyond exploring the means by which one intellectual came to play a role in the decades-long kulturkampf that was waged between the two rival Chinese governments, then, I shall demonstrate how Goddard’s story raises all kinds of questions about how those who make careers out of the study of East Asia are commemorated or otherwise in Asian Studies today.

Before Taipei

Goddard made his first trip to Taiwan late in life. He was already 67 years of age by the time of his initial visit to the island in 1954. Yet his links to the government that was installed in Taipei at the time, and his belief in the importance of that government’s eventual victory over the Chinese Community Party (which had forced the Nationalists’ retreat to Taiwan just five years earlier) may well have been forged many years earlier on the Chinese mainland.

It is unclear when and why Goddard first visited China. At a later stage, he would claim to have spent some twenty years in the country prior to the Second World War, and to have been employed as a member of faculty at the West China Union University (WCUU)—an institution established in the province of Sichuan by a consortium of North American and British Christian groups in 1910.9 However, Goddard’s name appears nowhere in the publications of groups affiliated with the WCUU, and a curriculum vitae that Goddard prepared in the early 1950s suggests that he was working instead as a ‘free press agent’ on the mainland between 1933 and 1936.10

While the details of Goddard’s life in mainland China remain elusive, we can be certain that he was born in the Australian city of Newcastle in 1887, the son of a railway-coach painter from Sussex and a mother of Irish birth.11 We also know that Goddard trained to join the Methodist clergy in

10 Undated curriculum vitae. Academia Historica (AH): Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 172-1, Aodaliya renshi fang Hua [Visits to China by Australians]; 3522 (1), Aogu diantai pinglunyuan Gao Da fang Tai [Visit to Taiwan of the Australian radio commentator Goddard], June 1952–December 1956. I have yet to find any mention of Goddard in issues of the Journal of the West China Border Research Society and the West China Missionary News (periodicals published through the WCUU) during this period; this may suggest that his time at the WCCU was not necessarily as long as he was later to claim.
Sydney during the early years of the 20th century, and that he went on to preach in Methodist parishes in regional Queensland and New South Wales between 1908 and 1914. \(^\text{12}\) Though Goddard seldom mentioned his career in the church in later writings, this experience may well have led him to develop sympathy for Nationalist China, as Methodism was the denomination of choice for Chiang Kai-shek and many other Nationalist leaders.

Registry documents tell us that in 1911 Goddard was married in Sydney to one Ruth Tollis, and that this marriage ended in 1933. \(^\text{13}\) Files held at the Sydney office of Australia’s National Archives suggest that Goddard spent a period of time in Japan. \(^\text{14}\) Goddard claimed to have obtained a doctorate in Oriental languages in the United States at some stage during the 1920s, although it is still unclear where he studied, or if indeed he obtained a degree at all while in that country. \(^\text{15}\)

From the mid-1930s to the end of the 1940s, however, the course of Goddard’s career becomes easier to follow. We know that he was employed by the commercial radio station 4BC in Brisbane as a commentator—a role that has already been examined in some detail by the media historian Bridget Griffen-Foley. \(^\text{16}\) He developed a loyal audience through weekly broadcasts about Asian and world politics, emerging as one of Australia’s most prominent media commentators on foreign affairs. Goddard shared with other Australian media personalities of the day a stance that was intensely sympathetic to the Chinese war effort against Japan. \(^\text{17}\) This won him substantial favour with Nationalist Chinese diplomats in Australia who expressed ‘appreciation...[for his]...deep sympathy for and profound interest in China’. \(^\text{18}\)


\(^\text{13}\) New South Wales Registry of Births, Deaths and Marriages: Marriage Certificate of William George Goddard and Ruth Tollis, 18 March 1911, Registration No. 1911/003416.

\(^\text{14}\) Letter from W. G. Goddard to the Consul-General of Japan, 17 September 1934. National Archives of Australia (NSW): Investigation Branch, New South Wales; C443, Consular investigations files, alpha-numeric series; J11, Dr. W. G. Goddard [Correspondence with the Japanese Consul General in Australia], 1934–1946.

\(^\text{15}\) ‘Ace Commentator Sways Big Audience’, *The ABC Weekly*, 29 June 1946, 38. Enquiries with archives at Columbia and Yale Universities, both of which were listed in various sources by Goddard himself as institutions at which he had studied, have resulted in no records relating to Goddard being found at either institution.


By the early 1940s, Goddard was also being acknowledged as an expert on Asia beyond the realm of radio. He spoke to a range of learned societies on Asian geography and history, and was invited to present the 1941 Morrison Memorial Lecture in Ethnology at the Institute of Anatomy in Canberra.\(^\text{19}\) He was commissioned to prepare reports on the Chinese community by Australian intelligence agencies, and later unsuccessfully sought employment with the newly-formed Australian Security Intelligence Organisation.\(^\text{20}\) It even appears that, at one stage, Goddard was being considered for the position of Australia’s first minister to China.\(^\text{21}\)

With the end of war in the Pacific, however, Goddard’s star began to wane. His career in radio ended at some stage in or around 1949; he reacted angrily to the Prime Minister’s Office’s efforts to veto the award of a commendation that the Nationalist Chinese government planned to confer upon him; and he watched from Australia as that same government crumbled in 1949, its remnants fleeing into exile on the island of Taiwan. By 1953, the disillusionment that Goddard was feeling with the course of world politics, and with Australian reactions to these, was palpable: ‘It is simply amazing’, he wrote despondently, ‘just how ignorant of what is happening in East Asia is the ordinary Australian.’\(^\text{22}\)

And so, when Goddard travelled across the Tasman Sea in mid-1953 to marry and live with Jessie McLennan—a Wellington-based radio commentator—it seemed very much as if his role in shaping Australian opinion on East Asia was coming to a slow and unspectacular end.

**In Nationalist Employ**

Towards the end of the same year, however, Goddard sent a hand-written note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Taipei, announcing his intention to visit the city later the same year, and hinting at his hope of ‘finding some post that will enable me to assist the Free China cause’ during his stay. It is impossible to know precisely why Goddard approached the Nationalist


\(^{21}\) NAA: Department of External Affairs; A1838, Correspondence files, multiple number series, 1 Jan 1914–8 Dec 1993; 484/1/1/2, China—Appointment of Goddard, 1944–1945.

authorities at this juncture. But we do know that, after consultations with Nationalist Chinese missions in Australia and New Zealand—both of which were on good terms with Goddard—the ministry drafted a response welcoming Goddard to Taiwan at a time of his choosing. Goddard’s visit was almost certainly made possible thanks to the direct support of Chen Tai-chu, the Nationalist Chinese chargé d’affaires in Canberra.

The Taipei in which Goddard subsequently arrived on New Year’s Day, 1954, must have looked remarkably different from the Wellington he had left days earlier. The symbols of Nationalist control—portraits of Chiang Kai-shek, national flags, banners predicting an imminent victory over communism—were found in almost all public places. Taipei was still coming to terms with the arrival of a million émigrés who had fled the mainland in 1949, and the presence of thousands of US troops. The city’s streets, still showing the signs of damage suffered at the hands of Allied bombing during the latter stages of the Second World War, were clogged ‘with everything from ox, and man-pulled carts to pedicabs . . . jeeps, limousines, heavy military trucks and buses’.

More importantly, however, this was a time when any number of futures for Taiwan, China and the wider East Asian region were being imagined, both in Taipei and in Australasia, as much as anywhere else. With the United Kingdom and other Western European countries extending diplomatic recognition to the Chinese Communist government, pessimistic supporters of the Nationalists were growing anxious about the longevity of this government-in-exile. Yet the Nationalists themselves promised the world that communism would be defeated in China, and that Chiang Kai-shek would soon be riding triumphantly into Nanjing (Nationalist China’s mainland capital). Many sympathetic foreign observers, including William Goddard, agreed.

William and Jessie Goddard stayed in Taiwan for just over two months. Their visit included many of the standard activities afforded to other foreign dignitaries at the time. They resided at the Friends of China Club and were feted by government officials. They travelled about the island in the presence of official guides, visiting pre-selected factories, schools and Aboriginal settlements.

Yet the experience was not simply about the Nationalists impressing a visiting foreign guest with the rate of progress on Taiwan. Just as

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23 The Taipei archives make mention of Goddard being engaged in some kind of legal dispute with his first wife, but do not directly suggest that this drove him to seek employment with the Government Information Office.
24 AH: 172-1, 3522 (1).
26 AH: 172-1, 3522 (1).
importantly, the trip gave Goddard himself an opportunity to display his skills in oratory and writing. Goddard sermonised about the achievements of the Nationalist regime and the exemplary leadership of Chiang Kai-shek on military radio and at National Taiwan University. In less public settings, he stressed Taipei’s need for a concerted propaganda campaign in the English-speaking world if communism was ever to be destroyed on the mainland.

Goddard appears to have taken to Taipei a pre-prepared plan for future propaganda work. This included a budget matched with an itinerary for public lectures and publications in Britain. The plan must have made for convincing reading, for by the time he was boarding a Hong Kong-bound airplane at Taipei’s Sungshan aerodrome in late February, it had been approved, and Goddard found himself in possession of a cheque to the value of £1,500. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Government Information Office had deliberated that pro-Communist sentiment in the press throughout the ‘old Commonwealth’ countries (i.e., Australia, New Zealand and Canada) was so prevalent that a tocsin was necessary. Someone such as Goddard, whose loyalty to the Nationalist cause was beyond doubt, and who could already claim a following of some note in Australia, might just be the person to provide this.

Arriving in Britain in March 1954, Goddard rented rooms in the London suburb of Finchley. Soon thereafter, and with the aid of the Office of Free China Information on New Cavendish Street—a quasi-official agency that acted as the Nationalists’ only form of representation in the United Kingdom at the time—he set to work lobbying for the Nationalist cause. In the following months, Goddard presented public lectures and question-and-answer sessions on the political situation in East Asia, spoke to politicians, newspaper editors and diplomats about Taiwan, and was featured on BBC broadcasts concerning China. The Goddards travelled north to Liverpool, Manchester, Leeds, and eventually Edinburgh, where William spoke at universities, Rotary clubs and churches. He was even granted a session with the Far Eastern Committee of the House of Commons during his stay. Overall, it was a campaign that suggested an enormous amount of enthusiasm and energy on Goddard’s part.27

Throughout, however, Goddard was determined to keep his relationship with the Nationalists secret. Whenever speaking publicly, he presented himself as an independent observer and expert, rather than a recipient of funding from the Government Information Office. He occasionally even felt the need to remind his patrons in Taipei, ‘NOT TO REVEAL THAT . . . [he] . . . WAS A GUEST OF THE GOVERNMENT OF

27 Details of his itinerary are found in AH: Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 172-3; 3718-1, Aozhou zuojia Gao Da fang Tai [Visit of the Australian writer Goddard to Taiwan], 1954–1955.
FORMOSA’ during his early-1954 visit. Goddard also suggested that payments from Taipei be handled via Nationalist missions abroad rather than be ‘sent in my name’.29

As well as speaking, Goddard spent much of this period writing. It was in 1954 that he completed his Report on Formosa, a tract that he claimed was not ‘an official report, but the record of an ordinary Australian who . . . [had] . . . recently spent three months’ on Taiwan.30 Whilst readers of the day would have been justified in doubting this claim, the Report was important in the context of Goddard’s writing for and about Nationalist China, for although it was essentially a work of propaganda, Goddard penned it for an ‘old Commonwealth’ readership, and through the lens of an ‘old Commonwealth’ intellectual. He made constant references throughout to his Australian identity, for instance, and decried what he saw as British ignorance about Taiwan. He also expressed anxiety about the corrosive (and very non-Commonwealth) influence of American magazines and films—products imported into Taiwan alongside US military supplies and civilian aid—which were ‘giving an entirely wrong view of life in Western civilisation’ to people in Taiwan. The only answer, suggested Goddard, was the dispatch of Australian and New Zealand English teachers to the island.31

Goddard also had the good fortune of coming to the attention of the Nationalist authorities at precisely the same time that cross-Strait competition for ‘hearts and minds’ in the international community was reaching a peak. Armed conflict between Nationalist and Communist troops in disputed islands along the southern coast of the Chinese mainland resumed in earnest only months after Goddard had first visited Taiwan. This would be followed by a similar episode in 1958, during which cross-Strait confrontation threatened to develop into regional war.

As Gary Rawnsley has noted, the ‘off-shore island crises’ of the 1950s were not simply military conflicts. More crucially, they became catalysts for a protracted propaganda battle between Taipei and Beijing.32 As major international events, the crises further altered the ways in which the Nationalist government on Taiwan promoted itself abroad, and how policymakers in London, Canberra and Wellington viewed the fate of Chiang Kai-shek and his regime. So whilst two Chinese armies shelled each other across the small stretches of water that separate the Taipei-controlled islands of Kinmen and Matsu from the mainland coast, a quite different war of

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31 Ibid., 9.
propaganda, misinformation and lobbying was getting underway in the international media, and in the academy.

Goddard himself referred to this microcosmic Cold War between the Nationalists and Communists as ‘the battle of paper bullets’. For Goddard, Taipei’s attempts to defend against communist bombardment of these ‘stepping stone[s] to the mainland’ paralleled his own propaganda campaign on behalf of ‘Free China’—a campaign that he personally designed, but which was funded by the Government Information Office in Taipei. This took Goddard back to New Zealand and Australia in 1955, to Canada and the United States (briefly) in the following year, and again to Britain, where he appears to have chosen to settle—for some years—in his father’s native Sussex. As the political scientist Henry Albinski pointed out, the Nationalists had found in Goddard a ‘powerful sympathiser’ by the middle of the decade.

Right through until the early 1960s, Goddard continued with the work of public speaking and writing that he had started in 1954, though on what might be termed a ‘Commonwealth-wide’ scale. With an annual honorarium of £1,500 provided by the Nationalists, and extra funds for travel, Goddard continued to shuttle back and forth between Britain and Australasia, often transiting for periods in Hong Kong and Southeast Asia, or Canada if taking the trans-Pacific route between London and the Antipodes. Indeed, today, it remains difficult to trace Goddard’s movements during these years, simply because they were so frequent and geographically so diverse. Here he is in February 1960 presenting a ‘talk on Formosa today’ for Wellington Rotarians; two years later, we find him mingling with members of the Australia-Free China Association in Melbourne.

This prolonged programme of lectures and publications was interspersed with return visits to Taipei, during which Goddard was briefed at the Government Information Office, or was asked to chaperone visiting dignitaries from Australia and New Zealand. When the New Zealand parliamentarian Duncan Rae left Taipei at the end of a lengthy tour of the

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34 China: Free or Red? (Sydney: Australia-Free China Association, n.d.), 10
36 Details of payments to Goddard are listed in a 3 June 1955 memo from the Government Information Office to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and in a letter from Goddard to Wu Nan-ju, 16 May 1955. AH: Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 172-3; 3718-2, Aozhou zuojia Gao Da fang Tai [Visit of the Australian writer Goddard to Taiwan], 1955--.
region in January 1960, the Nationalist authorities arranged for Goddard to accompany their guest on the return leg of his journey.\textsuperscript{38} Goddard also arranged for other public figures from New Zealand to visit Taipei.\textsuperscript{39} And he provided members of the ‘Formosa lobby’ in Canberra and Wellington with information about the island, and with disinformation about communist China.\textsuperscript{40} In effect, Goddard emerged in this period as a lobbyist, and as a mediator between Taipei and political elites in Australia and New Zealand.

The Government Information Office was impressed with Goddard’s endeavours. By the close of 1959, it was recommending to Chiang Kai-shek himself that Goddard be awarded an official decoration because of his ‘tireless efforts in working for us . . . [during] . . . numerous travels throughout Europe, Australia and [North] America’.\textsuperscript{41} Goddard continued to be feted by Nationalist diplomats in almost every major city he visited in this period. The cross-Strait ‘battle of paper bullets’ may have been far from over, but the Nationalists were certainly willing to recognise the contributions that this ‘friend of Free China’ had made to some future, final victory.

Taiwan Through a Commonwealth Lens

For much of the post-war era, Taipei’s approach to both Australia and New Zealand focused on ensuring that the governments of these countries followed American policy in the region, rather than London’s position of diplomatic recognition of Beijing. Moreover, in the political geography imagined by Taipei’s bureaucrats, Canberra and Wellington both represented alternative routes to London. The Nationalists made little distinction between the United Kingdom and the Dominions. In fact there appears to have been a general belief that, as citizens of a wider British world and subjects of a common monarch, Australians and New Zealanders were able to influence policy in Whitehall. As recent scholarship has suggested, the Nationalists may well have been partly correct in this assumption, although

\textsuperscript{38} Details of Rae’s itinerary are listed in Archives New Zealand: Prime Minister’s Department; Visits From New Zealand; Visits of Mr Duncan Rae MP [EA 1 59/2/186 part 1].
\textsuperscript{39} AH: Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 135; 23, Yao Niuxilan jizhe fang Tai [Invitations to New Zealand journalists to visit Taiwan], July 1954–September 1956.
\textsuperscript{40} NAA (ACT): A6119, 3652.
\textsuperscript{41} Memo from the Executive Yuan to the President, 18 November 1959. Office of the President (Taipei); Gao Da Boshi [Dr Goddard]. My thanks to the Office of the President for allowing me access to this file.
the role of Commonwealth opinion was only one factor in a much wider system of influences on British Taiwan policy in the 1950s.  

Predictably, it was these same arguments—the importance of strengthening ties with Taipei, and the belief that the ‘old Commonwealth’ countries had a responsibility to Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists where London had failed—that dominated much of Goddard’s writing during this period. For Goddard, Britain’s China policy should not be ‘slavishly followed by people whose destiny lies in the Pacific [i.e., Australians and New Zealanders]’. Indeed, on the contrary, it fell to (Australian-born) ‘Britishers’ such as Goddard to ‘state the case’ on issues such as China’s representation at the United Nations where Westminster politicians had not.

In this regard, it was Goddard’s identity as not simply an Australian (and the spouse of a New Zealander), but also a member of the British Commonwealth, that made him so important to the Nationalists. Goddard represented, and could speak to, that bloc of Dominions whose governments had yet to firmly support either side in an unresolved war between the Chinese Nationalists and Communists. Given that the ‘Formosa question’ was a topic of prolonged debate at various Commonwealth fora, Taipei’s interest in patronising an Australian voice that could influence opinion in both the Dominions and London was completely understandable.

From the beginning of his collaboration with the Foreign Ministry and the Government Information Office, every effort was made by both Goddard and his backers in Taipei to stress his country of origin, as well as that country’s place within the Commonwealth. In 1954, the head of Nationalist propaganda in London wrote of Goddard to his superiors in precisely such terms:

Generally speaking, I think it was a very wise decision of the Government to send Dr. Goddard over here to speak to us. Being an Australian, that is a Britisher . . . his word carries weight with people

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45 The role of Australia vis-à-vis a ‘Commonwealth approach’ to the Taiwan problem is dealt with in some detail in Stuart Doran, ‘Introduction’, in Stuart Doran and David Lee (eds), Australia and Recognition of the People’s Republic of China, 1949–1972 (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2002), xix-xxxi.
here, who believe him implicitly. Unlike us, for they think whatever we say about Taiwan is propaganda and take no notice at all.\textsuperscript{46}

Goddard and his colleagues continuously stressed his nationality and place of birth, and equally, his links to the United Kingdom. In Taiwan, Goddard ‘the Australian broadcasting commentator’ (\textit{Aozhou guangbo pinglunyuan}) and ‘Australian writer’ (\textit{Aozhou zuojia}) was just as commonly Goddard the ‘Britisher’.\textsuperscript{47} Indeed, Goddard even spoke in defence of the Chinese Nationalists in what might be termed a ‘pan-Commonwealth’ English, his measured voice, honed through years of experience in the media, betraying influences from regional British and New Zealand accents.\textsuperscript{48}

The distinction between Britain and Australasia was also something Goddard himself was willing to blur. Like many—perhaps most—of his generation, Goddard saw himself as Australian, but also, by extension, as part of a wider British Diaspora, and the inheritor of age-old British traditions. ‘I am an Australian, born of British parents. Perhaps I should say that I am a Britisher born in Australia’, Goddard stated in 1954. But with good reason, for this meant that, like the ‘Free Chinese’, he ‘belong[ed] to a people who prize liberty above all things else’.\textsuperscript{49} ‘I don’t hesitate to affirm’, he wrote some months later, ‘that the people of Formosa are as free as we Britishers’.\textsuperscript{50}

This issue of British and Commonwealth identity featured centrally in each of the books that Goddard wrote in this post-1954 period. The first of these was \textit{Formosa (Taiwan)}, which was published in 1958 through China Publishing (a company affiliated with the Government Information Office), and then republished in Chinese under the title \textit{Mingyun zhi dao [Island of Destiny]} in 1960.\textsuperscript{51} This was followed by a string of other works: \textit{The Story of Formosa} in 1960; \textit{The Story of Chang Lao} in 1962; \textit{The Makers of Taiwan} ...

\textsuperscript{46} Letter from Y. S. Chen to Wu Nan-ju, 28 May 1954. AH: 172-3, 3718-1. Interestingly, this letter was written in English, despite being sent from one Nationalist agency to another.

\textsuperscript{47} As was the case when his work was included in a hagiographic collection entitled ‘High Esteem to President Chiang Kai-shek from Foreign personages [sic]’. See \textit{Zhongguo Yizhou [China This Week]}, 26 October 1959, 17-19.

\textsuperscript{48} Relatively few audio records survive of Goddard. The only one I have thus far found gives us some clue of what I would term Goddard’s ‘pan-Commonwealth’ accent, one which is almost impossible to tie down to any single locality. National Film and Sound Archive (Australia): 193731, 4BH [Historic Events Compilation. Tape]; 156297, ‘Doctor Goddard [speaks] on [the] Laos [situation]’, 26 June 1961, sound recording.


in 1963; and *Formosa: A Study in Chinese History* in 1966. It was this final work that emerged as Goddard’s *magnum opus*, perhaps because it was his only book to be accepted by reputable academic publishers.\(^{52}\)

Most of these works were based, in part, on the lectures that Goddard had presented during his tours in the mid- to late 1950s. Given the aim of such lectures, together with the role of a government-managed publisher in bringing at least some of these books to print, it is not surprising that much of Goddard’s writing from this era reads like propaganda. The same conclusion was reached by some of Goddard’s peers in academia. The historian Leonard Gordon described *Formosa: A Study in Chinese History* as a ‘dogmatic commentary’ full of ‘numerous factual errors’.\(^{53}\) Another contemporary believed that Goddard had ‘not the makings of an historian’.\(^{54}\)

But it is also true that Goddard was informed by a particular interpretation of Taiwanese history and geography that went beyond doctrine, and which probably reflected, most of all, his own sense of ancestry. Indeed, while Goddard was certainly driven by a desire to promote the ‘Free China cause’ in these writings, he did so within the bounds of a very personal understanding of why Taiwan mattered. In other words, even in the midst of blatant propaganda and hagiography, there is an element of Goddard’s work that was clearly not modelled on directives from Taipei, and that may have even escaped the notice of Nationalist bureaucrats by virtue of subtlety.

Most noticeably, Goddard’s writings betray a personal conviction that the people of Taiwan—as the descendants of Chinese immigrants who had sailed to the island in centuries past—shared some kind of experiential bond with the children of British settlers who had made Australia and New Zealand their homes in the same period. ‘The people called “Formosans” are the descendants of Chinese migrants who went to Formosa at different periods from the time of the Sui Dynasty onwards’, wrote Goddard in 1954 as he vigorously attacked the notion of Taiwanese independence: ‘They bear the same relationship to the Chinese from the mainland as we who were born in Australia do to the people of Britain’.\(^{55}\)

A similar trend can be found in Goddard’s adaptation of one of the Nationalists’ favourite themes—i.e., that, with the mainland lost to

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communism, Taiwan represented a crucible of traditional Chinese civilisation. This theme gained currency in Taiwanese propaganda from the late 1950s onwards, as it became increasingly clear that Chiang Kai-shek’s dreams of reconquering the mainland would never be realised. Through Goddard’s pen, however, it was transformed into one in which Taiwan was presented not only as a showcase of Chinese heritage, but also of Chinese people, just as the settler societies of Australia and New Zealand had—in his view—become for Britain. In the Chinese-speaking world, it had fallen to Taiwan to welcome millions of Chinese migrants, and with them millennia-old traditions and values; in the British Commonwealth, Australia and New Zealand played a similar role. Taiwan was a ‘repository of the values of the oldest civilisation extant’, while Australia represented ‘the land of promise, with a destiny that could well eclipse anything yet recorded in our long British story’. In essence, Taiwan was for Goddard a Chinese settler society that could claim everything his native Australia could:

There was a striking similarity between the making of...[the]...Formosan character and that of the Australian. In each case the early migrants had to face the inclemencies of Nature and dare the dangers of an inhospitable land. In Formosa there was the earthquake and the typhoon; in Australia drought, burning sun, and destroying bush-fire.

In Goddard’s take on official Chinese Nationalist discourse, then, the people of Taiwan deserved support not simply because they were resisting Chinese communism, but because they shared a deep experiential link with the Sussex railwaymen and Irish housewives who had migrated to the southern hemisphere generations ago.

Goddard expanded on this notion of a kindred settler history through frequent allusions to Antipodean geography when writing of Taiwan, and, conversely, to Formosan geography when speaking of Australia. ‘The tropic of Cancer runs through the centre of Taiwan...[and also]...through the hearts of the people’ wrote Goddard in 1962, referring to the imaginary line that splits the island into tropical and subtropical zones; it was Australia ‘north of Capricorn’ that Goddard—building on long-standing Australian anxieties about invasion—frequently argued was at risk from eventual Communist Chinese encroachment. And if ever such a day did arrive, he warned, ‘Tasmania could become our Formosa’. He also used geography

56 Goddard, Formosa: A Study in Chinese History, 219; Goddard, Formosa (Taiwan), i.
58 Goddard, The Makers of Taiwan, 39; Goddard, The Story of Formosa, 49.
59 Goddard, The Story of Chang Lao, 80.
metaphorically: Taiwan was an ‘island of destiny’, while Australia was an ‘isthmus between the West and Asia’ or a ‘bridge between East and West’.60 The two were drawn together not only by history, but by ‘the waters of the Strait of Formosa [that] flow, not only between the island and the Chinese mainland . . . but through the heart of the world’.61

It was Goddard’s belief in some kind of a pan-Pacific cultural and historical connection between Australasia and Nationalist Taiwan that underpinned his efforts to found his own institution in Taipei in the late 1960s. Goddard’s Institute of Pacific Research was set up within the newly-founded China Academy, an institution which had been established by conservative elements within the Nationalist intelligentsia on Taiwan, and which later became Chinese Culture University. Goddard envisaged his new institute as ‘a counterpart to our Institute of Pacific Affairs in Australia’—a reference, perhaps, to what was then the Research School of Pacific Studies in Canberra—which would ‘promote and encourage the study of the cultures of the peoples of the Pacific’, and would provide a platform upon which Goddard could promote his theories about a shared history and geography.62 Its opening was attended by, amongst others, the unofficial head of Canberra’s ‘Formosa Lobby’ and Liberal parliamentarian, Sir Wilfrid Kent Hughes, as well as Goddard’s old friend Chen Tai-chu (the one-time Nationalist chargé d’affaires to Australia).63

Yet accounts suggest that, despite an initial flurry of activity, including the publication of a single issue of its own bulletin, Goddard’s institute had, at its inception, ‘no accommodation, equipment or staff’.64 It never expanded beyond a small number of students and a notice on a door.65 Indeed, the institute appears to have ceased to function following Goddard’s retirement to Britain in or around 1973—no records of it survive today at the Chinese Culture University—and its founder’s idea of promoting the concept of a shared settler history between Taiwan and Australasia died with it. In this regard, the institute could well be read as a metaphor for the latter years of Goddard’s career.

60 Goddard, The Story of Formosa, 61; Gao Dali [W. G. Goddard], ‘Taipingyang de wenhua shizhe’ [The cultural ambassadors of the Pacific], Dong Xi wenhua [Eastern and Western Culture] 3 (September 1967): 45.
64 Ibid.
65 Interview with Professor Hou Chia-chu (a former colleague of Goddard), 26 February 2005, Sindian (Taipei County, Taiwan).
Forgetting Goddard

In hindsight—and in the context of very different geopolitical circumstances to those which existed at the height of the Cold War—it would be easy to dismiss Goddard as nothing more than a propagandist. As Goddard was paid to write and speak on behalf of Chiang Kai-shek’s government, and did so without acknowledging this source of funding publicly, one would also be justified in questioning the extent to which he necessarily believed in what he said.

Yet it has not been my aim in this paper to ascertain exactly why Goddard chose the path that he did, and we shall perhaps never know the extent to which Goddard’s belief in the Nationalist cause was born of genuine conviction, pecuniary incentive, or a combination of the two. We can be sure, however, that Goddard was not unusual in his bias, or in his practice of blurring the boundaries between ‘researching’ and ‘lobbying’. Indeed, when we look further at the approaches taken by other ‘foreign advisors’ and ‘friends of China’ across the course of the 20th century, Goddard’s partisan approach begins to look less unusual.

In his study of Western advisors in China, Jonathan Spence has argued that the bias often inherent in the writings and actions of foreigners who have served Chinese governments over recent centuries has been the result of the ‘standpoint of superiority’ commonly assumed by such persons.66 Countless foreigners have offered their service to Chinese governments over the years because they believed that they, as Westerners, possessed something—usually a science, ideology or religion—that China lacked yet needed. Yet Goddard represented no Western government or agency in Taiwan, and never attempted to force his own beliefs or ideologies upon his Chinese hosts. On the contrary, Goddard appears to have internalised the cultural superiority articulated in sections of the Taiwan-based literati, and to have claimed the moral high ground over his fellow ‘Britishers’ who, he believed, knew less about Asia than he did. Indeed, Goddard could be said to have taken upon a role far more similar to the ‘foreign friends’ of Anne-Marie Brady’s studies—those who have offered their services as propagandists, translators and teachers to the People’s Republic because they ‘feel China is misunderstood . . . are ashamed or disapprove of the way the West has treated China in the past, or in some cases . . . can see the potential economic and

political benefits of being regarded as friends’. 67 That such a description can make as much sense for Goddard in Taipei in the 1950s as it can for those engaged in similar work on the other side of the Taiwan Strait in the 1970s and later may appear ironic, yet it also suggests that Goddard’s stance was in no way unique.

Many of Goddard’s contemporaries also took a remarkably similar approach. The Australian sinologist C. P. Fitzgerald was just as open about promoting political causes as Goddard was at precisely the same time. Like Goddard, Fitzgerald also mixed such partisan causes with scholarship, initiating tours to China by Australian intellectuals and writing a ‘report’ on conditions in People’s China after visiting the mainland—two years after Goddard had done the same. 68 Fitzgerald also saw himself as fitting into a distinctly Australian tradition of involvement in Chinese politics that stretched back to George Ernest Morrison, though one that saw the Republican era as merely a rehearsal for the ‘New China’ that was to emerge out of 1949. 69

None of this excuses Goddard, and the comparison with Fitzgerald is not raised in his defence. Yet it does help illustrate that Goddard’s partisanship should be appreciated in the context of the Cold War, and in light of the fact that almost all scholarship in Australia and New Zealand concerning Taiwan during that era was shaped by the political positions assumed by supporters and critics of the Chinese Nationalists.

What is more, like many other Western advisors, it appears that Goddard’s support for Taipei was borne out of a very personal belief that the Nationalists required his assistance, even though he was paid for his services. During his first visit to Taipei in 1954, it was Goddard who initiated his alliance with the Nationalists, doing so on his own terms. And while retaining a clear affinity with the Nationalist cause in much of his writings, Goddard often erred from the ‘party line’. For instance, the idea of Chinese exceptionality that dominated much of Nationalist discourse—in which the antiquity of Chinese culture and the inherent differences between the Chinese world and the West were stressed—rarely appeared in Goddard’s writing on Taiwan. Moreover, although he must have been aware that the Nationalist propaganda effort abroad was largely supported by American agencies, and though he undoubtedly did meet Americans in Taipei in the 1950s, Goddard

67 Anne-Marie Brady, “‘Treat Insiders and Outsiders Differently’: The Use and Control of Foreigners in the PRC”, China Quarterly 164 (December 2000): 943-964.
publicly dissociated himself from the United States.\textsuperscript{70} He lamented the influence of American culture on Taiwanese life, warning against the ‘grave risk of Americanisation’ and ‘the cult of Washington’.\textsuperscript{71}

While such references to American influence may seem peripheral to the broader themes of Goddard’s work, they do suggest just how important US support was for the very regime that Goddard defended, and also how much more important an issue Taiwan was in the United States compared to the very marginal role it took in Canberra, Wellington or London. Despite a longstanding distrust of communist China within sections of both political and academic life in Australia and New Zealand, a tradition of scholarship sympathetic to the Chinese Nationalists never developed to any great extent in these countries in the post-war years. Commonwealth leaders simply did not share the same ‘emotional attachment’ to Chiang Kai-shek that many of their American contemporaries did.\textsuperscript{72} Indeed, on the contrary, many of the same Commonwealth scholars who had been close to the Nationalists on the mainland came to distance themselves from that government following 1949—one could point to examples such as the scientist cum sinologist Joseph Needham, who had been vocal in his support of the Chinese Nationalists during the war years, but who later maintained a substantial distance from Chiang Kai-shek’s regime, only visiting the republic-in-exile late in life. This is in complete contrast to the situation in the United States, where a lineage of ‘KMT apologists’ within academia and the media was active from the 1930s onwards, was particularly vocal during the early years of the Cold War, and could well be said to have survived into the present day through the work of scholars at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution and elsewhere.\textsuperscript{73} Recent scholarship has even suggested that the Australian government of Sir Robert Menzies not only distrusted Chiang Kai-shek himself, but also framed much of its China policy on ‘suspicion of the [Nationalist] “China lobby”’ and its influence on American foreign policy’.\textsuperscript{74} There was little official tolerance throughout most of the 1950s and 1960s for the development of a parallel lobby in Canberra or Wellington. As a result, unlike the substantial number of academics, writers and broadcasters who voiced support for the Nationalists in American universities and think-tanks

\textsuperscript{70}Rawnsley, op cit., 93.
\textsuperscript{71}Goddard, \textit{Formosa: A Study in Chinese History}, 209 and 216.
\textsuperscript{74}Peter Edwards, \textit{Arthur Tange: Last of the Mandarins} (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2006), 62.
throughout the period in question, the Australasian ‘Formosan lobby’ never grew far beyond a small circle of backbenchers whose connections with Taiwan were often more personal than ideological.

Goddard’s intellectual influence on Australian politicians who favoured greater contact with Taipei was certainly tangible. His belief in a shared settler history shaped by a common struggle against a harsh climate, for example, was echoed in the writings and public speeches of people such as Douglas Darby, a New South Wales parliamentarian who acted as the Taipei’s *de facto* honorary consul in the immediate aftermath of Canberra’s diplomatic recognition of Beijing. Sir Wilfrid Kent Hughes similarly appears to have been influenced by Goddard’s allusions to Antipodean geography when he referred to ‘Formosa . . . [as one of the] two front gate posts of the Australian garden’. Yet even these voices, like the Chinese Nationalist Government itself, were becoming increasingly marginalised by the late 1970s, and had fallen all but silent on the issue of Taiwan by the following decade.

Just as significantly, little attempt is now made in Taiwan to remember Cold-War Western support for the Chinese Nationalist government. For Taiwan’s current Democratic Progressive Party administration, Goddard’s heyday of the 1950s and 1960s marks the height of Chiang Kai-shek’s repression, and it no longer makes political sense to commemorate those who aided the Nationalists in their efforts, now that the Nationalists themselves are merely a party in opposition. In the present era, new ‘friends of Taiwan’ have taken on the role once reserved by the likes of Goddard, penning laudatory biographies of Chen Shui-bian just as Goddard once did for Chiang Kai-shek. Indeed, the growth of ‘Taiwan Studies’ in North American (and, to a lesser extent, Australasian) universities in tandem with the rise of local consciousness on Taiwan itself has seen the role of ‘friends of Free China’ displaced by a new history of foreign intellectuals who worked against Nationalist notions of a ‘Chinese Taiwan’ in the 1960s and 1970s. In this context, Goddard’s absence from both Australasian and Taiwanese intellectual history provides an interesting twist to John Fairbank’s laconic observation that ‘the only way to be a friend of China for keeps is to die at

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75 As in ‘Taiwan; the world’s most important island’, an address given by Douglas Darby to the All Nation’s Club, 27 July 1973. Darby Family Papers, MLMSS 6164, Box 51, State Library of New South Wales.
78 See, for example, *Issues and Studies* 40 (September/December 2004), which features autobiographical articles by foreign ‘Taiwan Studies’ scholars, detailing their experiences of conducting research on and writing about the island.
the right moment’. 79 For Goddard, being remembered as a ‘friend of China for keeps’ was reliant on the Republic of China itself not slipping into diplomatic and political oblivion.

Most importantly of all, however, is that in an institutional history of Chinese studies in Australasia which now hinges on the extension of diplomatic recognition to Beijing in 1972—and, in doing so, ignores the complicated relationship between Taipei and the ‘old Commonwealth’ in the years between 1949 and 1972—the role played by Australians and New Zealanders in support of the Chinese Nationalists no longer finds a place. Within what one scholar has termed an ‘official vision’ of the history of Australasia-China relations since the late 1970s, it is those Australasians who worked towards the establishment of diplomatic ties with Beijing—C. P. Fitzgerald, Wilfred Burchett and Rewi Alley—who now take precedence. 80 Those who supported different aims and objectives (which may today seem ludicrous) have sunken into obscurity. It is now only in occasional references or footnotes that such figures emerge—fleetingly, and almost never in relation to the development of Asian Studies in Australia and New Zealand. For William Goddard, the issue was never one of bias, partisanship or allegiance to the Right or Left, but one of a career that did not conform to what have since become the dominant narratives in the story of China-Commonwealth relations.

Archival Abbreviations

AH: Academia Historica
NAA: National Archives of Australia

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80 Timothy Kendall, From Yellow Peril to Shangrila: Ways of Seeing China (Perth: Curtin University Books, 2005), 177.